Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy

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Introduction

> Philosophy and the history of philosophy are one. You cannot do the first without also doing the second. Otherwise put, it is essential to an adequate understanding of certain problems, questions, issues, that one understand them genetically.
>
> *Charles Taylor*[1]

This book has two intimately intertwined topics. First, it is an interpretive study of Immanuel Kant's massive and seminal *Critique of Pure Reason*; but secondly and equally, it is a critical essay on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege to W. V. O. Quine.

By Kant's own reckoning, the first *Critique* is an extended reflection on a single question: 'Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question: how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?' (*CPR* B19). Translated out of Kant's jargon, this question raises a deep and broadly applicable philosophical difficulty: how can the same judgement be at once necessarily true, referred to the real or natural world in a substantive way, yet cognizable by creatures minded like us apart from all sense experience? For easy reference, I will call this 'the Modal Problem'.

Kant's Modal Problem comprehends four important subthemes of the first *Critique*: (1) the nature of judgement—in all four senses of (i) a particular truth-evaluable 'judgement' (*Urteil*) or 'proposition' (*Satz*), (ii) an act of propositional affirmation or 'holding-for-true' (*Fürwahrhalten*), (iii) the mental state or process of 'judging' (*Beurteilen*), and (iv) the mental capacity for judging or the 'power to judge' (*Urteilskraft*); (2) the crucial distinction between 'concepts' (*Begriffe*) and 'intuitions' (*Anschauungen*); (3) the intimately related and equally crucial distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements; and, last but not least, (4) the protean distinction between a priori and a posteriori, which cuts right across the other three subthemes.

Ultimately, however, neither Kant's proposed solution to the Modal Problem, nor any of its implicated subthemes, fully makes sense except against the backdrop of Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism. Hence a central feature of my account is a new interpretation of his special brand of idealism. The nub of that interpretation is that Kant's answer in the first *Critique*

[1] Taylor, 'Philosophy and its History', 17.

to his leading question about synthetic a priori judgements grows directly out of his long-standing engagement with an even more fundamental problem. In his pre-Critical work of 1763, 'The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God', Kant speaks in passing of 'the deepest science of all, where the word "representation" is understood with sufficient precision and employed with confidence, even though its meaning can never be analysed by means of definition' (OPA Ak. ii. 70). A decade later, in a famous letter to his former student Marcus Herz, he returns to the same idea while describing the main topics of what eventually became the first *Critique*:

> [I] was then making plans for a work that might perhaps have the the title, 'The Limits of Sense and Reason'. I planned to have it consist of two parts, a theoretical and a practical. The first part would have two sections, (1) general phenomenology[2] and (2) metaphysics, but only with regard to its nature and method.[3] . . . As I thought through the theoretical part, considering its whole scope and the reciprocal relations of its parts, I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to pay attention to and that, in fact, constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics. *I asked myself: What is the ground of the reference of that in us which we call "representation" to the object?* (*PC* Ak. x. 129–30, emphasis added)

A representation is a *Vorstellung*—literally, a 'putting' (*stellung*) of something 'before' (*Vor*) a conscious mind. Later in the letter to Herz, Kant goes on to say that he is especially concerned with the question of how an a priori (that is, non-empirical or non-sensory) mental representation can correctly refer to real objects. He wants to know 'how my understanding may form for itself concepts of things completely a priori, with which concepts the things must necessarily agree' (*PC* Ak. x. 131). And the task of finding an answer to that question largely determines both the focus and the trajectory of Kant's intensive work in the so-called silent decade leading up to the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But the particular question about a priori necessary objective mental representations, crucial as it is, cannot be answered without first answering the question about objective mental representations in general; indeed, an answer to the latter question largely determines an answer to the former question. So the absolutely fundamental question of Kant's revolutionary new approach to philosophy as adumbrated in 1772—which 'constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics'—is this: how are objective mental representations possible?

In the Critical period, Kant's technical term for any sort of objective mental representation is "cognition" (*Erkenntnis*): 'The genus is *representation* in general (*repraesentatio*). Subordinate to it stands representation with

[2] This corresponds to the Transcendental Aesthetic.

