

THE TRIAL OF THE TEMPLARS



Second edition

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Contents



<i>Preface to the Second Edition</i>	page viii
<i>Preface to the First Edition</i>	ix
<i>Abbreviations</i>	x
Introduction	i
1 The Participants	5
2 The Arrests	59
3 The Papal Intervention	88
4 The Papal and Episcopal Inquiries	116
5 The Defence of the Order	141
6 The End of Resistance	175
7 The Charges	202
8 The Trial in Other Countries	217
9 The Suppression	259
10 Conclusion	283
<i>Chronology of the Trial of the Templars</i>	291
<i>Recent Historiography on the Dissolution of the Temple</i>	294
<i>Notes</i>	312
<i>Bibliography</i>	362
<i>Index</i>	381

Preface to the Second Edition



Although the first edition of this book was published in 1978, it was effectively completed by 1975, so that, in terms of secondary reading at least, it is based on publications no later than the early 1970s. Since that time there has been a tremendous growth of interest in the history of the crusades and the military orders, as well as in the Order of the Temple and its dramatic demise. Some of this interest has been generated by a sub-industry of conspiracy theorists, satirised by Umberto Eco in his novel, *Foucault's Pendulum*, but at the same time there has been important research, especially in the publication and analysis of relevant texts. It seems, therefore, appropriate to try to bring the book up-to-date and to correct mistakes of judgement and fact in the first edition. I have been greatly helped by Simon Barton, Paul Crawford, Alain Demurger, Peter Edbury, Barbara Frale, Luis Garcia-Guijarro Ramos, Anne Gilmour-Bryson, Christian Guzzo, Piers Mitchell, Helen Nicholson, Jonathan Riley-Smith, and Joseph Maria Sans i Trave, all of whom generously made their research available to me, often before publication.

Reading, 2006
M.C.B.

Preface to the First Edition



I wrote this book for two main reasons. Firstly, because the trial of the Templars was an affair of considerable importance in the middle ages which has been unjustly neglected by historians writing in English, and secondly, because I believe that the event has some relevance to the world of the late twentieth century so many of whose peoples have been, and continue to be, oppressed by regimes which use terror and torture to enforce conformity of thought and action.

I have received ungrudging help from many people in the writing of this book, but I should particularly like to record my thanks to Dr Bernard Hamilton of the University of Nottingham, Professor J. C. Holt of the University of Reading, and above all, to my wife, Elizabeth, the value of whose encouragement, support and criticism cannot be adequately expressed. I should also like to thank Mrs Janet Cory and Mrs Audrey Munro for the typing of the manuscript, Professor Lewis Thorpe, the editor of *Nottingham Mediaeval Studies*, for kindly granting permission for the reuse of material from my article 'Propaganda in the Middle Ages: The Charges against the Templars', which appeared in 1973, and the Syndics and editors at Cambridge University Press for their interest in the work.

Reading, 1977

M.C.B.

Introduction



The Templars were a military religious Order, founded in the Holy Land in 1119. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries they acquired extensive property both in the crusader states in Palestine and Syria and in the West, especially in France, and they were granted far-reaching ecclesiastical and jurisdictional privileges both by the popes to whom they were immediately responsible, and by the secular monarchs in whose lands their members resided. They also functioned as bankers on a large scale, a position facilitated by the international nature of their organisation. But most of all they bore a large share of the responsibility for the military defence of the crusader states in the East, to which they owed their origin and on account of which they had become so famous and powerful. However, in 1291, the Christian settlers of the East were driven out of Palestine by the Mamluks of Egypt, and the Templars were cut adrift from the main purpose of their existence.

Suddenly, in the early hours of Friday 13 October 1307, the brothers of this Order residing in France were arrested by the officials of King Philip IV in the name of the papal inquisitors, and their property was taken over by royal representatives. They were charged with serious heresies encompassing the denial of Christ and spitting on the crucifix, indecent kissing and homosexuality, and idol worship, carried on in secret receptions and chapter meetings of the Order. In October and November, the captured Templars, including James of Molay, the grand master, and Hugh of Pairaud, the visitor, almost unanimously confessed their guilt. Torture was freely used upon many of the prisoners. Molay then repeated his confession before a public assembly of theologians from the university of Paris. For his part King Philip wrote to the other monarchs of Christendom urging them to follow his lead and to arrest the Templars in their own lands, for the confessions had proved them to be manifest heretics.

The reigning pope, Clement V, at first saw the arrests as a direct affront to his authority, for the Templars were responsible to the papacy, and

although the previous summer there had been discussions between the pope and the king concerning the condition of the Order, Clement had not actually authorised the arrests. However, after his initial anger, he was forced to accept the situation and, instead of resisting, endeavoured to put himself in charge. On 22 November 1307 he issued the bull *Pastoralis praeeminentiae*, which ordered all the monarchs of Christendom to arrest the Templars and sequester their lands in the name of the papacy. This bull initiated proceedings in the British Isles, Iberia, Germany, Italy and Cyprus. Two cardinals were then sent to Paris to interview the leaders of the Order personally. But, once in front of the papal representatives, Molay and Pairaud revoked their confessions and urged the rest of the Templars to do the same.

By now the pope had become highly suspicious of the whole affair and, early in 1308, he suspended the inquisitorial proceedings. Philip IV and his ministers were obliged to spend the next six months in an attempt to force the pope to reopen the trial, both by the marshalling of public and theological opinion in France, and by the implicit threat of physical violence against the pope himself. This campaign culminated in a meeting between the pope and the king at Poitiers in May and June, 1308, in which, after much debate, the pope finally agreed to set up two kinds of inquiry: one by a papal commission into the Order itself, and another consisting of a series of provincial councils, held at diocesan level, to investigate the guilt or innocence of individual Templars. Furthermore, a general council of the Church was arranged, to be held at Vienne in October 1310, to make a final decision in the matter. Meanwhile, three cardinals were sent to Chinon to hear the depositions of the leaders of the Order who were imprisoned there, only to find that they had reverted to their original confessions.

The episcopal inquiries, which were largely dominated by bishops closely associated with the French monarchy, seem to have begun work in 1309, and it appears that in most cases the Templars repeated their confessions, once again under pressure from extensive torture. The papal commission investigating the Order as a whole did not begin its sittings until November 1309. Initially it appeared that the familiar pattern of confessions would be followed, but at first falteringly and then with gathering momentum, the brothers, led by two able Templar priests, Peter of Bologna and Reginald of Provins, began to mount a defence of their Order and their way of life before the commission. By early May 1310 almost six hundred Templars had agreed to defend the Order, denying the validity of previous confessions whether made

before the inquisitors in 1307 or the bishops in 1309. Pope Clement, seeing that no immediate end to the proceedings seemed in prospect, postponed the council of Vienne for a year until October 1311. It was to crush this increasingly confident Templar defence that Philip IV took drastic action. The archbishop of Sens, a royal nominee, reopened his inquiry against individual Templars within his province and, finding fifty-four of them guilty of being relapsed heretics, handed them over to the secular authorities. On 12 May 1310 the fifty-four Templars were burnt at the stake in a field outside Paris. Of the two leading defenders, Peter of Bologna mysteriously disappeared, and Reginald of Provins was sentenced to perpetual imprisonment by the council of Sens. With the exception of a few brave individuals, the burnings effectively silenced the defence, and many Templars returned to their confessions. The hearings of the papal commission eventually petered out in June 1311.

In the summer of 1311 the pope collected together the evidence sent from France, as well as the material slowly coming in from the other countries where proceedings had taken place. In essence only in France and in those regions under French domination or influence were there substantial confessions from Templars. In October the council of Vienne at last opened, and the pope pressed for the suppression (although not the condemnation) of the Order on the grounds that it was now too defamed to carry on. However, resistance among the fathers at the council was considerable, and the pope, pressed by the military presence of the king of France, only achieved his will by imposing silence on the council to be broken under pain of excommunication. The bull *Vox in excelso* of 22 March 1312 suppressed the Order, and *Ad providam* of 2 May granted its property to the other great military order, the Hospital. Soon after, Philip IV extracted a huge sum of money from the Hospitallers in compensation for his costs in bringing the Templars to trial. As for the individual Templars, in some cases they had to submit to heavy penances including perpetual imprisonment, and in others, where they had admitted nothing, they were sent to monasteries of other orders to spin out the rest of their lives. The leaders eventually came before the papal representatives on 18 March 1314 and were sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. Hugh of Pairaud and Geoffrey of Gonneville, Preceptor of Aquitaine, accepted their fate in silence, but James of Molay and Geoffrey of Charney, Preceptor of Normandy, loudly protested their innocence and asserted that the Order was pure and holy. At once the king ordered that they

be condemned as relapsed heretics and, on the same evening, they were burnt at the stake on the Ile des Javiaux in the Seine.

The aim of this book is to trace in detail the course of these events, to examine the motivation of the chief participants, and to assess the extent to which the charges brought against the Order were justified.

CHAPTER I

The Participants



THE ORDER OF THE TEMPLE

In this place a great misfortune befell, by which the Saracens who had come into the city, as I have said, were able to enter more easily and quickly, and by which our people were greatly disheartened. The occasion was this: a javelin came at the master of the Temple, just as he raised his left hand. He had no shield save his spear in his right hand. The javelin struck him under the armpit, and the shaft sank into his body a palm's-length; it came in through the gap where the plates of the armour were not joined. This was not proper armour, but rather light armour for putting on hastily at an alarm.

When he felt himself mortally wounded, he turned to go. Some of the defenders thought that he was retiring because he wanted to save himself. The standard-bearer saw him go, and fell in behind him, and then all his household followed as well. After he had gone some way, twenty crusaders from the Vallo di Spoleto saw him withdrawing, and they called to him, 'Oh, for God's sake, Sir, don't leave, or the city will fall at once!' And he cried out to them in a loud voice, so that everyone could hear him: 'My lords, I can do no more, for I am killed; see the wound here!'

And then we saw the javelin stuck in his body, and as he spoke he dropped the spear on the ground, and his head slumped to one side. He started to fall from his horse, but those of his household sprang down from their horses and supported him and took him off, and laid him on a shield that they found cast off there, a tall, broad buckler. They carried him off towards the St Anthony Gate, but found it closed; instead, they found a small door which had a bridge leading from the *fosse* into the residence of the Lady Maria of Antioch, which had previously belonged to Sir James of La Mandelée.

There his household removed his armour, cutting the *cuirasse* off at the shoulders, for they could do nothing else because of the wound he had taken. Then they put him, still in his *epaulières*, under a blanket, and took him towards the seashore, which is to say, on the beach which is between the abbatoir where

they slaughter beasts and the house of the lord of Tyre. There they heard a cry from in front of the Tower of the Legate, that the Saracens were there, so some of the household leapt into the sea to try to reach the two *barques* that were there – there were only these two, because the sea was so stormy and the waves so great that the *barques* were unable to cope with them – and many of the men were lost because of this. Other members of his household carried him to the Temple fortress with the aid of other men, and they laid him within the house – not going in by way of the gate, which they did not want to open, but taking him by way of a courtyard where they piled manure.

He lived all that day without saying a word, for since he had been taken down from his horse he had not spoken, save only a word to those in the Temple; when he heard the clamour of men fleeing death, he wanted to know what was happening. They told him that men were fighting, and he commanded that they should leave him in peace.

He did not speak again, but gave up his soul to God. He was buried before his tabernacle, which was the altar where they said mass. And God has his soul – but what great harm was caused by his death!

This dramatic eyewitness description of the death of William of Beaujeu, the Master of the Temple, at Acre on 18 May, 1291, was written by an author known as the Templar of Tyre. He was not in fact a Templar, but the master's secretary and confidant, a position he had held since 1285, and it is clear from this account that he was with his patron to the end.² The great port of Acre with its large protected harbour was a key city in the history of the Latin states in the East. It had been captured by the crusaders as early as 1104, only five years after the fall of Jerusalem to the forces of the First Crusade and, although it had been taken by Saladin in July, 1187, soon after his victory over the Christians at the battle of Hattin, it had been regained by the Third Crusade four years later. From Acre Richard I of England had been able to launch his campaign against Saladin, a campaign which led to the sultan's defeat near Arsuf on 7 September, 1191, and which ensured that, despite Saladin's retention of Jerusalem (which had fallen to him on 2 October, 1187, after Hattin) the Latin states would survive into the thirteenth century. There had been several crises since – most notably the Christian defeat at La Forbie in October, 1244, during which the Templar master, Armand of Périgord, simply disappeared, either overwhelmed in fighting or carried off to prison or death by the victors – but the siege of Acre in the spring of 1291 was indeed the decisive moment in the history of Latin states.

Acre had held out since 5 April, when al-Ashraf Khalil, the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, had first brought the full strength of his formidable army to bear, but the fighting which killed William of Beaujeu had already penetrated the streets, and by that time only the Temple compound, situated on the north side of the city along the sea front, was still resisting. With the master's death, the remaining Templars knew that there was little time left, and Theobald Gaudin, the Grand Commander, together with a contingent which must have included the Templar of Tyre, took a Venetian ship to Sidon, fifty-eight miles to the north, leaving Peter of Sevrey, the Marshal, and a group of Templars, to try to protect the panic-stricken inhabitants now struggling into the Templar area. They lasted another ten days, during which time Peter of Sevrey and some of his men attempted to negotiate with al-Ashraf, only to be taken and beheaded. The last Templars in the city were crushed to death when their main tower collapsed as a result of undermining; apparently none survived. Meanwhile, in the sea castle at Sidon, a Templar possession, Theobald Gaudin was elected master, and from there he sailed to Cyprus from which he promised to send help. However, according to the Templar of Tyre who, in contrast to his admiration for William of Beaujeu, had little time for the new master, he went about it 'in such an unenthusiastic way' that the Templars in Cyprus sent word to the brethren still at Sidon to abandon it, advice which they duly took on 14 July.³ The last Templar castles, Tortosa to the north, and the great sea fortress of 'Atlit to the south, were now isolated, and they too were evacuated on 3 and 14 August. From then on the most forward Templar base was the island of Cyprus.

Until the Templars were forced to leave 'Atlit they had functioned as defenders of the holy places and the Latin settlements in Palestine and Syria for 172 years without a break. They had begun modestly when, in 1119, two French knights, Hugh of Payns and Godfrey of Saint-Omer, together with a small number of companions, volunteered to protect pilgrims travelling from the port of Jaffa to Jerusalem and the surrounding holy places. At first the knights seem to have been dependent upon the Augustinian canons of the Holy Sepulchre and to have been resident in the Muristan, just to the south of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.⁴ Here the Order of St John provided hospital facilities for sick pilgrims, a conjunction which suggests that the two operations were closely connected. Indeed, in clause 49 of the Latin Rule of the Temple of 1129, the Templars are commanded to serve the sick 'as if they were Christ', a phrase very reminiscent of the Hospitaller obligation towards

'our lords the sick'.⁵ King Baldwin II and Warmund of Picquigny, Patriarch of Jerusalem, provided the knights with a base on the Temple platform, together with grants in money and kind, and it is likely they received ecclesiastical sanction at the council of Nablus, held in January, 1120. Sometime during the 1120s, Baldwin II moved out of his quarters in the al-Aqsa mosque and re-established himself in the Tower of David on the opposite side of the city. This left Hugh of Payns and his knights to occupy what the Latins regarded as 'the Temple of Solomon'.

