

**RADICAL
ENLIGHTENMENT**

Philosophy and the
Making of Modernity 1650–1750

JONATHAN I. ISRAEL

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Preface

There are various ways of interpreting the European Enlightenment, some long cultivated in the historiography, others of more recent provenance. One formidable tradition of study adopts a primarily 'French' perspective, seeing the wider European phenomenon as a projection of French ideas and intellectual concerns, especially those of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, d'Holbach, and Rousseau. Another approach, which enjoys support not only among Anglophone but also some continental scholars, envisages the Enlightenment as an intellectual reorientation inspired chiefly by English ideas and science, especially the endeavours of Locke and Newton. In recent years, it has also become fashionable to claim there was not one Enlightenment but rather an entire constellation or family of 'Enlightenments', related but distinct, growing up in numerous different national contexts. Finally, there has also been an incipient tendency latterly to distinguish between a mainstream 'moderate' and a more radical underground Enlightenment, albeit usually with the latter being deemed essentially marginal to the wider phenomenon.

One of my two main purposes in this work is to argue for another and different way of approaching the subject. The French perspective, though it has much to offer, remains increasingly susceptible to the charge that it underestimates the extensive philosophical and scientific borrowing all major eighteenth-century French thinkers engaged in. The 'English' approach might seem initially more plausible, not least since Voltaire's original stance was based almost wholly on Locke and Newton. Yet given the slow and sporadic reception of Locke and Newton outside Britain, and still more the often penetrating criticism their ideas were subjected to, this perspective is, in reality, even more vulnerable not just to the charge that it overly inflates the role of a particular nation but also that it fails to grasp the wider play of forces involved. As for the idea that we are dealing with a whole family of Enlightenments, there are seemingly insuperable objections to this too. For this notion encourages the tendency to study the subject within the context of 'national history' which is decidedly the wrong framework for so international and pan-European a phenomenon. Worse still, it unacceptably ignores or overlooks the extent to which common impulses and concerns shaped the Enlightenment as a whole.

My first goal then is to try to convey, however imperfectly and tentatively, a sense of the European Enlightenment as a single highly integrated intellectual and cultural movement, displaying differences in timing, no doubt, but for the most part preoccupied not only with the same intellectual problems but often even the very same books and insights everywhere from Portugal to Russia and from Ireland to Sicily. Arguably,

indeed, no major cultural transformation in Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, displayed anything comparable to the impressive cohesion of European intellectual culture in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. For it was then that western and central Europe first became, in the sphere of ideas, broadly a single arena integrated by mostly newly invented channels of communication, ranging from newspapers, magazines, and the salon to the coffee-shop and a whole array of fresh cultural devices of which the erudite journals (invented in the 1660s) and the 'universal' library were particularly crucial.

My second objective is to demonstrate that the Radical Enlightenment, far from being a peripheral development, is an integral and vital part of the wider picture and was seemingly even more internationally cohesive than the mainstream Enlightenment. Frequently, the moderate mainstream were consciously, even desperately, reacting to what was widely perceived as the massively dangerous threat posed by radical thought. Many scholars will, I assume, be rather surprised by the prominence given here to the role of Spinoza and Spinozism not only on the continent but even in the British context where, historiographically, there has been a persistent refusal to acknowledge that Spinoza had any influence at all. Yet a close reading of the primary materials strongly suggests, at least to me, that Spinoza and Spinozism were in fact the intellectual backbone of the European Radical Enlightenment everywhere, not only in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, and Scandinavia but also Britain and Ireland.

Of course, neither the Enlightenment itself, and still less its consequences, were limited to Europe. There is indeed a further dimension to the problem of how to interpret the Enlightenment. For if the Enlightenment marks the most dramatic step towards secularization and rationalization in Europe's history, it does so no less in the wider history not just of western civilization but, arguably, of the entire world. From this, it plainly follows, it was one of the most important shifts in the history of man. Fittingly, there exists a vast and formidable literature on the topic. Yet there are comparatively few general surveys and large-scale interpretative works, and it is possible to question whether it really receives the emphasis it deserves in the study and teaching of modern history, in comparison, for example, with the Renaissance and the Reformation. These too, of course, were vast and fundamental changes, at any rate in western civilization. Nevertheless, these earlier great cultural movements, limited as they were to western and central Europe, are really only adjustments, modifications to what was essentially still a theologically conceived and ordered regional society, based on hierarchy and ecclesiastical authority, not universality and equality.

By contrast, the Enlightenment—European and global—not only attacked and severed the roots of traditional European culture in the sacred, magic, kingship, and hierarchy, secularizing all institutions and ideas, but (intellectually and to a degree in practice) effectively demolished all legitimation of monarchy, aristocracy, woman's subordination to man, ecclesiastical authority, and slavery, replacing these with the principles of universality, equality, and democracy. This implies the Enlightenment was of a different order of importance for understanding the rise of the modern world

than the Reformation and Renaissance, and that there is something disproportionate and inadequate about its coverage in the existing historiography. But to assess its assuredly overriding global significance one must first gauge the Enlightenment as a whole, which means, in my view, giving due weight to the Radical Enlightenment and, equally, emancipating ourselves from the deadly compulsion to squeeze the Enlightenment, radical and mainstream, into the constricting strait-jacket of 'national history'.

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	v
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>List of Plates</i>	xv
<i>List of Figures</i>	xvii
<i>List of Map and Tables</i>	xvii
<i>Abbreviations of Library and Archive Locations</i>	xviii
<i>Other Abbreviations</i>	xix
PART I: THE 'RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT'	I
I. Introduction	3
i. Radical Thought in the Early Enlightenment	3
ii. The 'Crisis of the European Mind'	14
2. Government and Philosophy	23
i. The Advent of Cartesianism	23
ii. Cartesianism in Central Europe	29
iii. The New Philosophy conquers Scandinavia and the Baltic	35
iv. France: Philosophy and Royal Absolutism	38
v. Reaction in the Italian States	43
3. Society, Institutions, Revolution	59
i. Philosophy and the Social Hierarchy	59
ii. Shaftesbury, Radicati, Vauvenargues	67
iii. The Revolutionary Impulse	71
4. Women, Philosophy, and Sexuality	82
i. The Emancipation of Women	82
ii. Conversational Freedom; Sexual Freedom	91

5. Censorship and Culture	97
i. French Royal Censorship	97
ii. Philosophy and Censorship in Central Europe	104
iii. Philosophy and Censorship in Southern Europe	109
iv. Freedom of Thought, Expression, and of the Press	116
6. Libraries and Enlightenment	119
i. The Universal Library	119
ii. The Crisis of the Universities	127
iii. Shelving the Two Enlightenments	131
iv. Lexicons and <i>Dictionnaires</i>	134
v. The Early Enlightenment in National Context	137
7. The Learned Journals	142
i. Changing Europe's Intellectual Culture	142
ii. The Journals and the Radical Enlightenment	152
PART II: THE RISE OF PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALISM	157
8. Spinoza	159
9. Van den Enden: Philosophy, Democracy, and Egalitarianism	175
i. Democratic Republicanism	175
ii. Revolutionary Conspiracy	180
10. Radicalism and the People: The Brothers Koerbagh	185
i. The Theologian-Philosopher, Johannes Koerbagh (1634–1672)	185
ii. The <i>Bloemhof</i>	190
iii. The Trial of the Brothers Koerbagh	192
11. Philosophy, the Interpreter of Scripture	197
i. Lodewijk Meyer (1629–1681)	197
ii. The <i>Philosophia</i>	200
iii. The Wolzogen Disputes	205
iv. The 'New Religion' of Philosophy	208
v. The <i>Philosophia</i> in England	212
vi. German and Scandinavian Reverberations	214
12. Miracles Denied	218

13. Spinoza's System	230
14. Spinoza, Science, and the Scientists	242
i. Radical Thought and the Scientific Revolution	242
ii. Spinoza and Huygens	246
iii. Spinoza versus Boyle	252
15. Philosophy, Politics, and the Liberation of Man	258
i. In Search of 'Freedom'	258
ii. Monarchy Overturned	262
iii. Spinoza, Locke, and the Enlightenment Struggle for Toleration	265
iv. Equality and the Quest for 'Natural Man'	270
16. Publishing a Banned Philosophy	275
i. The <i>Tractatus Theologico-Politicus</i>	275
ii. The Battle of the <i>Ethics</i>	285
17. The Spread of a Forbidden Movement	295
i. The Death of a Philosopher	295
ii. Lucas, Saint-Glain, and The Hague Coterie	302
iii. The Rise of Dutch Spinozism	307
iv. <i>Philopater</i>	315
v. Dutch Radicalism at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century	320
PART III: EUROPE AND THE 'NEW' INTELLECTUAL CONTROVERSIES (1680–1720)	329
18. Bayle and the 'Virtuous Atheist'	331
19. The Bredenburg Disputes	342
20. Fontenelle and the War of the Oracles	359
21. The Death of the Devil	375
i. From Van Dale to Bekker	375
ii. The Public Furore	382
iii. Churches Divided	388
iv. The European Diffusion	392

