

# “Scholarly Islam” and “Everyday Islam”: Reflections on the Debate over Integration of the Muslim Minority in India and Western Europe<sup>1</sup>

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## *Abstract*

*The debate on the integration of a Muslim minority community in a non-Muslim majoritarian-national context has often been conducted, from an Islamic point of view, in terms of a single discourse of compatibility, or non-compatibility of Islam, with the given majoritarian-national ethos. This paper rejects such a discourse and reflects on the role of Islam(s) in the construction of “self” and “other” and its attended consequences in terms of integration, both in India and in Western Europe. It does so by underlying the plural character of Islam in its two broad dimensions: Scholarly Islam and Everyday Islam. Within the limitation of structure of nation state that burdens the minority community with the idea of proving loyalty, the paper shows that politics of Islamic representation of “self” and “other” primarily belong to the domain of Scholarly Islam. It then goes on to demonstrate the variation in the (Scholarly) Islamic representation of “other” depending upon the context, while asserting the superiority of “Islamic self” in any given situation. By taking examples from contemporary Indian and West European history, the paper concludes how the bi-polarity, totalizing and homogenizing features of Scholarly Islam, including its liberal facet, hamper the prospect of integration, while the multiple, fuzzy, non-ideological character of Everyday Islam promotes the prospect of social and political integration in the society.*

## **Introduction**

The specific construction of the notion of “self” and “other” and the mutual perception of each other at both the individual as well as the group level is crucial to understanding the success or failure of any model of integration. Broadly, there exist two models of integration: national-majoritarian and multicultural. In the national-majoritarian perspective, or what is called assimilationist model of integration, integration implies assimilation of minority cultures into the dominant majoritarian culture or at best non-recognition of minority cultures in the public sphere. It upholds the majoritarian basis of territorial nationalism. In the multicultural model of integration, integration means equal recognition of minority cultures and religions in the public sphere and the right to negotiate their personal identity within the context of nation-state, while upholding the value of territorial loyalty. However both models *absolutize* the term “majority” and “minority”, thus hindering the prospects of meaningful integration that allow the channel of constant interaction between the two communities, by adhering to the principle of mutual acceptance of each-other’s way of life within the parameters of “operative national value and laws”, arrived through the mutual process of dialogue, negotiation, interaction and engagement. It is within this *particular* meaning of

integration that this paper reflects on the role of Islam(s) in the construction of “self” and “other” and its attended consequences, both in India and in Western Europe. It does so by classifying the role of Islam(s) into two broad categories: “Scholarly Islam” and “Everyday Islam” and argues that while the former hinders the prospects of social and political integration, the latter facilitates the same. The “other” here refers to the “religious other”, and should be read as such through out the paper.

Before one proceeds to demonstrate the underlying assumption of this paper, a clarification pertaining to the comparison between post-colonial India and post-war Western Europe is required at the outset. Though critics might point out the futility of comparison between what is called “modern” Western Europe and “traditional” India, yet the comparison between the two is premised on the following observations:

1. Both Western Europe and India share two common features: a secular, liberal-democratic polity and Muslims as the most dominant religious minority.<sup>2</sup> There is hardly any other part of world where Muslims live as a minority in such great numbers as they are found in the West European nations (particularly in Germany, France and Britain) and in India.
2. Europe had an early encounter with Islam, which was virtually displaced as a result of the Crusades and did not have a role in the making of modern Europe. Islam has started refiguring itself in the context of colonial encounters and waves of migrations in this last century. Islam has had more or less a continuous presence in India and has substantially contributed to the making of Indian culture and civilization. Thus both India and West European nations have a rich historical legacy of encounter with Islam.
3. Both are currently engaged in managing the religious diversity, particularly the Muslim communities, within the dominant framework of the nation-state model of integration.

### **Political Location of Muslims in India and Western Europe**

Muslims in India are “historical communities” with a legitimate claim to “shared history and culture”.<sup>3</sup> Despite this shared historical background Muslims are frequently accused of maintaining a separate, distinct identity at the cost of the “majoritarian” conception of national identity in contemporary India. The “Partition” of the Indian subcontinent<sup>4</sup> created the overarching, “single Muslim identity” for all Muslim generations to come, against the plural identities—regional, sectarian, linguistic, social—with which Muslims were recognized<sup>5</sup> and referred to in the past, and are now permanently juxtaposed against the constructed notion of “Hindu” nation.<sup>6</sup> To this extent, Muslims will continue to suffer from the charge of “non-integration”, “disloyalty”, and a “stubborn” and “non-conformist” attitude towards national (read majoritarian) tradition and the culture and laws and values of the state. In contrast to Muslims in India, Muslims are of relatively recent transplant in the Western European<sup>7</sup> countries and are struggling for the recognition of citizenship and other rights. As such they are not historically developed communities but have faced the similar charge of “non-integration”, “isolationism” and “ghettoism”. This description of Muslim minority communities in two different political, social and national contexts only reinforces the recognition of a general political tendency that the minority community, irrespective of its legal status—citizen or immigrant—in the context of the modern nation-state, will suffer from the burden of either

proving their loyalty to the nation or joining what is called the “national mainstream” in the Indian public political vocabulary.

This becomes more problematic in the context of Muslim communities, particularly in the West, for, according to many, the principle of Islam contradicts the modern notions of “Nationalism”, “Patriotism”, “Secularism”, “Democracy” and now “Multiculturalism”. Incidents like the “Rushdie affair”, the “Honeyford affair” and “Bradford riots” in Britain; the “headscarf affairs” during the 1980s and 1990s in France and Germany; the London bombing (7 July 2005); the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh (November 2004); the Madrid bombing (August 2004); the hostage taking and killing of Beslan schoolchildren (1–3 September 2004); the Arab Muslim riots in French suburbs in November–December 2005; and many other incidents have convinced many, including the articulate section of the European population, that Islam lacks the doctrinal resources to promote the Muslims’ integration into the Western liberal values. Thus, the dominant discourse on multiculturalism in Europe as a viable framework to integrate the Muslim immigrants has received a serious jolt in the background of the Muslims’ demand for recognition of their cultural and religious right in the public sphere, and the associated violent activities.<sup>8</sup> In the case of India, the ideology of “composite nationalism” and “composite culture” was seriously questioned as part of the process of integration of the Muslim communities, especially in the background of growing Islamic militancy in the Muslim-dominated province of Jammu and Kashmir, and in the background of the Shaha Bano Case<sup>9</sup> controversy that witnessed probably the largest Muslim mobilization in the post-independence history of India, demanding the constitutional protection of Muslim Personal Law and its recognition in the public sphere. Many have considered this act of Muslim assertion in the public sphere as a crucial factor in giving help to the forces of Hindu nationalism. Thus, both in the Indian as well as in the European context, serious doubts have been cast on the potential of Islam to promote the process of integration. Such perception *vis-à-vis* Islam exists not only among the rightwing section of the majoritarian populations but also among large numbers of those who adhere to liberal-secular ideology.

It is in this context that the question of “self-representation” becomes extremely important, particularly for the Muslim minority communities, as it is connected with the larger process of national integration. The ways in which the “self” and “other” are imagined in each religion have a crucial bearing on inter-community relations, for these can be a potent weapon for conflict as well as a rich resource for dialogue and cooperation. Given the context of the Muslim minority, the precise question that needs to be asked here is: how does the Islam(s) of a Muslim minority construct the notion of “self” and “other” in different political, social and national contexts? Or how does the minority status of Islam affect the prospect of integration? Does the difference in context affect the process of Islamic articulation of “self” and “other”? If yes, then how? In what ways do these Islamic constructions of “self” and “other” affect the process of social and political integration within the context of a nation-state?

