

The Politically Correct University

Problems, Scope, and Reforms

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I

The PC Academy Debate: Questions Not Asked

Robert Maranto, Richard E. Redding, and Frederick M. Hess

After we launched this project exploring intellectual diversity in American higher education, a colleague of the lead editor playfully accused him of wasting time on “that stab-us-in-the-back book” rather than producing ever greater quantities of conventional social science. The remark was a joke, but it hints at the academic culture that led us to undertake this project, a culture in which any departure from the politically correct norm is viewed with suspicion. Our goal in this book is to explore and finally offer remedies to this culture of political correctness, the bugaboo that has most bedeviled American higher education in recent years. We focus on the problem of liberal political orthodoxy in teaching and scholarship and seek to understand how “diversity”—of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation, but not of ideas—has become the dominant ideology in higher education.

Charges of a leftist, politically correct environment in academia are nothing new. The famous Bennington College study of the 1930s presented evidence that even in that era, conservative students felt isolated from the larger campus atmosphere.¹ The father of modern American conservatism, William F. Buckley Jr., complained in 1951 that university professors had

We wish to thank the American Enterprise Institute for its vital support of this project. We must also thank Villanova University, particularly the Office of Sponsored Research, and the Department of Education Reform at the University of Arkansas. In addition, Jason O’Brien, Henry Olsen, and April Gresham Maranto played a vital role in critiquing this and other chapters. The usual caveats apply.

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contempt for religion and capitalism, combined with reverence for central planning. More recent heirs to Buckley include Charles J. Sykes, Dinesh D'Souza, and Martin Anderson.² Each has savaged colleges and universities for lowering academic standards and fostering political correctness. Nor have all the critics come from the right. Centrist thinkers including Jonathan Rauch and Richard Bernstein have made essentially the same complaints.³

More recently, however, political entrepreneurs have turned a generalized complaint into a very specific political movement. The critics of academia, most notably conservative activist David Horowitz, have organized for reform. Horowitz has “outed” the “101 most dangerous professors” who proselytize for their political views in the classroom and has founded the activist group Students for Academic Freedom, which seeks to guarantee equal rights for conservative students and faculty. Proposals outlawing discrimination against conservative faculty and students have been under consideration in at least eighteen states.⁴

Mainstream academics have reacted to the Horowitz critique with denial and condescension: if conservatives are underrepresented in the academy, it is because they lack sufficient motivation or intelligence to survive professional peer review. Many academics seem even to deny that colleges and universities *should* play host to a variety of viewpoints. For an interesting example, see the American Association of University Professors report *Freedom in the Classroom*, which argues that any attempt at ideological diversity would inevitably lead to “‘equal time’ for Communist totalitarianism or Nazi fascism,” given the “potentially infinite number of competing perspectives.” Seemingly the AAUP finds Republican doctrines no more (or less) plausible than those of Hitler and Stalin.⁵

This volume begins from the premise that the response of mainstream academics to charges of political correctness has been empirically suspect and intellectually counterproductive. Substantial anecdotal and quantitative evidence indicates that there is a decided leftist bent to colleges and universities, particularly the most prestigious institutions. Former Harvard president and Clinton treasury secretary Larry Summers has said that in Washington he was “the right half of the left,” while at Harvard he found himself “on the right half of the right.”⁶ Moreover, as several of the following contributions discuss, this political imbalance likely stems from practices within the academy that discourage conservatives from pursuing academic careers.

We do not regard this as an indictment of most college and university faculty and administrators, however. As Daniel Klein and Charlotta Stern show in a later chapter on majoritarian departmental politics, the sort of biases that disadvantage conservatives in academic job markets may be subtle and largely unintentional. Pressures to conform to group norms may have become particularly strong in recent years, given the weak academic job market.⁷

Such pressures have resulted in colleges and universities that drastically overrepresent the left and far left to the point of marginalizing alternative voices. In the social sciences, where one's ideology plays a far greater role in guiding teaching and research than in the sciences, we have observed the following firsthand:

- A senior professor urges a non-tenure-track political science professor to delete from his resume work on a Republican campaign, speculating that this “blotch” might explain the younger man's failure to land a tenure-track job.
- An undergraduate psychology student, a conservative, says he feels “alone with my views amid a sea of liberal graduate students and professors”—so much so that he doubts his ability to be successful in his chosen profession.
- A graduate student in the social sciences cites the frequency with which psychologists “write or say demeaning things about people with conservative political or religious views” without ever considering the views of their audience.

We maintain that the relative absence of conservative, libertarian, and neoliberal thinkers and thought from the academy is in part caused by discriminatory academic personnel practices. Further, we see this discrimination against conservatives as having four chief costs to academia and society.