22. Leenhof and the ‘Universal Philosophical Religion’	406
i. Frederik van Leenhof (1647–1713)	406
ii. Heaven on Earth	410
iii. The Politics of Philosophy	422
iv. The Leenhof Controversy in the Netherlands, Germany, and the Baltic	431
23. The ‘Nature of God’ Controversy (1710–1720)	436
PART IV: THE INTELLECTUAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE	445
24. New Theological Strategies	447
i. Theology and the Revolution in Bible Criticism	447
ii. Physico-Theology	456
iii. Le Clerc, Limborch, and Locke	464
iv. From the ‘Rationalization’ to the ‘Irrationalization’ of Religion	471
25. The Collapse of Cartesianism	477
i. Empiricism	477
ii. Deadlock in France	485
iii. Régis and the Failure of French Cartesianism	491
26. Leibniz and the Radical Enlightenment	502
i. Early Encounters	502
ii. Leibniz, Steno, and the Radical Challenge (1676–1680)	507
iii. Leibniz and the ‘War of Philosophies’	511
27. Anglomania: The ‘Triumph’ of Newton and Locke	515
i. Europe Embraces English Ideas	515
ii. Locke, Newtonianism, and Enlightenment	522
28. The Intellectual Drama in Spain and Portugal	528
29. Germany and the Baltic: the ‘War of the Philosophers’	541
i. Deepening Philosophical Crisis	541
ii. The Wolffian Controversies (1723–1740)	544
iii. Wolff and the Rise of German Deism	552
iv. Wolffianism versus Newtonianism in the Baltic	558

PART V: THE CLANDESTINE PROGRESS OF THE RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT (1680–1750)	563
30. Boulainvilliers and the Rise of French Deism	565
31. French Refugee Deists in Exile	575
i. The Flight to Holland	575
ii. Gueudeville and Lahontan	579
iii. Antagonist of Voltaire: Saint-Hyacinthe (1684–1746)	582
iv. The Marquis d’Argens (1703–1771)	586
32. The Spinozistic Novel in French	591
33. English Deism and Europe	599
i. The Deist Challenge	599
ii. John Toland (1670–1722)	609
iii. Anthony Collins (1676–1729)	614
iv. Matthew Tindal (c.1657–1733)	619
v. Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733)	623
34. Germany: The Radical <i>Aufklärung</i>	628
i. Initial Reaction	628
ii. Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708)	637
iii. Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch (1648–1704)	641
iv. Spinoza and Cabbala: Wachter and Spaeth	645
v. Theodor Ludwig Lau (1670–1740)	652
vi. Schmidt and the Maturing of German Spinozism	655
vii. Johann Christian Edelmann (1698–1767)	659
35. The Radical Impact in Italy	664
i. Giambattista Vico (1668–1744)	664
ii. Paolo Mattia Doria (1662–1746)	670
iii. Pietro Giannone (1676–1748)	674
iv. Radical Thought in Venice	677
36. The Clandestine Philosophical Manuscripts	684
i. Categories	684
ii. <i>L’Esprit de Spinosà</i>	694
iii. Despotism, Islam, and the Politicization of Superstition	701
	xiii

Contents

37. From La Mettrie to Diderot	704
i. Materialism	704
ii Diderot	709
38. Epilogue: Rousseau, Radicalism, Revolution	714
<i>Bibliography</i>	721
<i>Index</i>	779

PART I

THE RADICAL
ENLIGHTENMENT

I | INTRODUCTION

i. Radical Thought in the Early Enlightenment

To many a courtier, official, teacher, lawyer, physician, and churchman, philosophy and philosophers seemed to have burst upon the European scene in the late seventeenth century with terrifying force. Countless books reflect the unprecedented and, for some, intoxicating, intellectual and spiritual upheaval of those decades, a vast turbulence in every sphere of knowledge and belief which shook European civilization to its foundations. A sense of shock and acute danger penetrated even the most remote and best defended fastnesses of the west. The Spanish physician Diego Matheo Zapata, writing in 1690—before his own conversion to Cartesianism—implored the cohorts of Cartesians and *Malebranchistas* besieging every citadel of traditional learning in Spain to desist, warning that it was not just received philosophy and science which was at stake but also, ultimately, the beliefs of the people, the authority of Church and Inquisition, the very foundations of Spanish society.¹ A Spanish professor of medicine claimed, in 1716, that Descartes' philosophy had thrown all Europe into the greatest intellectual and spiritual perplexity seen for centuries.² In less isolated regions the agitation was no less. A Zeeland preacher, writing in 1712, appalled by the impact of Descartes, Spinoza, and Bayle, despairingly compared the Netherlands of his time to the ancient Athens of the warring Hellenistic philosophy schools, a land racked by intellectual controversy where rival schools of thought battled ceaselessly, philosophy divided the ruling élite, and even the common people were proving susceptible to new ideas, letting themselves be 'led like children through the whirlwinds of thought', the helpless prey of philosophical seducers and, through new ideas, becoming entrapped in the 'Devil's snares'.³ Parts of this tide of new concepts, moreover, were of a distinctly radical character, that is, totally incompatible with the fundamentals of traditional authority, thought, and belief.

During the later Middle Ages and the early modern age down to around 1650, western civilization was based on a largely shared core of faith, tradition, and authority. By contrast, after 1650, everything, no matter how fundamental or deeply rooted, was questioned in the light of philosophical reason and frequently challenged or replaced by startlingly different concepts generated by the New Philosophy and what may still

¹ Zapata, *Verdadera Apologia*, 40–5, 49, 64.

² Boix y Moliner, *Hippocrates aclarado*, prólogo x.

³ Tuinman, *Johan Kalvijn's Onderrichting*, 1, 3–4.

usefully be termed the Scientific Revolution. Admittedly the Reformation had earlier engendered a deep split in western Christendom. But throughout the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, there was still much, intellectually and spiritually, that the western segments of Christendom shared. Mid-seventeenth-century Europe was still, not just predominantly but overwhelmingly, a culture in which all debates about man, God, and the World which penetrated into the public sphere revolved around 'confessional'—that is Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed (Calvinist), or Anglican issues, and scholars fought above all to establish which confessional bloc possessed a monopoly of truth and a God-given title to authority. It was a civilization in which almost no one challenged the essentials of Christianity or the basic premises of what was taken to be a divinely ordained system of aristocracy, monarchy, land-ownership, and ecclesiastical authority.

By contrast, after 1650, a general process of rationalization and secularization set in which rapidly overthrew theology's age-old hegemony in the world of study, slowly but surely eradicated magic and belief in the supernatural from Europe's intellectual culture, and led a few openly to challenge everything inherited from the past—not just commonly received assumptions about mankind, society, politics, and the cosmos but also the veracity of the Bible and the Christian faith or indeed any faith. Of course, most people at all levels of society were profoundly disquieted by such sweeping intellectual and cultural change and frightened by the upsurge of radical thinking. Jeremiads were heard everywhere. In Germany, from the 1670s onwards, there was a powerful reaction to the sudden stream of 'godless' books appearing in both Latin and the vernacular and obviously designed to overthrow all conventionally accepted values and beliefs.⁴ University students were assumed to be especially vulnerable. A treatise by a Leipzig theologian published in 1708 sought to equip German professors with ready-made, concise Latin answers and philosophical demonstrations with which to combat the tide of philosophical atheism, deism, Naturalism, fatalism, and Neo-Epicureanism, and especially the penetration of the kind of radical thought which 'calls God Nature' and equates 'His intelligence, energy, and capability, with *Natura Naturans*', that is, the most systematically philosophical form of atheism.⁵

Whereas before 1650 practically everyone disputed and wrote about confessional differences, subsequently, by the 1680s, it began to be noted by French, German, Dutch, and English writers that confessional conflict, previously at the centre, was increasingly receding to secondary status and that the main issue now was the escalating contest between faith and incredulity. Instead of theological controversy, 'now', exclaimed an English publicist abhorring Anthony Collins' *A Discourse of Freethinking* (1713), a work which rejects scriptural authority and provoked deep outrage, 'now religion in general is the question; religion is the thing stabb'd at; the controversie now is,

⁴ Müller, *Atheismus devictus*, 28–39; Lassenius, *Besiegte Atheisterey*, preface, i–vi; Undereyck, *Nährische Atheist*, 609–II.

⁵ Rechenberg, *Fundamenta*, preface and pp. 4, 21, 61.

whether there ought to be any form of religion on earth, or whether there be any God in Heaven.⁶

Revealed religion and ecclesiastical authority long remained the chief targets of the new radical thinkers. But they were by no means the only ones. A prominent late seventeenth-century German court official, the Freiherr Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626–92), observed in 1685 that what the radicals ultimately intended was to make ‘life in this world’ the basis of politics.⁷ This, he explained, amounted to a revolution in outlook and expectations which potentially changed everything. Numerous theologians, he grants, strove valiantly to counter the disastrous impact of the new radical ideas, especially Spinozism, which he saw as the backbone of the radical challenge in the sphere of faith and Church authority. But what was insufficiently grasped in the Germany of his day and inadequately opposed, in his opinion, were the consequences of such ideas as Spinoza’s for politics, the public sphere, and the individual’s place in society. For in Spinoza, he avers, nothing is based on God’s Word or commandment so that no institutions are God-ordained and no laws divinely sanctioned: hence the only legitimacy in politics is the self-interest of the individual.⁸ Nor did the mounting strife over the nature and status of morality reverberate any less stridently. The Dutch preacher, Johannes Aalstius, held in his general introduction to Christian ethics, published at Dordrecht in 1705, that the new radicalism, and especially Spinozism, overturns the entire structure of divinely ordained morality.⁹ Were such influences to gain wide acceptance, he predicted, mankind would in the future concern itself only with individual happiness in this life.¹⁰ To many it appeared a frightful prospect.

It is, furthermore, a drama which profoundly involved the common people, even those who were unschooled and illiterate. What did they know of the Scientific Revolution or the new philosophical ideas, one might well ask? Surely, it is often supposed, there was turmoil on the surface but little change in the minds and outlook of the great majority. But while it is true that the intellectual revolution of the late seventeenth century was primarily a crisis of élites—courtiers, officials, scholars, patricians, and clergy, it was precisely these élites which moulded, supervised, and fixed the contours of popular culture. Consequently, an intellectual crisis of élites quickly made an impact on ordinary men’s attitudes too and by no means only the minority of literate artisans and small bourgeoisie. Doubtless some officials, theologians, and academics toyed with trying to confine the more awesome shifts in ideas to the sphere of élite culture so as to preserve intact the existing structures of authority and belief among the common people. After 1650, as those pervaded by the new concepts increasingly doubted the existence of Hell and the reality of eternal torment for the damned, for example, some consideration was given to whether it might be possible to screen such

⁶ *An Answer to the Discourse on Free-Thinking*, preface.