### **Self and Other: Some Clarifications**

Before we proceed further, a clarification with regard to the notion of “self” and “other” is essential in order to situate the role of Islam(s) in the construction of “self” and “other” and its attended consequences upon the process of social and political integration. Attempts to understand the notion of “self” and “other” have been mostly in terms of relationship and representation of each other. To this extent the relationship between

“self” and “other” has been recognized as “Cartesian problematic” in the domain of philosophy and “the problem of representation” in the social science literature. Anthropological study on this subject matter has demonstrated how the understanding of “self” represents in parts the appropriation and internalization of the “other”. The “self” is the “other’s” double and as it appropriates the “other” to reconstitute itself, it learns to recognize an irreducible presence of the “other”.<sup>10</sup> It is this dialectical relationship between the “self” and “other” that influences the particular construction of identity. As Berger and Luckmann<sup>11</sup> pointed out, the self is a reflective entity, reflecting the attitudes first taken by significant “others” toward it; the individual becomes what he is addressed as by his significant “others”. It entails a dialectic between identification by others and self-identification, and between objectively assigned and subjectively appropriated identity. However it was Edward Said<sup>12</sup> who provided the inter-cultural representation of the relationship between “self” and “other” within the context of power and knowledge and envisaged three possible forms of the relationship between the two. Firstly, the “other” is better, and as such should be seen as superior to the “self”. A second possibility is that the “self” is better than the “other”, which is potentially capable of improvement and should be encouraged to learn from the “self”. Thirdly, but beyond this relationship of knowledge and power, is the possibility of the recognition of the moral equality of cultures such that the “self” and “other” could learn from one another as equals.

How and where does Islam figure in these three possible forms of relationship between the “self” and the “other”? An answer to this question may be found in the Islamic representation of other religions and cultures, based on the textual sources of the Qur’an and the *Hadith* (Sayings of Prophet Muhammad), which is otherwise a dominant norm in the academia.<sup>13</sup> But as El-Zain noted: ““Islam”, “economy”, “history”, “religion” and so on do not exist as things or entities with meaning inherent in them, but rather as articulations of structural relations, and are the outcome of these relations and not simply a set of positive terms from which we start our studies”.<sup>14</sup> Therefore a single, monolithic, orientalist solution to the complex issue of (Islamic) representation of “self” and “other” will at best be a mere simplification of the otherwise complex social reality. Rather, the Islamic representation of “self” and “other” and the relationship between the two would be “socially constructed”, bound by the notion of “time and space” and plural in forms depending upon such factors as doctrinal and sectarian differences, class, caste (in the Indian context), status (whether minority or majority, citizen or immigrant), gender, rural, urban, and regional locations of individuals, groups or organizations—all of which are involved in the articulation of relationship between the “self” and “other” in Islamic terms.

### **Scholarly Islam: Meaning and Dimensions**

The plural forms of the Islamic representation of “self” and “other” is further affected by a vertical distinction between what I refer to as “Scholarly Islam”—whether traditional or modern, and “Everyday Islam”,<sup>15</sup> which is different from Clifford Geertz’s distinction of “High and Low Islam”,<sup>16</sup> or the generally recognized difference between Elite/Official and Popular/Folk Islam—as they correspond roughly to an urban, hierarchical and literate form of Islam and rural and local form of Islam respectively. By Scholarly Islam I mean the whole gamut of formal, literate, institutionalized Islam represented by a class of religious specialists known as *ulema* and *sufi* orders<sup>17</sup> and the Muslim intellectuals of all shades—whether religious or secular, moderate-liberal or conservative-hardliner.

Scholarly Islam is also reflected in a network of Islamic educational and cultural institutions and organizations, including political parties, to be found in both urban and rural social settings, and who are involved in the construction of the ideology of Islam for the purpose of Islamic legitimization of social reality. Scholarly Islam is heavily influenced by the paradigm of modernity.<sup>18</sup> Azmeh attributes this process of Islamic legitimization as being the principle of “nominal translation”; that is, applying the name of Islam “to that which historically was neither part of it nor its intellectual and cultural authority, and implicating this name with a politically desired and intellectually pre-determined world”.<sup>19</sup>

The plural representative of this Islam in the Indian context ranges from such traditional theological institutions as Dar al-Ulum in Deoband; Dar al Ulum Nadwa in Lucknow; Baraelvi School and its network of *madrassas*; various Islamic studies departments in secular universities and colleges; parties and organizations such as Jamat-e-Islami Hind, Jamait Uleme Hind, Ahle Hadith, Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI); various *Sufi* saints; and *khankhas* (hospices). In addition to the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, All India Milli Council, and Muslim League, Islamic scholars such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Hussain Madani, Allama Iqbal, Wahiduddin Khan, Asghar Ali Engineer and so on represent plural Islam in the Indian context. In the Western European context, it is predominantly represented by various Islamic and Muslim organizations of all shades like the Central Council of the Muslims in Germany, Muslim Council of Britain, French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), Paris Mosque, Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), National Federation of Muslims of France (FNMF), DITB (the Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birligi), Avrupa Milli Gorus Teskilateri (AMGT) or Milli Gorus, Hizbul Tahrir, and scholars such as Mohammad Arkoun, Tariq Ramdan, Ziauddin Sardar, etc., without any recognizable class of institutionalized *ulema*.

The genealogy of Scholarly Islam is mainly concerned with the issue of preservation and promotion of a distinct “Islamic” identity of the Muslims, particularly in the minority context. A perceived threat to Islam or Islamic/Muslim identity is deeply felt among Muslim minority communities in comparison to Muslim majority communities, lest they get assimilated in the majoritarian value system of the host society. In the post-colonial Indian context, the constant engagement of Scholarly Islam with issues such as Aligarh Muslim University, Urdu language, Babri Masjid, Muslim Personal Law and others pertaining to the protection and promotion of Islamic/Muslim identity, culture and heritage,<sup>20</sup> in part, also reflects the “politics of self-representation” of the otherwise diversified Muslim communities by the Muslim elite, thereby securing access for them to the governmental resources.<sup>21</sup> It is no wonder any outside attack on any Muslim institution, in the Indian context, gets transformed into an attack on Islam itself. Given the system of electoral democracy in India, the government and the secular political parties have generally been cautious in dealing with issues related to Muslim institutions.

One finds similar trends in the West European context. The threat of assimilation *vis-à-vis* the nascent Muslim immigrant communities, looms large for many of the representatives of Scholarly Islam whom I had met and interviewed during the course of my field work. I was indeed struck by some of their observations and their articulation about European history: if secularization and industrialization has rendered Christianity “impotent” in this part of the world, then what will happen to Islam and Muslim identity here? The perseverance of Islam is a challenge for every Muslim. Many of them see the proliferation of Islamic/Muslim institutions as the best way to protect the Islamic identity and heritage. It has also been observed that wherever, in the West European context,

Muslims have been allowed to participate in the political process, such as in Great Britain, they have mainly raised those issues, such as the construction of mosques, Islamic instruction in public schools, establishment of Islamic schools, provision of *halal* food, etc., that strengthened their Islamic/Muslim identity. In part, these issues also serve the material interests of Scholarly Islam, for all these “Islamic” demands also entail a financial dimension, for example, management of subsidies, wages, and revenue from *halal* food business.<sup>22</sup> Given this predicament of Islam in a Muslim minority situation, many see the phenomenon of Islamization as a means of maintaining and reinforcing the sense of belonging to Islam in a non-Muslim context, while in Muslim countries it can refer to a process of politicisation.<sup>23</sup>

Both the liberal and radical facets of Scholarly Islam—while they may differ in terms of their thrust from “accommodation and tolerance” to “rejection”—place emphasis on “living as [an] ideal Muslim”, thereby endowing the Muslim individual with a single Islamic/Muslim identity at the cost of multiple identities that an individual may acquire during the “process of living”. One such indicator of the process of Islamic homogenization that is taking place in India is the continuous historical exercise related to the codification of *Sharia* law. One finds a similar process occurring in Europe. A great number of Muslim and Islamic scholars, assisted by the respective European governments as well as the European Union, are involved in the creation of a homogenized, codified, singular conception of *Sharia* that conforms to the European value system.<sup>24</sup> Notwithstanding the merit of this exercise of Scholarly Islam as it helps in making the task of state governance easy, I am skeptical about the successful outcome of such a codification process in terms of integration.<sup>25</sup> Without explaining the reasons for my skepticism in this regard as it falls outside the scope of this paper, it would suffice here to point out that the emergence of Political Islam is, in part, connected with this process of “homogenization” and “ideologization” of Islam in the contemporary period.<sup>26</sup> While the radical facet of the “ideologized Islam” is still a minority trend in Western society, the net effect of their actions, however, particularly the violent ones, has outlived their marginal and minority presence in the society and as such hampers the process of integration as it negatively affects the mutual perception of interactions.