[3] This corresponds to the Transcendental Logic and the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.

consciousness (*perceptio*). . . . An objective perception is *cognition* (*cognitio*)' (*CPR* A320/B376–7).[4] If we abstract away for a moment from the purely mental or conscious component of a cognition—which Kant (slightly misleadingly[5]) calls its 'form'—then we are left with its 'content' or 'matter' (*Inhalt*, *Materie*). The representational content is the essential—or individuating—part of a cognition in the sense that it determines precisely which object the cognition refers to. That is, it determines the object directedness, aboutness, or *intentionality* of the cognition.[6] Put this way, and recalling that we have momentarily abstracted away from the purely mental or conscious aspects of a cognition, then we can clearly see that Kant's fundamental philosophical question is effectively equivalent to the question: how are *meanings* possible? In the philosopher's lexicon, 'meanings' are nothing other than object-directed representational contents, taken together with the formal or logical elements contained within such contents. This immediately implies that Kant's fundamental question belongs to the domain of *philosophical semantics*.[7] For this reason, I will dub the problem that Kant's transcendental idealism is ultimately designed to solve 'the Semantic Problem'. Now, as Kant makes quite clear in his letter to Herz, but also later in the first *Critique* itself (*CPR* Bxvi. B166–7), his underlying intention in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is that his solution to the Modal Problem will follow directly from his solution to the Semantic Problem. In this sense, Kant's transcendental idealism is at once a general *cognitive semantics* and a general *theory of necessary truth*.

Once we have isolated the Semantic Problem and the Modal Problem as the key difficulties that Kant is struggling with in the first *Critique*, then we are in a good position to see the segue between the twin topics of this book. If the *Critique of Pure Reason* is indeed at bottom a general cognitive semantics and a general theory of necessary truth, then it seems to me that we cannot properly understand the first *Critique* without undertaking at the same time a critical reassessment of the philosophical reception and fate of these doctrines in the tradition of analytic philosophy up to Quine.

[4] For more on the term "cognition", see Ch. 1 n. 13. [5] See Ch. 1 n. 11.

[6] See Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, bk. two, Ch. I, esp. p. 88; Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Investigation V; Aquila, *Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts*; and Searle, *Intentionality*.

[7] For surveys, see Hacking, *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?*, and Kretzmann, 'Semantics, History of'. Kant's semantics falls into a mentalistic tradition that runs backwards through early modern philosophy (esp. Locke and Descartes) and the Scholastics (esp. Aquinas), to Aristotle; forwards in one track from Kant through von Humboldt to Chomsky, Fodor, and Jackendoff; and forwards in another track from Kant through Trendelenburg (Brentano's teacher) to Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, early Gilbert Ryle, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, and John Searle. For rejections of semantic mentalism, see Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*; Dummett, 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (I–II)'; Quine, 'Mind and Verbal Dispositions'; and Quine, 'On Mental Entities'.

It is doubtless somewhat hazardous to attempt a comprehensive and uncontroversial formulation of the origins and nature of analytic philosophy, given both its complex historical development and the patent fact that one of the most vigorous and contentious debates in recent and contemporary analytic philosophy concerns precisely *what* the origins and nature of analytic philosophy really *are*.[8] But even granting that, at least two partial characterizations of it do seem to be unobjectionably correct. First, the analytic tradition is an Austro-German and Anglo-American philosophical movement that got underway in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by promoting semantics and a theory of necessary truth based on mathematical logic together with a thoroughly conventionalistic construal of language to front-and-centre position in philosophy, thereby displacing to the periphery its traditional ontological, epistemological, and psychological concerns. Secondly, the leading figures in the analytic tradition are (1) Gottlob Frege in Germany in the 1880s and 1890s; (2) Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and their Austrian-born student, colleague, and sometimes *bête noire* Ludwig Wittgenstein in England from the late 1890s into the early 1920s; (3) the 'logical positivists' or 'logical empiricists' (especially Rudolf Carnap) in Austria and Germany from the mid-1920s through the mid-1930s, and then later in the USA from the late 1930s until the late 1940s;[9] (4) Wittgenstein again and the Oxford-centred 'ordinary-language' movement (led by J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, P. F. Strawson, and H. P. Grice) in the 1940s and 1950s;[10] and, finally, (5) W. V. O. Quine in the USA in the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond.