⁷ Seckendorff, *Christen-Staat*, i, 12; on Seckendorff, see Pleticha, *Adel und Buch*, 82–3.

⁸ Seckendorff, *Christen-Staat* ii, 139–41; Walther, ‘*Machina Civilis*’, 202; Funkenstein, *Theology*, 338–44.

⁹ Aalstius, *Inleiding tot de Zeden-leer*, 512.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 512–14; similarly see Poiret, *Cogitationes rationales*, 592–602, 606, 629.

disbelief from the general population.¹¹ But attempting such wholesale deception would have involved restructuring the entire system of cultural relations between élites and common people on the basis of consciously, systematically, and universally propagated fraud and deceit, scarcely a feasible project.

In practice, ordinary folk could not be shielded from the philosophical revolution transforming the outlook and attitudes of Europe's élites.¹² To many the consequences of this seemed alarming in the extreme. Especially worrying, according to Seckendorff, was the growing trend among ordinary folk to mock Holy Scripture, reject Heaven and Hell, doubt the immortality of the soul, and question the existence of Satan, demons, and spirits.¹³ If one demands proof that new ideas were rapidly transforming attitudes and beliefs throughout society, such proof was abundantly evident on every side and in every part of Europe. Indeed, surely no other period of European history displays such a profound and decisive shift towards rationalization and secularization at every level as the few decades before Voltaire. 'The triumph of the mechanical philosophy,' it has been rightly asserted, 'meant the end of the animistic conception of the universe which had constituted the basic rationale for magical thinking.'¹⁴ In England a veritable sea-change had taken place by the early eighteenth century. In Holland medals were issued in the 1690s celebrating the slaying of Satan and the end of belief in magic and witchcraft. In Germany the key public campaign, based on new philosophical ideas, which brought the trying and burning of witches to an end, took place during the first decade of the eighteenth century. Similarly, as has been justly observed of society and culture in Venice, if one wants to know when the crucial shift took place which led to the end of cases of sorcery, the virtual end of ecclesiastical control over intellectual life, and the first emergence of women into the public sphere as putatively equal to men in intellect, artistic capabilities, and personal freedom, then that decisive moment occurred in the period between 1700 and 1750.¹⁵

If one accepts there is a direct and crucial connection between the intellectual revolution of the late seventeenth century and the wide-ranging social and cultural change in Europe in the period immediately preceding Voltaire, then the implications for the history of Enlightenment thought are far-reaching. There is indeed an urgent need for Enlightenment historians to put much more emphasis on what was happening before and down to the 1740s. Indeed, there is a case for arguing that the most crucial developments were already over by the middle of the eighteenth century. Certainly the Radical Enlightenment arose and matured in under a century, culminating in the materialistic and atheistic books of La Mettrie and Diderot in the 1740s. These men, dubbed by Diderot the 'Nouveaux

¹¹ Walker, *Decline of Hell*, 4-6.

¹² *Ibid.*; Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 643-7.

¹³ Seckendorff, *Christen-Staat*, i, 1-2, 41-4, 74-5 and ii, 31, 174, 191.

¹⁴ Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 664.

¹⁵ Georgelin, *Venise*, 714-17, 720-2, 731-2, 1129.

Spinosistes',¹⁶ wrote works which are in the main a summing up of the philosophical, scientific, and political radicalism of the previous three generations. Seen in this light they represent the extreme, most uncompromising fringe of the general trend in culture and ideas towards rationalization and secularization. But their less radical colleagues undoubtedly had a far greater impact on attitudes and popular culture. In fact, neither the Reformation of the sixteenth century nor the so-called 'High Enlightenment' of the post-1750 period—often little more than footnotes to the earlier shift—even begins to compete with the intellectual upheaval of the Early Enlightenment in terms of sheer impact, and the depth and extent of the intellectual and spiritual changes it brought about. It may be that the story of the High Enlightenment after 1750 is more familiar to readers and historians, but that does not alter the reality that the later movement was basically just one of consolidating, popularizing, and annotating revolutionary concepts introduced earlier. Consequently, even before Voltaire came to be widely known, in the 1740s, the real business was already over.

Most accounts of the European Enlightenment concentrate on developments in only one or two countries, particularly England and France. Although it is often taken for granted that this is where the most important philosophical and scientific developments in the century 1650–1750 took place, there are strong grounds for questioning the validity of such an approach. For the intellectual scenario of the age was extremely wide-ranging and was never confined to just one or two regions. It was, on the contrary, a drama played out from the depths of Spain to Russia and from Scandinavia to Sicily. Its complexity and awesome dynamic force sprang not only from the diversity and incompatibility of the new philosophical and scientific systems themselves but also from the tremendous power of the traditionalist counter-offensive, a veritable 'Counter-Enlightenment' which, as with the Counter-Reformation of the sixteenth century, generated a major reorganization and revitalization of traditional structures of authority, thought, and belief. For the age of confessional antagonism, broadly the period 1520–1650, had equipped Europe's governments, churches, courts, schools, and universities with newly devised or reinforced mechanisms of spiritual and intellectual control which proved extremely effective in tightening the cohesion of society and culture, and strengthening the State and ecclesiastical authority, and therefore represented an accumulation of power and influence which was not going to be lightly abandoned anywhere.

However, even the most assertive and intolerant of these instruments of doctrinal supervision, such as the Calvinist *consistoires* or the Spanish Inquisition, were primarily geared to eradicate theological dissent and were soon partly, if not largely, outflanked and neutralized by the advance of new philosophies and scientific ideas which posed a much tougher problem for ecclesiastical authority to deal with than had religious heresy, especially as it proved difficult to separate what was compatible from what was incompatible with established religious doctrine. Hence, before long, confusion, hesitation, and a rapid fragmentation of ideas prevailed everywhere, even in

¹⁶ [Diderot], *Encyclopédie* XV, 474; Proust, *Diderot*, 121, 289.

Rome itself.¹⁷ Furthermore, in the new context, in contrast to the past, none of Europe's rulers, not even the Papacy, could easily decide on, or consistently adopt, a coherent intellectual and spiritual strategy. Opinion was simply too divided for this to be feasible. Should rulers and the Churches try to suppress both the moderate Early Enlightenment and its radical offshoots by shoring up the structures of the past, or should they discard the old structures and ally with one or another strand of the moderate Enlightenment—Neo-Cartesianism as expounded by Malebranche, or Newtonianism perhaps, or the widely adopted system of the German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754), to forge a new orthodoxy and a more cogent front against the radical wing? Although this or that ruler chose one or the other path, the overall result was one of collective disarray and bafflement. Historically, State and Church had worked closely together and since the mid-sixteenth century had met the challenge of confessionalizing the population with spectacular success. Whether Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, or Anglican, the people of western and central Europe had everywhere been grouped into cohesive doctrinal blocs formidably resistant to rival theologies. But once the main thrust of dissent ceased to be theological and became philosophical, there set in an inexorable slackening and loss of coordination in State–Church collaboration in the cultural, educational, and intellectual spheres.

Whatever strategies governments and Churches adopted, the European intellectual arena grew more complex, fragmented, and uncertain. Paolo Mattia Doria (1662–1746), the Genoese patrician and *érudit* who resided in Naples from the late 1680s, subsequently playing a key part in that city's spectacular intellectual life during the Early Enlightenment, a seasoned observer of the philosophical currents of the age,¹⁸ in 1732 published a book deploring the sudden fervour for the ideas of Locke and Newton 'in Rome, in Naples, and in other parts of Italy' and the progress of English empiricism, since the late 1720s, in a land already rent from top to bottom by warring philosophies.¹⁹ What he terms the 'furore Lockense' served, in his view, only to escalate and convolute further what was now a five-cornered contest in which scholastic Aristotelianism, though in full retreat, still fought on tenaciously against three competing cohorts of respectable *moderni*—*Lochisti*, the *Cartesiani-Malebranchisti*, and the devotees of the Leibnizian-Wolffian system. The *Lochisti* might be gaining ground rapidly, and many clergy had joined them, but all they would accomplish, admonished Doria, would be to further split the middle ground. By contributing to the pulverization of Italy's former cultural, intellectual and spiritual cohesion, they were simply opening the door, albeit inadvertently, to the awesome fifth column, the radicals or *Epicurei-Spinosisti* as he terms them—who reject all authority and established ideas and despise Revelation, the Church, and Christian morality.²⁰ Italy was in the grip of a gigantic and horrifying dilemma. Doria considered Locke dangerous, Cartesianism

¹⁷ Ferrone, *Intellectual Roots*, 2, 4–8.

¹⁸ Conti, *Paolo Mattia Doria*, 9, 53, 61, 71–2.

¹⁹ Doria, *Difesa della metafisica*, 3–4, 31–3, 40, 49.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 31–3; see also Doria, *Discorsi critici filosofici*, 6, 24, 112; Doria, *Filosofia*, 1, 146–7, 172, 184–5, 226–7.