One consequence of Islamic homogenization is that, like all other processes of boundary maintenance, this entails the construction of clear dividing lines marking off Muslims from others. However, this process of “othering”, to a great extent, also signifies the relative knowledge and power position of a social group as noted by Said,<sup>27</sup> and is primarily connected with the acts of those individuals and groups who are involved in the ideological—secular or religious—legitimization of hegemony and the maintenance of their social privileges. All such Islamic ideological constructs, whether *dar al-harb* (Abode of War), *dar al-Islam* (Abode of Islam), *dar al-aman* (a state at peace with Islam), *dar al-sahara* (to bear witness to the truth of Islam), the notions of *Sharia* (Islamic Law) and *umma* (global Muslim brotherhood) and many others, belong to this genre of Scholarly Islam that aimed to provide Islamic legitimization to Muslims living in different settings. These in effect also intended to protect the material interests of dominant Muslim social groups, whether located in Muslim majority or in Muslim minority contexts. The theological element thus plays a central role in the discourse of Scholarly Islam for a variety of purposes; however, it essentially serves as a crucial means of self-identification. Often, the “other within” is seen (in a sectarian sense) as more dangerous than the “other without”, for its very familiarity threatens the integrity and faith of the community. In the process of constructing the “other” as perverse, as an enemy of God or simply misguided, the “self” is imagined as the only guided community of



faith, God’s only trusted followers. For Scholarly Islam, the “other” can take the various forms, while the superiority of the “self” is always claimed, irrespective of the context—whether Muslim majority or Muslim minority.

### Representations in Scholarly Islam: The Indian Context

The variation in the Islamic representation of “others” while upholding the superiority of the “Islamic self”, even in the minority context, can be demonstrated by a few select examples from Indian as well as from contemporary West European history. Thus in the Indian context, when Islam was the ruling ideology of the Muslim kingdom in India and enjoying the position of power and influence, it was represented as “generous” and “magnanimous”—treating the culture and religion of non-Muslims groups with respect within the notion of *dhimmi* (non-Muslim subjects under Muslim rule). On the other hand, the representation of “majority Hindus” ranges from *kafir* (non-believer)<sup>28</sup> or *mushrikin* (the idol worshippers) to *ahle-a-kitab* (People of the Book).<sup>29</sup> Harsher descriptions of “Hindus” even today, although rarely openly, include *gumrah* (misguided), *jahil* (ignorant), *nape* and *najis* (unclean), *dushmana-i-Islam* (enemies of Islam) and *auliya-i-shaitan* (friends of the devil).<sup>30</sup>

During the nineteenth century, when Britain consolidated its hold over India, the dominant Islamic representation of the “other” (that is, British) ranged from Sufi Shah Abd al-Aziz’s declaration of India as *dar al-harb* in 1803, in order to legitimize economic transactions and social interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims,<sup>31</sup> to Sayyid Ahmad Barailvi’s declaration of India as *dar al-harb*, calling Muslims to wage war against the British or to leave the country for another destination where they could practice Islam.<sup>32</sup> Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s declaration in the 1860s that India was very much a land of *dar al-Islam* sought to construct a closer relationship between the British rulers and the Muslims on the basis of the Quranic concept of *ahle-kitab* which affirms that since Christians and Jews are “people of the Book”, they are of equal status to Muslims.<sup>33</sup> However, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s declaration of India as *dar al-Islam* under British rule was primarily meant to secure British co-operation to maintain the privileged position of Muslim nobility.<sup>34</sup>

Furthermore, during the period of anti-colonial struggle in the twentieth century, the Islamic representation of the “other” was manifested in two dominant tendencies representative of their respective class position. The first may be identified as “modernist Islam” and was represented by such leaders as Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948, hailed as father of Pakistan) and poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), and backed by “people of means” who articulated the doctrine of the Two Nation Theory.<sup>35</sup> They rejected the Western territorial concept of nationalism in the name of “Pan-Islamism”, but finally ended up with the creation of a territorial nation-state called Pakistan. The other, what is called the “traditionalist Islam”, believed in the cultural understanding of the *umma*, and articulated and advocated the notion of “composite territorial nationalism” in the light of Islamic doctrine of governance within which Muslims can live with non-Muslims without any fear or danger to Islamic life. It thus opposed the division of the country on religious lines.<sup>36</sup> The proponents of this view included leaders like Maulana Hussein Ahmed Madni (1879–1957), principal of the theological seminary Deoband-ul-Ulum and leader of Jamiat Ulema-Hind, and Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), President of the Indian National Congress from 1940–1946 who subsequently served as education minister in independent India.

In the post-independence period of India, the dominant Islamic representation of “self” and “other” was reflected in the theory of *dar al-ahad* (land of the pact), derived from Prophet Muhammad’s pact (*ahad*) with the Jews of Medina after his *hijra* (migration). According to this thesis, Muslims and non-Muslims have entered upon a mutual contract in India since independence in order to establish a secular state under which Muslims would be free to exercise their religious obligations, at least in the personal sphere.<sup>37</sup> In other words, allegiance of a Muslim citizen to the non-Muslim state is conditional upon the recognition and protection of Muslim identity, at least in the personal sphere. It is through this process that Muslims enter into a relationship with the dominant Hindu majority.<sup>38</sup> The superiority of the Islamic “self”, even in the theory of *dar al-ahad*, was best expressed by Mawlana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (1913–1999), one of the most influential Islamic thinkers of the Muslim world. In response to an interview conducted by Christian W. Troll on the issue of accommodation and status of Muslims in a non-Muslim nation state such as India, Maulana Nadwi remarked, “Considering the role they (Muslims) have played in the history of India, ruling the country successfully and blamelessly for 800 years, and taking into account the superior religious and moral equipment God has bestowed upon them as the final and best *umma*, possessing Qur’an, *hadith*, and *sira* as well as the fully developed *sharia*, they are bound to be asked by their co-citizens to give decisive leadership. Living in a republican (*jumhuri*) set up, they hold the balance in lawmaking and other areas of national life”.<sup>39</sup>

In fact the changing pattern of Islamic representation of the “other”, while asserting the Islamic “self”, at least in the context of India, very much reflects different positions of various Muslim elites and the nature of their relationship with the political authority.

### **Representations in Scholarly Islam: The West European Context**

The dominant Islamic representation of the “self” and “other”, from the Muslim minority perspective in the European context, ranges from celebration of the (Islamic) *millet* system of the Ottoman era,<sup>40</sup> to Sayyid Qutub’s notion of *jahilliya*,<sup>41</sup> to Tariq Ramadan’s notion of *dar al-shahada*—all three frameworks have been applied to represent (Christian) Europe by different sections of Muslim immigrant communities. The celebration of the Ottoman *millet* system and its bizarre, even nonsensical, comparison with present-day multiculturalism, that calls for the equal treatment and recognition of all cultures in the public sphere, in the liberal Muslim academia, is essentially to demonstrate the superiority of the Islamic system of governance that was supposedly “magnanimous, fair and just” as compared to the present-day Western/Christian system of rule, which is considered “discriminatory, unfair and unjust”, particularly to the Muslim communities.