Where precisely do Kant and the *Critique of Pure Reason* come into this familiar picture of the analytic tradition and its Hall of Fame? One obvious

[8] See e.g. Bell and Cooper (eds.), *The Analytic Tradition*; Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*; Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*; French *et al.* (eds.), *The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*; Glock (ed.), *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*; Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*; Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*; Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, esp. Chs. III–VI; and Tugendhat, *Traditional and Analytical Philosophy*, esp. pt. I. Dummett has argued in 'Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic and Ought it to Be?', 441–2, and in *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* that analytic philosophy must be identified with linguistic philosophy. But this identification is almost certainly too narrow: see e.g. Hacker, 'The Rise of Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy'; Monk, 'Was Russell an Analytical Philosopher?'; and Monk again, 'What is Analytical Philosophy?'

[9] Logical empiricism or positivism originated in the writings of members and associates of the Vienna Circle (*Wiener Kreis*), including A. J. Ayer, Gustav Bergmann, Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Kurt Gödel, Carl Hempel, Otto Neurath, W. V. O. Quine, Hans Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, Alfred Tarski, and Friedrich Waismann. See Ayer (ed.), *Logical Positivism*; Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*, chs. 9–19; and Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*.

[10] See Dummett, 'Oxford Philosophy'; Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy*, chs. 5–6; and Hanna, 'Conceptual Analysis'.

fact is that the rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the century-long dominance of Kant's philosophy in Europe.[11] But the deeper fact is that the analytic tradition *emerged* from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their views only by means of an intensive, extended engagement with, and a partial or complete rejection of, the first *Critique*. So I think that the overall career of analysis up to Quine almost perfectly reflects Alberto Coffa's crisp dictum about the logical positivist or empiricist phase of the tradition—that it 'was born in the effort to avoid Kant's theory of the a priori'.[12] And essentially the same point is nicely encapsulated in a characteristically forthright self-observation made by Russell in *My Philosophical Development*: 'Ever since I abandoned the philosophy of Kant . . . I have sought solutions of philosophical problems by means of analysis; and I remain firmly persuaded . . . that only by analysing is progress possible.'[13]

Assuming that I am correct in closely connecting the rise and flourishing of analytic philosophy up to Quine with the extended and complex process of rejecting Kant's theoretical philosophy, this puts the contemporary student of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in a philosophically rather odd but at the same time quite unprecedented and potentially exciting position. The Kant we study nowadays is manifestly a Kant who has been reworked and represented to us by those who participated directly in the analytic tradition's long and winding struggle with the first *Critique*. That is, by necessity we read Kant's theoretical philosophy from *within* the historical and conceptual framework of analytic philosophy. But two consequences seem to follow immediately from our becoming self-consciously aware of that fact, each of which partially determines the shape and subject matter of this book. First, those of us writing about Kant's first *Critique* at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and therefore 100 years after the beginning of the analytic tradition, cannot possibly ignore the dialectical interplay between Kant's views and those of his leading analytic critics without risking misunderstanding Kant's theories. Secondly, to re-examine several of Kant's key doctrines in the light of their critical reception and transmission by the leading figures of the analytic tradition is also critically to re-explore the foundations of analytic philosophy from a specifically Kantian point of view.

[11] I do not mean to underestimate the crucial importance of Hegel's philosophy during the early and mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, by the 1860s and 1870s—in Germany at least—Kant's ideas had made a decisive comeback, via neo-Kantianism. See Beck, 'Neo-Kantianism', and Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism*, chs. 3–7. The Hegelian influence survived somewhat longer in England than in Germany, but in the form of neo-Hegelianism—in which Kantian and Hegelian ideas cohabited very comfortably; see Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, chs. 3–4.