‘damaging to civil society’,²¹ and Pierre Bayle of Rotterdam *perniciosissimo*,²² yet all these were innocence itself, he declares, compared with the threat to Church and society posed by the radicals.²³ For those ‘who deny God the attributes of goodness, love, intelligence and providence’, the *Spinosisti*, not only demolish all religion but are also ‘destructive of civil society’.²⁴

Advocates of the mainstream moderate Enlightenment in the early eighteenth century before Voltaire simultaneously promised that the new ideas, and the sweeping away of ignorance and superstition, would confer immense benefits on mankind while warning—often no less stridently than their conservative opponents—of the terrible dangers inherent in the proliferating intellectual turmoil. Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), for example, chief herald of the Early Enlightenment in Protestant Germany and Scandinavia, did not doubt that the war on ‘superstition’ in which he himself was a prominent participant, and the application of new ideas in society, what he termed *philosophia practica*, offered humanity great advantages whether in administration, government, medicine, education, technology, or reforming the legal system.²⁵ But with deep disquiet, he also acknowledged that the intellectual upheaval was stimulating a vast upsurge in incredulity and *Atheistery*—like Bayle, he defines ‘atheism’ to mean denial of divine Providence and reward and punishment in the hereafter. Not the least disturbing aspect of this erosion of faith, he held, was the manner in which countless false and hypercritical champions of piety, mostly, he says, ignorant bigots and obscurantists, seize the opportunity to condemn and vilify upright well-meaning *philosophes* (such as himself) before the public.²⁶ The honestly enlightened, striving for the improvement of society, found themselves inextricably caught up, he maintains, in a vast conflict on two fronts, battling ignorance and superstition on one side, and the ‘Atheisten’ on the other.²⁷

The most pressing priority in the new context, it was universally acknowledged, was to overcome the growing fragmentation of ideas and, by means of solid demonstrations and convincing arguments, restore stable and enduring structures of authority, legitimacy, knowledge, and faith. But if the need was obvious, how was it to be met? Without a consensus as to the criteria of truth and legitimacy, without an agreed methodology and principles, the task was impossible. Some progress towards the common goal might be made if leading intellects were less inclined to feud with each other and more unified in their attacks on the Radical Enlightenment; but even this limited goal appeared increasingly unattainable. In Italy, the gaps between the three main enlightened moderate camps proved unbridgeable. In Germany, the often virulent struggle between the eclectic Thomasians and the more systematic Wolffians

²¹ Doria, *Difesa della metafisica*, 319; Doria, *Discorsi critici filosofici*, 24, 33–6, 48–9.

²² Doria, *Difesa della metafisica*, 284.

²³ *Ibid.*, 31, 170, 198, 272–3, 287; Doria, *Risposta* 4–5, 26, 31–2, 73–4.

²⁴ Doria, *Difesa della metafisica*, 283, 287; Doria, *Risposta*, 26, 74; Doria, *Filosofia*, i, 146–7, 237–8; Doria, *Lettere e ragionamenti*, 297–301; Doria, *Il Capitano filosofo*, i, 3.

²⁵ Thomasius, *Von der Kunst*, 8–11; Koch, *History of Prussia*, 70; Kuehn, ‘German *Aufklärung*’, 309–10.

²⁶ Thomasius, *Von der Kunst*, 144, 148, 152. ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 152.

proved irresolvable.²⁸ Meanwhile, nothing caused more dismay than the ambivalence and corrosive scepticism of one of the most widely read and influential thinkers of the age, Pierre Bayle (1647–1706). Bayle, his critics complained, ‘*avoue, il prouve, il repète cent fois que la raison est incompatible avec la religion*’;²⁹ but when he infers from this that individuals must therefore be guided solely by faith and the dictates of divine Revelation, was he being serious or playing libertine games with his readership? No one seemed to know for sure. Was Bayle, who was to be the ‘Patron Saint’ of so many eighteenth-century thinkers including Voltaire, Diderot and d’Holbach, a sincere Christian, as he and his defenders claimed, or as his enemies insisted, an atheist, wreaking philosophico-theological havoc on all sides and duping the public.³⁰ And if Bayle was the prime enigma, there were also others, not least Locke and Vico.

Those who undertook to wrestle with the intellectual dilemmas of the age were labelled by Thomasius, using the French term *philosophes*. In the late seventeenth century it was a term just beginning to acquire a new and revolutionary resonance. If philosophy itself was as old as pre-classical Greece—or older—it had assuredly been marginal to the life of society since the advent of the Christian empire in late antiquity, from the time of Constantine the Great onwards. From then until around 1650, philosophy had remained the modest ‘serving-maid’, as some called it, of theology and in an essentially ancillary relationship to the other great vocational disciplines, law and medicine. It was only with the intellectual crisis of the late seventeenth century that the old hierarchy of studies, with theology supreme, and philosophy and science her handmaidens, suddenly disintegrated. With this philosophy was released from her previous subordination and became once again an independent force potentially at odds with theology and the Churches. No longer the ancillary of others, philosophers became a new breed, formidably different from the subservient, abstract theoreticians of former times. However unsettling in a society expressly based on authority, tradition, and faith, it was henceforth—at any rate down to the dawn of the nineteenth century—the exponents of philosophy (which then included both theoretical and experimental science), as much as, and eventually even more than, the still strongly entrenched theologians and lawyers, who dominated the intellectual agenda and determined the outcome of controversies. Presenting and popularizing the new findings, concepts, and theories, the *philosophes*—of whom Fontenelle and Boulainvilliers were the first in France to acquire European reputations—suddenly discovered that they too could exert a practical impact in the real world—in ideas in the first place but through ideas also on education, politics, religion, and general culture. Philosophy became not just emancipated but also powerful. This happened, as the French historian of thought Boureau-Deslandes noted in 1737, because *philosophes* had discovered how to influence debates about education, moral notions, the arts, economic policy, administration, and ‘*toute la*

²⁸ Kuehn, ‘German *Aufklärung*’, 310–13.

²⁹ Jaquelot, *Conformité de la foi*, 238; [Jurieu], *Philosophe de Rotterdam*, 49.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 5, 49, 54; Spinelli, *De origine mali*, I, 3, 36; Labrousse, *Pierre Bayle*, II, 605; Knetsch, *Pierre Jurieu*, 344, 371–5, 397; on Bayle as the ‘Patron Saint’ of the *philosophes*, see Wokler, ‘Multiculturalism’, 75.

conduite de la vie'.³¹ Even in lands remote from the forefront of intellectual innovation, the power of philosophy in the new context was undeniable. When the medical revolution—based primarily on Dutch ideas—began in Spain in the 1680s, the Valencian physician Juan de Cabriada, a devotee in particular of the famous Professor Dele Boe Sylvius, at Leiden, expressly identified *libertad filosófica* (liberty to philosophize), and especially to study Cartesianism, and receive up-to-date information about philosophical debates from 'Germany, France and other provinces', as the prime engine of change, the instrument with which to smash down Spain's outmoded, medical culture, based on Galen, with its age-old zeal for blood-letting and purging.³²

Hence Europe's war of philosophies during the Early Enlightenment down to 1750 was never confined to the intellectual sphere and was never anywhere a straightforward two-way contest between traditionalists and *moderni*. Rather, the rivalry between moderate mainstream and radical fringe was always as much an integral part of the drama as that between the moderate Enlightenment and conservative opposition. In this triangular battle of ideas what was ultimately at stake was what kind of belief-system should prevail in Europe's politics, social order, and institutions, as well as in high culture and, no less, in popular attitudes.³³

Of the two rival wings of the European Enlightenment, the moderate mainstream, supported as it was by numerous governments and influential factions in the main Churches, appeared, at least on the surface, much the more powerful tendency. Among its primary spokesmen were Newton and Locke in England, Thomasius and Wolff in Germany, the 'Newtonians' Nieuwentijt and 's-Gravesande in the Netherlands, and Feijóo and Piquer, in Spain. This was the Enlightenment which aspired to conquer ignorance and superstition, establish toleration, and revolutionize ideas, education, and attitudes by means of philosophy but in such a way as to preserve and safeguard what were judged essential elements of the older structures, effecting a viable synthesis of old and new, and of reason and faith. Although down to 1750, in Europe as a whole, the struggle for the middle ground remained inconclusive, much of the European mainstream had, by the 1730s and 1740s, firmly espoused the ideas of Locke and Newton which indeed seemed uniquely attuned and suited to the moderate Enlightenment purpose.

By contrast, the Radical Enlightenment, whether on an atheistic or deistic basis, rejected all compromise with the past and sought to sweep away existing structures entirely, rejecting the Creation as traditionally understood in Judaeo-Christian civilization, and the intervention of a providential God in human affairs, denying the possibility of miracles, and reward and punishment in an afterlife, scorning all forms of ecclesiastical authority, and refusing to accept that there is any God-ordained social hierarchy, concentration of privilege or land-ownership in noble hands, or religious

³¹ Boureau-Deslandes, *Histoire critique*, i, preface, pp. ix–x; see also La Mettrie, *Preliminary Discourse*, 163–70.

³² Cabriada, *Carta filosófica médica-chymica*, 4–5; López Piñero, *Joan de Cabriada*, 58, 89; Israel, 'Counter-Reformation', 41, 52.

³³ Jacob, *Radical Enlightenment*, 20–3, 93.

sanction for monarchy.³⁴ From its origins in the 1650s and 1660s, the philosophical radicalism of the European Early Enlightenment characteristically combined immense reverence for science, and for mathematical logic, with some form of non-providential deism, if not outright materialism and atheism along with unmistakably republican, even democratic tendencies.