The doctrine of *jahilliya* asserts that no part of the world is being governed by Islamic Law anymore; the human civilization has once again receded into the pre-Islamic past—age of ignorance (*jahilliya*)—and hence it calls upon the Muslims to work for the establishment of Islamic rule all over the world including among the existing Muslim nations. Living a Muslim life is only possible under the rule of an Islamic state. Under this doctrine, the appeal of which is generally found among a section of radical Islamists, the West is projected as suffering from “cumulative internal disorder” represented by “laxed morality”, “sexual obscenity”, “vulgar consumerism”, “rampant racism”, etc., and is contrasted with “pure”, “simple”, “honoured” and “respectful” Islamic life. As an important functionary of Milli Gorous, the radical Islamic movement in Europe, based in Berlin, told me: “Every 40 minutes a suicide takes place somewhere



in Germany. This is the result of the fact that we live in a materialist system, therefore there is the need for an Islamic organization which can guide the way towards Islam”.<sup>42</sup> One also discovers the same negative representation of Europe in the speeches and recordings of Hassan Inquioussens, a second-generation French born popular Islamic preacher and former president of the youth organization “Jeunes Musulmans de France” (JMF). Today he is employed as a full time preacher by the UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations in France), the federation to which JMF belongs. In a story told as a warning example about the result of being enslaved to ones’ own desires, Inquioussens describes how an elegant, non-Muslim woman, dressed in the “devil’s fashion”, seduces a drugged Muslim, eventually leading to pregnancy and marriage, after which the woman reveals her true personality and the Muslim realizes that he has fallen “into [a] trap of desire” by getting married to a “sorceress”. Inquioussens concludes this story by drawing the attention of the French Muslim to the fact that the celebration of individual freedom and choice in France only disguises a specific form of modern dependency and corrupts Islamic morality, which he compares with the life and work of the “Pharaoh, the ancestor of Western civilization”.<sup>43</sup> Many see such assertions of Islamic superiority by the Muslim immigrants as “cultural compensation” for their deprived material condition in the West.

In contrast to the doctrine of *jahilliya*, the representation of the West in Tariq Ramadan’s doctrine of *dar al-shahada* has a positive connotation. Literally, the term *dar al-shahada* means “to bear witness (to their Faith) before all mankind”. This doctrine asserts that a Muslim can live anywhere in the world and under any form of government that provides the necessary conditions to fulfill his “basic” religious obligations. According to Ramadan, Europe, with its system of governance, provides far better conditions and freedom than many of the existing Muslim nations to perform the basic duties as commanded by Islam. Hence Muslims can live in Europe with legitimate claim and without any fear of losing their Muslim/Islamic identity.<sup>44</sup> The appeal of this doctrine is found more among those Muslims who are well integrated into the opportunity structure of European society. Given the stake of well-to-do Muslim sections in the European system, the overall thrust of Ramadan’s work, that is, to “Islamicise modernity” (to use the words of Sheikh Yassin, the Moroccan Islamic leader<sup>45</sup>), makes sense to these sections as it calls for “depoliticized Islam” and mutual engagement between the Muslims and non-Muslims and between Islam and the West through the mechanism of dialogue and negotiation.

### **Dialogue(s) in Scholarly Islam and its Limitations**

The Quranic notion of *dai* or *da’wah* (one who invites others to Islam) is in fact emerging as the “key” concept, along with the references from the Prophet’s life in Mecca as “a Muslim living in a non-Muslim context”, and his agreement with non-Muslims in Medina (what is called the “Medina Constitution”<sup>46</sup>), to provide Islamic justification for the Muslims’ presence as a “minority” throughout the globe, particularly in the West. However, the interpretation of *da’wah* varies from liberal-moderate to radical facets of Scholarly Islam. In the radical writings of Scholarly Islam, the notion of *da’wah* emerged as the most important Islamic duty for the Muslims living in a minority context with an eventual vision of transforming the non-Muslim majority into Muslims through the work of *da’wah*, leading to the establishment of an Islamic state and society. This approach treats the minority status of Muslims as a “*de facto* situational reality”, “a temporary phenomenon”, and then proceeds to engage with the concepts of “pluralism”,

“multiculturalism” and “diversity” with an eventual conclusion: either to accept these concepts as “pragmatic necessity” or to reject them on the basis that they contradict the “Islamic” prescription of a good life.<sup>47</sup> In contrast to the radical faces of Scholarly Islam, the notion of *da’wah* has emerged as a key hermeneutic tool in the hands of liberal-moderate voices of Islam to engage in the task of inter-cultural, inter-faith and inter-community dialogue (without renouncing Islamic positions) as a part of the wider objective of integration of the Muslim minority in the non-Muslim majority nations.<sup>48</sup> Some of the prominent liberal figures of Scholarly Islam include Muhammad Talibi (b.1921), Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (b.1925), Syed Zainal Abedin (1928–93),<sup>49</sup> Muhammad Arkoun (b.1928), Asghar Ali Engineer (b.1940), Farid Esack (b.1958), and Tariq Ramadan (b.1962).

These liberal faces of Scholarly Islam provide powerful Islamic justification of the notions of “diversity”, “pluralism” and “tolerance”. Tariq Ramadan goes farthest in this respect, to the extent of providing Islamic recognition of the plurality of Truth. As he remarked, “The intimate awareness of *tawheed* forms the perception of the believer, who understands that plurality has been chosen by the One, that He is the God of all beings, and that He requires that each be respected. . .” and say, “We believe in what has been revealed to us and what has been revealed to you; Our god and your God is the One”.<sup>50</sup> However, given the “totalizing” and “apologetic”<sup>51</sup> character of Scholarly Islam that leaves no space to “learn and appreciate things” without reference to Islam in the writings of these liberal protagonists of Islam including Ramadan, it is indeed difficult to appreciate, despite their best intentions, how their creative interpretation of the notion of *dai* and other Qur’anic concepts will result in the “mutual inter-cultural” understanding of each other through the agenda of inter-community and inter-faith dialogue, even if it is being practiced genuinely, given the fact the such an hermeneutic exercise, in terms of its overall effect, will further sharpen the Islamic identity of Muslim communities at the cost of their diverse identity. In a nutshell, the essentialization and homogenization of an otherwise diverse Muslim life obstructs the “free movement” of dialogue and communication between the minority and majority in two significant ways. Firstly, given the asymmetry of the power structure at all levels between the minority and majority, and being overtly conscious about one’s own identity due to their own minority status, minorities tend to become more insular or protective while interacting with the “imagined” collective majority personified in the dialogue partner (whether as an individual or institution) during the course of “structured negotiating or dialogic space”. This in turn prevents the “self-representative” from learning about others or at least being open to other’s point of view. Secondly, it prepares the socio-psychological ground for the “politicization of religious identity” depending upon the context. Once this happens it further increases the “social gap” between the Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority, leading to the breakdown of negotiating space between the two.<sup>52</sup> In fact, the attitude of Scholarly Islam towards the principles of pluralism varies from “reluctant acceptance” to “outright rejection” of the “idea” of equal recognition of relative definitions of Truth,<sup>53</sup> if not in terms of the internal legal and doctrinal pluralism that exists within Islam.<sup>54</sup> This is because most of them start from the assumption that Islam is the final, superior and most excellent religion of mankind and try to prove this while engaging with other religious traditions. Thus reflecting on the Muslim studies of other religions in the contemporary period, Jacques Waardenburg observed the following:

Most Muslim writings about other religions than Islam since world war concern Christianity. A great number of them are refutations of it in one form or

another, written from Muslim readers in the “Islamic” languages Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Urdu. As in earlier periods, the arguments are based on Quranic texts and common sense, and they are addressed specifically against such Christian doctrines as the sonship of Jesus, the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the Bible as Revelation. More recently, with the presence of Muslim *da’wa* centres in the West and elsewhere, Muslim publications critical of Christianity are now also printed and sold in the West. Besides such straightforward polemical literature, one also finds a more informative kind of literature that tries to compare Christianity with Islam, evidently concluding that Islam is superior.<sup>55</sup>

Similarly one has to concur with the British Muslim Scholar Shabbir Akhtar<sup>56</sup> who wrote in 1991 that “the theme of inter-faith dialogue. . . is likely to occupy the centre-stage of the theological concerns in this and the coming century”. Nevertheless, he added, most Muslim writers are yet to come to terms with the truthful claims of other faiths or with the ways in which these religions see themselves.