First and most importantly, the lack of diversity in academia limits the questions we ask and the phenomena we study, retarding our pursuit of knowledge and our ability to serve society. We know, for instance, that the public had determined by the 1970s that the welfare program AFDC was not working, yet academic sociologists even now adamantly reject that conclusion

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and ostracize those who take it seriously.⁸ Charles Murray's research on the problems caused by out-of-wedlock birth in general and AFDC in particular has influenced public policy—but from outside the academy. Murray is not an academic and could almost certainly not attain an academic position given his views.⁹

Similarly, criminology professors have worked tirelessly to deny the success of the New York City Police Department's reforms rather than encouraging other cities to adopt like reforms.¹⁰ Despite New York City's fifteen-year decline in crime continuing through the tenure of three mayors and five police chiefs, criminologists still struggle to attribute increased safety to demographic shifts or even random statistical variation (which seemingly skipped other cities!) rather than to more effective policing. This failure to accept reality costs thousands of lives.¹¹

A second, related problem is that limiting “critical” conservative or libertarian thought serves to delegitimize academic expertise and the academy in general among large swaths of voters and policymakers. It thus becomes harder for scholars to contribute effectively to policy debates. Indeed, the development of free-market-oriented think tanks such as those in the State Policy Network in part reflects the erosion of academics' technical authority.¹² It also becomes harder for citizens to believe in their public universities. As Hanna F. Pitkin has shown, most conceptions of democratic representation suggest that public organizations, including universities, should represent the ideals and demography of citizens.¹³ Without a reasonable diversity of political opinion, public institutions of higher learning lose their legitimacy.

Third, a range of insightful critics, including Allan Bloom, Martin Anderson, Josiah Bunting III, C. John Sommerville, and Richard H. Hersh and John Merrow, has questioned whether universities as now constituted serve to make students more capable people and citizens.¹⁴ Indeed, recent studies by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute report that even elite colleges and universities fail to teach students the basic information they need to make good decisions as voters, in matters such as where public money goes.¹⁵ The lack of intellectual diversity on campuses itself harms undergraduates by limiting the depth and range of ideas to which they are exposed. The result is incalculable damage to the life of the mind, as the academy becomes ever more a mere credentials machine. Yet the days of growth without accountability

may be coming to an end; academia is now under increasing scrutiny for permitting lower academic standards, substituting indoctrination for teaching, and raising costs, themes developed in the last section of this book.

Finally, such critics as Martin Anderson and David Lodge argue that our ideological monoculture makes universities intellectually dull places where careerism and profit seeking prevail and the energy of contending ideas is absent.¹⁶ Such matters as the Iraq War and affirmative action are debated in newspapers and in Congress, but not in academia, where a single acceptable view is presumed. Dullness sounds like a minor problem, but in practice it bleeds academia of some of its best and brightest minds, a point made even by such nonconservative thinkers as David M. Ricci and Russell Jacoby.¹⁷

Although the lack of intellectual diversity in academia clearly has costs, the conservative critiques to date are unlikely to bring about desired changes. For starters, too much of the case suggesting that academia is hostile to conservative ideas has been anecdotal rather than systematic. Moreover, some “conservative” critics of academe appear to be more concerned with ideological balance on campus than with ensuring that higher education is equipped to pursue its intellectual, educational, and social mission.

What the debate needs—and what we offer in this volume—is empirically and historically grounded criticism of academia combined with ideas about how to make academia truer to its social purpose of gaining and disseminating knowledge. We have brought together a group of scholars and practitioners who care deeply about higher education, and who set about systematically answering the following questions: How rare are conservative professors? Why are they so rare? How does this vary by discipline? What are the effects of this political homogeneity on campus? What solutions are available for reforming the PC university?

This book is organized into four sections. Chapters in the first and most empirical section, “Diagnosing the Problem,” establish that universities actually do need reform. This section begins with chapters providing the most current and comprehensive statistical analyses of the relative rarity of conservative and libertarian professors. Chapters follow that explore the psychological and sociological mechanisms by which such imbalance comes about; these chapters also consider how and why academia stresses demographic diversity while largely eschewing political diversity.

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In “By the Numbers: The Ideological Profile of Professors,” Daniel Klein of George Mason University and Charlotta Stern of Stockholm University summarize and critique all important survey research since the 1960s on the ideology, policy views, and voting behavior of humanities and social science faculty. They find that conservatives and libertarians are becoming increasingly rare in academia, outnumbered by liberals and radicals by nearly 3 to 1 in relatively conservative fields like economics, more than 5 to 1 in moderate fields like political science, and 20 to 1 or more in anthropology and sociology.

In “Left Pipeline: Why Conservatives Don’t Get Doctorates,” Matthew Woessner of Penn State–Harrisburg and April Kelly-Woessner of Elizabethtown College use a national survey of college and university seniors to show that conservative students are substantially less likely to want to pursue doctorates than similarly situated liberal peers. This is not because they are less intelligent (liberal and conservative students have identical mean GPAs) but because they have different life priorities and career goals. Yet the data also suggest that conservative students lack academic role models, have more distant relationships to faculty, and may have fewer opportunities to do research with their professors, all of which may also affect their decision to pursue graduate education.