The armies of the First Crusade had captured Jerusalem in July, 1099, but the creation of viable political entities remained a struggle throughout the first generation of settlement: attacks from the Turks in the north and the Egyptians in the south were difficult to repel with the limited forces available to the early rulers, Godfrey of Bouillon (1099–1100), Baldwin I (1100–18) and Baldwin II (1118–31), while the need to seize the vital Mediterranean ports placed a further strain on resources. Not surprisingly, the contribution of the French knights, small as it was, was encouraged by the Christian leaders, as well as by prominent pilgrims such as Fulk V, Count of Anjou, who visited the holy places in 1120, and Hugh of Troyes, Count of Champagne, who appears to have joined the group himself in 1125.⁶ When Fulk of Anjou agreed to marry Melisende, Baldwin II's eldest daughter and heir, Hugh of Payns was a member of the delegation sent to fetch him; once in the West, he not only attended upon Fulk, but also began an energetic and successful recruiting campaign in France and the British Isles, travelling extensively through Champagne, Anjou, Normandy and Flanders, and crossing the Channel to England and Scotland. Other members of the group similarly drew on their home territories in an effort to raise forces for an attack on Damascus, planned by Baldwin II to follow the marriage of Fulk and Melisende.⁷

Hugh's major purpose in the West had, however, been prearranged for, in January, 1129, he presented himself before an ecclesiastical council at Troyes in Champagne, presided over by Matthew du Remois, Cardinal-Bishop of Albano, the papal legate in France. Supported by the five companions he had brought with him, he 'conveyed from memory . . . the manner and observance of the small beginnings of his military order which owed its existence to Him who says, "I speak to you who am the beginning"'. The result was a Rule of 71 clauses, written in Latin, incorporating those elements of previous practice that the fathers at the council found acceptable and rejecting practices described as absurd. The brethren were divided into two classes: the knights, who wore white,

and the sergeants (later also called serving brothers), who wore black or brown. Squires were allocated to provide practical support, while spiritual needs were supplied by chaplains, although neither were professed members of the Order. Association for a fixed period was continued, a custom which included married brothers, who were required to bequeath a portion of their possessions to the Order if they were to enjoy full spiritual benefits, although they were not to share the same quarters as fully professed brethren. Temporary association could be conceded to knights, sergeants or squires. In contrast to much contemporary monastic practice, the Order was not to accept sisters nor to receive oblates, since women served as a temptation which might undermine 'the flower of chastity', while young boys, not yet old enough to bear arms, were simply an encumbrance. Perhaps the lack of a formal novitiate was a consequence of this; a probationary period was laid down, but its term was entirely at the discretion of the master, based on his judgement of the nature of the candidate's life.

In view of 'their exceptional merit and particular probity', the Templars were granted lands and men, together with their customary services, and they were allowed to receive tithes. Within the convent lifestyle was a modified form of contemporary practices among the regulars: attendance at the Divine Office, communal meals, taken in silence and accompanied by readings from Scripture, plain diet with meat three days per week, unostentatious behaviour, clothing and accoutrements, and no personal possessions. Ultimate authority lay with the master, as it did with the abbot in the Benedictine world; joining the Temple was a commitment to obedience which characterised all who gave themselves to a monastery. Any offences were therefore subject to a proportionate penance, while refusal to accept such discipline would result in expulsion. According to clause 65, 'It is essential that the sickly sheep be removed from the congregation of the faithful brothers.'⁸

The Latin Rule of the Temple reflects the wide experience of those who were present at Troyes. These included the archbishops of Reims and Sens, ten of their suffragan bishops, eight abbots, and two of the most powerful provincial lords, Theobald, Count of Blois and Champagne, and William, Count of Auxerre and Nevers. Cistercian influence was, however, predominant, since four of the abbots were from the Order and, according to John Michael, the scribe, the council was convened at the instigation of Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux. Moreover, it was to Bernard that Hugh of Payns turned, shortly after the council, with a request that he write a 'sermon of encouragement' for him and his fellow knights.

This eventually took the form of a treatise, *In Praise of the New Knighthood*, set out in thirteen chapters. After extolling the virtues of the Templars and contrasting them with the venality and viciousness of contemporary secular knights, Bernard analysed one by one the spiritual significance of the holy sites which it was the role of the Templars to protect, the most important of which was the Holy Sepulchre itself.⁹ The striking similarity between the depiction of the crimes of secular knights in the prologue to the Rule and their elaboration in chapter two of the treatise helps to confirm the powerful influence that the abbot of Clairvaux had upon the proceedings at Troyes. Not surprisingly, a later master of the Temple described the Order as having its origins in Cîteaux and its predecessors.¹⁰

However, even if the idea of the council had evolved in Cistercian circles, it was assembled under papal auspices in the person of Matthew of Albano, Honorius II's legate, without whose authority the Order could not have gained official recognition. At first sight such papal interest might seem unlikely, for the number of Templars was still small, but in fact it was quite consistent with recent papal policy. Since the era of Gregory VII (1073–85), the popes had energetically encouraged monastic communities to seek papal protection, a policy developed both to increase papal power and to reduce secular influence. The emergence of new orders, like the Carthusians and the Cistercians, and the reform of the cathedral canons, most evident from the late eleventh century onwards, gave huge impetus to this trend, as the popes sought to make them directly responsible to Rome.¹¹ Thus ten years after Troyes, Innocent II began the process of conferring privileges on the Order, encapsulated in their fundamental bull, *Omne Datum Optimum* (29 March, 1139), granted to the second master, Robert of Craon, and his successors. The Templars were 'appointed by the Lord defenders of the Catholic Church and attackers of the enemies of Christ', a role which entitled them to exclusive possession of any spoils taken in battle. All their possessions were placed 'under the protection and tutelage of the Holy See for all time to come'. Nobody was to be chosen as master unless he was 'both a military and a religious person who had made profession of the habit of your brotherhood', no changes could be made to their Rule except by the master and chapter, and no secular or ecclesiastical person could demand any fealty or homage from them. However, once professed, a brother could not leave the Order nor transfer elsewhere to another monastery without the permission of the master. As stated in the Rule, they were not obliged to render tithes, although they could retain any tithes they themselves

acquired. Moreover, the bull created a new class of brethren, allowing the Order to recruit its own priests, who could become full members after a year's probation. Once provided with priests, the Order could build oratories on its own land, so that brethren could avoid mixing with secular men and women, and establish their own burial grounds.¹²

Two further bulls, much shorter and directed to the prelates of the Church, followed. *Milites Templi* (9 January, 1144), issued by Celestine II, exhorted the prelates to encourage grants to the Order, offering donors the incentive of an indulgence of a seventh part of any penance. Once a year collectors were to be allowed to open churches and celebrate the divine offices in areas otherwise under interdict. *Milicia Dei* (7 April, 1145), issued by Eugenius III, informed the clergy that the Templars had been granted the right to recruit their own priests and to build their own oratories with associated burial grounds. Although the pope assured them that he in no way wished to diminish parochial rights, he nevertheless instructed the clergy to consecrate these oratories and bless the cemeteries when requested by the Templars.¹³

These striking privileges reflect the depth of support which the Order had received since 1129. Although documentary losses make the history of the Templars in Outremer in the 1130s and 1140s difficult to trace, the many charters to the Temple in northern France, Languedoc, Aragon, Portugal, Italy and England establish beyond doubt that their vocation had caught the imagination of Latin Christians across the whole social spectrum. Donations ranged from the spectacular grant of the five great castles of Monzón, Mongay, Chalamera, Barbará and Remoulins, as well as Corbins when it could be captured, made by Raymond Berenguer IV, Count of Barcelona and Lord of Aragon, in 1143, to hundreds of small-scale contributions from individuals which often amounted to nothing more than a single horse or a fraction of a vineyard, but which cumulatively helped to establish scores of local preceptories.¹⁴ From this base, often promoted by local aristocratic families in a manner familiar in the history of other monastic houses, the Temple was able to create a network of preceptories in the Latin West, ruled by a hierarchy of officers, and supplying men, money and goods to the knights and sergeants who formed the frontline in Outremer.

An index of the practical results of this can be seen in the ability of the Order to assemble 130 knights in chapter at Paris under Everard des Barres, Master in France, in April, 1147, just before the departure of King Louis VII on crusade. It was probably on this occasion that Eugenius III, who was personally present, granted the Templars the right to sew the

distinctive red cross onto their mantles.¹⁵ This was a force large enough to make an appreciable difference to the defence of Louis's unwieldy army as it made its way across Asia Minor in the winter of 1147–48, while once the king was in the East the Templars had the resources to secure his financial position with loan of 30,000 *livres*.¹⁶ The provision of the loan was particularly significant, for it is the first large-scale demonstration of the important role that they came to play in Capetian finance; by the mid-thirteenth century, the treasurer of the Temple in Paris was as important an official in the Capetian administration as he was in the Order itself.

Given the scale of these contributions it seems likely that the estimate of William, Archbishop of Tyre, that, in the 1170s they could deploy 300 knights in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, as well as countless sergeants, was close to the truth.¹⁷ As the main archive of the Order has been lost – probably when the Ottomans captured Cyprus in 1571¹⁸ – it is not possible to gain a complete picture of the Templars' military establishment in Outremer, but it is clear that, from the 1130s, they were seen as effective guardians of castles, and it is arguable that by the 1170s they were in a better position to take a strategic overview of the defensive needs of the crusader states than most individual lords. By this time, they protected key areas in the north in the Amanus Mountains through their castles of Baghras, La Roche de Roussel, La Roche Guillaume, and Darbsak, and in the south, centred on Gaza. The small state of Tripoli relied heavily on their fortresses at Chastel-Blanc in the east, al-Arimah to the south, and Tortosa on the coast. In central Palestine, they established an important supply depot and garrison at La Fève, while in Galilee they regarded their castle at Safad as the basis for a lordship which would have been extended east to Jacob's Ford, had it not been for Saladin's destruction of the unfinished fortress in 1179.¹⁹ Their original vocation was still maintained: knights were assigned to accompany pilgrims both from the ports to Jerusalem and from Jerusalem to the Jordan, routes which they had furnished with fortified refuges.²⁰ From 1150 the Templars were always present in crusader armies from the successful siege of Ascalon in 1153 to the terrible defeats at the Springs of Cresson and at Hattin in 1187. After Hattin they rebuilt their position so they were able to take a vital role in Richard I's army, while their advice was sufficiently esteemed by the king to convince him that it would not be viable to hold Jerusalem, despite the popularity an attack on the city would have had with the rank-and-file of the army.²¹

The growth of the Order was reflected in the development of the Rule. The statutes established at Troyes took little account of military affairs, nor were they accessible to many of the brethren, who read little or no

Latin. A French translation appears to have been made by the early 1140s, and within twenty years (probably sooner) a large new section of 146 clauses, known as the Hierarchical Statutes or *Retrais*, was added.²² These explain the structure of command with the grand master at its head and the seneschal as his deputy. Detailed sections describe the duties and equipment of these officials, as well as the method of electing a new master. The Order's possessions were divided into ten provinces: Jerusalem, Tripoli, Antioch, France, England, Poitou, Aragon, Portugal, Apulia and Hungary. Each had its own commander who headed a hierarchy of local preceptors of individual houses. However, in the second half of the twelfth century, as the Order expanded, further subdivisions were introduced, called *baiulia*, while changing priorities over the next 150 years meant that new provinces or grand commanderies were established in response to perceived needs.²³ In c.1250, a new post was created, second only to the grand master, that of visitor, who became the chief Templar official in the West. By this time, the Order had grown so large that provinces were grouped into three, one encompassing France, England and Germany, another the Iberian lands, and a third, those of the Italian peninsula.²⁴ Important decisions were taken in chapter meetings, headed by the grand master, who also determined their composition; only the seneschal had automatic right of attendance.

A further 319 clauses, which appear to be of the same period as the *Retrais*, set out penances for offences, the pattern of conventual life and the procedure for holding ordinary chapters, held weekly in the local preceptories.²⁵ These chapters were compulsory for brothers and were used to discuss the business of the house and to discipline those who had confessed to minor transgressions. Major offences however, such as simony, treason, heresy, sodomy, or the revelation of the secrets of the chapter, were reserved for higher authority. Sometime between 1257 and 1267 another section of 112 clauses was added in the form of a series of case histories showing how penalties for serious offences should be applied in practice.²⁶

New entrants often joined the Order at their local preceptory, usually at the time of the weekly chapter. The holding of receptions is described in a separate section of twenty-nine clauses at the end of the Rule; like the rest of the French Rule there is no date. If a majority of the brethren agreed, the candidate was brought into the chapter and, having confirmed his desire to join, was examined by two or three senior Templars.

They should ask him if he has a woman as a wife or fiancée; or if he has ever made a vow or promise to another order; or if he owes a debt to any secular man

which he cannot pay; and if he is healthy in his body, and has no secret illness; or if he is the serf of any man.

The postulant was then brought before the preceptor or presiding officer and admonished:

Good brother, you ask a very great thing, for of our Order you see only the outer appearance. For the appearance is that you see us having fine horses, and good equipment, and good food and drink, and fine robes, and thus it seems to you that you would be well at ease. But you do not know the harsh commandments which lie beneath: for it is a painful thing for you, who are your own master, to make yourself a serf to others.

The candidate then vowed obedience, chastity and poverty, and to follow the good usage and customs of the house, and promised to strive to help conquer the Holy Land. After this, he was admitted to the Order and the mantle was placed on his shoulder. The chaplain said the psalm, *Ecce quam bonum* (Psalm 133) and the prayer to the Holy Spirit, each brother said the Paternoster, and the receptor and the chaplain kissed him on the mouth.²⁷

The responsibilities of the Temple were shared with the Hospitallers who, although an older foundation, dating from the 1070s, developed a military role after the Templar example. Their close connection with the early Templars suggests that this might have taken place during the 1120s, since it is evident by 1136 when they took over the castle of Bait Jibrin. In the last decade of the twelfth century a third important military order was created, that of the Teutonic Knights, initially little more than a German field hospital, but soon becoming a major contributor to the military establishment of Outremer in the thirteenth century after official recognition by Innocent III in 1198. On a much smaller scale, the Order of St Lazarus, which was closely connected to the Temple, but acted as a refuge for leprous knights, had, by the 1230s, developed a military role as well. The Templar model was equally influential in Iberia, where between 1158 and 1170 the Orders of Calatrava, Santiago and Alcántara were founded.²⁸ By the early thirteenth century the concept of a military order had been fully integrated into the body of a Church which, despite setbacks, remained militant, and which under Innocent III (1198–1216) determined to launch a new large-scale expedition to recover the lands lost to Saladin.

In the thirteenth century the role of the military orders became even more essential, for in the East weak or absentee kings wielded only

enough power to create internal conflict, without ever being able to impose themselves in the manner of at least some of their twelfth-century predecessors, while after *c.*1250 the upper baronage of Outremer found it increasingly difficult to maintain the expensive castles needed for defence.²⁹ After the defeat of the Christians by a combined force of Egyptians and Khorezmian Turks at La Forbie in October, 1244, and the failure of the crusade of Louis IX of France to conquer Egypt in 1248–49, the pressures on the lands remaining to the Latins grew ever greater. Chief among these pressures were the Mongols, whose power had originally been built up by Genghis Khan between 1206 and 1227. By the 1240s they had created a huge landed empire which stretched from China to Hungary. Although they were apparently hostile to Islam – epitomised by their sacking of Baghdad in 1258 – all the other eastern powers feared them, whatever their religion or race. In the words of Thomas Bérard, Master of the Temple between 1256 and 1273, their arrival was ‘terrible and awesome’.³⁰ Equally dangerous to the survival of the crusader states were the Mamluks, who had seized power in Cairo in 1259. There was no ambiguity about their hostility to Christianity, yet so terrifying did the Mongols appear that the Latins allowed the Mamluk army passage through their territories in order to confront the Mongols, whom they met at the battle of ‘Ain Jalut in 1260. The resulting Mongol defeat left the Mamluks in an even stronger position, a situation which eventually culminated in their conquest of Acre in 1291.