[12] Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*, 21.

[13] Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, 14–15. See also Hylton, 'Logic in Russell's Logicism'.

I have suggested that analytic philosophy up to Quine is to be partially identified with the thesis that semantics lies at or very near the centre of philosophy. So Ryle was not so very far from the truth when he wittily remarked that 'preoccupation with the theory of meaning could be described as the occupational disease of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philosophy'.[14] I have also suggested that the other core element of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine is a theory of necessary truth deriving from the fusion of mathematical logic and linguistic conventionalism. So in a Rylean tone of voice we might say that analytic philosophy is the joint product of two intimately connected occupational diseases: a preoccupation with the theory of meaning, and a preoccupation with the logico-linguistic theory of necessity. In order to be able to relate Kant's main doctrines in the first *Critique* to their later exciting adventures in the analytic tradition, we should have before us at least a schematic history of that two-headed obsession. Further fine points of detail, including chapter-and-verse references, and the inevitable qualifications needed for a richer and more fully adequate understanding of the analytic movement, can be added later as we go along.

As Coffa persuasively shows, the analytic tradition had its first stirrings in the early to mid-nineteenth century with Bernard Bolzano's criticisms of Kant's logic in his *Theory of Science* (1837),[15] and with Hermann von Helmholtz's criticisms of Kant's views on perception and geometry in the 1860s and 1870s.[16] Indeed, with the benefit of historical hindsight, we can see very clearly that Bolzano's focus on the philosophy of the formal sciences strongly anticipates the logicistic, rationalistic, and platonistic orientation of early analytic philosophy, and also that Helmholtz's focus on the epistemology of the natural sciences and non-Euclidean geometry just as strongly anticipates the empiricistic and exact-science-oriented slants of the middle and later phases of the analytic tradition.

If Bolzano and Helmholtz are the advance guard of analytic philosophy, then Frege is the first of its two Founding Fathers. Frege's claim to this status rests largely on three logical treatises in the foundations of mathematics—the *Begriffsschrift* (1879),[17] *Foundations of Arithmetic* (1884), and *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (1893)—and his two essays, 'Function and Concept' (1891) and 'On Sense and Meaning' (1892). Of crucial importance in Frege's writings are his trenchant critique of 'logical psychologism' (i.e. the thesis that logic or

[14] Ryle, 'The Theory of Meaning', 350.

[15] See Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*, ch. 2.

[16] See ibid., ch. 3, and Hatfield, *The Natural and the Normative*, ch. 5. See also Sect. 5.5 below.

[17] "*Begriffsschrift*" means 'conceptual notation' or 'concept script'. The general idea is that mathematical logic must take the form of a universal ideographic symbolism—a *characteristica universalis*. See Boole, *The Laws of Thought*, and Frege, *Conceptual Notation and Related Articles*.

mathematics is fully explained by empirical psychology) as found, for example, in J. S. Mill's *System of Logic* (1843); his rejection of Kant's theory that truths of arithmetic are synthetic a priori; his theory of analytic truth as deductive derivability from logical definitions and universal logical laws; his logicism—that is, the project of theoretically reducing arithmetic to logic via his famous definition of number in terms of sets of one-to-one correlated sets; his analytical strategy of contextual definition, obeying the dictum that a word or term has meaning only in the context of whole propositions; and last but not least his metaphysically realistic[18] theory of linguistic meaning—his theory of non-physical, mind-independent 'sense' (*Sinn*) or descriptive content, and mind-independent (although sometimes physical) 'Meaning' (*Bedeutung*) or reference.