That the academic job markets seem to discriminate against conservative PhDs is suggested in “The Vanishing Conservative—Is There a Glass Ceiling?” by Stanley Rothman of Smith College and S. Robert Lichter of George Mason University. They find strong statistical evidence that socially conservative academics must publish more books and articles to get the same jobs as liberal peers. While publication records have the most impact on academic success, it remains the case that conservatives seem to be underplaced within the academic meritocracy, with social conservatism having about a third of the statistical impact on career success as one’s publishing record.

The second section, “‘Diversity’ in Higher Education,” begins with a second piece by Daniel Klein and Charlotta Stern, “Groupthink in Academia: Majoritarian Departmental Politics and the Professional Pyramid.” Klein and Stern suggest that anticonservative bias in the academy is likely explained by a psychological phenomenon known as “groupthink.” Organizations that can both select members and control members’ rewards tend to select and reward those like the original group, so that an initial

liberal academic orientation has led to faculties that are increasingly less ideologically diverse. In developing their groupthink interpretation, Klein and Stern explore how a few especially prestigious departments shape majoritarian thinking in departments across the discipline.

In “The Psychology of Political Correctness in Higher Education,” University of Nevada–Reno professor William O’Donohue and Chapman University professor Richard Redding explore the psychological goals and assumptions underlying diversity programs and political correctness. They challenge the assumption that disadvantaged groups suffer harm from certain speech or actions, and that ameliorative interventions are necessary to correct the harm. Drawing on psychological research, they argue that sociopolitical diversity may actually be the most important form of diversity for achieving the stated goals of diversity in higher education.

How demographic diversity came to trump ideological diversity on campus is the subject of “College Conformity 101: Where the Diversity of Ideas Meets the Idea of Diversity,” by National Association of Scholars executor director Peter Wood. Wood shows how demographic diversity has come to dominate higher education through its application in faculty hiring, student admissions, curricula, student orientation, residence hall policies, and virtually every other aspect of college life. Wood refers to a “new kind of aristocracy” created by this understanding of diversity, with a hierarchy of privilege based on perceived victimization, but he holds out the hope that inherent tensions in the diversity doctrine, combined with state ballot initiatives outlawing affirmative action, may ultimately chip away at the diversity regime.

Finally, in “The American University: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” James Piereson, president of the William E. Simon Foundation and a former academic, sees the modern university as the product of twentieth-century liberalism, and suggests that the break-up of the foundational assumption of liberalism—free thought—poses the most profound challenge of all to the modern university. He suggests that the nationalization and internationalization of higher education is working to increase political uniformity among faculty, and that the very financial success of universities may insulate them from reform impulses.

In the third section, “Different Disciplines, Same Problem,” leading scholars explore how political correctness affects scholarship and teaching

across core liberal arts and social science disciplines. While the AAUP holds that “it is not indoctrination for professors to expect students to comprehend ideas and apply knowledge that is accepted as true within a relevant discipline,”¹⁸ these essays illustrate how liberal political biases and agendas color what is accepted and acceptable within a discipline.

In “When Is Diversity Not Diversity: A Brief History of the English Department,” University of Virginia professor Paul Cantor shows that literature departments were much more intellectually diverse in the 1950s, when discrete schools of literary study dominated individual campuses and competed with one another in the broader academic universe. Today, a depressing uniformity of approach prevails, as literature departments may study a wider variety of works but generally do so through the narrower lenses of race, class, and gender.

In “Linguistics from the Left: The Truth about Black English That the Academy Doesn’t Want You to Know,” Manhattan Institute scholar and former University of California, Berkeley professor John McWhorter looks at the study of Black English to show how identity politics has managed to drive linguistics from its original mission, the nonpartisan description and analysis of languages and dialects. Dishonest linguists, McWhorter shows, are influencing elementary educators, and in turn making it harder for struggling black children to learn to read.

The field of history shows a similar dynamic. In “History Upside Down,” Hoover Institution scholar Victor Davis Hanson defines politically correct history as those efforts to use the past to achieve social change in the present. The goal of such history is to indict the West—and the United States in particular—as an inherently pathological oppressor of the “other.” Hanson describes numerous examples of such demonization, which increasingly replaces more nuanced and accurate understandings of the past. The resulting weaknesses of modern academic history have left the field ripe for takeover: increasingly, journalists fill the roles previously held by historians.

Political science may be in better shape than history, the next chapter suggests. In “Why Political Science Is Left But Not Quite PC: Causes of Disunion and Diversity,” University of Virginia professor James Ceaser and University of Arkansas professor Robert Maranto demonstrate that political science is less rigidly liberal than many other disciplines. The cause: certain subfields such as constitutional law, traditional political philosophy, political

economy, and international relations require skills and attitudes that permit moderates and conservatives to compete effectively for jobs. In addition, the pluralist ideology of American political science argues for tolerance of a range of viewpoints. Nevertheless, roughly 80 percent of political scientists are liberal or progressive, and this limits the sorts of questions those in the field ask.