The formation of the Order of the Temple was an extraordinary event in the society of Latin Christendom in the first half of the twelfth century. In one sense it was part of a wider trend for, a generation before, the reforming drive of Bruno of Cologne and Robert of Molesme had already broken with the monasticism of the day, seen most evidently in the all-conquering Cluniacs, to create new and successful orders in the form of the Carthusians and the Cistercians. For them the need to return to what they regarded as the original Benedictine ideals justified their rejection of contemporary monastic life. However, while in retrospect they can be seen as highly innovatory both in lifestyle and in organisation, they were careful to present themselves as champions of traditional values, whose purity they claimed had been lost in the modern world. In a conservative society this approach, whether conscious or not, was undoubtedly a wise one, and the consequent acceptance of these new orders is not surprising. In contrast, there was no way in which the Templars could be viewed in this light, their Augustinian and Cistercian connections notwithstanding. The idea of what the fathers at Troyes called a ‘military order’ was completely new to

Christian society and, despite the general enthusiasm which followed the council, there were always those, albeit a minority, who were uneasy or even downright hostile to this combination of apparently contradictory lifestyles. The Order was therefore never without its critics, even right at the beginning. Some, like Guigo of Chartres, Prior of la Grand Chartreuse, were mildly admonitory, warning Hugh of Payns that 'it was pointless to wage war against external enemies without first overcoming internal ones', while others, like John of Salisbury, writing a generation later, were genuinely repelled by what they saw as the enfolding of men of blood within ecclesiastical society.³¹ Even the early Templars themselves had doubts, as a letter of reassurance as to the validity of their vocation, written to them at about the time of the Council of Troyes seems to indicate.³²

Others were less concerned with principle than with conduct. Among the most prominent was William of Tyre, the most important chronicler of the Latin East until his death in c.1186, who was a confidant of King Amalric (1162–74) and an active participant in the politics of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the 1170s and 1180s. William was a prelate especially sensitive about his archiepiscopal rights, so it is not surprising that Templar privileges offended him, but he is not unrepresentative of a strand of opinion among an episcopacy already affronted by papal encouragement of exempt orders, apparently at the expense of diocesan authority. While he accepted their honest beginnings, he believed that, during his lifetime, they had lost sight of their vocation.

For a long time they remained faithful to their noble vows, carrying out their duties fairly satisfactorily. Afterwards they forgot about humility, the guardian of all virtues, which, voluntarily sitting in the lowest seat, has no reason to fear a fall, and abandoned the patriarch of Jerusalem, who had established their Order and granted them their first benefices. They refused him the obedience that their predecessors had shown him. They even caused many problems for the churches of God by removing their tithes and unjustly harassing their possessions.

According to William the tension between the Templars and King Amalric rose to such a pitch that, in 1174, had the king recovered from what in fact proved to be his final illness, he had intended to take up the matter of Templar independence with other leaders of Christendom.³³

Echoes of this discontent certainly reached the papacy and, as a consequence, from time to time, Rome became less generous in its support. In 1207, in response to increasing concerns about methods of Templar recruitment, which could be seen as simoniacal, Innocent III complained

to Philip of Plessis, the Master, that the Templars

do not care about adding sin to sin like a long rope, alleging that, whoever, having collected two or three *denarii* annually for them, will have joined their fraternity, cannot lawfully be deprived of ecclesiastical burial, even if they are excommunicate; and through this, adulterers, manifest usurers and other false criminals excommunicated from the Church are, by insolence of this kind, buried in their cemeteries just like the Catholic faithful.³⁴

In 1265, after a dispute about the papacy's ultimate authority over the internal affairs of the Order, Clement IV wrote to the master, Thomas Bérard, and the brothers, reminding them that 'if the Church removed for a short while the hand of its protection from you in the face of the prelates and the secular princes, you could not in any way subsist against the assaults of these prelates or the force of the princes.' The Templars would be well advised not to beat against the edifice 'on whose help, after God, you are totally dependent'. The pope suggested that the Templars displayed greater humility and mildness.³⁵ Nevertheless, papal rebukes on specific matters did not in themselves indicate that the Temple had fallen from favour. Much depended on circumstances. Thus, in 1218, when the papacy was anxious to maintain support for the crusaders fighting in Egypt, Honorius III attempted to stamp out what he called mendacious rumours about both the Templars and the Hospitallers, 'who continually fight the Lord's battles'; without them, he was assured by Pelagius, Bishop of Albano, his legate, 'the army would be totally incapable of remaining at Damietta'.³⁶

It is, in fact, hardly to be expected that the history of such an Order could have been free from controversy or, indeed, that the support which the early Templars enjoyed could have been sustained indefinitely. Most religious orders lost their initial popularity after a generation or so; the attacks against both the Cistercians and the Franciscans in the late thirteenth century were more vehement than anything experienced by the military orders and would certainly have been regarded in a different light by posterity had either order been brought to trial or suppressed.³⁷ The key to the Order's problems in the thirteenth century was the increasing cost of sustaining its role in Outremer. The war in the East consumed resources at an alarming rate, yet successes were modest. 'Atlit, built 1217–18, and Safad, rebuilt in the early 1240s, are among the most impressive castles to be found anywhere in the thirteenth century, but both were immensely expensive to construct and maintain. Both were widely publicised; the anonymous treatise which describes the construction of Safad set out the costs 'to persuade the Christian faithful to show charity

towards the said Order'.³⁸ The problem with simony may well have been a symptom of these pressures, while complaints about the rigidity with which the Templars enforced their rights stemmed from the need to extract maximum returns from their lands.³⁹ Criticism of their motives such as that of the St Albans chronicler, Matthew Paris, no friend of privileged orders in general, found its origins here. Thus, during Louis IX's crusade to Egypt in 1248, William of Sonnac, the Templar Master, advised the king's younger brother, Robert, Count of Artois, against attacking Mansourah, for the respectable tactical reason that the rest of the army was not yet available to aid them. Matthew, however, reports that Robert accused the military orders of hindering the crusade for their own ends, because if Egypt were conquered they would no longer be able to dominate the land from which they drew such large profits.⁴⁰ Despite this evident strand of discontent, which is almost entirely clerical and monastic, in the circumstances of the second half of the thirteenth century, when the crusader states struggled to survive and costs consistently outran resources, the image of the military orders seems to have stood up remarkably well. In the secular world, epic and romance literature, largely consumed by those same knightly classes which had supported the military orders with donations and recruits, presents a positive image throughout this period. Although the Templars do not fulfil leading roles, the authors knew that their stories had to make sense to audiences experienced in martial activity, and the Templars are frequently to be seen performing their military, charitable and advisory roles to good effect.⁴¹ Moreover, the Bernardine vision of the Templars as Christian martyrs still endured, for other contemporaries, most notably Thaddeo of Naples and the Dominican, Ricoldo of Monte Croce, were as certain as the Templar of Tyre that William of Beaujeu had died a hero's death at Acre.⁴²

The apparently demoralised Theobald Gaudin did not long outlive the fall of Acre. Sometime before 20 April, 1292, he had been succeeded by a highly experienced Burgundian Templar of twenty-seven years' standing called James of Molay.⁴³ Molay was probably in his mid-forties at this time and, according to his own witness, had seen extensive service in the East. He had joined the Temple at Beaune in 1265, and was probably sent to Outremer in the mid-1270s, perhaps as part of William of Beaujeu's attempt to provide extra support for the crusader states.⁴⁴ Reinforcements were certainly needed, since in 1265 the Mamluk Sultan, Baybars, had taken the Hospitaller castle of Arsuf and the next year, the Templars' own astonishing castle at Safad. Equally shattering was the sack of Antioch in 1268 and the consequent abandonment of the Templar castles in the

Amanus Mountains at Baghras (Gaston) and La Roche de Rousel.⁴⁵ Molay's Templar youth was spent in a world in which the Latins were forced out of their inland bases and increasingly squeezed into coastal enclaves. Although he arrived in the East eager to take the fight to the infidel he soon found that there was little opportunity for such initiatives. Neither Louis IX's crusade to Tunisia in 1270, nor the relatively small forces brought to the East by Prince Edward of England in 1271 and 1272, made any substantial difference to the threat posed by the Mamluks, but after Edward's departure in September, 1272, even expeditions such as this no longer appeared.

Not surprisingly, many Christians were apprehensive. At the second Council of Lyon, held between 7 May and 17 July, 1274, summoned by Pope Gregory X largely to gather opinions about the state of crusading, there was a clear perception that the territories in Palestine and Syria were in acute danger. William of Beaujeu, elected to succeed Thomas Bérard as master on 13 May, was among those present at the council. He was wary of grandiose plans, advising the pope that the most immediate needs were arms and provisions, together with a permanent force of 250–300 knights and 500 foot soldiers.⁴⁶ James of Aragon, the only monarch present, thought that this was a quite inadequate response, but Beaujeu nevertheless spent the next two years gathering help for the Holy Land, before sailing for the East himself.⁴⁷ According to Antonio Siccì, a notary at that time employed by the Templars in the Holy Land, Beaujeu recruited many *servientes* from 'diverse parts' to defend the Order's fortresses, but then apparently did not have the means to pay them, causing some to desert to the Saracens.⁴⁸ When Acre did eventually fall Pope Nicholas IV once more sent out for advice, although this time it was gathered in a series of provincial councils, most of which met towards the end of 1291 and the beginning of 1292. Inevitably, the loss of Acre concentrated attention upon the role of the military orders, giving a focal point to more general discontent about their effectiveness. Almost all the surviving replies include the idea that the military orders should be united, reviving a proposal which had already been put forward in 1274. The hope seems to have been that this would lead to more efficient use of resources, less conflict and possibly better secular support.⁴⁹ The prelates' view was reinforced by Charles II, King of Naples, who thought that the leader of the new Order should be crowned king of Jerusalem.⁵⁰ As Molay was to discover, this idea, of which he disapproved, did not disappear. Among its other proponents was a Mallorcan, Raymond Lull, a redoubtable campaigner on behalf of the Christian cause in the Mediterranean. Lull, who

met Molay in Limassol in 1301, where he must have discussed plans with him, wanted a united Order under what he called a *Bellator Rex*, a role he apparently envisaged could be filled by James II of Aragon.⁵¹

Almost thirty treatises were written about the state of the Holy Land between 1291 and 1336 and, until the trial, both the Hospital and the Temple remained central elements in any scheme for its recovery.⁵² However, with the death of Nicholas IV in April, 1292, the prospect of a new crusade faded and it was left to those directly involved to organise a practical response. Molay was very active during the 1290s. His first priority was the rebuilding of the Order in the East since, in addition to the losses of 1291, many of the survivors were in no condition to continue and had had to be sent to the West to recuperate or retire.⁵³ He was particularly concerned to secure free movement of men and supplies for Cyprus, both by lobbying the key rulers and by ensuring that the Order's houses in the West were aware of the needs of their eastern brethren, aims given particular urgency by the sharp increase in the cost of crusading during the second half of the thirteenth century.⁵⁴ Molay therefore sailed for Marseille in the spring of 1293 and spent the rest of that year visiting preceptories in Languedoc, Catalonia and England. By December, 1294, he was at the Roman Curia, and during the next year he negotiated with Pope Boniface VIII and Charles II of Naples, efforts which resulted in a papal grant of privileges in Cyprus equivalent to those enjoyed by the Temple in the Holy Land and in the issue of export licences allowing the Order to ship supplies from Apulia free of taxes. A visit to Paris by way of the preceptories at Arles and Dijon in June, 1295, was similarly aimed at securing the aid of the French Crown.⁵⁵ The increase in shipping of men and goods in the late 1290s and early 1300s, especially from Catalonia, Marseille and Apulia, suggests that these efforts met with some success.⁵⁶

Analysis of the age structure within the Order taken from the trial records tends to confirm this, in that it does seem as if brethren of fighting age and capability were being transferred to the frontline. Thus, in Cyprus in 1310, only one of the 37 knights whose ages can be determined was over 50, and only 2 of these had joined before 1291. Taking knights and sergeants together, in Cyprus only 7% were over 50, whereas among those Templars living in France who appeared before the Parisian inquisitors the figure is 40%.⁵⁷ The relative youth of the Templars in Cyprus is shown by the fact that the highest percentage of those in the West who had served less than 10 years was in the British Isles, where the figure was 36%, compared to 64% in Cyprus.⁵⁸ Recruitment in the West continued after 1291, enabling appropriate men to be sent to Cyprus: only

5 of the 76 Templars who appeared in the Cypriot proceedings during the trial had joined in the crusader East, while 46 of these had joined since 1300. These men had been drawn from almost every part of the Templar provincial structure, including France, Languedoc, Portugal, Castile, Aragon, England, Germany, Lombardy, Apulia, Dalmatia and the Morea.⁵⁹ Claims that large numbers of Templars had been assembled for the frontline were later made by witnesses during the trial: one Templar described a chapter at Nicosia in 1291 at which he believed 400 brethren were present, another that he was sent to Cyprus in 1297 as one of a contingent of 300 gathered for that purpose at the annual chapter held in Paris.⁶⁰ Neither testimony can be fully trusted, but the Order had indeed managed to replace previous losses, most notably after the defeats of 1187 and the disasters of the 1240s, so the scenarios are quite possible.⁶¹ Nor were these men ill-equipped. When the Templar house at Nicosia was inventoried following the arrest of the brethren on the island in June, 1308, officials found 930 breast-plates, 970 crossbows, 640 iron helmets, and a large quantity of swords, coats of mail, leg armour, shields, lances, and arrows, as well their personal weaponry and horses, copious supplies of foodstuffs, animals and, among other things, some 20 boxes of horseshoes and nails.⁶² Moreover, insofar as the relatively small numbers can be taken as representative, the proportion of knights to sergeants was much higher in the areas where the Order was directly involved in fighting than in other provinces: in Cyprus 42 of the 76 Templar witnesses who deposed in May 1310 were knights, and in Castile which, in contrast to Aragon, still had an active frontier with the Moors, 15 of the 30 Templars interrogated at Medina del Campo in April 1310 were knights. In Aragon-Catalonia only 21% were knights, while in most of the other trials the figure is more typically around 10%. Most strikingly, in March, 1310, when the Templars in Paris were assembled in the garden behind the residence of the bishop of Paris, only 18 of the total of 546 were identified as knights.⁶³ Overall numbers may have been declining, as some historians believe but, if this was so, this evidence suggests that it was not on a sufficient scale to prevent the Order from continuing to pursue a prominent role in the conflict with the infidel.⁶⁴

Molay's activity was all the more important since the situation in Cyprus was not promising. According to the Templar of Tyre, although it was 'a most gentle country', it had been transformed by the crisis of 1291 into a society which had been 'torn apart'. Those who had escaped from Acre were 'in great poverty', but received little help from their former friends in Cyprus.⁶⁵ A series of poor harvests in the mid-1290s

exacerbated economic problems. Nor was the island prepared for its new role. The total population is unlikely to have been more than 150,000, the great majority of whom were Greek peasants, while it had no ship-building capacity or large-scale port facilities.⁶⁶ The nearest Christian state was the Kingdom of Lesser Armenia in Cilicia, which, by 1298 was, according to the Templar of Tyre, 'in very bad shape and suffering greatly at the hands of the Saracens'.⁶⁷ Moreover, the Templars remained suspicious of Henry II, King of both Cyprus and Jerusalem, since William of Beaujeu had supported the rival Angevin claim to the throne of Jerusalem, only moving toward acceptance of Henry in the 1280s.⁶⁸ Beaujeu's partisan stance had, at least for a time, facilitated the export of essential supplies from Angevin Apulia, but it had also undermined his credibility in Outremer. Thus, although his spies kept him well informed about Mamluk plans, he was not able to convince others that attacks were imminent, even when his previous warnings had proved to be accurate.⁶⁹ In Cyprus tensions clearly remained, for in 1299 Boniface VIII felt obliged to tell Molay to resolve the Order's quarrels with the king.⁷⁰