Russell is the second Founding Father of the analytic tradition. His first philosophical book was a neo-Kantian study of the philosophy of space, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* (1897). But he soon gave up what was left of his Kantianism under the powerful influence of Moore.[19] Moore was at this time a violent anti-idealist and a radical platonic realist.[20] According to him, concepts are literally the objective constituents of the world; propositions in turn are essentially connections of concepts and thereby objectively exist in the world as well; and every object of sensation or perception is fully mind-independent. The writings of the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong[21] added fuel to the engine of Russell's platonic realism by convincing him that propositions are abstract or 'subsistent' ontic complexes containing both individual objects and concepts or universals; and also that most well-formed, meaningful mental presentations or verbal expressions stand for an object, whether that object actually occurs in space and time or not. And, perhaps most importantly of all, the works of the Italian logician and mathematician Giuseppe Peano[22] and Frege jointly convinced him that logicism was a fully viable philosophical programme. In the period 1900–14, Russell assimilated but also brilliantly synthesized these influences, particularly in *Principles of Mathematics* (1903), 'On Denoting' (1905), *Principia Mathematica* (1910–13),[23] *Problems of Philosophy* (1912), and *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914). Russell's signal contributions to the foundations of the analytic tradition are his conception of philosophical analysis as the decomposition of logical,

[18] It is not quite accurate to call Frege's theory 'platonistic', although it certainly has some platonic features; see Ch. 4 n. 6.

[19] See esp. Moore's 'Critical Notice of B. A. W. Russell, *Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*' (1899), 'The Nature of Judgment' (1899), 'The Refutation of Idealism' (1903), and 'Kant's Idealism' (1904).

[20] See Baldwin, *G. E. Moore*, chs. I–II.

[21] See Meinong, *On Assumptions* (1st edn., 1902), and Russell, 'Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions' (1904).

[22] See Rossi-Landi, 'Peano, Giuseppe'; Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, 4, 10; and Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, 129–31.

[23] Co-authored with A. N. Whitehead.

semantic, epistemological, psychological, or ontological complexes into simples or atoms; his sharp distinction between knowledge by description (conceptual or propositional cognition) and knowledge by acquaintance (intuitive or perceptual cognition); his denotational or (to use Ryle's phrase) ' "Fido"-Fido' semantics, according to which words have meaning solely by standing for objects; his theory of definite descriptions in 'On Denoting', which says that most or even all apparent singular terms can be theoretically eliminated by translating them into special contextually defined logically complex general terms; and finally his extension of logicism to geometry.

Then: enter Wittgenstein. From his arrival in Cambridge in 1911 through the publication of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in 1921, Wittgenstein absorbed, refocused, and crucially transformed the Fregean–Russellian logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. Indeed, he turned analytic philosophy in a fundamentally new direction that initiated its second major phase. This Tractarian turn essentially contains four doctrines. They are a 'picture theory' of meaning for the denotational parts of language, according to which propositions are structurally isomorphic with what they are about;[24] a theory of logical constants as strictly non-denotational or functionally defined parts of language; two highly restrictive distinctions between logical sense and logical nonsense, on the one hand, and between 'saying' (= describing, stating) and 'showing' (= indicating, ostending) on the other; and lastly a closely related doctrine of logical truths as vacuous linguistic tautologies. The overall upshot, however, is a strong emphasis on the fundamental philosophical importance of language—especially 'ideal' logical languages or *Begriffsschriften*.

Wittgenstein's achievement significantly contributed to the creation of a new submovement within the overall analytic development—namely, logical empiricism or positivism.[25] This submovement began in the discussions and writings of the members of the Vienna Circle. In turn, the philosophical interests and outlook of the Circle had six main sources of inspiration and cognitive funding: Hume's epistemological empiricism, as updated by Ernst Mach; neo-Kantian philosophy;[26] the Helmholtzian conviction that philosophy should take its cue from the exact sciences and eschew speculative metaphysics; non-Euclidean geometry and Einstein's theory of relativity; Frege's and Russell's logicism; and, above all, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Combining the intellectual

[24] Or at least that is the standard interpretation. See e.g. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion*, ch. III. But see also Diamond, *The Realistic Spirit*, Introduction II and ch. 6, for a revisionist reading of the *Tractatus* according to which everything propositional (including logic) is literally nonsense. If correct, this radically sharpens the contrast between what Frege, Moore, and Russell did and what Wittgenstein was actually up to.