In the final section, “Needed Reforms,” practitioners describe the history of political correctness in universities and outline possible ways to reform academia.

In “The Route to Academic Pluralism,” National Association of Scholars president Stephen Balch calls for more active trustees and the creation of centers within universities to explore and represent conservative, traditional liberal, and libertarian perspectives. Such centers now exist at Princeton, Duke, Brown, and other schools. They lay the groundwork for eventually creating intellectually diverse departments, which, through their ability to hire and train, could reopen the academic marketplace to intellectual dissidents.

In “The Role of Alumni and Trustees,” Anne Neal of the American Council of Trustees and Alumni argues for the involvement of informed alumni and trustees in overseeing colleges and universities. Alumni and trustees have abdicated their proper role out of deference to faculty and presidents, but they must be willing to articulate their concerns about trends in the academy that threaten its future stature, rather than merely delegate to academics.

In “Openness, Transparency, and Accountability: Fostering Public Trust in Higher Education” former U.S. senator and University of Colorado president Hank Brown, and his colleagues John Cooney and Michael Poliakoff, point out that both America’s preeminence in, and public trust of, higher education are eroding. The authors explain that only by adhering to principles of openness, transparency, and accountability can the academy regain public trust. The authors discuss such policies in the context of perceived fiscal mismanagement, political bias, declining academic rigor, and low standards for awarding tenure.

Finally, John Agresto, former National Endowment for the Humanities chairman and former president of St. John’s College in New Mexico, explains that PC problems mainly affect the liberal arts, in part for reasons inherent in their very nature. In “To Reform the Politically Correct University, Reform

the Liberal Arts,” he advocates restoring balance and openness to our colleges and universities by deliberately exploring the vital middle ground between those who see the liberal arts as necessarily in opposition to reigning orthodoxies, and those more libertarian scholars who know that some apparent attempts to smash all idols are actually efforts to substitute a new orthodoxy for the old. In effect, Agresto wants academics to heal themselves by changing the culture of academia from one of smugness to one of seeking.

This volume will not be the last word on the PC university. In particular, we have hardly begun to explore the costs of ideological consensus—to look, that is, at how academia’s left-oriented status quo harms students and society. Still, we hope this work will start a dialogue between groups such as the AAUP, which defend that status quo, and critics mainly from the right and center. (In that debate, we trust that civility and data will prevail over passions and interests.) If the empirical evidence this volume offers persuades many well-meaning scholars on the left that higher education really has a PC problem, academia may begin to reform itself from the inside. One thing is near certain: reform will come—only its timing and nature are in doubt.

Notes

1. T. M. Newcome, *Personality and Social Change* (New York: Dryden, 1943).
2. William F. Buckley Jr., *God and Man at Yale* (Chicago: Regnery, 1951). See also Charles J. Sykes, *ProfScam* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988); Dinesh D'Souza, *Illiberal Education* (New York: Vintage, 1991); and Martin Anderson, *Impostors in the Temple* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1996).
3. See Jonathan Rauch, *Kindly Inquisitors* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Richard Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Virtue* (New York: Vintage, 1994).
4. See David Horowitz, *The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2006); see also "Students for Academic Freedom," <http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org/>. Horowitz is an institution builder in the mode of Ralph Nader, though with notably different goals. He has also founded the Center for the Study of Popular Culture (now called the David Horowitz Freedom Center) and *FrontPage Magazine*.
5. American Association of University Professors, *Freedom in the Classroom*, September 11, 2007, <http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/A/class.htm>. See also Michael Berube, "Freedom to Teach," *Inside Higher Ed*, September 11, 2007, <http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/09/11/berube>.
6. Lawrence Summers, cited in Scott Jaschick, "The Liberal (and Moderating) Professoriate," *Inside Higher Ed*, October 8, 2007, <http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/10/08/politics>.
7. As Zachary Karabell states in *What's College For?* (New York: Basic Books, 1998), a poor academic job market since the 1970s has limited intellectual innovation in the academy: "Because of the pressure to get a job and the odds against landing one, graduate students are becoming ever more likely to conform to the orthodoxies of their field and ever less likely to be able to communicate with the world outside of the academy" (67).
8. Stephen Teles, *Whose Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), makes clear that the failures of AFDC were apparent early on.
9. See, for example, Murray's *Losing Ground* (New York: Basic Books, 1984). Murray was anathema to the academy even before he wrote (with R. J. Herrnstein) *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (New York: Free Press, 1994).
10. See William Bratton and Peter Knobler, *Turnaround* (New York: Random House, 1998); and George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, *Do Police Matter?* (New York: Manhattan Institute, 2001).
11. Examples of this type are rampant. In the area of comparative politics, scholars eager to see U.S. and Israeli failings but reluctant to acknowledge problems within Arab societies could neither anticipate nor understand the potent threat of political Islam, a point developed by, among others, Martin S. Kramer, *Ivory Towers on Sand* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001). While most of the critics of the academy are conservatives or libertarians, the left-of-center E. D.