This seems to have had some effect, for in the summer of the following year, the king and the military orders cooperated to equip a fleet of 16 galleys which was used to attack Rosetta, Alexandria, Acre, Tortosa and Maraclea.⁷¹ More ambitiously, in November, 1300, James of Molay and the king's brother, Amaury of Lusignan, attempted to occupy the former Templar stronghold of Tortosa. A force of 600 men, of which the Templars supplied about 150, failed to establish itself in the town itself, although they were able to leave a garrison of 120 men on the island of Ruad, just off the coast. The aim was to link up with Ghazan, the Mongol Il-Khan of Persia, who had invited the Cypriots to participate in joint operations against the Mamluks, but it does appear that this was intended as a step in a more long-term project in that, in November, 1301, Boniface VIII granted the island to the Order.⁷² The plan failed for, following a very severe winter, in mid-1302 the Mamluks forced the defenders to surrender, enslaving the Templars and beheading the Syrian footsoldiers.⁷³ Nearly 40 of these men were still in prison in Cairo years later where, according to a former fellow prisoner, the Genoese Matthew Zaccaria, they died of starvation, having refused an offer of 'many riches and goods' in return for apostasising.⁷⁴ This capitulation certainly influenced Molay's thinking, since he later vehemently dismissed proposals for a small-scale expedition preliminary to a more general crusade, but it also emphasised that, although they had men and weapons, the Templars had not yet succeeded in building up their naval capacity even

though it was becoming increasingly important. The Templar of Tyre says that the Templars were unable to defend the island because they had no galleys, only *tarides* (transports), and, indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that the Order could assemble more than 10 galleys at any given time during the post-1291 period.⁷⁵

Even so, whatever their problems, the military orders remained an integral part of any planning for a new crusade. When Clement V became pope in November, 1305, he at once began to consider the recovery of the Holy Land. To this end, he wrote to Molay, telling him that he was considering a new crusade; in response the master began to organise a large-scale chapter meeting in Cyprus for August, 1306.⁷⁶ However, on 6 June, 1306, the pope summoned Fulk of Villaret, Master of the Hospital, and James of Molay, to meet him at Poitiers on All Saints' Day (1 November), and the chapter never took place.⁷⁷ In mid-October, Molay set out from Cyprus, together with Raimbaud of Caromb, Preceptor of Cyprus since 1304. The other leading Templars remained in Cyprus under the command of Ayme of Oselier, the Marshal.⁷⁸ The master probably arrived in France about a month later, missing the set date, but finding that Clement had postponed the meeting anyway because of ill health.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, for the first time since Molay's election, it was apparent that the papacy had the serious intention of inaugurating a major new crusading expedition.

THE PAPACY

In 1305 the city of Lyon was part of the Empire, but French influence was paramount there. Philip IV, the French king, owned the suburb of Saint-Just and held suzerainty over the town. The towns of the Rhône-Saône corridor, including not only Lyon, but also Vienne and Avignon, were only in a technical sense outside the French kingdom, for they were continually subject to the creeping expansionism at which the Capetian dynasty had become so adept. In November 1305 this French presence was very striking. Philip IV and his brothers, Charles of Valois and Louis of Evreux, had arrived with large escorts. John II, Duke of Brittany, and Henry, Count of Luxembourg, were also there, as were the ambassadors of Edward I of England and James II of Aragon, and clergy from all parts of Christendom. The occasion of this great gathering was the coronation of a new pope, Bertrand of Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux, who, after a conclave at Perugia lasting eleven months, had, on 5 June 1305, been chosen to succeed Benedict XI. He took the name of Clement V.⁸⁰

He was a Gascon of modest family, but by 1305 his kin held several important church offices and Bertrand himself was a well-established prelate in the region. He had become bishop of Comminges in 1295 and archbishop of Bordeaux in 1299,⁸¹ and it is likely that this was the summit of his ambition. It was certainly all that he could expect, for he was increasingly crippled by a serious and recurring illness. In 1314, the Dominican, Ptolemy of Lucca, who worked in Avignon from 1309 onwards and was able to observe the pope closely during his reign, described how 'for a long time he had been ill with the gripes, as a result of which he lost his appetite. Sometimes he suffered from dysentery, and through that the gripes were eased. Sometimes he suffered vomiting'.⁸² But Bertrand was chosen because he was an outsider to the complicated politics and rivalries of the cardinals' college, for the cardinals were acutely aware of the tremendous and shattering events in which the papacy had been involved over the previous decade.

The role of the papacy as it had been interpreted by the holders of the office in the thirteenth century had largely been conceived in the second half of the eleventh century. In the early middle ages church appointments had come under lay control, for lay rulers needed the administrative services of a literate clergy, and the Church commanded great wealth as a consequence of generations of pious endowment. Many of the clergy appointed by lay patrons were unsuited to their office, and it was this situation which the reformers, inspired by Leo IX (1049–54) and Gregory VII, had sought to change. They had hoped to free the Church from lay control and to create a moral reformation of the clergy, and through them the whole of the Christian population, under papal leadership. They conceived of a united Christendom controlled by the pope, who held his position directly from God, and whose power transcended that of the secular rulers. From Gregory VII onwards the medieval popes grappled with the problems which had to be overcome if this great ideal was to be achieved. It was not to be expected that the secular powers would give up their entrenched positions without a struggle, but in the twelfth century the papacy was the better equipped, both in its intellectual justification and its administrative skill, to push forward its plans. A particularly potent weapon was the systematic application of canon law to papal activities from the middle years of the twelfth century, a result of the development of important schools in the city of Bologna. This gave the papacy a vital advantage over its secular rivals, because from this time both the popes and their administrators were trained jurists, who by means of canon law could apply the theories of papal government to

practical matters.⁸³ As yet, most secular rulers were relatively weak, their administrative organs still evolving, while the extent of their control over the lands that they nominally ruled was in places tenuous and almost everywhere uneven. The reformers were able to create new moral standards for the clergy, and the overall suitability and quality of at least the holders of important church offices improved markedly. Moreover, there was then little effective counter to papal claims to the leadership of Christendom; only the German Emperors tried to dispute them at all vigorously, but in the end they could not have felt very satisfied with the results of their efforts.

However, from the early thirteenth century, this situation was beginning to change. With most rulers of any consequence appointment to high ecclesiastical office was often a matter of compromise between king, pope and local electors. More serious, the principle of papal leadership was never fully free of challenge. In the 1160s and 1170s Alexander III and Frederick Barbarossa had struggled mightily over this issue, and after Innocent III's death in 1216, a new conflict increasingly came to occupy the papacy with Frederick II, Barbarossa's grandson. The Hohenstaufen saw themselves as the heirs of the Carolingians and of the Roman Empire itself, and such a view did not admit papal claims. This theoretical clash was reinforced by territorial problems. The Hohenstaufen laid claim to Italy, and wished, as supposed successors of Augustus, to control Rome. This necessarily led to conflict with the popes, who based their claim to be Vicars of Christ on their tenure of St Peter's See of Rome. This conflict intensified in Frederick II's reign, for he was King of Sicily as well as Emperor. If he had succeeded in his attempted conquest of Lombardy and Tuscany, the papal states would have been encircled and the grand theoretical claims of the papacy reduced to empty formulae. It was to avoid this curtailment of independence that the thirteenth-century popes fought the Hohenstaufen to a standstill. After Frederick's death in 1250 the papacy found a champion in Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX of France, who, with papal subsidies, destroyed the remaining Hohenstaufen and made himself King of Sicily. He proved, however, an equal threat to papal independence, and in 1281 secured the election of a French pope, Martin IV, who became little more than an Angevin puppet. But, in 1282, a popular rising in Sicily enabled the Aragonese to take control of the island. The papacy had been fortuitously freed from this new threat, but equally had suffered a severe blow to its prestige, so close had been its association with the Angevins. The succeeding popes therefore spent much of their time, energy and resources in a futile attempt to recapture Sicily.⁸⁴

These events highlight the essential dilemma of the reformed papacy: the changes desired could not be fully brought about without the means, financial, legal and military, to implement them, but prolonged resistance produced more emphasis on these means at the ultimate expense of the end, which remained elusive. During the thirteenth century the papacy centralised its administration: more and more appeals were channelled to the papal courts, more and more benefices were reserved to the papacy, more and more money was collected from an increasingly unwilling clergy to finance papal projects. More often than ever before the papacy backed up its commands with the weapons of its spiritual armoury, so much so that excommunication began to lose the bite that had made it so effective in the early years of reform.

A fundamental element in these problems was the growth of heresy, ironically itself partly inspired by the reform papacy's own exposure of the Church's weaknesses. In the early middle ages deviations were relatively minor and none caught the popular imagination, but from the beginning of the twelfth century many clerics claimed to discern a growing adherence to heretical belief. At first its manifestations were sporadic, usually inspired by charismatic preachers, but seldom lasting long beyond their deaths. However, in the second half of the century, there were signs of more durable movements which had wider popular appeal, in the form of the Waldensians and the Cathars. The Waldensians derived from Valdes, a merchant from Lyon, who, in 1173, attempted to respond to what he believed was Christ's call to follow him in poverty and preaching, an action not in itself heretical, but which contained the seeds of future deviance in the Waldensian insistence on the importance of lay preaching. More directly dangerous was the dualist heresy known as Catharism which, by the late twelfth century, was perceived by the papacy to be widespread in Languedoc and in central and northern Italy. The Cathars tried to confront the eternal problem of the origins of evil, which they attributed to the material world, which was, they believed, the domain of Satan, either after his fall from Heaven, or, more radically, as a quite separate power, thus postulating the existence of two co-eternal principles of light and darkness. To the former they attributed the creation of souls and of angels, to the latter the creation of the visible universe. They believed that Satan had seduced angelic souls and had imprisoned them in material bodies; but that Jesus, Son of the God of Light, had come to free them from this bondage. He only had the appearance of a material body, so he could not suffer or be resurrected since he did not belong to Satan's material world. Jesus had accomplished

his mission by establishing the true Church, that of the Cathars. Unfortunately, at the same time Satan had established a false church, the Church of Rome, which postulated the Incarnation, Resurrection and Redemption, and adopted the cross as a symbol of its faith. The logical application of this was the rejection of all the sacraments of the Catholic Church. The only true path was through the Cathar Church in which the souls, imprisoned in their bodies of matter, could be released. This was accomplished by a baptism of the spirit, the *consolamentum*, a laying on of hands by the spiritual elite of this church, the *bonhommes* or *perfecti*. The *bonhommes* lived chaste, ascetic lives, eating only the least material foods, such as fruit, fish and vegetables, and living off the charity of their supporters, known as *credentes* or believers. Most *credentes* were unable to sustain lives of such rigour, and they lived in ordinary society, concealing their beliefs when it was necessary and only receiving the *consolamentum* at the point of death. This heresy was therefore much more than an argument over an intellectual conceit or even a fringe reforming movement which had overstepped the mark; to the papacy Catharism was an attack upon the very fabric of Christian society.⁸⁵

Faced with a heresy so far reaching the papacy was forced to recognise that the Church had no effective means of dealing with the problem. A series of church councils had excommunicated heretics and their protectors, and this had been backed by preaching missions, but Catharism in Languedoc continued to grow in popularity, in some areas becoming quite overtly the religion of the region. Innocent III launched a crusade against the Cathars of Languedoc in 1209, but it proved ineffective in the long term because it was too dependent on the quality of individual leaders, while the knights who took part could only be required to serve for forty days. It was necessary for Louis VIII of France to undertake a second crusade before the south finally capitulated, and that was fought more for the benefit of the Capetian monarchy than of the Roman Church.

The crusade had failed as a means of suppressing heresy, and the papacy was led to develop a new weapon in defence of orthodoxy. The old methods for dealing with heresy had relied upon procedures deriving from Roman law. Heretics could either be denounced by a person in authority (*denuntiatio*) or accused by a member of the community (*accusatio*), or the bishop could proceed against a suspect through *inquisitio*, trying to obtain a confession, taking testimony from witnesses and finally making a judgement. These methods were not very helpful against Catharism, for such an approach belonged to the early middle

ages, when the Church was troubled only by isolated individual deviants and when legal studies were largely in abeyance. In 1184 Lucius III issued the bull *Ad abolendam* which enacted that bishops or archdeacons were, at least once a year, personally to visit every parish where heresy was thought to exist. If any heretics were found they were to be excommunicated and then handed over to the secular arm, which meant imprisonment and confiscation of property. This established an episcopal inquisition, but the system remained inadequate. It was Gregory IX (1227–41) who developed a more systematic operation which he staffed primarily with members of the newly founded Dominican and Franciscan Orders. Gregory IX's statutes allowed a period of grace for heretics to come forward, they called for witnesses to testify against heretics, they set out methods for the interrogation of the accused, and they provided for the reconciliation of repentant heretics and for the condemnation of the stubborn. Those who remained obstinate ultimately could be sent to the secular arm for punishment. This involved the confiscation of property and sometimes death by burning, officially the work of the state. In 1252 Innocent IV allowed the use of torture in the bull *Ad extirpanda*.⁸⁶

Bernard Gui, the Dominican who between 1307 and 1323 was an inquisitor in the Toulousain, wrote a five-part treatise describing inquisitorial procedure, which is a useful guide to the procedure current when the Templars were brought to trial. When a suspect was brought to Bernard Gui's attention, a citation was sent out. If the person concerned did not appear, he was provisionally excommunicated, a sentence which became definitive after the lapse of one year. The implications of this were serious, for nobody was supposed to have contact with him and if anyone knew where he was hiding he was obliged, on pain of canonical penalty, to tell the inquisitor.⁸⁷ The secular authorities were empowered to arrest a suspect. The king of France ordered his officials 'to supply help and suitable advice to the inquisitors and to obey the inquisitors in everything which appertains to the office of the Inquisition'.⁸⁸ The accused was interrogated by the inquisitor and his assistants and a summary of the proceedings was recorded by a notary. The aim was to establish guilt, either by confession or by the use of testimonial evidence. He was not allowed a defending advocate, even if he could have found one, and witnesses were reluctant to testify on his behalf for fear of guilt by association. Hostile witnesses were allowed to remain anonymous on the grounds that they might otherwise be intimidated, and the accused could only read a précis of their depositions. In contrast to secular proceedings, all kinds of witnesses could be used, even perjurers, criminals

and the excommunicate. The accused could only list his enemies in the hope that some names would coincide with the witnesses.⁸⁹ It seems, however, that the inquisitors' real aim was to obtain a confession, for, without the admission of guilt, a heretic could not be reconciled to the Church. If confession could not be obtained spontaneously, compulsion could be used, firstly by imprisonment under increasingly harsh conditions and ultimately by torture, supposedly of a limited kind which did not involve the effusion of blood or permanent mutilation.⁹⁰ Once guilt was established, sentence was pronounced in the form of a 'general sermon' held in public. Heretics who were believed to be genuinely repentant were reconciled to the Church, and penances imposed which varied from a monetary fine for minor transgressions to harsh imprisonment, the prisoner chained in irons and fed only a diet of 'the bread of sadness and the water of tribulation'. Sometimes the guilty had to wear badges on their clothing as signs of their infamy, a provision which often led to their molestation. In other cases they had to undertake a pilgrimage. But those who refused to abjure their heresy, or who retracted their confessions, together with the obstinate who refused to confess the errors of which they were accused, were delivered to the secular arm to receive an appropriate punishment, usually death by burning.⁹¹ Their property was confiscated by the secular rulers, and their heirs debarred from holding any public office, usually for at least two generations.⁹² By Bernard Gui's time the political dominance of the French crown in Languedoc had established an environment quite inimical to Catharism, and within this context the inquisitors had been able to pursue the remaining elements of the heresy very effectively, so that by the 1320s it was no longer an active force in the region.