[25] On the transition between the *Tractatus* and logical empiricism, see Coffa, *Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*, chs. 8–12, and Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*, ch. 8.

[26] See Richardson, *Carnap's Construction of the World*, chs. 4–6.

inputs from these sources with Wittgenstein's conversations with some members of the Vienna Circle in the late 1920s and early 1930s,[27] Carnap and the other empiricists then gradually developed three basic views. The first was the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a proposition is the method or rule by which it is empirically tested for truth; the second was the conventionalist, linguistic, or more accurately logico-linguistic theory of necessary truth, which holds that necessary truths are nothing but either truths of elementary logic or else theorems logically derivable from a set of arbitrarily chosen axioms or postulates for a given formal or natural language system; and the third was a blanket rejection of the very idea of the synthetic a priori[28] and of metaphysics more generally.

Wittgenstein returned to England in 1929, whereupon he promptly and rather perversely set about destroying his own earlier views.[29] The eventual positive result of this destruction was a strong emphasis on a painstaking, micrological description of the basic concepts implicit in 'ordinary' or natural languages and everyday speech practices, as opposed to the logical study of formalized languages.[30] But the negative result was a deep scepticism about the very possibility of systematic philosophy, including classical semantic and logical analysis in either its rationalist–platonist or empiricist–positivist versions.[31] Wittgenstein's new doctrines—or anti-doctrines—circulated in samizdat form and by word of mouth for many years, but were eventually published in the hugely influential *Philosophical Investigations* (1953).

The intellectually liberating ideas of the *Investigations* produced an odd interference pattern within the rolling wave that was the analytic tradition in the 1940s and 1950s, in the sense that they somewhat paradoxically at once gave it impetus and also tended subversively towards its dissolution. Still, even allowing for the important differences between Wittgenstein's early and later views, there remains an underlying thread linking both of them, and those of the intervening logical empiricists, together—namely, a primary focus on language, and on the thesis that all philosophical questions are ultimately—in some sense—questions of language. This crucially transforms Kant's famous Copernican Revolution in philosophy (*CPR* Bxvi), which says that all philosophical questions are ultimately questions about the origins, nature, scope, and limits of human cognition.[32] Hence it has been aptly called 'the linguistic

[27] See Waismann, *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*.

[28] This is slightly overstated for expository convenience; for qualification, see Ch. 5 n. 10.

[29] This is not to deny the existence of many important continuities between earlier and later Wittgenstein: e.g. prop. 3.326 of the *Tractatus* (p. 57) strongly anticipates the intimate linkage of meaning and use in the *Philosophical Investigations*, etc.

[30] See e.g. Rorty (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn*, pt. III.

[31] If Diamond is correct, this deep scepticism about systematic philosophy infuses the *Tractatus* as well; see *The Realistic Spirit*, Introduction II.

[32] See Sects. 1.1 and 1.2.

turn'.[33] Viewed in this synoptic way, what otherwise appears to be a sharp or even unbridgeable dichotomy between the doctrines of the early and later Wittgenstein can be smoothly bridged by construing it as an essentially domestic difference between ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy.

Influential as it was, the linguistic phase of analytic philosophy did not stay permanently in place. Just as Wittgenstein had transformed the logicist phase of analytic philosophy and initiated its linguistic turn, so Quine again transformed analytic philosophy and initiated its third phase. Quine's main intellectual influences were Frege's and Russell's logico-mathematical writings, on the one hand, and the writings of Carnap and the other members or affiliates of the Vienna Circle, on the other. But there were also lesser yet still significant elements of pragmatism, neo-Hegelian holism, and neo-Kantian verificationism in his work, perhaps more or less unconsciously inherited from Harvard's philosophical heavy-hitters of the previous two generations—William James, Josiah Royce, and C. I. Lewis.[34] In any case, particularly in 'Truth by Convention' (1935), 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951), *Word and Object* (1960), 'Carnap and Logical Truth' (1963), and 'Epistemology Naturalized' (1969), Quine thoroughly rejected the 'very ideas' of meanings or intensions, modality and modal logic, the analytic/synthetic distinction, atomistic verificationism, and the a priori/a posteriori distinction. Then on the ruins of logical empiricism he built a new form of empiricism—one that is thoroughly holistic, behaviouristic, and fallibilistic. Although Quine managed to retain an important element of linguistic philosophy in his great sensitivity to the 'use versus mention' distinction,[35] his version of analysis was above all guided by philosophical naturalism,[36] or the thesis that all serious metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological questions in philosophy can be answered only by direct appeal to the natural sciences. For this reason it seems highly appropriate to dub Quine's transformation of the analytic tradition the 'scientific turn'. Otherwise put, after Quine analytic philosophy is *scientific philosophy*.[37]