### **Everyday Islam: Meaning and Dimensions**

In contrast to the notion of Scholarly Islam as elaborated above, the notion of “Everyday Islam” refers to the reality of “lived Islam”, which is understood as handed down by generation to generation in the form of practice, and is connected with the life process of common Muslims who have developed the “internal social code”, which is considered Islamic, to interact and negotiate within themselves and with other social groups of the society. Like the notion of everyday religion,<sup>57</sup> the notion of Everyday Islam is a critique of Scholarly Islam that draws heavily upon the structure of modernity. As a concept it comes closer to Habermas’s term “lifeworld”<sup>58</sup> and Bourdieu’s term “habitus”.<sup>59</sup> However, despite the commonality with these concepts, the usage of Everyday Islam has a specific connotation and is derived from the following considerations. Firstly, Islam fundamentally differs from all other religions in its conception of history as rightly pointed out by W.C. Smith in his seminal work, *Islam in Modern History*.<sup>60</sup> It is hard to disagree with Smith’s observation that Muslims possess a greater sense of history than other religious and ethnic communities. Secondly, it is to do with the recognition of the symbolic, but important, role of Islam in the organization of the everyday life of common Muslims. Thirdly, unlike other religions and cultures, Islam has become generic. Due to its specific course of development, which includes its association with the formation of state, and the absence of a church-like structure, at least within Sunni Islam, it has developed its own epistemology that does not follow what is considered the universal path of “Progress and Development”. As the “Islamic ideal” remains open contested space, it permeates all aspects of Muslim life. Thus Everyday Islam helps one to understand the fuzzy, non-representative and non-ideological nature of “practiced Islam” in the common Muslim’s conception of life.

Everyday Islam resides in the great mass of Muslims, cutting across class, caste, gender, region, rural-urban classification and other social categories and is beyond the reach of all sectarian Islamic organizations—whether Sunni or Shii. Common Muslims acknowledge the general concepts dictated by Scholarly Islam, but they choose to live according to more particularistic notions of Islam, which conform to the patterns of their daily experience. As Olivier Roy remarked, “Although there is long tradition of exegesis and *fatwa* on what a Muslim should or should not do when confronted

with a non-Muslim environment and practices, most Muslims find a way to deal with that without contacting fatwaonline.com".<sup>61</sup> One may find the location and representation of this Islam in the form of Sufi Islam or in the Muslim community life centered around the mosque, but it is beyond that. It lies between Islamic ideology and theology. This form of Islam, unlike Scholarly Islam, has not indulged in the "politics of (Islamic) representation of 'self' and 'other'", and neither does it desire the monolithic construction of *Sharia*. As Mujeeb wrote: "A bird's eye view of the variety of beliefs and practices and customs among Indian Muslims will convince us that it was not the Shariat of Islam that they adopted but the manners and customs and to some extent even their belief that became the Shariat of Islam, of their Islam".<sup>62</sup> In fact, the realities of social life lead one inevitably to the conclusion that for the generality of the Muslims, the *Sharia* was only an object of reverence, not a body of law that was, or could be, enforced. Rather, as al Sadiq al-Mahdi has cogently put it, "the masses have always regarded Islam as the basis of their identity and the source of their morality".<sup>63</sup> It is hardly surprising that the first generation of "single male Muslim" migrants in Western Europe did not make any demand of "Islamic presence" in the public sphere, not because they were "illiterate", "poor", or having less knowledge of Islam; or primarily saw themselves as "economic migrants" for a temporary period to be eventually returned to their native place; or lacking the historical sense of Islam—as the case was made out in various Scholarly Islam writings and others—but because they never saw, even in the sojourn, their historically established Islamic/Muslim identity as being threatened by outside forces and they were "accustomed" to performing what they considered as an "Islamic duty" in any given space. It is only with the intervention of Scholarly Islam, whether liberal/moderate or radical/conservative, that facilitates in channelizing the "frustrated social existence" of second and third generation European born Muslim youths into the "Islamic cause", some of whom went into the direction of Islamic militancy.

In fact, the general perception among the Muslim masses in the minority communities has been that issues such as the veiling of women, interest-free banking, the banning of alcohol, regular attendance at mosques in the Indian setting; and the issue of Islamic instruction in public schools, the construction of mosques, the recognition of Islam in the public sphere, the wearing of the headscarf in the European setting; or the Islamic ideological debate concerning the "status" of Muslims living in non-Muslim countries in both continents—whether it is *dar al-Islam*, *dar al-harb*, *dar al-amen*, *dar al-ahad*, *dar al-shahada*, etc.—that preoccupy the forces of Scholarly Islam, are virtually irrelevant to them. The field work and the interviews that I conducted in different cities of Western Europe further revealed the paradox of Muslim immigrants relating to their Islamic identity: most of them believe in God without reading the Qur'an; hardly know about the five basic tenets of Islam; hardly visit the mosque for the prayers but for other cultural activities; and are strongly aware that drinking alcohol, gambling, taking interest and eating pork are un-Islamic; and claimed to exercise strict "Islamic control" over the female members of their family. Most of them have an idea about Islam through their family.<sup>64</sup>

### **Difference and Accommodation in Everyday Islam**

In Everyday Islam, religion represents a generalized level of negotiation in the integration process in relation to the surrounding society, which is founded on non-Islamic values and traditions. Thus from the modernist perspective Everyday Islam may appear to be conservative in its social ethos. It might legitimize such pre-Islamic cultural practices

as “honor killings”, “female circumcision” and “arranged marriages” that are still prevalent among a section of Muslim communities in many parts of the world, including the West. Since all these practices are dominantly related with the “female”, the wide coverage in the Western media of these practices has a specific purpose to serve: to demonstrate that Islam as “practiced” not only denies the basic principles of human rights, equality and freedom but is also essentially anti-women. Therefore unless “Islam” reforms itself, the integration of Muslims is not possible. Hence, one might argue that Everyday Islam is more harmful than Scholarly Islam, which at least condemns such practices as “un-Islamic”.

While sharing the modernist concern on this issue, it needs to be pointed out here that people have their own “pragmatic reason” for adjusting with the changing value system. This can be found from undertaking a comparative study of the frequency of the occurrence of such acts within the same group living in the West and in their original countries. Moreover such acts represent a minority and are declining, therefore if the host society and its institutions do not indulge in the deliberate “politics of negative representation of Islam” on the basis of such acts, simply to ensure the image of “a good Europe/Christian” as against a “bad Islam/Muslim”, then these cultural practices can be tackled through a gradual process of educational awareness.

Unlike Scholarly Islam, Everyday Islam accepts the logic of pluralism. The average Muslim masses, irrespective of context, learned the value of accommodation and adjustment through the struggle of daily life without resorting to the ideological legitimization of their conduct. Considerable amounts of research with reference to India have demonstrated that accommodations and adjustments bearing cultural exchanges, shared value-orientations and life-styles at the micro level, have been worked out by the people in the course of their everyday life in both the intra-religious (within Islam) and inter-religious (between Muslims and non-Muslims) contexts.<sup>65</sup> Similarly, the vast magnitude of Muslim immigrants, including the European-born Muslims, like the Indian Muslim masses, though concerned with things called “Islamic”, are also much bothered about their daily life existential situations—the issues of unemployment, rampant racism, citizenship, housing, etc. It is through these daily courses of existential struggle that they learn the art of mutual accommodation, adjustment and living together without undergoing the ideological learning process of Scholarly Islam. Thus, Saifal Boutliki, a second-generation Algerian immigrant in France who runs a grocery shop, confidently told me: “. . . of course we can live in France and in Europe and remain Muslims, become Western and at the same time practice our religion . . . we are working to integrate Islam into French society”.<sup>66</sup> This statement is indicative of the fact that the second and third generations of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe are very much comfortable, having no doubt about their “Islamic” credentials, with their emerging “hybrid identity”, both individual and collective—a trend that has been observed by many serious scholars working in this field.<sup>67</sup> This emerging hybrid identity among the Muslim immigrants in Europe was popularly reflected in the development of Turkish “hiphop and rap” and Arabic “Rai” music as well as in the publication of bi-lingual literatures. Given this trend it would not be exaggeration to claim that unlike Scholarly Islam that has the effect of eroding the diverse, hybrid identity of Muslims, Everyday Islam has the potential to produce, like a “Muslim Indian”, a “Muslim French”, a “Muslim German”, a “Muslim British” and a “Muslim European”.