The harsh legalism of the inquisitorial proceedings reflects the changing nature of the priorities of the Catholic Church in the thirteenth century. The papacy presided over a large centralised administrative, legal and financial structure which encompassed a wide range of responsibilities and roles, from the raising of a papal army to fight political opponents in Italy, to the judgement of adultery or usury. This organisation had finally overcome the Hohenstaufen threat and it had rolled over the heretics of Languedoc. At the same time the popes had developed the Papal State, establishing themselves as lords of a large wedge of territory in central Italy which extended from Campagna and Marittima to the March of Ancona and Romagna. But this had been achieved at a heavy cost to papal prestige. To many people the papacy had degenerated into just another political power, devoid of any moral purpose or lofty

spiritual aims. This loss of prestige was doubly important because it coincided with a significant development in the secular world. While the papacy had been locked in battle with the Empire, France and England had been steadily achieving coherence in administration, backed by a growing sense of loyalty towards the monarchy from the general populace. The extent of these changes should not be exaggerated, for the monarchs had many unsolved problems with which to contend, and in the fourteenth century the French rulers in particular were to sustain many setbacks in their efforts to achieve a unified realm. Nevertheless, the papacy was soon to find that the chief opponent of its goal of universal domination was no longer the Emperor, now too weak for any such pretensions, but the more compact secular monarchy of France.

In the last decade of the thirteenth century the state of the Church was reflected in a series of acute crises at its very centre. When Nicholas IV died in 1292 the cardinals took two years before electing the hermit, Peter of Murrone, who became Celestine V. This represented a short-lived triumph for those elements in the Church, such as the Spiritual Franciscans, who were in revolt against the excessive concentration of the papacy upon administration and politics during the previous century. It met with predictable disaster, for within a few months the papal administration was in chaos and Celestine was persuaded to resign. At Christmas 1294 Cardinal Benedict Gaetani was elected as Boniface VIII.⁹³ He was a man of entirely different temper and experience, fully in tune with the lawyer-popes who had preceded him. There is no doubt that he was able, but his personality was flawed by a lack of diplomacy and tact. He was uncompromising and arrogant when he believed himself right, and it was perhaps because of this that the developments of the thirteenth century came to a head during his pontificate. Moreover, he had many enemies. Within Italy he had alienated the Colonna clan by his excessive favours to his own family, the Gaetani. The groups which the Spiritual Franciscans represented deeply resented the removal of their candidate and blamed Boniface for it. Finally, in 1296, Boniface provoked a headlong collision with the ruler of the most powerful state in western Europe, the 'Most Christian King of France', Philip IV.

Both Edward I of England and Philip IV were taxing their clergy to finance their war with each other. In February 1296 Boniface issued the bull *Clericis laicos* in which he placed under interdict those who taxed the clergy without the pope's permission, since this contravened a decree of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. Boniface's vulnerability at once became evident. Philip IV effectively blocked the receipt of papal taxation

from France, while Boniface's Italian enemies called for a council to try him for heresy and simony. The pope seems to have decided that prudent retreat was the best course, and in July 1297, in the bull *Etsi de statu*, he gave the kings the right to decide when the kingdom was in danger and therefore when the clergy should be taxed.⁹⁴ The next month he authorised the canonisation of Louis IX, Philip's admired grandfather. The conflict then subsided, but the basic issue of the relative authority of pope and king in the Capetian lands remained unsettled. In 1301 Bernard Saisset, Bishop of Pamiers, on very thin evidence based upon the depositions of tortured servants and some drunken personal attacks upon the king by the bishop himself, was tried and condemned for blasphemy, heresy, simony and treason by the king's officials, without reference to the pope. Boniface reacted to this new outrage upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and by implication, upon papal authority, by a series of demands that Philip justify himself, which culminated in the bull *Ausculta fili* of December 1301. It was quite clear and established law that the Roman pontiff had supreme power over ecclesiastical dignities, but the king abused this by impeding collations, dragging prelates and clerics before the royal tribunal and taking the revenues of vacant benefices. The pope was therefore determined to summon a council in Rome to deal with these matters.⁹⁵

Philip's government acted equally vigorously. The bull was replaced by a slanted summary of its main points which gave the impression that the pope was claiming the feudal overlordship of France, while on 10 April 1302 an assembly of estates was called to add the backing of public opinion to what the government was presenting as an attack upon the French people. The king's reply stated that despite the fact that it had always been recognised that he and his predecessors held the kingdom from God alone, the pope had decreed that the king should submit to him in temporal matters and should hold the kingdom directly from the papacy. The pope had also called to his presence the prelates and university theologians of France for the purpose of correcting the alleged excesses and abuses committed by the king and his officers against the clergy and churches. This was simply a pretext to impoverish and ruin the kingdom by depriving it of some of its best men. The Church of Rome oppressed the Gallican Church by its reservations and arbitrary collations of important sees so that they were placed in the hands of strangers. At the same time the churches had been crushed by financial exactions. These abuses had developed to such an extent under Boniface VIII that they could not be tolerated any longer.⁹⁶

The French clergy now faced an acute dilemma of divided loyalties. They wrote querulously to the pope, telling him of the grave scandals which had arisen in France because the laity no longer held them in any esteem, and they pleaded with him to revoke the edict for the council, that peace might be re-established within the Church of France.⁹⁷ Boniface had no intention of another retreat in the ignominious fashion of 1297. The council was held early in November 1302, and was followed by the issue of the famous bull *Unam sanctam* which, basing its arguments and language upon two centuries of papal tradition, set forth uncompromisingly the doctrine of papal supremacy. In the summer of 1303, the pope drew up the bull *Super petri solio*, excommunicating Philip. He intended to publish this on 8 September.⁹⁸

However, the government of Philip IV had not been inactive. In June 1303, William of Nogaret, Philip's leading minister since 1302, framed charges against Boniface, including murder, idolatry, sodomy, simony and heresy. A council should be assembled to try the pope.⁹⁹ Nor were these empty words. Assemblies were held in Paris and in the provinces where the pope's crimes were enumerated.¹⁰⁰ In August 1303 Nogaret travelled to Italy with a small escort and, on 7 September, together with members of the Colonna family, burst upon the pope at Anagni. They insulted and threatened him, but the plan did not succeed, for Nogaret and the Colonna quarrelled, and Nogaret had not the resources to take the pope back to France in the face of growing opposition. He was forced to release Boniface. But the pope, now well into his eighties, died the following month.¹⁰¹

The new pope, Benedict XI, endeavoured to calm the political climate both by delay and by separating his dealings with Philip from those with his advisers, especially Nogaret. Between March and May 1304 he lifted all sentences upon Philip and on the Colonna, but Nogaret remained excommunicated.¹⁰² From this time therefore Nogaret retained a personal interest in the demand for a trial, now posthumous, of Boniface VIII, and pursued this goal with great determination until action was eventually taken in 1310 and 1311. This demand became interwoven with the trial of the Templars, and had an enduring impact upon Clement V's policies. Benedict's measures had restored the king and the kingdom of France to the status which they held before the issue of the bulls of Boniface VIII. But Benedict died on 7 July 1304, and the cardinals were once more forced into conclave to find a suitable candidate for what had now become two almost irreconcilable parties: the Bonifacians and the partisans of France. For this reason they eventually turned to the Gascon, Bertrand of Got, as a compromise.

Clement was crowned on 14 November in the Church of Saint-Just in Lyon by the Cardinal Napoleone Orsini, leader of the pro-French faction in the conclave. The ceremony over, a solemn procession left the church and began to wind its way through the narrow streets, packed with spectators. The pope rode a white palfrey; his bridle was held on one side by the king's brother, Charles of Valois, and on the other by John, Duke of Brittany. Immediately behind rode the king himself. Suddenly, a section of a wall collapsed under the unaccustomed weight of the spectators and fell upon the papal party. John of Brittany was mortally wounded, Charles of Valois was seriously injured, and Clement was thrown from his horse. Clement was shaken but not badly hurt, but to those who saw and talked of the incident, this seemed a bad omen for the success of the reign.¹⁰³ Indeed, there were many who were ready to accept such an interpretation, for neither the Italians nor the French had much time for Gascons. As the Florentine merchant and politician, Dino Compagni, saw it: 'Divine justice, which often punishes in hidden ways, and takes good pastors away from wicked people who do not deserve them and gives them instead that which their malice deserves, took from them Pope Benedict.'¹⁰⁴ Certainly Clement carried a heavy weight from the past. To invest the pretensions of the reforming popes once more with some kind of reality and to erase with dignity and honour the scandals of recent years needed vision, drive, health, and above all, opportunity, but Clement possessed none of these. Throughout his pontificate illness rendered him inactive from time to time: in August 1306 he was 'on the edge of the tomb', and during September he was unable to conduct business. Again, the following year, while travelling to meet King Philip IV at Poitiers, illness forced him to break his journey for fifteen days at the monastery of Baignes. These attacks became more frequent as he grew older, particularly after 1309.¹⁰⁵

He had been elected mainly for his negative qualities. He seems to have survived the vicissitudes of the long-running conflict between Edward I and Philip IV over the possession of Gascony without alienating either monarch. Nor he did appear strongly attached to either the Bonifacian or the French party in the disputes of 1296–97 and 1302–03. He owed his appointments in Comminges and Bordeaux to Boniface and he had attended the pope's council in Rome in November, 1302.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, he had also been present at the assembly in Paris in April earlier that year and thus party to the appeal of the French prelates to Boniface asking him not to hold the planned council. To the French he must have seemed potentially more tractable than any remote Italian.¹⁰⁷

The Cardinal Napoleone Orsini, pensioner of the king of France to the extent of 1,000 florins per annum since 1303, wrote, after Clement's death, that by the choice of the late pope the cardinals believed that 'the kingdom and the king had been magnificently exalted',¹⁰⁸ and indeed, it had quickly become evident that Philip and his government could effectively keep papal independence within quite narrow limits. The coronation had been at Lyon despite the pope's initial choice of Vienne,¹⁰⁹ and once the formalities were completed, Philip and his ministers were on hand to ensure that French affairs remained the chief papal preoccupation. On 15 December the number of cardinals was increased from sixteen to twenty-eight, of whom sixteen were Italian, ten French, one English and one Spanish. It has been calculated that relatives of the pope and royal partisans from the French clergy reduced the Bonifacians in the Sacred College to a minority of nine.¹¹⁰ John Burgunyó, the Aragonese ambassador to the papal court, frustrated at his lack of access to the new pope, wrote to James II telling him that it was the common view – which 'we believe to be true' – that Clement would do whatever Philip IV wished.¹¹¹ Four of the new cardinals, Nicolas of Fréauville, Berengar Frédol, Stephen of Suisy and Peter of la Chapelle, played prominent roles in the proceedings against the Templars, both in the negotiations between pope and king and in the tribunals which conducted inquiries against the Order in 1308 and after. At least two were pensioners of the king. In 1306 Stephen of Suisy was granted an annual pension of 1,000 *livres tournois*, and in October 1308 Peter of la Chapelle received a payment of 16,000 *petites livres tournois*.¹¹² Philip also made progress on specific issues as well. In the following months Clement quashed the proceedings against the Colonna for their part in the attack at Anagni and revoked the bulls *Clericis laicos* and *Unam sanctam*. A tenth for three years was granted for Philip's Flemish wars. He was, however, more circumspect with the more extreme of French wishes: the canonisation of Celestine V and the inauguration of proceedings against Boniface VIII. Here can be seen the personal interest of Nogaret, who was particularly concerned about his continued excommunication.¹¹³

Throughout 1306 affairs in France continued to keep the pope fully occupied – he was vitally interested in a negotiated peace between England and France as a prelude to the gathering of a new crusade and knew that no progress could be made in either matter if he went to Rome. In May 1306 he met Philip at Poitiers to discuss these affairs and the matter of the trial of Boniface. Meanwhile, he proposed that the king abandon the proceedings against Boniface in return for the annulment of

all the pope's acts against France. Nogaret was to be absolved but, as a penance, he was to go on a crusade within five years from which he could only return with the pope's permission. But the king rejected this compromise.¹¹⁴ It was this web of circumstance which finally contributed to Clement's decision in 1308 to set up a papal establishment at Avignon, just outside the kingdom of France, on a semi-permanent basis. Clement's attempts to make a fresh start in relations with the French monarchy stemmed from his conviction that no new crusade would be possible without French support. Neither Celestine V nor Benedict XI had reigned long enough to be of any practical help to the Holy Land, while Boniface VIII's conflicts with Philip IV and the Colonna so preoccupied him that he never asked for advice on the planning of a new crusade in the manner of Gregory X or Nicholas IV.¹¹⁵ Clement, however, showed his commitment from the outset; his summons to the two grand masters was a public demonstration of his seriousness.

The pope had asked the masters for advice on two main issues: the organisation of a new crusade and the union of the military orders. In response James of Molay prepared reports on both subjects, although Fulk of Villaret seems to have written only about the crusade, since in June, 1306, he had begun to organise the conquest of Rhodes, which he clearly saw as an exclusively Hospitaller project.¹¹⁶ On the question of the crusade, Clement had asked 'what was the best course of action, a great or a small expedition?' Not surprisingly, in these circumstances, although he realised that a general expedition would eventually be needed, Villaret favoured preliminary naval actions, which would be used both to blockade and to attack Egypt.¹¹⁷ Molay, however, had no such agenda, and, clearly influenced by the disaster at Ruad, only four years before, regarded any small-scale expedition as suicidal.¹¹⁸ With no secure base to fall back on such an expedition would be completely isolated in the face of an enemy which could muster, he estimated, 12 to 15,000 horsemen and 40 to 50,000 sergeant bowmen in the region of Jerusalem alone, not taking account of Egyptian forces under the sultan himself. The kingdom of Lesser Armenia (Cilicia) – a country whose inhabitants he did not trust and the climate of which he regarded as unhealthy – was not a practical alternative. Within a year, he reckoned that a force of 4,000 would have been reduced to 500, and brave men should not be sent to die in the company of unreliable Armenians, perhaps even before they could engage the Mamluks, since Turcomans, Kurds and Bedouins blocked the passes into Syria.¹¹⁹

For Molay, the only answer was 'a large all-embracing expedition to destroy the infidels and restore the blood-spattered Holy Land of Christ'.

By this he meant utilising the resources of Latin Christendom as a whole, using Venice, Genoa and other maritime cities as carriers. Perhaps drawing on his experience of the fruitless raids of the 1290s he emphasised that he did not mean that this should be a naval expedition, since the Christians had control of the sea in any case and equipping war galleys was both costly and inefficient. Basing his estimate on a remark supposedly made by the Sultan Baybars, to the effect that if the Franks mustered more than 15,000 knights he would leave the field, he recommended a force of 12 to 15,000 armed horsemen (2,000 of whom should be crossbowmen) and 5,000 foot soldiers. They would gather in Cyprus and then sail to a secret destination in the Holy Land. For Molay the rejection of the idea of a small-scale expedition did not preclude the need for immediate aid to Cyprus nor the mobilisation of 10 galleys under the command of Rogeron, son the late Roger of Lauria, to prevent the Italian maritime cities from trading with the Mamluks, a practice he knew was widespread. Any galleys captured by this means should be impounded and those responsible placed under a strict ban 'from which they could not be easily absolved on their return as has sometimes been the case in the past'.¹²⁰

Molay's report on a possible new crusade was an important practical contribution to a current problem, based on over forty years' experience, much of which had been spent in the East under circumstances of great pressure. It reflects a continuing commitment to the crusade and to the role of the military orders in any attempt to recapture the holy places. However, he had more difficulty presenting his views on the proposal to unite the military orders, a scheme to which he was very much opposed, but was obliged by the pope to discuss. It was, he thought, an old idea which had been thoroughly considered in the past and found to be wanting. It had been rejected at the council of Lyon in 1274 partly because of objections from the Spanish rulers and, as Molay saw it, had been disinterred in 1291 by Nicholas IV simply as a means of deflecting criticism of his own inadequate response to the evident Mamluk danger. Thereafter, Boniface VIII 'made several statements on this topic, and yet, after considering everything, he thought it better to close the matter completely'. The master's particular concern was what he called the 'danger to souls' caused by changing the nature of the institution to which entrants had sworn their vows, leading to internal quarrels and armed conflict, thus resulting in 'the opposite of what had been achieved so far'. He stressed that the Hospital and the Temple were not in fact the same, since the emphasis of each was quite different; the Hospital was

'founded on hospitality', while the Temple was 'founded expressly for military service'. Any union would inevitably result in the diminution of both elements. On the other hand, external rivalry was quite different, stimulating the two orders to try to outdo each other in their efforts to help the Holy Land, just as the Dominicans and Franciscans strove to recruit outstanding men to preach the word of God. Pilgrims and crusaders were well aware of the services provided by the military orders, which acted as vanguard and rearguard of the armies. The tradition of the complementary nature of the two orders, seen at the time of the Templars' foundation, evidently lived on in Molay's mind and was therefore probably part of the institutional memory of the Order. Molay did add a short section on the advantages of union. Two points were especially relevant: the orders could defend their rights more strongly in a world in which people were no longer accustomed 'to be very devout to men of religion' as they had been in the past, and they could reduce expenses to such an extent that 'the savings would be enormous'. As other treatises of the period show, the last point seems to have been a major argument for union, and Molay's admission of this was perhaps more significant than he realised. Nevertheless, whatever their views on union and whatever their criticisms of the orders' defects, the authors of crusading proposals of the post-1291 era all assumed their continuing role in any plans for recovery. When he arrived in France in late 1306 for his meeting with Clement V, James of Molay must have been confident that, as he said in his report on the idea of union, the orders 'who are subject to obedience, are better suited and more useful for reconquering and guarding the Holy Land than other peoples are'.