To summarize, we have three salient facts. First, there is the overarching explicit or implicit concern of all analytic philosophers from Frege to Quine with semantics and the logico-linguistic theory of necessity. Secondly, there is the overarching three-part symphonic structure[38] of the analytic tradition:

[33] The phrase is Gustav Bergmann's. See Rorty, 'Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy'.

[34] See Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy*.

[35] See Carnap on the material mode versus the formal mode of speech in *The Logical Syntax of Language*, sects. 64, 74–81; Tarski on object languages versus metalanguages in 'The Semantic Conception of Truth', 349–51; and Quine on semantic ascent in *Word and Object*, 270–6.

[36] See e.g. Kitcher, 'The Naturalists Return', and Papineau, *Philosophical Naturalism*.

[37] See Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*.

[38] i.e. the middle part of the analytic tradition up to Quine further divides into two subparts: ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy.

(1) logicistic philosophy (led by Frege, early Moore, and early Russell); (2) linguistic philosophy (led in its first or ideal language phase by early Wittgenstein and Carnap, and then in its second or ordinary language phase by the later Wittgenstein); and (3) scientific philosophy (led by Quine). But, thirdly and perhaps most importantly, there is the underlying dialectical engine of philosophical analysis—namely, its ongoing critical struggles with the central doctrines of the first *Critique*. The first thing to go was Kant's philosophy of arithmetic, by Frege's means;[39] then Kant's idealism and theory of judgement, by Moore's means;[40] then Kant's philosophy of geometry, by Russell's means;[41] then Kant's doctrine of the meaningfulness of analytic or logical truths, by early Wittgenstein's means;[42] then Kant's doctrine of the synthetic a priori, by Carnap's means (although significantly prefigured by early Wittgenstein and Schlick);[43] and then finally Kant's seminal analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, by Quine's means.[44] Seen in this light, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the inner drama of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine and beyond[45] is its century-long love–hate relationship with Kant's theoretical philosophy.

I have one further point to make in this particular connection. It has been forcefully argued by several leading contemporary philosophers that analytic philosophy has now reached a stage of crisis[46] in its development. This crisis arises from the very unsettling fact that many and perhaps even most analytic philosophers now question the defensibility and ultimate intelligibility of the very idea of analysis. But how can there be analytic philosophy without a cogent and coherent conception of philosophical analysis? In this sense, the analytic consensus in contemporary philosophy—as intellectually vigorous, institutionally secure, and one might even say bull-marketish, as it undoubtedly is—is speeding towards a crash. Michael Friedman has very plausibly traced the origins of this crisis back to analytic philosophy's rejection of Kant, via its intimate but stormy relationship with logical positivism.[47] Perhaps, then, our re-examination of the first *Critique* and the historical foundations of analytic philosophy up to Quine will also throw some light upon the underlying causes and possible remedies of this unwholesome situation.

[39] See Sect. 3.3. [40] See Sects. 2.3 and 2.4. [41] See Sect. 5.5.
[42] See Sects. 2.2 and 3.1. [43] See Sects. 5.0 and 5.6. [44] See Sect. 3.5.

[45] For the beyond, see Hanna, 'A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism'. Scientific essentialists reject Kant's thesis of the strong equivalence between necessity and apriority (see Sect. 5.2).