Down to the 1750s the principal luminaries of the moderate Enlightenment were uninterruptedly battling on several different fronts simultaneously. Divided among themselves into three main separate factions contending for the middle ground, they were at the same time engaged in fending off traditionalists on one flank and radicals on the other. Hence it became a typical feature of intellectual conflict that moderates endeavoured to shield themselves against conservatives by stressing, even exaggerating, the gulf dividing them from the universally reviled and abhorred radicals while, simultaneously, traditionalists sought a tactical advantage, in their public discourse, by minimizing the gap separating the latter from the moderates as much as possible. A classic instance of such manoeuvring was the controversy surrounding the publication of Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des Lois*, a landmark of moderate Enlightenment thought, in 1748. Scarcely had it appeared than it was vociferously decried, especially by the Jesuits in France, Italy, and Austria as 'Spinosiste et déiste' in inspiration, since it treats morals and laws as essentially natural, man-made contrivances bearing no relation to any God-given absolute standard.³⁵ At this point it was also retrospectively pointed out that Montesquieu's earlier work, the *Lettres Persanes* (1721) was similarly infused with Spinozist ideas about morality and law and that when discussing the Emperor Theodosius once again 'Spinoza est le modèle que l'auteur a voulu imiter'.³⁶ Forced to reply, Montesquieu published a brochure at Geneva, in February 1750, maintaining (not altogether convincingly) that the accusation was self-contradictory since Spinozism, properly understood, is incompatible with deism. In any case, he insisted on his own Christian allegiance, and belief in a providential God 'comme Créateur et comme conservateur' of the universe; he had always condemned, he claimed, those who assert that the world is governed by blind fate and scrupulously differentiated in his writing the material world from 'les intelligences spirituelles'.³⁷ Montesquieu's assurances that 'il n'y a donc point de Spinosisme dans *L'Esprit des Lois*'³⁸ were cautiously accepted by most governments, including, after a protracted controversy, the imperial court at Vienna, though the papal Inquisition at Rome, after considerable hesitation, rejected his defence and banned the book anyway in November 1751.

The question of Spinozism is indeed central and indispensable to any proper understanding of Early Enlightenment European thought. Its prominence in European intellectual debates of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century is generally

³⁴ Doria, *Il Capitano Filosofo*, i, 3–4; Capasso, *Institutiones Theologicae*, i, 190–1.

³⁵ Montesquieu, *Oeuvres complètes*, 808; Vernière, *Spinoza*, 454–60; Rotondò, 'Censura ecclesiastica', 1490–1; Ferrone, *Intellectual Roots*, 27.

³⁶ [Gaultier], *Lettres Persanes convaincues*, 34–6, 101.

³⁷ Montesquieu, *Oeuvres complètes*, 808–9.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 809; Davidson, 'Toleration', 231.

far greater than anyone would suppose from the existing secondary literature; one of the chief aims of this present study is to demonstrate that there has been a persistent and unfortunate tendency in modern historiography to misconstrue and underestimate its significance. Admittedly, the term 'Spinosisme' as used in the French Enlightenment, or *Spinozisterey*, as it was called in Germany, was frequently employed, as in the campaign against Montesquieu, rather broadly to denote virtually the whole of the Radical Enlightenment, that is, all deistic, Naturalistic, and atheistic systems that exclude divine Providence, Revelation, and miracles, including reward and punishment in the hereafter, rather than strict adherence to Spinoza's system as such.³⁹ Yet this does not mean that it was a vague or meaningless usage. On the contrary, the extremely frequent and extensive use of the terms Spinozism and *Spinosistes* in Early Enlightenment discourse, not least in Bayle, who devoted the longest single article in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* to the subject of Spinoza and *Spinosisme*, is precisely intended to connect—and with considerable justification, as we shall see—Spinoza's philosophy with a wide-ranging network of other radical thought. Thus, for example, the most voluminous eighteenth-century European encyclopaedia, Zedler's *Grosses Universal Lexicon* (see pp. 135, 655 below), published at Leipzig and completed in 1750, provides separate entries for 'Spinoza' and 'Spinozisterey' both of which are individually considerably longer than what is said about 'Locke'.⁴⁰ The pattern is the same in the later French *Encyclopédie* edited by Diderot and d'Alembert: for all the lavish praise heaped on Locke by d'Alembert in his preliminary discourse to the *Encyclopédie*—praise which, as we shall see, may have had a diversionary purpose—in the body of the *Encyclopédie* itself the coverage given to Locke is far less, scarcely one fifth, of the coverage accorded to Spinoza.⁴¹

The *Grosses Universal Lexicon* lists the leading 'Spinozists' apart from Spinoza himself as 'Leenhof, Kuyper, Lucas, Boulainvilliers, Cuffeler, the author of *Philopater*, Wyermars, Koerbagh, Lau, Lahontan, Moses Germanus, Stosch and Toland'.⁴² In addition, a second list is given of those suspected of being strongly influenced by Spinoza, namely 'Geulincx, Bredenburg, Bekker, Deurhoff, Burman, Wachter and [Jacob] Wittichius'. Today most of these names, aside from those of Boulainvilliers and Toland, are largely or entirely forgotten. Yet there is little justification for ignoring or marginalizing these writers since even a cursory examination of their writings shows that their views are more radical and, in some cases, more innovative than those of numerous figures who, for one reason or another, are far more familiar to those who study and discuss the Enlightenment today. For this reason, another key objective of this present study is to redress the balance somewhat in their regard too.

³⁹ Hence Bayle's dictum 'on appelle Spinosistes tous ceux qui n'ont guère de religion, et qui ne s'en cachent pas beaucoup', quoted in Bohrmann, *Spinozas Stellung*, 76; Wolff defines *Spinosisterey* in his *Natürliche Gottesgelahrheit*, vi, pp. 36–113.

⁴⁰ Zedler, *Grosses Universal Lexicon*, xxxix, pp. 75–86 and for 'Spinozisterey' pp. 88–95; for 'Locke' see *Ibid.* xviii, pp. 107–13.

⁴¹ For 'Locke', see [Diderot and d'Alembert], *Encyclopédie*, ix, 625–7; for 'Spinoza', see *ibid.*, xv, 463–74.

⁴² Zedler, *Grosses Universal Lexicon*, xxxix, 86.

ii. The 'Crisis of the European Mind'

As employed in this present work, the term 'Crisis of the European Mind' denotes the unprecedented intellectual turmoil which commenced in the mid-seventeenth century, with the rise of Cartesianism and the subsequent spread of 'mechanical philosophy' or the 'mechanistic world-view', an upheaval which heralded the onset of the Enlightenment proper in the closing years of the century.⁴³ Admittedly, new philosophical and scientific ideas such as Cartesianism cannot claim all the credit for engineering the resulting revolutionary transformation in European culture. New kinds of theological controversy often contributed both to weakening the internal cohesion of the main confessional blocs and, as has been shown in the case of the decline of belief in Hell and eternal torment for the damned, to driving some of the most characteristic changes of attitude regarding traditional beliefs during this most decisive of all periods of cultural change.⁴⁴ Yet it was unquestionably the rise of powerful new philosophical systems, rooted in the scientific advances of the early seventeenth century and especially the mechanistic views of Galileo, which chiefly generated that vast *Kulturkampf* between traditional, theologically sanctioned ideas about Man, God, and the universe and secular, mechanistic conceptions which stood independently of any theological sanction. What came to be called the 'New Philosophy', which in most cases meant Cartesianism, diverged fundamentally from the essentially magical, Aristotelian, 'pre-scientific' view of the world which had everywhere prevailed hitherto and worked to supplant it, projecting a rigorous mechanism which, in the eyes of adversaries, inevitably entailed the subordination of theology and Church authority to concepts rooted in a mathematically grounded philosophical reason—albeit most 'Cartesians' of the 1650s and 1660s never intended to undermine theology's hegemony or weaken the sway of the churches to anything like the extent which rapidly resulted.⁴⁵

This transitional phase, or prelude to the Early Enlightenment, arguably corresponds to the larger part of the second half of the century, down to the 1680s. In these years, the sway of theology, ecclesiastical authority, and divine-right monarchy appeared broadly still intact but was perceptibly being weakened by the onset of alarming rifts and fissures. Sporadically, especially in France and Italy, various manifestations of clandestine atheistic and deistic traditions reaching back via such authors as Bodin, Bruno, and Giulio Cesare Vanini, the alleged 'atheist' burned at the stake in Toulouse in 1619, and then through earlier Italian thinkers, notably Machiavelli and Pomponazzi, to ancient Rome and Greece, appeared, albeit usually in the veiled, camouflaged manner of the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century libertines. This form of intellectual dissent, termed *libertinisme érudit*, still an appreciable force in the

⁴³ Casini, *Introduzione*, i, pp. x–xi.

⁴⁴ Walker, *Decline of Hell*, 4, 8, 59–70.

⁴⁵ Yates, *Giordano Bruno*, 448–52; Verbeek, *Descartes and the Dutch*, 34–77; Schmidt-Biggemann, 'Spinoza dans le cartésianisme', 71–6.

late seventeenth century, sought to mask, but simultaneously to disseminate, views opposed to prevailing theological and metaphysical orthodoxies by presenting opinions and quotations culled mostly from classical authors in innovative and seditious ways, paying particular attention to sceptical, irreverent, and atheistic sources such as Lucian, Epicurus, and Sextus Empiricus, and historians of philosophy such as Diogenes Laertius.⁴⁶

This was a potent intellectual undercurrent, especially in France and Italy, and one which played a notable role in preparing the ground for the rise of the Radical Enlightenment, especially by creating a sophisticated audience potentially receptive to its message and promoting the theory, insinuated particularly by Machiavelli and Vanini, of the political origin of organized religion.⁴⁷ However, such erudite *libertinismo* was never strictly part of the phenomenon of the Radical Enlightenment itself. For the perfecting of the erudite libertine techniques was chiefly a feature of the early seventeenth century—especially the work of Gabriel Naudé (1600–53) and François de la Mothe Le Vayer (1588–1672)—when there was still little or no possibility of producing or propagating a systematic philosophy explicitly at odds with the prevailing orthodoxies. The *libertins érudits*, however seditious, were essentially precursors of the Radical Enlightenment operating behind a dense layer of camouflage.