THE FRENCH MONARCHY

When Philip the Fair became king in October 1285 he was the eleventh member of his family in the direct male line to occupy the French throne, and he represented a tradition which reached back to the accession of Hugh Capet in 987.¹²¹ Initially, the authority of the dynasty had been largely restricted to the royal demesne centred on the Ile-de-France, but the steady enforcement of the rights of feudal overlordship, at first on a small scale against the petty vassals of the royal demesne, and then in conflict with the might of the Angevin Empire during the reign of Philip II (1180–1223), had greatly increased the dynasty's prestige and real power. Philip II's defeat of the Angevin John Lackland had added Normandy, Anjou, Maine and Touraine to the royal demesne, giving access to a long

stretch of coastline, and turning the Capetians into a major north European power. The expansion of the physical limits of the kingdom was matched by the growth of financial resources: 72 per cent between 1179 and 1203, and another 70 per cent between 1203 and 1221.¹²² Other gains followed in the thirteenth century. The county of Toulouse fell after the blows of the Albigensian Crusade, and in 1229 Count Raymond VII was obliged to cede part of his lands to his daughter, who was married into a cadet branch of the royal house. In 1271 Toulouse reverted directly to the royal demesne. The monarchy had also been strengthened by the support of the Church, which regarded kingship as divinely ordained, and welcomed the protection and peace which a strong king might give. The sacred character of royalty was emphasised by an elaborate coronation ceremony at Reims, where new kings were anointed with holy oil, which, according to legend, had been brought by a dove from heaven for the baptism of Clovis in 496 and was supposed never to diminish.¹²³

To this monarchy Philip the Fair's grandfather, Louis IX (1226–70), added a much more ambitious interpretation of the role of the Capetian kings than had previously been the case, for he believed, more fervently than any of his predecessors, that he had received his throne in trust from God and that it was his duty to govern according to a rigorous interpretation of Christian principles, which should be applied both to his personal life and to the everyday tasks of his office. The power to heal the disease of scrofula by touch, asserted by the kings since the early eleventh century, was regularly employed by Louis, whose character and demeanour made the claim all the more convincing. Most importantly, he spent time and resources on two great crusades to Egypt and Palestine between 1248 and 1254 and to Tunis in 1270, in a commitment which far exceeded that of either his contemporaries or his ancestors.¹²⁴ As a result, he was able to exploit the quasi-religious character of the Capetian kings, to develop the idea of 'theocratic kingship'¹²⁵ which, carried to its logical conclusion, was antipathetic to feudal ideas of consent. Ultimately a king must follow his holy duty in endeavouring to achieve the salvation of his people, existing man-made restrictions notwithstanding. Louis IX therefore bequeathed to his successors a very special sacred function, unique to the French monarchy. In his preface to his lives of Louis IX and his son, Philip III, William of Nangis, a contemporary who was a monk at Saint-Denis, stressed the duties and responsibilities of this function which Philip IV would have to undertake. He sent the work to the king so that 'knowing the vigorous and praiseworthy acts of such princes as

your grandfather and father, you should have them as an example of virtue like a mirror, and you should rejoice in the Lord that you have derived your origin from blood so good and praiseworthy'.¹²⁶

Philip IV therefore inherited the raw material which could be forged into what has been called a 'political theology',¹²⁷ a means of focusing loyalty upon the monarchy. However, the effectiveness of this would be severely limited without an administrative structure which could match the vaulting ambition implicit in Capetian theory. The simple structure of the past needed expanding. Philip II had already begun this process by appointing salaried officials in the royal demesne called *baillis* in the north and *sénéchaux* in the south. At the same time, at the centre, the old institutions of the household had been enlarged to cope with the increasing flow of documentation which Philip's legal and military activity had provoked, and fixed places of administration were established. Changes were therefore occurring which were ultimately to alter the nature of government, but as yet the basic objectives remained the same. The paid officials, the settled institutions, the embryo capital at Paris, were there so that the kings could utilise the lifeblood of Capetian government: the enforcement of the monarchy's feudal rights. But, after Louis IX, the French monarchs began to find more and more difficulties in maintaining the system in workable order, for monarchical pretensions had begun to outpace practical means. Philip the Fair was the first of these monarchs to be forced fully to face the new problems which grew out of the very success of the Capetians as feudal monarchs.

Contemporaries seem agreed on his general appearance: tall and handsome, with pale, fair colouring. He was a good knight and hunter.¹²⁸ There is no doubt that he cut an imposing figure. The Templar of Tyre's description of him, which seems to have been derived from observation, says that he was 'a very big man, more than a palm's breadth taller than other tall men, with bones bigger than beams . . . His hips and thighs were so large that when he was mounted, his feet were within a palm's breadth of the ground. He was so handsome of face, and so fair-skinned and so blond, that in his time there was no one more handsome than he, and anyone who has seen him knows well that what I have told you is the very truth'.¹²⁹ He certainly took seriously the obligations imposed on him by his ancestors, especially his grandfather, and his 'fervency in the faith', expressed both in his personal conduct and in his policies, seems to have been an abiding characteristic. Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the condemnation of his daughters-in-law for adultery in 1314, a scandal which tainted his family and contained no political advantage

whatsoever, yet which he pursued relentlessly. Two of the women, Margaret and Blanche, wives of Louis and Charles, were imprisoned for their alleged affairs with two brothers, knights in the royal household, while the third, Joan, wife of Philip, was accused of complicity. The two knights were publicly tortured and executed.¹³⁰

It is not therefore surprising to find that he applied these rigorous moral standards to public matters at all levels. In the two high profile cases of the posthumous proceedings against Boniface VIII and the trial of Guichard, Bishop of Troyes, both men were presented as enemies of Christian society. William of Nogaret's foray to Anagni in November, 1302, had been prompted by the idea that the pope could be judged by a council of the Church for alleged crimes of sodomy, heresy and simony. Nogaret failed in his aim on this occasion, but the French government continued to pursue the pope after his death. This came to a head in hearings held in Avignon in March, 1310, which ultimately the king was persuaded to leave unresolved, but it is noticeable that Philip never actually agreed to drop the accusations.¹³¹ Philip had a direct personal interest in the second case. In 1308 Guichard, Bishop of Troyes, was accused of causing the death of Queen Joan, three years before, by sorcery. In the 1290s the bishop had been an important figure in the administration of the county of Champagne, which was a part of the patrimony of Blanche of Artois, the Queen Mother, but had fallen from favour after being accused of accepting bribes. There is no doubt that Guichard had made enemies during his career, but the transformation of financial misdemeanour into murder by sorcery seems to have come from the king, for it is clear that many contemporaries found the accusations hard to credit. Unlike the proceedings against Boniface VIII, this case was of little relevance to governmental policy and in the end Guichard was not convicted. Nevertheless, he spent three years in prison and never regained his see.¹³² Philip's moral sense led him to crush much smaller fry as well. In June 1310, a woman called Margaret Porete was burnt to death as a 'free spirit', on the basis of her writings which suggested she believed in the possibility of the union of the soul with God outside Paradise, while Guiard of Cressonessart was condemned to prison for supporting her. While the king cannot be shown to be directly involved, these cases were prosecuted by William of Paris, the papal inquisitor in France, who was also the king's confessor.¹³³

However, it is difficult to construct a truly comprehensive picture of the personality of King Philip, for it is veiled by a small group of ministers who seem to formulate and execute policy. From the 1290s the

dominant figure was Peter Flote, Keeper of the Seals and head of the Chancery until his death in 1302, and thereafter it was William of Nogaret, who became Keeper of the Seals in 1307. Nogaret retained his pre-eminence until his death in 1313, but from about 1310 increasingly the royal chamberlain, Enguerrand of Marigny, seems to have been the most influential minister. Flote, who came from a noble family in the Dauphiné, and Nogaret, who came from near Toulouse and was ennobled by the king in 1299, were lawyers, the leading representatives of the so-called *légestes*, who were so prominent during Philip IV's reign.¹³⁴ Closely associated with Nogaret was another lawyer, William of Plaisians, who often acted on Nogaret's behalf. Marigny is less typical of the ruling coterie. He came from the *petite noblesse* of the Norman Vexin and had had no education comparable to the lawyers. His real forte lay in finance and diplomacy, and he became effective head of financial affairs in 1308. During the last three or four years of the reign, the reorientation of royal policy away from the great juristic battles of Flote and Nogaret seems to have been the consequence of Marigny's influence.¹³⁵

Contemporaries are not very helpful in revealing the man beyond these ministers. When they disapproved of the king's actions, most adhered to the conventional line, as, for instance, is reflected by the monk Ives of Saint-Denis, who blamed exceptional currency alterations and heavy taxation 'more on the advice of his counsellors than on the instigation of the king himself'.¹³⁶ Some were less restrained. An anonymous writer from the early years of the reign attacked the king because he had surrounded himself with *villani*, thieves and plunderers of all kinds, men who were by nature brutal, corrupt and malignant. These men were a canker which should be purged, if the body politic was to regain its health. Justice was not administered, for the king was almost entirely occupied in pursuing his favourite occupation of hunting.¹³⁷ Even more direct was Bernard Saisset, Bishop of Pamiers, who was to pay heavily for his criticisms. He was reported as comparing the king to an owl, which the birds of antiquity had chosen as their king, for none was more beautiful. In fact, it was a worthless bird, good for absolutely nothing. The bishop had allegedly said that 'such was our king of France, who was more handsome than any man in the world, and who knew nothing at all except to stare at men'. He added that

there was more, since the kingdom of France would perish during the time of this king, for, when he was abbot of Pamiers, Saint Louis had told him many times that in this reign the kingdom would perish, since he was the tenth king since Hugh Capet.¹³⁸

In contrast, others idealised him. William of Nogaret, whose elevation and subsequent landed prosperity stemmed almost entirely from royal favour, offered the following eulogy during the posthumous proceedings against Boniface VIII.

The lord king was born of the progeny of the kings of France, who all, from the time of King Pepin, from whose line the said king is known to have descended, have been religious, fervent champions of the faith, and strong defenders of the Holy Mother Church. They have ejected many schismatics who have invaded the Roman Church, nor could any of them have had a more just cause than this king. The king has always in his marriage, both before and after, been chaste, humble, modest of face and in speech, never angry, hating no one, envying no one, loving all. Full of grace, charity, piety and mercy, always following truth and justice, never a detraction in his mouth, fervent in the faith, religious in his life, building basilicas and engaging in works of piety, handsome of face and graceful in manner, graceful even to all his enemies when they are in his presence, through his hands, God affords clear miracles to the sick.¹³⁹

Modern historians remain divided. Joseph Strayer believed Philip was the controlling power in the reign, the director of overall policy and, at times, even the supervisor of much detail. His servants were chosen by him and none dominated affairs throughout the entire reign.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, Robert-Henri Bautier argued that Philip's narrow piety, intensified after the death of his wife, Joan of Navarre, in 1305, was open to exploitation by his close advisers, and that his interest in affairs was limited to quite specific subjects. For Bautier, Nogaret was a skilful manipulator of a credulous monarch. More recently, in a comprehensive study of his character and personality, Elizabeth Brown has reasserted Strayer's view that Philip retained a strong grasp on affairs, but allows that his advisers did indeed take advantage of their position to steer him in directions which suited their policy ends, playing on the king's rigid morality, itself derived from his desire to emulate his grandfather.¹⁴¹

By 1285 the strength of the Capetian monarchy was evident: a general acceptance as feudal overlord in France, the support of the Church which elevated the king as a quasi-religious figure, membership of a venerable and ancient line, now indisputably legitimate kings of France, a record of crusading unmatched by any other dynasty. But the weaknesses of this inheritance only became clear as the reign progressed. Four major fiefs remained outside the royal demesne, and each presented special problems which did not prove amenable to the feudal solution so ably propounded by Philip II and Louis IX. These fiefs were Flanders, Gascony, Brittany

and Burgundy. The peculiar problems of the last two showed themselves most markedly during the fourteenth and fifteen centuries, but Flanders and Gascony offered more immediate difficulties.