14 NOTES TO PAGES 6–10

Hirsch argues in *The Schools We Need and Why We Don't Have Them* (New York: Anchor, 1999) that academics in schools of education have harmed young people by promoting progressive dogma rather than examining what works in real classrooms, a theme also developed later in this volume by John McWhorter.

12. In the interest of full disclosure, the first author of this chapter is associated with two SPN institutions.

13. Hanna F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

14. See Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Anderson, *Impostors in the Temple*; Josiah Bunting III, *An Education for Our Time* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1998); C. John Sommerville, *The Decline of the Secular University* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Richard Hersh and John Merrow, *Declining by Degrees* (New York: Palgrave, 2005).

15. T. Kenneth Cribb Jr., *Failing Our Students, Failing America* (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2007).

16. Anderson, *Impostors in the Temple*; David Lodge, *Small World* (New York: Penguin, 1984). Lodge's work is fiction, inspired by real people and events.

17. David M. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984); Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

18. America Association of University Professors, *Freedom in the Classroom*.

2

By the Numbers: The Ideological Profile of Professors

Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern

There have been two peaks in interest in the ideology of professors, the first in the 1960s and '70s, the second in the beginning of the twenty-first century. In both periods studies found that professors tended to be radical; and in both periods the findings were challenged by scholars who claimed that professors were less radical than the studies showed. But there is one difference between the periods: in the earlier period the critics were openly disappointed that professors were not more radical, whereas in the later period the critics defensively argued that professors are more like ordinary people, more “moderate,” than the studies show.

The change in attitude partly has to do with the researchers themselves. In the earlier period the studies were conducted by prominent liberal academics such as Ladd and Lipset and openly left sympathizers such as Faia,¹ whereas the later studies come from conservative and classical liberal/libertarian academics. The change in attitude may also be an indication of the decline of professors with definite nonleftist views. This chapter summarizes the evidence on the ideology of professors and shows that few professors in the social sciences and humanities today are not on the left, and that there has been a decline since the 1960s in professors who are not on the left, as indicated by Republican voting, self-identified conservative leanings, or policy views.

We thank Richard Redding for detailed feedback that significantly improved this chapter.

TABLE 2-1

DEMOCRAT:REPUBLICAN RATIOS FOUND IN VOTER REGISTRATION STUDIES

	Cardiff and Klein^a	Five Misc. Studies^b	Center for Study of Popular Culture^c
Anthropology	10.5	NA ^d	—
Economics	2.8	1.6	4.3
English	13.3	19.3	18.6
History	10.9	75.0	20.7
Philosophy	5.0	24.0	8.9
Political science	6.5	7.9	7.9
Sociology	44.0	NA ^e	30.4

NOTES: a. Cardiff and Klein, "Faculty Partisan Affiliation," 239, based on 2004–5 data; b. 2003–5 voter registration data pooled from separate investigations at Capital University, Dartmouth College, Duke University, Ithaca College, and the University of Nevada–Las Vegas, detailed in "Other Schools" worksheet, <http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/klein/Voter/California%20Voter%20Reg%20CORRECTED%2013%20Oct%202007.xls>; c. 2001–2 voter registration data for thirty-two elite schools reported in David Horowitz and Eli Lehrer, "Political Bias in the Administrations and Faculties of 32 Elite Colleges and Universities," Center for the Study of Popular Culture, 2002, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Content/read.asp?ID=55>; d. This group consisted of twenty-one Democrats and zero Republicans; e. This group consisted of thirty-two Democrats and zero Republicans.

We focus on the humanities and social sciences (abbreviated here as h/ss) because in those disciplines, where professors deal with political matters in the classroom, ideological sensibilities likely play a significant role. Political views play a much smaller role in fields like math or chemistry.

Voter Registration Studies

Voter registration studies are in some ways more useful than survey studies as a means of understanding individuals' political beliefs. Voter registration studies avoid response bias and membership bias. However, the approach is obviously limited by America's two-party system—specifically, the crudeness of what can be inferred from support for either of those two parties and the problem that a large percentage of any faculty sample cannot be identified as being either Democrat or Republican.² Of course, there is also the concern that the faculties investigated may not be representative of academia in general.

TABLE 2-2
**DEMOCRAT:REPUBLICAN RATIOS IN ELEVEN CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITIES,
 2004 TO 2005**

Division	N	D	R	D:R Ratio
Humanities	1,153	600	60	10.0
Arts	313	151	20	7.6
Social sciences	1,039	529	78	6.8
Hard sciences/math	1,635	792	126	6.3
Medicine/nursing/health	489	233	49	4.8
Social professional ^a	662	315	71	4.4
Engineering	700	213	85	2.5
Business	389	116	86	1.3
Military/sports	69	11	15	0.7
<i>Total</i>	6,449	2,960	590	5.0

SOURCE: Cardiff and Klein, "Faculty Partisan Affiliation."