From the 1650s, particularly in the relatively freer atmosphere of the Netherlands and England, the opportunity to forge an explicit and systematic philosophical radicalism existed. Nevertheless, all new streams of thought which gained any broad support in Europe between 1650 and 1750, such as the philosophies of Descartes, Malebranche, Le Clerc, Locke, Newton, Thomasius, Leibniz, or Wolff, sought to substantiate and defend the truth of revealed religion and the principle of a divinely created and ordered universe. If the great thinkers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century uniformly reviled bigotry and ‘superstition’ and discarded, if not expressly rejected, belief in magic, divination, alchemy, and demonology, all except Spinoza and Bayle sought to accommodate the new advances in science and mathematics to Christian belief (if not always to that of one or other Church) and the authority of Scripture. They asserted as fundamental features of our cosmos the ceaseless working of divine Providence, the authenticity of Biblical prophecy, the reality of miracles, immortality of the soul, reward and punishment in the hereafter, and, in one way or another—sometimes highly unorthodox as with Le Clerc, Locke and Newton—Christ’s mission as the Redeemer of Man.

Admittedly, fragmentation of ideas as such was not entirely a new phenomenon. For there had never been a single accepted corpus of philosophy and science, linked to theology, which was universally acknowledged and taught in the west. It is true that before 1650, as afterwards, Europe’s philosophical heritage was ramified and diverse.

⁴⁶ Popkin, *History of Scepticism*, 87–109; Gregory, ‘Libertinisme érudit’, 325–7.

⁴⁷ Machiavelli’s most notorious exposition of this doctrine comes in the *Discorsi* where he recounts the story of the Roman king Numa Pompilius who ‘turned to religion as something entirely necessary for a ruler wishing to maintain an orderly society’, Gregory, ‘Libertinisme érudit’, 325–7; Machiavelli, *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, 146.

Nor since the Reformation had there been a single dominant theology. Instead, four competing principal Churches—the Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican—had each in its own manner secured a locally dominant position in spiritual life, education, and general culture. Each confessional bloc exhibited its own distinct theological tradition, exegetical methodology, ecclesiastical hierarchy, and network of institutions of higher learning.

Yet despite the profound disarray and distress generated by the Reformation and sporadic wars of religion, by the late sixteenth century a generally stable and imposing façade of spiritual and intellectual unity had been restored, each main confessional bloc succeeding in the territory it dominated in establishing a cultural hegemony which was both locally overwhelming and remarkably resilient. After around 1590, changes in Europe's confessional boundaries, even in the midst of the horrors of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), became increasingly rare. Furthermore, while remaining irreconcilably antagonistic towards each other, these hegemonic Churches all successfully built, each in its own sphere, a confessional uniformity, not only within their own ranks but, in most cases (other than in the Dutch Republic and England) also in society as a whole. They were able to confine lesser Churches and fringe sects to a completely marginal status, or eliminate them altogether. Even in confessionally hybrid states such as the electorate of Brandenburg-Prussia which, in 1701, became a monarchy, there was a strong propensity before 1650 for the constituent territories to belong predominantly to one or another confession; thus in Brandenburg, Pomerania, and East Prussia the Lutheran and, in Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg, the Reformed (Calvinist). Finally, all four main church blocs found they could agree, if not on questions of authority and numerous secondary points of theology, then broadly, on the core Christian doctrines to be upheld and protected.

The four principal confessions also largely agreed as to the metaphysical, logical, and scientific underpinning, namely scholastic Aristotelianism, best adapted to reinforcing and extending the sway of their ultimately convergent theologies.⁴⁸ Hence, while scholastic Aristotelianism in the seventeenth century was by no means either entirely uniform, nor as inflexible and unwilling to debate the new mechanistic theories as is sometimes implied,⁴⁹ it was nevertheless, in both Catholic and Protestant lands, throughout Europe until the 1650s overwhelmingly *philosophia recepta*, the officially and ecclesiastically sanctioned philosophy prevailing in universities and academies, and dominating philosophical and scientific discourse and textbooks.⁵⁰ Characteristic ingredients of this common Aristotelian legacy included the idea that all knowledge comes initially through the senses, and that the human mind—as Locke concurred later, in opposition to Descartes—is first a 'tabula rasa', and the key notion that all things are constituted of matter and form, the latter emanating from the soul or essence of things so that bodies and souls cannot be separate entities in

⁴⁸ Phillips, *Church and Culture*, 136–42; Schmitt, 'Rise', 801–3; Van Ruler, *Crisis of Causality*, 34, 38–42.

⁴⁹ Mercer, 'Vitality and Importance', 40–3.

⁵⁰ Lessaca, *Colyrio philosophico*, 7–10; Schmitt, 'Rise', 799–801.

themselves, a concept resulting in the celebrated doctrine of 'substantial forms'.⁵¹ This concept of innate propensities in turn shaped scientific procedure by giving priority to classifying things according to their 'qualities' and then explaining the specific responses and characteristics of individual things in terms of primary group properties. Behaviour and function consequently arise, and are determined by, the soul or essence of things rather than mechanistically. Hence there is a conceptual but no observable or measurable dividing line between the 'natural' and 'supernatural', a distinction which could only be clearly made following the rise of the mechanistic world-view.

If discrepancies, tensions, and contradictions abounded, it is nevertheless true that a broadly coherent culture took shape in most of Europe between the Reformation and the middle of the seventeenth century, favoured and supported by an elaborate apparatus of royal, ecclesiastical, and academic authority. Powerful instruments of religious and intellectual censorship had been forged to deal with the problem of religious heresy and these could in turn be put to use to tighten the linkage between theology and approved philosophy. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, Europe was a civilization in which formal education, public debate, preaching, printing, book-selling, even tavern disputes about religion and the world, were closely supervised and controlled. Virtually nowhere, not even in England or Holland after 1688, was full toleration the rule, and hardly anyone subscribed to the idea that the individual should be free to think and believe as he or she thought fit.⁵² Still at the end of the seventeenth century, 'le dogme de la tolérance', as a French correspondent urged Leibniz, in 1691, was widely considered exceedingly dangerous despite the rapidly growing support for it, indeed the worst of all errors, because it is the one which encourages acquiescence in all the others—and was perceived as being primarily promoted by Socinians and 'ceux qu'on nomme Déistes et Spinosistes'.⁵³

Consequently, the cultural and intellectual system prevailing in mid-seventeenth-century Europe, with the partial exception only of England and the United Provinces was—deep confessional divisions notwithstanding—doctrinally coherent, geared to uniformity, authoritarian, and formidably resistant to intellectual innovation and change. As such, it harmonized admirably not only with the dominant ecclesiastical and aristocratic hierarchies presiding over Church and society but also the pervasive princely absolutism of the age. Yet, astonishingly, it was precisely when the monarchical principle was most dominant, in France, Germany, Scandinavia, and Italy alike, that this common European culture, based on the primacy of confessional theology and scholastic Aristotelianism over belief, thought, education, and scholarship, first faltered, then rapidly weakened, and finally disintegrated.⁵⁴ From the 1650s onwards, first in one land, then another, variants of the New Philosophy breached the defences of authority, tradition, and confessional theology,

⁵¹ Phillips, *Church and Culture*, 137–8; Van Ruler, *Crisis of Causality*, 58–61; Mercer, 'Vitality and Importance', 64.

⁵² Israel, 'Intellectual Debate', 21–36.

⁵³ Leibniz, *Otium Hanoveranum*, 262–3.

⁵⁴ Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 643–4.

fragmenting the old edifice of thought at every level from court to university and from pulpit to coffee-shop.⁵⁵

In places, even entire countries, Cartesianism gained an imposing general preponderance which here and there lasted many decades. Yet despite its broad and vigorous impetus internationally from around 1650 down to the 1720s, there was never much likelihood that it could supplant *philosophia aristotelico-scholastica* as the new generally accepted consensus, welding philosophy, science, and theology coherently into a new unity receiving both official and ecclesiastical sanction. In the first place there were too many internal intellectual difficulties and tensions within Cartesianism, which, in the longer run, sapped its unity, cogency, and momentum. Secondly, there was little prospect that Europe's princely courts and Churches would uniformly espouse Descartes' system as formerly they had that of Aristotle. For leading voices within all Churches either hesitated or expressed strong opposition, some unsure whether Cartesianism was really as useful and effective a prop for the core doctrines of Christianity as Descartes and his followers claimed, others convinced that Cartesianism was, on the contrary, prejudicial to Christianity and the ecclesiastical interest. Then thirdly, Aristotelianism, though badly shaken and widely disparaged, was by no means eliminated but rather adapted and fought back, with considerable effect.⁵⁶ Even in the United Provinces and England, where the new mechanistic ideas gained an early primacy, Aristotelianism remained an appreciable factor in the equation.⁵⁷ Post-1650 Aristotelians in northern and southern Europe not only deplored the mechanistic systems of Descartes, Gassendi, and others as incompatible with traditional epistemology, metaphysics, and science but as a first step towards irreligion and atheism.⁵⁸ According to Giovanni Battista Benedetti (or De Benedictis; 1620–1706), rector of the Jesuit college in Naples at the end of the seventeenth century, chief advocate of scholastic Aristotelianism in Italy, and, after the publication of his *Philosophia perpatetica* (1687), a formidable presence also in Spain and Portugal, the *Cartesiani* and *Malebranchisti*, for all their disclaimers, were calling divine Providence into doubt and undermining belief in the core Christian 'mysteries'.⁵⁹

The Cartesians failed, moreover, to maintain any real sense of unity among themselves. Rather, especially in France, they split into openly warring factions with the three leading figures—Antoine Arnauld (1632–94), Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), and Pierre-Sylvain Régis (1632–1707)—all at each other's throats.⁶⁰ Furthermore, Descartes' system proved unable to sway not only many clergy and academics, within all confessional camps, but also some of the most acute thinkers and scientists of the

⁵⁵ Benedetti, *Lettere Apologetiche*, 115–16, 121; Kors, *Atheism in France*, i, 374–8.