The position of Gascony had been created by the Treaty of Paris (1259) which had been negotiated between Louis IX and Henry III. Henry III gave up his dynasty's claims to the lost lands of the old Angevin Empire, but was confirmed as the duke of Gascony, holding it in fief from the king of France. But there remained the temptation for the French monarchy to try to subjugate this fief, as it had done so often before, or at least make it more amenable to central authority. Opportunities presented themselves frequently, for under feudal law the Gascon vassals of the English king had the right to appeal to their overlord's court, the *Parlement* of Paris, if they felt that they had been unjustly treated. However, French intervention had far wider implications than with most other fiefs, for it brought conflict not simply with the duke of Gascony, but also with the king of England, who could call upon resources outside the duchy and could mobilise allies on a European scale. In 1295 the latent rivalry which stemmed from the anomalous position of the fief showed itself in a violent sea battle between Gascon and Norman sailors. The usual feudal response followed. Philip cited Edward I, in his capacity as duke, to appear before his *Parlement*; Edmund of Lancaster, the king's brother, was sent in his stead. It was agreed to put the main fortresses of the fief of Gascony under the control of the French royal officials for a forty-day period while an inquiry took place. The French officials, following the methods of feudal encroachment which typified past Capetian policy, were slow to hand back the fortresses. War followed. Between 1294 and 1296 the French king's forces occupied most of Gascony and the following year even assembled a fleet to invade England. Although in 1298 a truce was mediated by Boniface VIII, and a marriage alliance negotiated, the basic problems remained.¹⁴²

Throughout the conflict Edward had been deeply occupied with Welsh and Scottish affairs, and had therefore largely relied upon subsidising continental allies, the most important of whom was Guy of Dampierre, Count of Flanders. Flanders was heavily feudalised, but also had important cities which owed their wealth to the textile industry based on English wool. Power was contested between the urban patriciate and the craft guilds, and if the French monarchy wished to assert itself there, it had to take account of all these factors. The French Crown pursued its alleged rights with extreme rigour. A tax of a fiftieth, imposed in the Flemish towns as a contribution towards the war with England, helped to

push the count into alliance with England. This provoked the French counter of an invasion of Flanders and defeat for the Flemish in 1297. When Edward made peace in 1297, Guy was left isolated. The French therefore had little difficulty in occupying most of the major cities of the county in 1300 and it seemed that Flanders would soon be annexed. But the count had traditionally looked for support among the craft elements in the towns, for the ruling oligarchies were always determinedly pro-French. Attempts by the French occupying forces to extract further tax from the urban communities served only to exacerbate class conflict, for the patricians passed on the brunt of these new demands to the crafts. The result was the revolt known as the 'matins of Bruges' on 18 May 1302, in which a large number of the French were massacred. This opened a long and expensive series of wars for the French monarchy. In July a powerful French army was defeated by the Flemings at Courtrai, and Peter Flote was killed. This serious reverse was never fully compensated for, although at Mons-en-Pévèle in August 1304, the Flemings were forced to retire, and the treaty of Athis-sur-Orge (June 1305) was imposed upon them. In theory the conditions were harsh – the destruction of town defences, the count to pay a heavy indemnity, the people of Bruges to go on a pilgrimage of expiation – but the treaty was never fully implemented, for the French monarchy did not have the strength to strike the decisive blow. Despite the occupation of certain towns as guarantees, despite two conferences at Tournai in 1311, despite even the annexation of Douai, Béthune and Lille to the royal demesne, Flanders could not be completely subdued, and the problem dragged on to face Philip's successors.¹⁴³

The existence of the Gascon and Flemish problems entailed expenditure on a hitherto unprecedented scale for which the French monarchy of the thirteenth century was not prepared. The situation had been complicated at the outset by the inheritance of large debts from the previous reign, incurred when Philip III unwisely undertook a crusade against Aragon, which had expenses estimated at not far short of 1.5 million *livres tournois*.¹⁴⁴ What had in the past been largely a matter of enforcing feudal rights, often in a piecemeal and opportunistic fashion, now contained the potentiality of large-scale and prolonged wars. Such wars demanded finance on a parallel scale: Joseph Strayer estimated that, between 1294 and 1299 the war with England cost the Crown at least 1.73 million *livres tournois*. Throughout his reign the root of the problems of Philip IV can be found in this financial weakness. The French monarchy did not receive large regular grants of taxation which would pay for a standing army, but

instead was forced to rely upon irregular payments related to specific emergencies and the assembly of a feudal host of dubious efficiency and limited utility for the type of warfare which was now required. Moreover, Philip IV presided over an administration in which specialisation of function, although sophisticated compared with the early Capetians, in that household and public expenditure were being separated under the *Chambre aux Deniers* and the *Chambre des Comptes* respectively, was nevertheless incomplete. At the same time, the number of salaried officials at the disposal of these organs of administration was insufficient and their attitudes lacked the impersonality of a modern civil service. The violence and disruption of the reign stem from these deficiencies which were imposed by the problems created in the attempts to extend the king's power over Flanders and Gascony. The attack on the Templars must be seen in the context of the many methods employed by the French government in its efforts to relieve the acute financial problems of the reign.

Above and beyond the resources of his own demesne, the monarch was entitled to ask his vassals for a feudal aid on the knighting of his eldest son and the marriage of his eldest daughter, and these were paid in 1313 and 1308 respectively, but such aids could hardly finance a sustained war effort, and a more general and regular form of taxation had to be found. The ancient liability of all men to defend the realm when called upon seemed at first to be a promising means of creating regular tax returns. An intensive effort was made to collect such taxes in the period 1295 to 1300, and was continued until 1305, but the results were disappointing. At first an attempt was made to collect this tax in the form of a general subsidy as a hundredth or fiftieth of capital or revenue. However, resistance was strong and payment irregular. Officials were often obliged to bargain with local powers and sometimes they were forced to accept a much lower sum than they had originally asked for, simply to gain quick payment, for when a campaign was imminent delay could be very damaging. From 1300 the government had explicitly to accept that the payment was in lieu of military service, and did not try to collect taxation as a general subsidy. Even so, it was still necessary to sugar the demands when dealing with the nobility. Some lords were allowed to summon their own contingents for the royal army, and after the government had fixed the tax required, they were allowed to collect at a higher rate to their own profit. Sometimes officials had to say that they were collecting without prejudice to ancient immunities in deference to those lords who claimed themselves exempt. Negotiations with individual lords or with assemblies of notables often involved some sort of concession, such as the confirmation of noble

privileges, the promise of exemption from all other taxes or from forced loans, or a specific prohibition on collection if a peace were made. Under Philip IV schemes of general taxation were still inextricably linked to particular wars and campaigns; the government failed to provide regular sums for annual budgets irrespective of the state of the country. A clear sign of recognised failure can be seen in the fact that after 1305 the government tried to avoid this kind of taxation, collecting only two general taxes on laymen on this basis until 1313.¹⁴⁵

It was not, however, necessary to pay such attention to the sensibilities of those lower down the social scale, where violence and arbitrary action by royal tax collectors was common. This seems to have been especially true of those parts of the south that had been forcibly subdued as heretical areas during the thirteenth century. There is a record of a series of complaints made by 9 communities in the Toulousain in 1298, concerning the financial exactions imposed upon them by the royal clerk, Peter of Latilly, and the royal knight, Ralph of Breuilly, during the previous year.¹⁴⁶ The case of the village of Laurac, a community of probably less than 500 people situated near Castelnaudary in the present *département* of Aude, is typical. One Tuesday in the autumn of 1297, 2 agents of Latilly and Breuilly, a notary, Raymond Durand, and another man known as Simonet, appeared in the village, accompanied by a band of about 24 sergeants. They had come to levy money which they claimed the community owed the king. At once they went briskly into action, taking securities from houses, even including clothes and bedding, and in some cases turning out the inhabitants, locking their houses and confiscating the keys. According to witnesses from the village, they then summoned 50 or 60 notables to the local *hôtel* and explained what payments they required. One man who refused to go was punched in the back. The consuls and notables were then obliged to go to Toulouse to appear before Latilly and Breuilly themselves, although when they got there, they were met by another royal notary, William of Gaudiès, who told them they would not leave the city until they had agreed to make a composition for the sums demanded. After some time, they gave in, agreeing to pay the immense sum, for a community so small, of 25,000 *sous toulousains* over the next 5 years, or alternatively 30,000 *sous toulousains* (or 3,000 *livres tournois*) in the course of the next 10 years. It was now necessary for the agreement made by the consuls to be ratified by the rest of the community, and 15 days later, Durand, backed by his men, again descended upon the village, where, at midday, he assembled the heads of each household – between 150 and 300 persons in all – in a room

in the place where pleas were usually heard for the royal court. When Durand told them what the consuls had agreed, there was a great deal of noisy discontent, from which there emerged a general refusal to pay. Durand therefore shut them up in the courtroom, with his sergeants guarding each exit. They were still there in the early hours of the morning. At length, Durand came back and told them that they would not leave until they had confirmed the payment. This seems finally to have ended the opposition, and each man filed past Durand, bible in his hand, and swore an oath to adhere to the agreement.

But the officials were not yet finished with Laurac, for Durand's sergeants came back twice more. On the first occasion they claimed 37.5 *livres* for the expenses of Durand and his men, and when this was not paid the consuls and 8 other villagers were taken off to Durand's residence at Avignonet, where they were subjected to the usual threats. Then Durand told them if they could not pay, his brother-in-law would lend them the money. The brother-in-law turned out to be an agent for a usurer in Toulouse, who charged them 15 *livres* for a loan of 37.5 *livres*. The second time that the sergeants came was to collect the first instalment of the composition which had fallen due. The community could not pay, and therefore the usual procedure of confiscations of movables, grain and animals, was put into motion, in lieu of direct payment.

The complaints of Laurac and the other eight communities were so vociferous that an inquiry was instituted into the matter in 1298, and it seems clear from the defence put forward that Latilly and Breuilly were unrepentant, for it was claimed that if seizures had been made then they were justified, for such action conformed with 'law and local custom' when those in debt to the king refused to make quittance. The consuls had agreed to pay however 'without threats or violence', and if the heads of households had been held for a time it had been 'scarcely one hour' and had been at the request of the consuls 'because the community did not understand the form of the *taille* to be imposed for the purpose of paying the composition'. Clerks and notaries who were present when the consuls and notables were taken to Toulouse claimed that the deputies from Laurac had, when taking leave of the commissioners, a very satisfied air and thanked them effusively. One said that there was joy on their faces, for they rejoiced at being the first in the Toulousain to have made a general composition. This contrasts with the witness from Laurac, who said that 'there were some who, from sadness and grief, were crying when the composition was made'.¹⁴⁷ Although the inquiry does seem to have resulted in an initial lifting of pressure in this region, it seems to have had

little permanent effect, for neither Latilly nor Breuilly appear to have been condemned, and there is reason to believe that by 1303 new financial exactions were being made in the south, albeit on a somewhat different basis.¹⁴⁸

A second possible method of raising money fairly regularly was to pick upon one particular group and lean heavily in this direction. Thus the clergy paid either a tenth of their income or annates or both, on twenty-four occasions between 1285 and 1314. In proportion to their numbers the clergy contributed more towards Philip's wars than any other single social group.¹⁴⁹ The urgency and violence of Philip's measures against Boniface VIII gain in clarity when examined in this way. The origin of this proportional tax upon the clergy can be found in the crusades, for successive popes had taxed the clergy to pay secular expenses for these expeditions, and soon monarchs began to take these taxes directly as a matter of course; the papacy had led the way in the misappropriation of the Church's incomes. In 1215 the Lateran Council had allowed taxation of the clergy on condition that papal permission was first acquired, and this formality had been adhered to under Louis IX and Philip III. Under Philip IV collection became more and more arbitrary as financial needs became desperate. There were frequent bitter laments about the methods employed by the royal officials.¹⁵⁰ In 1295 William *Le Maire*, Bishop of Angers, complained about the operation of legal sanctions on *amortissements*, or new property gained by the Church. William called the royal representatives 'officials of hell', who seize everything old or new, asserting that it is all new. 'How in these times the Church is oppressed and tortured, indeed stripped to the bone, when things are newly acquired, I have not the ability to describe. Certainly the wisdom of Solomon or the fluency of Demosthenes, the most eloquent of orators, would not be sufficient for this.' Another abuse was the exploitation of vacant sees. The king was entitled to the revenues of some sees during vacancies, but royal officials seem to have pushed this right to its limits. William cites the cases of the sees of Tours and Angers, where carpenters and woodcutters had been especially brought in to cut down valuable forests belonging to these sees, 'so that everything could be destroyed before the election'.¹⁵¹

Matters had not improved by 1299 when William was again outraged by the violent collection of tenths. Royal sergeants 'with a multitude of armed men, rushing up to abbeys and the houses of canons and other ecclesiastical persons, break into houses and doors, cellars, chests and barns, take what they can find with them, and sell it at a great market, so

that they can have the money immediately'. They seized horses belonging to the clergy, almost, it appears, from underneath them.

It recently happened at Angers that a certain archpriest, a worthy man, the chaplain of the bishop of Angers, and his clerk, going to the episcopal residence of the bishop of Angers on his business, had dismounted from their horses. These men having dismounted, having scarcely taken their feet out of the stirrups, certain sergeants of the lord king were present, as they said, who at once took and led away the horses with them.

Only an expensive monetary pledge could redeem the horses, together with the payment of 10 *sous* expenses.

Not being content with these excesses, after a few days, going to the house of this archpriest and breaking violently into his room, they took away his books. All of these things were most injuriously done, when the archpriest owed no tithe, since in the previous year, for which two tenths were asked, his benefice had been vacant through death and for it a settlement was made with the collectors of the lord king on the annates of the benefices.

For this a fine of 110 *livres* had been paid to the collectors.¹⁵²

Ostensibly some attempt was made to curb the royal officials. In 1299, in response to complaints from Reginald of Montbason, Archbishop of Tours, the king ordered his *baillis* in Tours and Cotentin to moderate their methods.

If because it is ordered by our curia that the temporalities of a prelate are to be seized, you are to be content for the main seisin with one manor and another small part, unless perhaps it is ordered that the seisin be extended to the greater part by stages for obstinate contumacy or the audacity of disobedience, not however proceeding to the seisin of the entire temporality, except when this is stated expressly in our letters, or unless the harshness of the action requires it.¹⁵³

An observer might be pardoned for mistaking this as a piece of tactical advice rather than an admonition for exceeding lawful authority.

During 1303 and 1304 the government's methods at last provoked clerical resistance on a wide scale, for the clergy felt strong enough to put up a series of conditions before payment, conditions which suggest the first germination of a movement which might be called 'constitutional'. An assembly at Bourges in 1304 had voted its tenth with conditions: it should be collected by the clergy, 'good money' should be restored (after the violent monetary alterations of the previous years), ecclesiastical

jurisdiction should be respected, new acquisitions by churches were to be allowed, the privileges of the Church of Bourges should be confirmed, and finally the temporalities of some of the churches in the province which had been seized should be restored.¹⁵⁴ It is not easy to judge the extent to which this resistance may have inhibited the government from making clerical tenths a regular, annual payment of a steady kind during the rest of the reign. The danger point seems to have been passed by 1305 and both Benedict XI and Clement V proved amenable in granting tenths, but the clerical ideas may have remained in the back of governmental minds and encouraged the search for other sources of income.

Nevertheless, the clergy continued to believe that they were being despoiled, for there were many more complaints during the church council held by the pope at Vienne in 1311–12. The abbot of Saint-Pierre, in the diocese of Tarbes, was not alone when he claimed that for his failure to recognise that the temporalities of the monastery were held from the king, the *sénéchal* of Bigorre had sent forty sergeants as a garrison who had devastated the place. He himself was dragged on foot to Tarbes, where he spent a long time in prison. After his release he found that the temporalities had still not been restored, that the monks and other ecclesiastics at the monastery had been expelled, that the movable goods, including the sacred vessels, had been carried off, that horses were being grazed in the precincts of the monastery, and that the divine offices had been suspended.¹⁵⁵

It is evident from governmental dealings with the clergy that the king was not averse to the use of force when and where it was necessary and if it were politically possible. The forced loan was a frequent expedient, especially during the war with England between 1294 and 1297. Individual merchants and urban communities often faced this threat and some preferred to make an outright gift of a smaller sum than was demanded as a loan, since they knew it was unlikely that the loan would ever be repaid. One such individual was a clerk called John Croissant to whom Philip wrote in September 1302, asking for a loan of 300 *livres tournois*. The king began by explaining how the needs of the kingdom had involved him in expenses 'without count and without number', and how he himself had made great personal sacrifices in his devotion to the cause. Croissant should therefore make the loan 'by reason of the love and fealty that you have for us and the kingdom', but adding that if he crossed him in this matter he would incur the royal indignation for ever. The loan should be paid into the Louvre at Paris without delay, for 'we know for certain that you can do this easily, either through yourself, or through your friends'.¹⁵⁶

The royal treasury succeeded in raising 630,000 *livres tournois* by this method during the reign.¹⁵⁷

There were other, at this time, comparatively minor sources of income. The *maltôte* was a tax on commercial transactions, which produced 16,000 *livres tournois* from the Italian merchants in the kingdom in 1295, and proved also to be another means of tapping the wealth of the towns. Certain occupations, like moneylending, were taxed, patents were sold for the export of certain goods, and on a small scale there was the beginning of sales of patents of nobility. As yet, however, none of these incomes can be seen as more than supplementary.¹⁵⁸ The fact was that regular organised taxation was foreign to the concepts of an age which still saw monetary exactions as exceptional and in response only to some special need, in particular imminent danger from warfare.