NOTE: a. Social professional includes fields of education, communications, law, social welfare, and policy.

Even given these limitations, voter registration data are still informative. Table 2-1 provides a summary of voter registration studies since 2001. The data show that h/ss faculties are dominated by registered Democrats.

A 2005 study by Klein and Stern suggests that h/ss faculties in the United States, excluding those at two-year colleges, have an overall D:R ratio (in terms of either usual voting behavior or voter registration) of at least 7:1 and more likely about 8:1.³ This chapter finds that such estimates continue to appear sound.

Consider table 2-2, which presents information from a study by Cardiff and Klein about a range of academic divisions at eleven California institutions, including two that are reputed to be relatively conservative, Pepperdine and Claremont-McKenna.⁴ Significant variations across academic divisions are evident when the eleven institutions are treated as a single pool. To be sure, Democratic preponderance is not the case at every school. Among the eleven schools investigated, the faculty *overall* at Pepperdine had a D:R ratio of 0.9, Point Loma Nazarene 1.0, and Claremont McKenna 1.3. However, those schools were deliberately included in the investigation because they have reputations for being conservative.

Table 2-2 shows that the only category that favors Republicans is military/sports, which is the smallest. The surprise is not that military/sports is less Democratic than other divisions, but that it is not more Republican than it is. The same is true of business, where the ratio of 1.3 Democrats per Republican indicates that the latter are not marginalized in business education, but that they are not dominant, either.

The high D:R ratios in h/ss echo studies from the 1960s. Older studies (which relied on self-reports of voting, not voter registration) often discussed an ideological divide in academia between h/ss and the “hard” sciences.⁵ Voter registration studies do not find such a divide. The hard sciences in these eleven California faculties are preponderantly Democratic.

Cardiff and Klein analyze the data by gender and academic rank. They find that female professors generally have significantly higher D:R ratios than male professors, except at Caltech and the two Protestant schools (Pepperdine and Point Loma Nazarene). The pattern for academic rank is not uniform across the eleven schools, but on the whole, the Republicans who can be found among the faculty are disproportionately full professors (not associate or assistant professors).⁶ Such is the case at all but two of the smaller schools, Pepperdine and Caltech, and dramatically so at Berkeley and Stanford. The implication is that, unless young Democratic professors occasionally mature into Republicans, the D:R ratios will become more lopsided in the future.

Democrat versus Republican by Self-Reporting

Another kind of party-affiliation data comes from survey questions that ask the respondents to report their own voting behavior, party identification, or party leanings. The phrasings of such questions differ, and the differences can be significant. For example, response might be sensitive to the moment or referent election (consider the 1964 Johnson landslide against Goldwater). Here we treat different formulations as asking the same basic question. Because such surveys have been conducted for decades, we can compare data over time.

Data indicate that in the period around 1970 the D:R ratio in the h/ss was about 4:1 (excluding two-year colleges). Thus, roughly speaking, over the thirty-five-year period from 1970 to 2005, the h/ss D:R ratio has probably

TABLE 2-3
 DEMOCRAT:REPUBLICAN RATIOS FOUND IN SURVEYS OF ENTIRE FACULTY,
 1960 TO 1972

Survey	Yee 1963 ^a	Joyner 1963 ^b	Eitzen and Maranell 1968 ^c	Faia 1967 ^d	Ladd and Lipset 1973 ^e
Year of data	1960	1962	1962	1965	1972
	Faculty, three state colleges, WA	Faculty, University of Arizona	Behavioral and physical sciences, fine arts	Faculty, universities and colleges, CA	Faculty, national sample
Average	2.04	1.3	1.3 ^f	1.3	2.6

SOURCE: Faia, "Myth of the Liberal Professor," 174.

NOTES: a. Robert Yee, "Faculty Participation in the 1960 Presidential Election," *Political Research Quarterly* 16 (March 1963): 213–20; b. Conrad Joyner, "Political Party Affiliation of University Administrative and Teaching Personnel," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 40 (March 1963): 353–56; c. D. Stanley Eitzen and Gary M. Maranell, "The Political Party Affiliation of College Professors," *Social Forces* 47, no. 2 (1968): 145–53; d. Michael A. Faia, "Alienation, Structural Strain, and Political Deviancy: A Test of Merton's Hypothesis," *Social Problems* 14 (Spring 1967): 389–413; e. Everett Carl Ladd Jr., and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Academics, Politics, and the 1972 Election* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); f. Eitzen and Maranell found that in the behavioral sciences the D:R ratio was about 2:1; in the physical sciences and in the fine arts there was no Democratic dominance.

about doubled. Here we review the survey-based D:R data, but space constraints require the omission of exact wording, sampling size, method, etc.