In fact, Edward Said’s proposed third possibility of the relationship between the “self” and “other” in the form of recognition of moral equality of all cultures, as pointed out in

the beginning of this paper, lies in the very domain of this notion of Everyday Islam. In fact, contrary to the assumption of many modernists that religious faith is necessarily exclusive and therefore results in in-group conflicts, there is considerable historical and ethnographical evidence that the common people everywhere, irrespective of individual religious identity, have long been comfortable with religious plurality. They acknowledge religious difference as the experienced reality: they do not consider it good or bad. In other words, social harmony, or agreement, is built on the basis of difference. Needless to emphasize, the two pluralisms—the people’s and the scholar’s—are different in several crucial respects. For example, and most notably, the former is wholly spontaneous (though follows fuzzy, customary law) and lived social reality, but the latter is ideologically bound and, in that sense, self-conscious and self-constructed. In addition, the former is based on a positive attitude towards other religions, but the latter is skeptical about the same. Thus in contrast to such “multi-dimensional” testimonies in Everyday Islam, the more rational categorization of the non-Muslim “others”, as carried out by theologians and doctors of law (*ulama* and *fuqaha*) and other representatives of Scholarly Islam, are rather flat and two-dimensional. Seen from this perspective it would appear that while Everyday Islam endorses the principles of “pluralism”, “tolerance” and “difference” and thereby enhances the cause of social and political integration in a multi-religious society, Scholarly Islam may delay and hinder the prospect of integration.

### **Conclusion**

By way of conclusion I would like to reflect upon the implications of the differing perspectives of Scholarly Islam and Everyday Islam in the context of integration of Muslim minority communities in the non-Muslim majority nation-states. One implication is that it casts doubt on the effectiveness of Western European governments’ policies towards Muslims that rely heavily upon moderate-liberal representatives of Scholarly Islam for integration into the Western society. The Western European search for a “representative institutionalized Islam”, as an institutional tool to integrate the Muslim minority, is a futile exercise for two reasons. Firstly, such a perspective approaches “Islam”—that is understood as singular—and not “Islams”—that is plural both in sociological and theological precepts. The second is due to such a perspective’s dependence on the liberal section of Scholarly Islam for the purpose of legitimacy and to counter the trend of Islamic militancy prevailing among a section of Muslim youths. The eventual result of the combined exercise of Scholarly Islam and the West European governments, in light of the demonstration of this paper, would be to create a single, homogenized Islamic/Muslim identity of otherwise diverse Muslim life-situations that, in turn, would further disrupt the “already fragile” existence of social communication between the Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority, thereby alienating both the communities. The frustration and anger of a section of European born Muslim youths against the state is not only indicative of their “acute material deprivation”, but, in part, is also a protest against the perceived super-imposition of Islamic or secular identity from above which demands the destruction of their acquired, fuzzy Islamic identity with which they are accustomed to live and interact with others. Examples from many parts of the Muslim world are illustrative in this context. It is generally considered that the strength of Islamic movements in many parts of the Muslim world is derived, in part, from the people’s anger against the state’s attempt to “nationalize” Islam.

Unlike Western Europe, the Indian situation is marked by frequent Hindu-Muslim conflicts, with a projected implication that the Muslim community is not well integrated



in the Indian society. However, like Western Europe, there hardly exists any effective Islamic militancy against the Indian state, except in the Muslim dominated state of Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>68</sup> This is partly because the state in India has never been perceived by any community, including the Muslims, of superimposing a particular religious or secular identity from above,<sup>69</sup> and nor has the Indian state ever demanded a representative religious body to negotiate with the religious communities. Rather the general practice has been that the Indian state has always kept its door open to listen and negotiate with any sect or group of the religious communities, including the Muslim community. The strength of Indian Muslims comes from “practiced” Everyday Islam, and not from the self-proclaimed representatives of Scholarly Islam, that is socially well integrated in terms of mutual acceptance of each other’s way(s) of life and the institutionalized social communication that exists between the two. It needs to be underlined here that the “political” plays the decisive role in the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India and as such is not the result of the rejection of each other’s values. A “Muslim Europe” or “Euro Islam”, like a “Muslim India” or “Indian Islam”, is possible, provided social interaction between the minority and majority is allowed to take place without much intervention from above.

## NOTES

1. This is a revised and expanded version of my paper entitled “Inter-Personal and Inter-Community Self Representation: Islam, Composite Culture and Multiculturalism in India and Europe”, presented in the Forum for Kulturwissenschaften, organized by Fakultät Philosophische, the Universität Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany on 14 February 2005. It was a part of my post-doctoral research project entitled “Accommodating Religion in Social Transformation: State, Ideology and Practice toward Muslims in Europe and India: A Comparative Study”, which was funded by the Alexander Von Humboldt (AVH) Foundation, Germany. I am thankful to AVH, Germany for funding my post-doctoral research project from September 2004 to February 2006.
2. According to the 2001 census, there are roughly 140 million Muslims constituting 12.4% of the entire Indian population. Though there is no consensus on the actual figure of Muslims residing in Europe, it is estimated that their numbers vary between 15 million and 20 million, measuring around 3% of the entire European population.
3. See Mohammad Mujeeb, *Indian Muslims*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1985. Also Rasheed Uddin Khan, *Composite Culture of India and National Integration*, Simla: Institute of Advance Studies, 1988; and Mushirul Hasan, *Legacy of Divided Nation: India’s Muslims Since Independence*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 125, 136, 250, 251 321.
4. At the end of the British rule in 1947, the Indian subcontinent was divided into two parts—Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Republic of India. Both in the Indian historiography and at the popular level, this incident is emotionally referred to as the “Partition”.
5. See Gyanendra Pandey, “Can a Muslim be an Indian”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 4, 1999, pp. 608–99. Also, Shibani Roy and S.H. M. Rizvi, “The Hindi Musalman – A Retrospection”, *Islam and Muslim Societies: A Social Science Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, pp. 93–121.
6. Some of the valuable works on the construction of the Hindu nation are: Pandey Gyan, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991; Vasudha Dalmia, *Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Tradition and National Identity*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995; William Gould, *Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Charles H. Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994; and Stuart Corbridge and John Harris, *Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
7. The massive Muslims migration toward the West was a part of the “labour movement” required for the post-war reconstruction in Europe in the 1950s and the 1960s. The migration of Muslims closely followed the colonial pattern. Thus South Asian Muslims migrated to Britain, whereas North African