With the failure to establish a regular countrywide basis for taxation, or perhaps even the failure to recognise the proper use and value of such a system, the government cast around for other temporary expedients. Alteration of the coinage proved too tempting to resist. Capetian France had inherited the system of *livres, sous* and *deniers* of the Carolingians of which only the *deniers* or silver pennies were real money, the *livres* and *sous* being money of account. From the late twelfth century the Italian city-republics issued a silver *gros*, worth a *sou*, and from the mid-thirteenth century, a gold coin, a florin, worth a silver pound *gros*. In France, Louis IX created the *gros tournois* in 1266. But the relationship between real money and money of account was not fixed, and Philip IV exploited this anomaly. Between 1295 and 1306, Philip repeatedly debased the coinage, either by changing the relationship between money of account and specie or by new minting. The silver *gros tournois* which ought to have been valued at 9 *deniers* in 1303, given that under Louis IX it was valued at 12 *deniers* or a *sou*, was in fact issued at 2 *sous* 2 *deniers*.¹⁵⁹ In May 1295 a royal ordinance explained that the king had been obliged to issue a money 'in which perhaps there will be lacking a little of weight, alloy or condition, which our predecessors, the kings of France, had, in settled times, been accustomed to observe'.¹⁶⁰

The crown as debtor undoubtedly benefited, but the crown as tax collector began to lose. A *gros tournois* of 1295, worth one *sou*, would fetch three by 1305.¹⁶¹ Therefore, in June 1306 the king announced that he was returning the money to its state at the time of Louis IX and that from 8 September the weakened *gros tournois* would be worth only its intrinsic value. Suddenly, the money circulating in the kingdom depreciated two-thirds. Riots took place in Paris. According to the chronicler John of

Saint-Victor, 'the citizens of Paris, especially the paupers and ordinary people, who rented houses, on account of a three-fold rise in rents, caused conspiracy to be made first against the landlords of the houses and afterwards against the king'.¹⁶² Ironically, the king was forced to take refuge in the Templar fortress in Paris, while outside the crowd refused to allow any victuals or other necessities to be brought in, or anybody to go in or out, until the king spoke with them about the matter, although the king, plotting secret flight, had no intention of doing this. Frustrated in their attempts to see the king, the rioters turned their attention to a rich Parisian called Stephen Barbete, who they believed had advised the king to make the return to good money. They broke into his houses and burnt them, and destroyed his goods. The king was only able to restore order by armed force, and many people were killed. Those who were thought to be responsible were captured and hanged in January 1307. John of Saint-Victor commented laconically that 'by chance some who were innocent were hanged; others, however, not wishing to run any risks, sought safety in flight'.¹⁶³ There was unrest in the provinces too. In Châlons a riot was incited by 'the great and rich persons' of the town against the royal ordinance prescribing the return to strong money. The local *prévôt* and some royal officials were violently attacked, and sustained many injuries. In 1310 the inhabitants of Châlons were heavily fined for their rebelliousness, being sentenced to pay 2,000 *livres tournois* to Gerard of Presles, *Prévôt* of Laon, and 10,000 *livres tournois* to the crown.¹⁶⁴ However, despite discontent of this kind, the government continued to alter the currency in the years after 1306, according to the needs of the moment. In 1311 the Parisian *denier* was doubled in value; in 1313 there was another return to 'good money'.¹⁶⁵ For all the problems which the weakening of currency had brought, the return to good money nevertheless seems to have been a mistake. In the late thirteenth century the price of precious metals had been consistently high, and any sustained attempt to maintain the value of money of account in relation to precious metals at the standard set under Louis IX in 1266 was bound to leave the king short of stocks of precious metal; the necessity of finding a new source of this may ultimately have resulted in the arrest of the Templars in 1307.

There was one further expedient: rich groups were singled out who could be despoiled without public protest. One such group were the 'Lombards', merchants and bankers from the Italian city-republics. Two Lombards, Albizzo and Musciatto Guidi, filled the role of receivers of taxes for the crown in the 1290s, as well as acting as royal treasurers at various periods during the reign. In 1294 they advanced the king money

on the basis that they would be repaid with future taxation; they secured loans from other Italians in France of 600,000 *livres tournois*; in 1297 they lent the king 200,000 *livres tournois* of their own money. But Philip found it easier to despoil the Lombards and seize their assets than to establish them in a settled position through which he could expect steady, if less spectacular, monetary profits. There was a general arrest of Lombards in 1291, and throughout the 1290s individuals were subject to seizures, heavy fines and expulsions. From 1303 they were used less and less in the royal service and finally in 1311 all their goods and debts were appropriated and they were arrested.¹⁶⁶ According to a royal ordinance of that year, they caused 'the inhabitants of this kingdom to be devoured by usury, our money to be destroyed and our ordinances to be violated'.¹⁶⁷ The Jews also suffered. In 1295 the Jews of the *sénéchaussée* of Beaucaire were forced to hand over all 'usurious' profits and to reveal the details of their financial contracts,¹⁶⁸ and then, on about 22 July 1306 all the Jews were arrested and their property seized, and they were expelled from the kingdom.¹⁶⁹

The Templars were even more deeply involved in royal financial administration than the Lombards and the Jews, for they had first helped Louis VII as long ago as 1148, when they had loaned him money while he was on the Second Crusade. From the early thirteenth century the French Templars had acted as royal treasurers, working in close cooperation with the *baillis* and *sénéchaux*. In the first surviving royal account of 1202–03, the Temple is shown as the central *dépôt* for the surplus revenue derived from the *prévôtés* and *bailliages* of the royal demesne, and the place from which are paid out the expenses not covered by the local officials. Under Louis IX, the royal treasure was kept at the Temple. The *tablettes* of the royal Chamberlain, John Sarrasin, show a constant movement between the Temple treasury and the various services of the royal household. Between February 1256 and November 1257 alone, John Sarrasin received from the Temple sums in excess of 84,000 *livres parisis*.¹⁷⁰

However, during the first half of the reign of Philip IV, the Templars apparently became less crucial to the ordering of affairs. Philip III had already tried and failed to stop the Templars acquiring property in *mainmorte*, and Philip the Fair also attempted to enforce this prohibition by confiscating the property acquired by the Order since Louis IX's confirmation of their possessions in 1258.¹⁷¹ In this the Templars were not unique; other ecclesiastical bodies faced the same problems. The Order did, however, lose its dominant position within royal financial administration, for between 1292 and 1295, the bulk of the royal treasure was

transferred to the Louvre, partly as a result of reorganisation and partly because the stresses placed upon the Order after 1291 made it less capable of providing the kind of services available in the past.¹⁷² Nevertheless, the crown continued to employ the Templars on less regular financial commissions, and in the financial crisis which followed the defeat at Courtrai in 1302, the Templars once more took over part of the royal financial administration. In July 1303, Hugh of Pairaud, Visitor of the Temple in France, was ordered to collect the war subsidy for the kingdom, except for the *sénéchaussées* of Toulouse and Rouergue.¹⁷³ Pairaud was among those who had supported the French monarchy against Boniface VIII in the previous month, and in June 1304 the king made a general confirmation of Templar property in France.¹⁷⁴ The Order retained an active role in the royal financial system as late as 1306, for on 6 November the king had authorised the Templars to pay the wages of some of the soldiers who had served in Flanders, while John of Tour, the Templar treasurer in Paris, was still auditing the royal accounts in Normandy at the time of the arrests in October, 1307.¹⁷⁵ The French monarchy was rationalising governmental functions, and the changes which the Templars experienced as royal financiers were in a large degree a result of this process. During the same period, a greater degree of specialisation was similarly achieved in judicial administration and in the royal chancery.¹⁷⁶

Despite the practical constraints imposed by the actual implementation of policy, Philip IV was in no theoretical way restricted in what he could do. Six times between 1290 and 1314 the king summoned assemblies of the representatives of the three orders of the realm.¹⁷⁷ Members were not expected to debate the policies which the king's ministers propounded to them; the king used the assemblies as a vehicle for making his wishes known to the people, and as an expression of French unanimity in the eyes of outsiders, when challenged by Boniface VIII or affronted by the Flemings or the Templars. In fact, throughout the reign the real pressure for such assemblies came not from the French people, who preferred to settle matters on a local basis, but from the monarchy itself, which saw these meetings as a potential means of centralisation. The king's subjects themselves often showed considerable reluctance when ordered to attend. Sectional interests were sometimes afraid that their position might be compromised, for they would, by their attendance, become associated with royal policy, and perhaps forced to express this in written form. The clergy were placed in a particularly embarrassing position in the assemblies of 1302 and 1303, which were aimed specifically at Boniface VIII.

The obvious answer was to avoid attendance, a ploy concerning which the French government was well aware, for in the convocations of December 1302 for the proposed meeting the following year, it was stressed that the clerics named were 'to appear personally, all excuses having been put aside'.¹⁷⁸ Further convocations issued in June 1303 were equally peremptory. In a not untypical citation the clergy of Rouergue were told by the king that he could in no way consider to be faithful or friendly to him and his kingdom, those who failed him in this matter. If they did not set out on the journey to Paris within eight days of the order being given, his officials were authorised to seize all their temporal goods.¹⁷⁹ Those clerics who had genuine difficulty in coming to the assembly hastened to make their excuses. Dragon, Abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Aurillac in the Auvergne, could not come because he was laid up at the castle of Beauvoir with a broken leg, but he was so frightened that his excuse would not be believed that he called in the *bailli* of the Auvergne to witness the fact, and procured two doctors and a surgeon to swear that he was not to move for a month. Another abbot, Paris, of the Cistercian foundation of Longuay (Haute-Marne), was sufficiently alarmed to attempt the journey, although he was almost eighty years of age, but when he reached Troyes he gave up and sent a procurator instead.¹⁸⁰

The theocratic conception of kingship and the refusal to recognise any temporal superior provided a firm base for developing a theory of Capetian sovereignty, which crystallised during the disputes with Boniface VIII. Much of the literature produced was in the form of anonymous pamphlets, which were almost certainly inspired by the government,¹⁸¹ but by far the most cogent treatise was written late in 1302 by the Dominican John of Paris. John rejected the derivative nature of secular government which was so fundamental to the views of the papal reformers. For him a kingdom was 'the government of a perfect community ordained for the common good by one man'. He sharpened this definition by examining each part in turn. 'Government' was the genus. 'Community' was added in order to differentiate from a government in which each rules himself, either by natural instinct as in brute beasts, or by reason as was the case with those who chose to lead a solitary life. 'Perfect' was meant in the sense of self-sufficient, and was to be distinguished from the family, which could only sustain itself for a short time, and could not provide for all the needs of life in the way that a community could. By 'ordained for the common good' he meant to differentiate from oligarchy, tyranny and democracy, where, especially in the case of tyranny, the ruler is interested only in his own good. 'By one

man' was included to differentiate from aristocracy or the rule of the best men according to virtue, on the one hand, and what he calls *polycratia* on the other, meaning the rule of the people through plebiscite.

For he is not a king except that he rule alone, as the Lord said through Ezekiel: 'My servant David will be over all and there will be one shepherd over them'.

The function of the priesthood was separate from this, for this was the spiritual power, given by Christ to the ministers of the Church for the purpose of administering the sacraments to the faithful. It was not possible to reach the supernatural goal of eternal life for which man is finally ordered simply through human nature, and therefore leadership in this sphere cannot belong to the king whose responsibility is the care of the government of human affairs. There is then a clear separation or dualism in which the royal power derives directly from God, for this royal power existed before papal power; indeed there were kings in France before there were Christians. 'To say that the power of kingship first came directly from God and afterwards from the pope is completely ridiculous.'¹⁸² For Philip IV and his government, those who were part of this community had the obligation to contribute to its well being; it was convenient to support this with the traditional medieval conception of the organic nature of this community, but now the community was not that of Christendom as a whole, but that of 'the chosen people' under 'the Most Christian King' of France.¹⁸³

The loose collection of feudal and ecclesiastical lordships was being welded together into the kingdom of France, focused upon the monarchy itself. It is, however, typical of the ambiguities of this reign that it is unlikely that anyone had a very clear idea of what this kingdom was in terms of a concrete geographical area. Frontiers in the modern sense of a line running between two different states did not exist in the fourteenth century.¹⁸⁴ Such vagueness made it all the more imperative that the crown should receive proper respect. This is clearly expressed in Philip's personal conception of his role: the kingship was a trust given to him, as it had been to his grandfather, by God. The king was elevated above the ordinary man however high his social standing, however influential he was in the royal council, and the achievement of the canonisation of Louis IX in 1297 symbolises this whole attitude.

By 1307 Philip IV had experimented with almost every financial expedient known to medieval rulers, yet he had failed to achieve the financial security which he sought. Moreover, he had been on the throne

for twenty-two years yet continual crises had prevented him from following Louis IX's path to the East; ultimately, despite a genuine desire to crusade, neither Philip nor the three sons who succeeded him ever managed to overcome domestic problems long enough to enable them to mount an expedition to regain the Holy Land.¹⁸⁵ This was especially frustrating, as the undoubted power of the Capetian monarchy had been effectively and publicly demonstrated in the conflict with Boniface VIII. The election of Bertrand of Got seemed to confirm this victory over the papacy, for Clement V looked a pale representative of a vigorous tradition. It was to this pope that the Order of the Temple looked for leadership, but the failure of Latin Christendom to organise a new crusade in response to the losses of 1291 undermined the Order's functional role and made it vulnerable to criticism and attack. Such criticism was not new, but while the Templars were able to sustain their efforts on behalf of the crusade, it was at least contained. Potential sources of conflict are therefore clear. The French monarchy needed specie, especially because of the return to good money in 1306; the papacy, although still an essential element in the political structure and religious life of western Christendom, was, under Clement V, seemingly a pliant instrument; while the Order of the Temple, closely linked to both of them, could not function without their support. All three wanted a new crusade, but for different reasons none of them could bring it about on their own. The situation of the Temple offered the king a potential means to clear this impasse. The means to accomplish a spoliation of the Order were at hand in the persons of the inquisitors, established by the papacy, but in France controlled by the monarchy. The spread of heresy had been one of the major issues of the thirteenth century, and the presentation of the Temple as an institution sunk in 'heretical depravity' was a task for which the counsellors of Philip the Fair were well suited. This was an approach they knew was likely to succeed with a monarch for whom an unbending Christian morality was an integral element of his character, who was especially sensitive to anything which he perceived might be a blight on the purity of his kingdom, which he had sworn to protect.

At about the same time as James of Molay was preparing to leave Cyprus for France, a Norman lawyer, Peter Dubois, was completing a tract, *Concerning the Recovery of the Holy Land*, one of the series of treatises which had been engendered by the events of 1291. His connection with royal circles remains unclear, for he never appears to have been among the king's close advisers, despite intermittent employment as a royal advocate. An integral part of his plan was the union of the military

orders. These Orders

have such a great quantity of rents, crops and possessions on this side of the Mediterranean Sea, which for a long time now have made insufficient contribution to the Holy Land. Since on occasions of great necessity these Orders have many times been divided among themselves, and on this account in confusion, and therefore with very great scandal exposed to mockery, it is expedient and necessary, if the cause of the Holy Land is to go forward, to unite them in administration, habit, status and goods, as will seem expedient to a holy council. Those members living in the Holy Land should subsist from their goods there and in Cyprus.

By this means 800,000 *livres tournois* would be raised annually to transport crusaders across the sea. 'Those members who, up to the present, have not been able conveniently to cross the sea and live there, should be driven into the monasteries of the Cistercian Order and other rich establishments, to do penance for their excesses.' Once the annual income gained from these policies is seen, 'the bad faith of the Templars and the Hospitallers will be apparent and it will be clear how, up to this time, for this thing [their wealth], they have betrayed the Holy Land and sinned towards it'.¹⁸⁶ Although Dubois's ideas here relate to both the orders, there is a brief postscript, apparently added shortly after the completion of the treatise, which is aimed much more specifically at the Templars. Once the union of the orders had been completed, and the property granted to this new organisation, 'it will be expedient to destroy the Order of the Templars completely, and for the needs of justice to annihilate it totally'.¹⁸⁷