D:R during the Earlier Period. Table 2-3 presents an overview of results on faculty voting from 1955 to 1972. Note that the overview compares only Democratic and Republican voters and excludes other party identifications, independents, and unaffiliated voters.

Overall, the results suggest that across campus in those days there was a Democratic lead, with the D:R ratio ranging between 1.3 and 2.6. Nowadays, faculty surveys on voting report ratios of 4.5:1,⁷ 2.9:1,⁸ and 3.6:1.⁹

Humanities and Social Sciences. In h/ss the Democratic lead has always been larger, as shown in table 2-4, with earlier discipline surveys (between

TABLE 2-4
 DEMOCRAT:REPUBLICAN RATIOS FOUND IN SURVEYS OF CERTAIN
 DISCIPLINES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES, 1959 TO 1964

	Source				
	Turner et al. 1963a ^a	Turner et al. 1963b ^b	Spaulding and Turner 1968 ^c	Eitzen and Maranell 1968 ^d	McClintock et al. 1965 ^e
Year	1959	1960	1959-64	1962	1962
History			2.6 (72% D)		
Philosophy			3.8 (79% D)		
Political science	4.5				
Psychology				2.3	3.4
Sociology		7.5			

NOTES: a. Henry A. Turner, Charles B. Spaulding, and Charles G. McClintock, "Political Orientations of Academically Affiliated Sociologists," *Sociology and Social Research* 47 (1963): 273-89. This study also reports on botanists (50 percent Democratic), geologists (35 percent), mathematicians (29 percent), and engineers (27 percent); b. Henry A. Turner, Charles B. Spaulding, and Charles G. McClintock, "The Political Party Affiliation of American Political Scientists," *Western Political Quarterly* 1 (1963): 650-65; c. Charles B. Spaulding and Henry A. Turner, "Political Orientation and Field of Specialization among College Professors," *Sociology of Education* 41, no. 3 (1968): 247-62. Spaulding and Turner's table reports only the percentage of Democrats, noted in the cells in parentheses. To make comparisons easier, we present ratios assuming that the remainder of the respondents reported voted Republican. When compared with numbers reported in the discipline-specific articles (see table footnotes a and b), we find that the assumption overrepresents the number of Republicans; d. D. Stanley Eitzen and Gary M. Maranell, "The Political Party Affiliation of College Professors," *Social Forces* 47, no. 2 (1968): 145-53. This study lumps sociologists and psychologists together; e. Charles G. McClintock, Charles B. Spaulding, and Henry Turner, "Political Orientations of Academically Affiliated Psychologists," *American Psychologists* 20 (March 1965): 211-21.

1959 and 1964) showing D:R ratios in the range of 2.3 to 7.5. An even earlier survey of social scientists, conducted in 1955 by Lazarfeld and Thielens, found an overall ratio of 2.9.¹⁰

Ladd and Lipset present data specifically on presidential voting by the entire social science and humanities categories, as shown in table 2-5. The smattering of data seems to sustain the conclusion that around 1970 the overall D:R ratio in h/ss was probably somewhere between 3.5 and 4.

TABLE 2-5
 DEMOCRAT:REPUBLICAN VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1964,
 1968, 1972

	1964 Presidential Election	1968 Presidential Election	1972 Presidential Election
Social science	8.9	3.8	3.5
Humanities	6.6	3.1	2.4

SOURCE: Ladd and Lipset, *Divided Academy*, 62–84.

Recent D:R Survey Data. Surveys of recent years, shown in table 2-6, indicate a substantial increase in D:R ratios. Rothman et al. find for the humanities as a whole a ratio of 10.3, and for the social sciences 7.9.¹¹ Tobin and Weinberg report that in the 2004 election the ratio of Kerry to Bush voters was 5.4 in the humanities and 4.8 in the social sciences.¹²

The survey results may be compared to voter registration results only for the recent period, where the two methods generally line up and reinforce each other. Gross and Simmons report that humanities professors in 2004 voted 83.7 percent for Kerry, 15.0 percent for Bush; and that social science professors voted 87.6 percent for Kerry, 6.2 percent for Bush. Thus “averaging the figures for the social sciences and humanities generates a ratio of Democratic to Republican voters of 8.1 to 1.”¹³

D:R by Cohorts. Another way to detect changes over time is by comparing cohorts at the same point in time. That younger faculty are usually somewhat more likely to vote for Democratic (or left) candidates is a finding of long standing—Ladd and Lipset show it occurring in the 1948 presidential election.¹⁴ Klein and Stern find that in each of the six h/ss associations surveyed, older respondents are on the whole more likely to vote Republican as opposed to Democratic.¹⁵ Using multivariate regression analysis, they also find an increase in the likelihood of voting Democratic with the year of one’s degree—that is, the longer ago one received his degree, the more likely he is to vote Republican; this relation holds statistically (at 0.01) even with a number of variable controls.¹⁶ The size of the effect is not big, but it is statistically strong. Gross and Simmons also indicate that Republican voters are more common among full professors.¹⁷