- Muslims migrated to France. Germany entered into a specific treaty with Turkey to facilitate the process of immigration of Turkish labour.
8. See, Christian Joppke, "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy", *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2004, pp. 237–57. Also, Tariq Modood, "Muslims and Politics of Difference", *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 74, No. 1, 2003, pp. 100–15; and "Remaking of Multiculturalism after 7/7", available online at: <[http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/multiculturalism\\_2879.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/multiculturalism_2879.jsp)> (accessed 10 October 2005).
  9. This case relates to a lady called Shaha Bano who was divorced by her husband in her old age. The matter reached the Supreme Court while interpreting the sacred text of the Qur'an and *Hadith*, endorsed the earlier High Court decree that Shaha Bano had the right to future maintenance from her former husband under section 125 of the Indian Code Criminal Procedure. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board and other Islamic religious organizations raised the issue that a secular institution does not have the right to interpret the Qur'an and *Hadith* and hence the court judgment amounts to interference in matters of personal law that have been sanctioned by the constitution to the Muslim communities. The movement became so powerful that it forced the then Rajiv Gandhi government to annul the Supreme Court judgment by passing a very retrogressive law called Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act in 1989. On the implication of the Shaha Bano Case for national politics in India, see Veena Das, *Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.
  10. R.S. Khare, "The Other's Double. The Anthropologist's Bracketed Self: Notes on Cultural Representation and Privileged Discourse", *New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1999, pp. 96–110.
  11. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality. Everything that Passes for Knowledge in Society*, London: Allen Lane, 1967, p. 32.
  12. See Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978; and Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, Amsterdam: Atlas, 1994.
  13. For a comprehensive early, medieval and modern Islamic (textual) representation of other religions and cultures, see Jacques Waardenburg, ed., *Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
  14. Abdul Hamid El-Zain, "Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology of Islam", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 6, 1977, p. 251.
  15. I have borrowed this term from Asish Nandy's usage of "everyday religion". Ashish Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance", in *Secularism and Its Critic*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 321–45.
  16. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
  17. In the Islamic historiography the *ulema* has been projected as representative of textual, pure and real Islam while the *sufi* orders have been portrayed as the representative of deviant, impure, mystical and diluted forms of Islam. However, as El-Zain has demonstrated, this distinction between the two is false as both are real and as such both claim to represent the "ideal" and "true" Islam. They differ only as modes of expression: one exists as an institution and the other as literature. El-Zain, "Beyond Ideology and Theology", *op. cit.*, p. 243.
  18. See the writings of Von Grunebaum, Gibb, Watt, Lewis, Crone and Cook, Geertz, Gellener and others, who have immensely contributed to this subject matter. However, an insightful work has been produced by Aziz al Azmeh, *Islam and Modernities*, London: Verso Publication, 1996.
  19. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
  20. See T.N. Madan, *Modern Myths, Locked Mind: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 106–49; also, Krishna Gopal, "Piety and Politics in Indian Islam", in *Muslim Communities of South Asia: Culture, Society and Power*, ed. T.N. Madan, New Delhi: Manohar, 1985, pp. 360–403.
  21. See Anwar Alam, "Democratization of Indian Muslims: Some Reflections", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 38, No. 46, 15 November 2003, pp. 4881–5.
  22. Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2005, pp. 136–7.
  23. Jocelyne Cesari, "Islam in European Cities", in *Minorities in European Cities: The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighbourhood Level*, eds, Sophie Body-Gendrot and Macro Martimiello, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 90.
  24. Mathias Rohe, "The Formation of European Sharia", in *Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre*, ed. Jamal Malik, London: Transaction Publishers, 2004, pp. 161–84.

25. The modernist assumption that the exercise of codification has inherent liberal value and serves the purpose of governance needs to be questioned. A comparative examination of Indian Shariat Law 1937, 1942 and Muslim Women Protection Law 1989 reveals how the position of Muslim women greatly deteriorated in terms of law from the first enactment of the law in 1937 to the last in 1989. Further, all three enactments of *Sharia* law significantly reduce the liberal rights that Muslims used to derive from their local customary law.
26. Jamal Malik, *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1998, pp. 5–20.
27. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, *op. cit.*
28. In extreme cases, even non-conformist Muslims could be considered unbelievers. The interesting thing in Muslim categorization is not only that believers are categorized according to their particular “religion”, but also that the various religions themselves are described or constructed according to typically Islamic criteria. Muslims have had an Islamo-centric view of religions other than Islam.
29. Thus scholars like al-Biruni (d. 1048), Mirza Mazhar Jane-e-Janan (d. 1780) and Dara Shikoh (d. 1659) believed Vedas, the Hindu scriptures, to be divinely inspired and considered Hindus as people of the Book who had prophets like other revealed religions. See Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 78–80.
30. Yoginder Sikand, “Indian Madrassas and ‘Terrorism’: Myths, Realities and Responses”, *Islam and Muslim Societies: A Social Science Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, p. 170.
31. Muhammad Khalid Masud, “The World of Shah Abd al-Aziz (1746–1824)”, in *Perspectives of Mutual Encounters in South Asian History, 1760–1860*, ed., Jamal Malik, Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 298–315.
32. Ghulam Mohammad Jaffar, “The Repudiation of Jihad by the Indian Scholars in the Nineteenth Century”, *Hamdard Islamicus*, Vol. XV, No. 3, Autumn 1992, pp. 93–100.
33. For the *fatava* of leading *ulema* of north India, including Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, see W.W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, Calcutta: The Comrade Publishers, 1945, Appendix II.
34. Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in Later Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 298–340.
35. The idea of the Two Nation Theory first appeared in the writings of Vinayak Damodar Sarvarkar (1883–1966), the ideologue of Hindu nationalism. See his *Hindutava*, Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 6th edn, 1989. However, the doctrine was popularized by the Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who demanded a separate state for the Muslims on the basis that people with different religions, languages, customs and history cannot live together within a single nation. See Jamal-ud-Din Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960, pp. 116–17, 160–1, 229–30.
36. See Maulana Hussein Ahmad Madani, *Composite Nationalism and Islam*, trans. Mohammad Anwar Hussein and Hasan Imam, Delhi: Manohar Publication, 2005. Also, Ian Henderson Douglas, *Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography*, eds, Gail Minault and Christian W. Troll, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988.
37. On this aspect see Syed Shabuddin and Theodore P. Wright JR, “India: Muslim Minority Politics and Society”, in *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, ed. John L. Esposito, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 157; W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 285; Christian W. Troll, “Sharing Islamically in the Pluralistic Nation-State of India: The Views of Some Contemporary Indian Muslim Leaders and Thinkers”, in *Christian-Muslim Encounters*, eds, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Wadi Z. Haddad, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1995, pp. 245–61.
38. Asghar Ali Engineer, “Muslim Views of Hindus Since 1950”, in *Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions*, ed., J. Waardenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 263–69.
39. Troll, “Sharing Islamically in the Pluralistic Nation-State of India”, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
40. The *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire conferred the right to cultural and religious autonomy to its non-Muslim subjects, mainly Christians and Jews, in the private sphere, within the Islamic framework of *dhimmi*. For an account of the *millet* system during the Ottoman Empire, see H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: Part II*, London: Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 207–14.
41. The notion of *Jahilliya* was first propounded by Maulana Abu Ala Maudidi (1903–1979), founder of the now worldwide Islamic movement called Jamat-i-Islami. Later, Sayyid Qutub borrowed this concept and expanded it further. What is important here is to note that despite the fact that the notion of *Jahilliya* was coined and applied to Indian society by an Indian Islamic scholar, it never (until today) became popular among the Indian Muslims, and nor have the dominant segments of Indian Islam ever characterized Indian society as “*Jahilliya*”, despite its marked polytheism which