[46] See e.g. McDowell, *Mind and World*; Norris, 'Doubting Castle or the Slough of Despond: Davidson and Schiffer on the Limits of Analysis'; and Putnam, *Words and Life*. Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* and Schiffer's *Remnants of Meaning* laid the groundwork for this line of thinking.

[47] See Friedman, 'Kant and the 20th Century', 44–5, and Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*, 1–14.

Before we get properly underway, however, I also have to lay down three caveats.

First, given its double-barrelled topic, my account does not follow in a perfectly strict way either the textual organization of the first *Critique* or the historical development of the analytic tradition. Instead its organization is thematic rather than textual-exegetical or conventionally historical.

Secondly, in order to avoid the ever-present danger of this book's becoming a loose, baggy monster, I have had to focus fairly selectively on certain key Kantian topics and also on certain corresponding key topics in the analytic tradition.

For these two reasons, however, a brief preliminary sketch of the contents of the chapters may help to orient the reader. In Chapter 1, I state and explicate my overarching interpretive proposal that Kant's positive theoretical philosophy as presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is at bottom a general theory of objective mental representation, or a general cognitive semantics; and then I begin the justification of that proposal by undertaking a preliminary discussion of Kant's theory of cognition, with a special emphasis on judgement. This is extended and widened in Chapter 2 with a discussion of the conditions under which cognitions are possible. This chapter unpacks in some detail my interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. Then I cover in sequence the natures of analytic (Chapter 3) and synthetic (Chapter 4) judgements. These two chapters also focus, respectively, on the cognitive semantics of concepts or descriptive terms, and the cognitive semantics of intuitions or directly referring terms. Chapter 5 deals with Kant's doctrine of necessary truth, and especially with his doctrine of synthetic a priori judgements. Here I argue on Kant's behalf for 'modal dualism'[48]—the thesis that there are two irreducibly different kinds of necessary truth. To confirm this thesis, I apply Kant's doctrine of the synthetic a priori to the highly controversial case of geometry and then look closely at the well-known objection(s) to Kant's doctrine from non-Euclidean geometry. Finally, in the Concluding Un-Quinean Postscript I offer a Kantian response to a radical worry—due of course to Quine—about the very idea of the a priori, and make a few tentative remarks about the broader implications of the first *Critique* for the future of analytic philosophy.

My third caveat is this. After much consideration, I have decided not to give a detailed or extended treatment of Kant's theory of the nature and justification of synthetic a priori truths of the transcendental metaphysics of nature—or, as he sometimes labels it, 'ontology' (*RP* Ak. xx. 260). Hence I present no detailed or extended interpretation of the Metaphysical Deduction, the Transcendental Deduction(s) of the pure concepts of the understanding, the Schematism of the pure concepts, the Analytic of Principles (Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of Experience, and Postulates

[48] This apt term was, I think, invented by David Chalmers.

of Empirical Thought), or the Refutation of Idealism. There are three reasons for this decision. First, the nature and justification of transcendental ontology is not a topic on which Kant has been directly engaged by Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein early or late, Carnap and the logical empiricists, or Quine. Instead, when dealing explicitly with Kant or with Kantian themes, they have focused almost exclusively on certain highly contested flashpoints: analytic versus synthetic; intuitions (or singular terms, directly referential terms) versus concepts (or general terms, descriptive terms); a posteriori versus a priori; the very idea of a synthetic a priori proposition; whether mathematics is grounded in pure intuition or in pure logic; the logical versus the psychological; realism versus idealism, and so on. Secondly, and somewhat more pragmatically, to work out Kant's theory of transcendental-ontological synthetic a priori propositions, with careful attention paid to all its aspects and implications, would take another book at least as long as the one I have already written. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this is a topic already heavily and excellently covered by mainstream English-speaking Kant scholarship over the last 100 years.[49] It is not my task to tread this well-trodden ground again. Instead, I want to see what philosophical sense can be made of some key doctrines of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in relation to the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine. That is more than task enough.

[49] See esp. (in reverse temporal order) Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*; Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*; Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*; Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*; and Kemp Smith, *Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*.