⁵⁶ Kors, *Atheism in France*, i, 270–85; Manzoni, Il 'Cattolicesimo Illuminato', 11–12; Mindán, 'Corrientes filosóficas', 473–7; Mercer, 'Vitality and Importance', 57–66.

⁵⁷ Krook, *John Sergeant*, 22–4; Van Ruler, *Crisis of Causality*, 316–19.

⁵⁸ Mercer, 'Vitality and Importance', 57.

⁵⁹ Benedetti, *Lettere Apologetiche*, 116–20, 182–3, 293, 311; Benedetti, *Difesa della scolastica teologia*, 136–7, 172–4; Benedetti, *Difesa della terza Lettera*, 17, 58–9, 91, 137–40, 154; Ferrone, *Intellectual Roots*, 2–3.

⁶⁰ [Aubert de Versé], *L'Impie convaincu*, 156; Sleight, *Leibniz and Arnauld*, 30–3, 153–6; Nadler, *Arnauld*, 79–90; Kors, 'Scepticism', 211–12.

age; and while some among the latter, like the renowned Dutch physicist, Christian Huygens, kept their reservations to themselves, others, including Locke in England, Leibniz in Germany, and Vico in Naples, not only formidably criticized their great precursor but presented imposing new philosophical systems of their own which sapped confidence in Cartesianism much as Descartes had discredited Aristotelianism.

A further factor which greatly contributed to the depth and intensity of the general crisis of the European mind was the susceptibility of all major Churches, and many minor ones, made brittle by internecine wrangling both theological and philosophical, to experience major new and enduring rifts within their own ranks. In effect, practically every Church itself became deeply divided, in part over matters connected with current philosophical and scientific debates, while simultaneously beset by fresh forms of internal theological dissension. Hence philosophy served both to complicate and intensify conflicts between rival theological factions, though in Italy and France it also frequently happened that even priest-professors belonging to the same religious orders took opposite sides in the struggle for and against the 'New Philosophy'.⁶¹ Thus Jansenists and anti-Jansenists (especially the Jesuits) engaged, from the 1640s onwards, in vociferous strife within the Catholic Church in France and both parts of the Netherlands, as well as less noisily in Italy, even while both sides had in addition to cope with splits between Cartesians and anti-Cartesians within their own ranks. No less acrimonious was the rivalry erupting within the Dutch Reformed Church between the liberal (Cocceian) and orthodox Calvinist (Voetian) wings, antagonism exacerbated by the tendency of the former to champion Cartesianism and the latter scholastic Aristotelianism.⁶² Similarly, the Anglican Church in Britain and Ireland divided theologically and intellectually (as well as politically) in the late seventeenth century between the traditionalists or 'high-flyers' and the liberal 'Latitudinarian' wing which proved receptive to Newtonianism if, at first, not to Locke. Even the clergy of Spain and Portugal, hitherto rock solid in their unity and commitment to scholasticism, fell into disarray towards the close of the seventeenth century as the Aristotelians strove (unsuccessfully, on the whole) to mobilize the Inquisition against the 'innovatores' while the Cartesians and *Malebranchistas* pointed out that John Wycliffe and many another 'appalling heretic' had wallowed in Aristotle.⁶³ Intellectually, the Iberian Peninsula may have struck other Europeans as remote and backward. Juan de Cabriada warned his compatriots in 1686 that due to their insufficient awareness of current philosophical and scientific developments elsewhere, they were disdained in other European lands like the 'Indians of America'.⁶⁴ Yet for all that, by the 1680s Spain too was becoming deeply fragmented by the New Philosophy and, despite the time lag, the bitter struggles over philosophy and science that erupted there in the early eighteenth century were in essence not greatly different from those convulsing the rest of Europe.

⁶¹ Mindán, 'Corrientes filosóficas', 473–4; Kors, *Atheism in France*, i, 277–9.

⁶² Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 889–99.

⁶³ Nájera, *Maignanus redivus*, 304; Mindán, 'Corrientes filosóficas', 473–9.

⁶⁴ Cabriada, *Carta filosófica*, 230–1.

The concept of a 'crisis of the European mind' in the late seventeenth century as a transitional phase sandwiched between the confessional era and the Enlightenment was introduced into modern historiography by the Belgian historian of thought Paul Hazard (1878–1944) in his seminal work *La Crise de la conscience européenne* (Paris, 1935) though, with his eye chiefly on developments in France, he tended to date the onset of the crisis unacceptably late, to around 1680.⁶⁵ More convincingly, Hazard described the intellectual upheaval as 'all-embracing, imperious, profound', a turmoil which 'though born of the seventeenth century was destined to leave its impress on virtually the whole of the eighteenth'.⁶⁶ His claim that the 'daring utterances of the *Aufklärung* . . . pale into insignificance before the aggressive audacities of [Spinoza's] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* [and] the amazing declarations of the *Ethics*' while 'neither Voltaire nor Frederick II ever came near the ungovernable anti-clerical, anti-religious frenzy of Toland and his like' remains valid, as does his thesis that the decisive breakthrough of modern rationalism and secularization to predominance in western civilization occurred during the final decades of the seventeenth century and the opening years of the eighteenth.⁶⁷

Indeed, some such notion as that introduced by Hazard is essential—as long as we modify his dates—since there has to be some sort of label to describe the prelude before the Enlightenment, that is, roughly the decades 1650–80, when the cohesion and unity of the confessional outlook, the ascendancy of the theological orthodoxy and scholastic Aristotelianism, frayed under the impact of the New Philosophy.⁶⁸ In this present study, the period 1650–80 is designated the phase of transition or 'crisis of the European mind' preceding the onset of the Enlightenment, and the period 1680–1750 the more dramatic and decisive period of rethinking when the mental world of the west was revolutionized along rationalistic and secular lines. By the 1750s, all major intellectual innovations and accomplishments of the European Enlightenment were well advanced if not largely complete.

The 'crisis of the European mind' was a collective, but also a deeply unsettling and traumatic individual experience, not least for the scientists themselves, of whom Blaise Pascal (1623–62) was probably the most eloquent in expressing the mental and emotional agonies such profound soul-searching could involve. Pascal painstakingly rescues and reaffirms his Christian faith by dividing reality into totally separate compartments. As for Descartes, Pascal maintains in his posthumously published *Pensées* (1670) that he finds his offence unforgivable: for instead of by-passing the whole question of God, as he ought to have done, he has Him merely press a button 'pour mettre

⁶⁵ See, for instance, Jacob, 'Crisis of the European Mind', 251–6; Phillips, *Church and Culture*, 100–70; Vermij, *Secularising*, 58.

⁶⁶ Hazard, *European Mind*, 502.

⁶⁷ See Jacob, 'Crisis of the European Mind', 251–2; Heyd, 'Be Sober and Reasonable', 1–10; Craven, *Jonathan Swift*, 3–7, 185–6; Hazard's dating of the onset of the 'Crisis' to the 1680s can no longer be justified, since the general fragmentation of the intellectual scene under the impact of the New Philosophy begins, especially in England and the Dutch Republic, but also elsewhere, much earlier than this.

⁶⁸ Casini, *Introduzione*, i, pp. x–xi; Casini, *L'universo-macchina*, 33–8.

le monde en mouvement; après cela, il n'a plus que faire de Dieu'.⁶⁹ Another eminent scientist of the period, the Danish anatomist and geologist Nicholas Steno (1638–87), with no less passion than Pascal, eventually concluded that faith and science cannot be easily or satisfactorily reconciled and abandoned the latter completely to champion the former. Lorenzo Magalotti (1636–1712), secretary of the first of the European scientific academies of the later seventeenth century, in Florence, and a man in touch with all the latest scientific developments internationally, was no less tormented. During his years in Vienna (1674–8) he lapsed into a deep and irreversible personal intellectual crisis, even admitting, in January 1676, to his morbidly devout sovereign, Cosimo III, Grand Duke of Tuscany, that despite every effort to keep up his Catholic allegiance, deep down the new ideas had stifled his faith,⁷⁰ an admission almost certainly connected with his falling into disgrace at the Tuscan court on his return there in 1678.

The European crisis had far-reaching intellectual and religious and also, at least potentially, political implications. Hazard has been criticized for giving insufficient emphasis to the political aspects of the 'crisis', that is the reaction against divine-right monarchy and absolutist ideology and the onset of republican political theories linked expressly, or tacitly, to radical philosophy. It has also been suggested that Hazard failed to grasp the extent to which the intellectual legacy of the English Revolution of the 1640s, and especially the social and religious ideas of the Levellers and Diggers with their democratic, and sometimes communistic, inclinations, may have served not just as a source of radical ideas for the Radical Enlightenment as a whole, but conceivably, even constituted the ideological driving force of the entire European phenomenon, especially its political and social radicalism.⁷¹

Although it cannot be said that its political thought was one of its most prominent or developed features, undeniably the Radical Enlightenment was republican, did reject divine-right monarchy, and did evince anti-aristocratic and democratic tendencies. Democratic republicanism was a particularly marked feature of the writings of the Dutch, English, and Italian radicals though it is also encountered, albeit much more faintly, in French and German contexts. However, there is little of a concrete nature to suggest that the continental Radical Enlightenment did in fact principally derive from English influence and example. On the whole, it seems more likely that the phenomenon derives from a broader, international context. After all, there were other quasi-revolutionary upheavals in mid-seventeenth-century Europe, notably the Frondes and the Massaniello rising (and the brief establishment of a republic) in Naples in 1647–8, which made a scarcely less profound impression on the European consciousness in general and radical minds in particular than the revolutionary upheaval in England. Then, judging by the intense interest it aroused, one might well insist that the Glorious Revolution of 1688–91 was actually more important as

⁶⁹ Pascal, *Pensées*, 94. ⁷⁰ Casini, *Introduzione*, i, 233–4; Cochrane, *Florence*, 275–313.