- contradicts the fundamental Islamic notion of *Tawheed*. How does one explain the difference in the appeal of the notion of *Jahilliya* among the Muslim minorities in the West and in India? It may be because of the fact that the “immoral and Godless face” of secularism in the West is contrasted with the “Godly morality” of Islam and given the near “social exclusion” of the Muslim immigrant communities, particularly its underclass, the notion of *Jahilliya* becomes significant for the Muslims for it provides them with a “moral cause” to live and struggle. In contrast, the absence of this context in India and the religiosity of the society may partly explain why the notion of *Jahilliya* hardly enjoys any legitimacy among the Indian Muslims. For Qutub’s notion of *Jahilliya*, see Sayyid Qutub, *Milestone*, translated from Arabic, Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publication, 1990.
42. The former chairman of Milli Gorous did not wish for his interview to be recorded on tape, and his name was not to appear in the text.
  43. I am thankful to Elizabeth Isabelle for the English translation of these cassettes. A total of six cassettes were translated for the purpose of this research.
  44. For details, see Tariq Ramadan, *To Be European Muslims*, Leicester: Islamic Foundation, Markfield Conference Centre, UK, 1999.
  45. Sheikh Abdessalam Yassin, *Islamiser la Modernite*, Rabat: al-Ofok, 1988, quoted in Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
  46. For the full text of the Medina Constitution, see Bulac Alic, “The Medina Document”, in *Liberal Islam: A Source Book*, ed. Charles Kurzman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 169–78. Various Islamic and Muslim scholars have drawn heavily upon the Meccan verses of the Qur’an that speak of love, tolerance and dialogue. Many of them have hailed the Medina Constitution as the first multicultural constitution in the world.
  47. See the most recent works in this regard by two important Indian Islamic scholars who are also office bearers of Jamait Uleme Hind, the Indian branch of Jamait-e-Islami, the most dominant representative of political Islam in South Asia. Fazlur Rehman Faridi, *A Reject All Recipe: Living as a Muslim in a Plural Society*, Chennai: Islamic Foundation Trust, 2003; Maulana Sayyed Jalaluddin Umri, *Ghayr Islami Riyasat Aur Musalman*, reviewed in *Islam and Muslim Societies: A Social Science Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, pp. 212–15.
  48. In recent years, both in India and in Europe, a number of Islamic organizations have set up their own *da’wah* departments, publishing literature on Islam in local languages intended especially for non-Muslims, and organizing seminars and conferences on Islam to which non-Muslims are regularly invited. A unique example of dialogue in the sense of common research is the Muslim-Christian Research Group (GRIC), a French language research group of Muslims and Christians. Several publications have resulted from their work, mostly in French. For an English translation, see Muslim-Christian Research Group, *The Challenge of the Scriptures*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Book, 1989. Another such group is the Christian-Islamische Begegnung Ruhr (CIB), based in Essen, Germany.
  49. I received the following clarification from the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, which suggests reclassifying Syed Zainal Abedin in an inclusive category: He was an ardent champion of “Everyday Islam”, yet he combined his mission with a scholarly approach, which would earn him a place in the classification among “the prominent liberal figures of Scholarly Islam”. Dr. Abedin is the founder of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs and founding editor of the *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, which were launched to provide a platform for the collection and dissemination of the ongoing discourses on “Scholarly Islam” and for the exchange of information and experiences in “Everyday Islam”. The *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* has become a repository of scholarship and information on Muslim minority communities worldwide with a broad coverage of Scholarly and Everyday Islam and related issues”.
  50. Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 203.
  51. I would like to give two examples of this appalling apologeticism that exists in Scholarly Islam. Both examples are not connected with any of the mentioned liberal faces of Scholarly Islam, but nevertheless they are representative of the liberal faces of Scholarly Islam and serve the purpose of this paper. Tahir Mahmood, a well-known liberal scholar of Islamic law and former chairman of the National Commission of Minority Rights in India, argued in a well-written paper on how the operation of public law in India does not contradict the basic principles of Islam and hence India is *dar al-amen*, one at peace with Islam (Tahir Mahmood, “Interaction of Islam and Public Law in Independent India”, in *Religion and Law in Independent India*, ed. Robert D. Blair, Delhi: Manohar, 1993, pp. 93–120). The second example is of Yahya Schlzke, former President of the Islamic Federation

- in Berlin. Reflecting upon the compatibility of the Qur’an and the various constitutions of the European states, he declared: “Since we are living here we have an obligation to recognize the constitution, and we are ready to live according to it. There is a parity between Islam and the bourgeois revolution: that which for example, the French Revolution brought to Europe. The Prophet Muhammad had actually implemented the ideals of French Revolution fourteen hundred years ago. The French Revolution then, was in essence an Islamic revolution” (interview conducted in Berlin, Germany, 4 July 2005).
52. The massive Muslim mobilization on the Shaha Bano Case in India, the headscarf issue in France and the Rushdie affair in the UK, during the 1980s and early 1990s, illustrates this point. Though it has been pointed out how religion essentially serves as a “social marker” devoid of any political connotation, for a religious minority, religious mobilization is nothing but an assertion of their “difference” *vis-à-vis* the majoritarian society, and little attempt has been made to understand how there is an inherent connection between the process of homogenization and politicization of religious identity, even in the minority context, and that both derive their strength from the long process of constructing the “other” in a negative manner.
  53. This observation is drawn from my fieldwork conducted in Berlin, Germany (July–August 2005), Paris, France (March–April 2005), Bristol and London (May 2005), and Amsterdam and Lieden, the Netherlands (September 2005). A total of 60 interviews were conducted with representatives of Scholarly Islam in these cities. Most of them were either important functionaries in various Islamic and Muslim organizations, preachers, *imams* of the mosques, or connected with the Islamic educational and research institutions. Without going into the detailed statistical demonstration of this observation due to the constraint of space and as it falls outside the scope of this paper, it would suffice to point out that the reluctance and even rejection of the framework of pluralism and multiculturalism was not only obvious in terms of according equal recognition and respect to the social groups like women and those who have different sexual orientation like lesbians and gays, but even in terms of according equality to intra-Islamic/Muslim groups. A majority of them also strongly felt that there is a danger of “covert Christianization” of Muslim children in daycare institutions and kindergartens and therefore Muslims should start these institutions on their own. On the other hand, most of them asserted the supreme values of the Islamic normative framework, which is capable of accommodating the Western values. The ambivalent attitude towards pluralism and multiculturalism among the representatives of Scholarly Islam, mostly liberal-moderate, was further corroborated by a study entitled “British Muslim Perspectives on Multiculturalism” by Tariq Modood (see Modood, “British Muslim Perspectives on Multiculturalism”, unpublished paper).
  54. This internal legal pluralism within Islam has been reflected in the development of four legitimate school of law: Shafi, Maliki, Hanafi and Hanbali.
  55. Waardenburg, *Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions*, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
  56. Shabbir Akhtar, *A Faith for All Seasons: Islam and the Challenges of the Modern World*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999, p. 197.
  57. Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism”, *op. cit.*
  58. J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1: Life World and System: Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1985.
  59. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Genesis of the Concepts of ‘Habitus’ and ‘Field’”, *Sociocriticism*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985, pp. 11–24.
  60. W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, *op. cit.*
  61. Roy, *Globalised Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
  62. Mujeeb, *Indian Muslims*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
  63. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, “Islam—Society and Change”, in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 231.
  64. The observation related to the Muslim communities in India is my personal observation by virtue of living in that society, while the observation related to diasporic Muslims in Western Europe is based on my field survey. A total of 100 interviews were randomly conducted in different cities of Western Europe as mentioned in footnote number 51. The people connected with low paid jobs such as those working at construction sites, restaurants and fast food chains, meat markets, cafés, grocery stores, travel agencies, etc., were identified as representatives of Everyday Islam. A detailed statistical analysis of the interview is not presented here due to the constraint of space and also as it falls beyond the scope of this paper.
  65. See T.N. Madan, “Religions of India”, in *Religious Pluralism in South Asia and Europe*, eds, Jamal Malik and Helmut Reifeld, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 66–72; Asim Roy,



- Islamic Syncretic Tradition in Bengal*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983; Roland E Miller, "The Dynamics of Religious Co-existence in Kerala: Muslim, Christians and Hindus", in *Christian-Muslim Encounters*, eds Y. Haddad and W. Haddad, *op. cit.*, pp. 263–84; Imtiaz Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld, eds, *Lived Islam*, New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2004.
66. Interview with Saifal Boutliki, Paris, 16 July 2005.
67. See Almut Hofert and Armando Salvatore, "Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: Transcultural Politics Between Europe and Islam", in *Between Europe and Islam: Shaping Modernity in a Transcultural Space*, eds Almut Hofert and Armando Salvatore, Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 2000, pp. 13–38; Thomas Faist, "Developing Transnational Social Spaces: The Turkish-German Example", in *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, ed., Ludger Pries, Ashgate: Aldershot, 1999, pp. 36–72; Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood, eds, *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism*, London: Zed Books, 1997.
68. Jammu and Kashmir has a different historical trajectory. The militancy in Jammu and Kashmir does not reflect the aspiration of rest of Indian Muslims. For a comprehensive account of the absence of effective Islamic militancy in India, see Anwar Alam, "Political Management of Islamic Fundamentalism: A View from India", *Ethnicities*, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2007, pp.30–60.
69. It is interesting to note here the that rise of the Hindu nationalist movement in recent years in India has been linked to many factors, including the superimposition of the state ideology of secularism among the poor, illiterate Hindu masses. This is questionable as the advocates and leaders of the Hindu nationalist party, the Bharitya Janata Party (BJP), claimed themselves as representing "real secularism" against the pseudo-secularism of the Congress, Communist and other political forces. Secondly, the dominant faction of their social constituency comprises of the literate and lower and middle class living in urban areas and belonging to both the high and backward castes—which were/are wedded to modernity.



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