⁷¹ Hill, *World Turned Upside Down*, 179, 219, 268; Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment*, 22–49; Jacob, 'Crisis of the European Mind', 254–60.

a political exemplum to the radical minds of the early Enlightenment than anything that happened earlier, and this was not in essence a national achievement of the English—nor was it then regarded as such—but essentially a consequence of Dutch *raison d'état* and a large-scale invasion from the continent.⁷² Furthermore, it seems that in Britain itself the social libertarianism of the mid-seventeenth century faded away in the late seventeenth century and did not reappear until the end of the eighteenth.⁷³

Finally, while it is clear that a highly developed republican tradition of political thought evolved in England from the 1650s onwards, and its characteristics have been studied in great detail by scholars, it is far from evident that this corpus of ideas was the prime inspiration for the radical republican tradition with which we are concerned in this present study. What has been termed the 'Anglicization of the republic'⁷⁴ produced certain specific features—an emphasis on land as the basis of political influence and an orientation towards the outlook and needs of the English gentry—which render this corpus of thought appreciably different from the alternative republican tradition, essentially urban and commercial, originating in the work of such writers as Johan and Pieter de la Court, and Spinoza's Latin master, Franciscus van den Enden, with its uncompromising anti-monarchism and egalitarian tendency, a tradition which sprang up on the continent and leads in direct line of descent to the revolutionary rhetoric of Robespierre and the French Jacobins.

In any case, focusing on national contexts is assuredly the wrong approach to an essentially European phenomenon such as the Radical Enlightenment. The movement or current was an international network bent on far-reaching reform philosophically, socially, ethically, in matters of gender and sexuality, and also politically, drawing inspiration from a wide range of sources and traditions, albeit from the 1660s onwards it evinced a high degree of intellectual cohesion, revolving in particular around Spinoza and Spinozism. Given the range of its sources and its widespread impact, as well as an immense anti-radical reaction extending to every corner of Europe, the most essential prerequisite for a balanced view of its origins, development, structure, and reception is to adopt a very broad European view. However difficult it may be to achieve a balanced coverage across a region as culturally diverse as Europe, it is essential to work in that direction if so crucial a manifestation of European history and culture is not to be largely overlooked and marginalized simply because it is too far-ranging and pervasive to be coped with in terms of traditional notions of 'national' history.

⁷² Israel, *Anglo-Dutch Moment*, 1–43, 105–62.

⁷³ Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce and History*, 51–5.

⁷⁴ Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 383–95.

- Scienza Nuova* (1725) 665–9, 679
- Vienna: book trade 107–8
- Habsburg imperial court 12, 54–5, 65, 105, 111, 676
- Hofbibliothek 124–5, 571, 578, 674–5
- Italian cultural influence 47, 107, 138
- university 108
- virgin birth 192, 471 n., 596, 701
- virginity 94–6, 225
- ‘virtuous atheist’ 337, 340
- vitalism 353, 543, 608
- Vittorio Amadeo II, king of Savoy (ruled: 1675–1730) 46–7
- Voetians 19, 25–9, 205–7, 316, 337–8, 382, 389–92, 406–8, 436, 479–80
- Voetius, Gijsbertus (1589–1676), Dutch Reformed theologian 25–6, 34, 53, 187, 207, 395, 413, 479, 483
- Vogelsang, Reinier (c.1610–79), Dutch Reformed theologian 207, 503
- Volder, Burchardus de (1643–1709), Dutch natural scientist 29, 247–8, 252, 278, 310–11, 436–7, 439–40, 442, 478, 480, 482–4, 543, 547, 551, 562, 567, 623, 705
- Voltaire, François-Marie Arouet (1694–1778), French *philosophe* 6–7, 10, 20, 107, 333, 472, 582–3, 586–7, 682, 707–9, 715–16
- absolutism 662
- agent of Newtonianism 85, 400, 525, 556, 584, 673, 709
- anglophilia 400, 515–16, 565, 590 n.
- on Bekker 400–1
- deism 109, 525, 570, 585, 618, 651, 673
- in England (1726–8) 584
- on Fontenelle 359–60, 370–1, 400
- Locke 85, 400, 527, 614, 673
- Éléments de la philosophie de Neuton* (1739) 516, 525–6
- Lettres philosophiques* (1734) 515, 523, 527, 673, 687
- Voorburg (The Hague) 247–8
- Vossius, Gerardus Johannes (1577–1649), Dutch humanist scholar 362, 604
- Vossius, Isaac (1618–98), Dutch deist 88, 127, 362, 449, 451–2, 588, 604, 606
- Voyages de Jacques Massé*, see Tyssot de Patot
- Vries, Gerardus de (1648–1705), Dutch empiricist philosopher 479–81, 483, 517
- Vroesen, Johan (d.1725), Dutch official 696
- Reformed theologian 203, 382, 395, 480
- Walch, Johann Georg (1693–1775), German Lutheran *érudit* 135, 326, 547
- Walloon Church and Synod (Calvinist), of the United Netherlands 207–8, 286
- Walten, Ericus (1663–97), Dutch radical writer 73, 265, 385–7
- Webber, Zacharias [alias Joan Adolphsz] (d.1695), Dutch follower of Bekker 395–6, 744
- Weber, Immanuel (1659–1726), German court writer 62–3
- Wertheim 553–4
- ‘Wertheim Bible’ 105, 552–5, 655
- see also Figure no. 4
- Whiston, William (1667–1752), Anglican divine and mathematician, Boyle lecturer in 1707, 98, 340, 377, 518–19, 602–3
- William III (1650–1702), Prince of Orange, Dutch Stadholder (1672–1702) and King of England (1689–1702) 29, 72–3, 88, 286–7, 304, 337, 387, 607
- Willis, Thomas (1621–75), English medical writer 530
- Wilson, John (dates unknown), English Puritan minister 212, 600
- The Scripture’s Genuine Interpreter* (1678) 212–14
- Winckler, Johann (1642–1705), German Pietist 394–5, 397, 651 n.
- Wistanley, Gerard (c.1609–after 1660), English radical writer 187, 601
- witches and witchcraft 363–4, 376–7, 379–82, 401–4, 598, 695
- growing scepticism concerning 6, 63, 114, 192, 194, 396–8, 400–3, 632–3
- Witt, Johan de (1625–72), Pensionary of Holland (1653–72) 28, 187, 275–8, 286, 479, 716
- Wittenberg (Saxony) 218, 393, 545, 635
- Wittichius (or Wittich), Christopher (1625–87), German-Dutch philosopher-theologian 25–9, 36–8, 201, 203, 207, 210, 215, 217, 221, 407–8, 413, 442, 449–50, 452, 470
- Anti-Spinoza* (1690) 63, 80, 316–18, 407, 440, 635
- Wittichius, Jacob (1677–1739), German-Dutch philosopher 13, 439–43, 470, 480, 567, 744–5
- Wolf, Johan Christian (1683–1739), German Hebraist 131, 202
- Wolfenbüttel, Bibliotheca Augustiniana 124–5
- see also Plate no. 10
- Wolff, Christian (1679–1754), German philosopher 8, 11, 15
- adapts Leibniz 514, 547, 560
- denounced as ‘Spinozist’ 434–5, 543, 545–9, 558
- contingency and necessity 549–50, 560
- critique of Spinoza 85, 549–52, 557, 641, 656–7

- Wolff, Christian (1679–1754) (*cont.*):
 ‘pre-established harmony’ (*harmonia praestabilita*) 85, 548–9
 Providence, *see* Providence
 Sinophilia 544, 588
Theologia naturalis (1736) 550, 555, 657
- Wolffian controversies 434, 544–62
- Wolffianism 456, 464, 473, 480
see also Russia, Sweden, *etc.*
- Wolsgryn, Aert (dates unknown), Dutch Spinozist
 publisher 315–19, 326, 413, 425–6
- Wolzogen, Louis (1633–90), Austro-Dutch
 Reformed theologian 26, 29, 205–8, 210, 215, 217, 503, 633
- women, emancipation of 60, 82–96, 177–8, 598
- Woolston, Thomas (1670–1733), English ‘Christian deist’ 98, 471–2
- Worcester 583, 585, 607
- Wotton, William (1666–1726), Anglican divine 89, 612
- Württemberg, duchy of 545, 587
- Wyermars (Wirmarsius), Hendrik (d. after 1710),
 Dutch Spinozist 13, 132, 252, 265, 322–7
 trial and imprisonment 325–6, 428
Den Ingebeelde Chaos (1710) 325, 432
- Xenophanes (c.570–c.478 BC) Greek philosopher-poet 136, 339, 617
- Yvon, Pierre (1646–1707), Huguenot theologian 63, 207, 604 n., 635, 636 n.
- Zapata, Diego Matheo (c.1665–1745), Spanish philosopher-physician 1, 528–30, 532–4
 crypto-Judaism 532–3
- Zedler, Johann Heinrich, *see* *Grosses Universal Lexicon*
- Zeeland 3, 28, 186 n., 286, 391, 431, 441, 483
 spread of Spinozism 307–8, 391, 443
- Zeno of Elea (5th cent. BC), Greek philosopher 136, 307, 339, 651
- Zeno, Apostolo (1668–1750), Venetian *érudit* 143, 148, 677–8
- Zwolle (Overijssel): book trade 321, 406, 414, 424–5, 494
 burgomasters 415–17, 419, 424, 426, 429–30
 classis 415, 421, 426
 consistory 414–15, 417–19, 423–4, 426
 populace 414, 430
 Spinozists 315, 320, 322, 494, 578, 593
- Zürich 33–4, 105