TABLE 2-6
 DEMOCRAT:REPUBLICAN RATIOS FOUND IN SURVEYS OF FACULTY
 IN SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES, 1999 TO 2003

	Source			
	Rothman et al. 2005 ^a	Brookings 2001, Light 2001 ^b	Klein and Stern 2005 ^c	Gross and Simmons 2007 ^d
Year	1999	2001	2003	2006
Economics	2.1	3.7	2.9	3.0
Philosophy	5.6		9.1	
History	17.5	4.1	8.5	18.9
Political science	7.3	4.8	5.6	18.8
Psychology	9			
Sociology	59	47	28 ^e	19.5

NOTES: a. Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte, “Politics and Professional Advancement among College Faculty”; b. Brookings Institution, “National Survey on Government Endeavors,” prepared by Princeton Survey Research Associates, November 9, 2005, http://www.brook.edu/comm/reformwatch/rw04_surveydata.pdf; Paul C. Light, “Government’s Greatest Priorities of the Next Half Century,” *Reform Watch*, no. 4, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, December 2001, <http://www.brook.edu/comm/reformwatch/rw04.htm>; c. Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern, “Professors and Their Politics: The Policy Views of Social Scientists,” *Critical Review* 17, no. 3–4 (2005): 257–303; d. Gross and Simmons, “Social and Political Views of American Professors.” We are using this study’s data on Kerry versus Bush voting in 2004. This study reports self-described party affiliation by departments, but only in a way such that 38.9 percent of faculty overall are independents; e. This ratio of 28 for sociology is from Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern, “Sociology and Classical Liberalism,” *Independent Review* 11 (Summer 2006): 37–52, which treats sociologists only.

The results agree with the voter registration data that generally found a lower D:R ratio among the full professors. Republican representation will likely decline as the older professors pass from the scene.

“Liberal versus Conservative”

Our analysis of D:R ratios thus far has proceeded with only minor points of controversy: Are we excluding the two-year colleges? Are we talking about h/ss or the entire faculty? These points are readily resolved. Discussion of political or ideological views, on the other hand, has been more troubled.

Some Conceptual Issues. Controversy surrounds the ways in which researchers read the data in terms of ideological attributions. Most scholars have employed America's dominant one-dimensional framework, "liberal versus conservative" (sometimes "left versus right"), which is often vague code for "Democrat versus Republican." That framework has a number of problems.

There is a tendency to treat Democratic as identical to "liberal" and Republican as identical to "conservative." One problem is that—third parties, etc. aside—voting behavior amounts to a binary variable with no in-between, whereas "liberal versus conservative" self-identification invariably allows for a substantial middle or center. There then arises confusion over how to categorize this middle.

There are other problems with "liberal versus conservative" (or "left versus right"): (1) "middle-of-the-road" as an option for self-identification is sensitive to the respondent's reference group—that is, not everyone lives on the same road; (2) politics has more than one dimension, so that what exactly is being measured in the "liberal to conservative" dimension is not clear; (3) the terms "liberal" and "conservative" have disparate connotations; (4) liberalism originally suggested *laissez-faire*, and that classical meaning has been rejuvenated ("liberalization," "liberal" drug or immigration policy, etc.), so that self-identification as "liberal" means more than one thing;¹⁸ (5) conservatism has traditionally meant establishment interests. Given that academe is one of the most established, caste-based domains of American society, and that extensive government interventions and welfare-state programs are now pervasive and entrenched, why shouldn't professors who support the status quo think of themselves as moderates or even conservatives?¹⁹

If you stick your finger into a glass of water it appears bent, because when light passes through a different medium it is refracted. Likewise, Democrat:Republican ratios do not exactly mirror ratios of self-identified "liberals" to self-identified "conservatives." Rather, because of the problems just listed, one is a kind of social refraction of the other.

Those who highlight the preponderance of Democrats (as well as certain policy opinions) naturally impute ideological content to the findings. There has been a recurrent response by other scholars, who represent the highlighters as saying that there is a corresponding preponderance, more or less, of "liberals." Academically well-placed examples of this kind of response are the following four papers:

1. Faia, “Myth of the Liberal Professor.”
2. Hamilton and Hargens, “Politics of the Professors: Self-Identifications, 1969–1984.”
3. Zipp and Fenwick, “Is the Academy a Liberal Hegemony?”
4. Gross and Simmons, “Social and Political Views of American Professors.”²⁰

Papers 2, 3, and 4 use political self-identification data to show that the liberals are less dominant than “right-wing activists and scholars” suggest.²¹ One reason is that a lot of Democratic-voting professors self-identify as “middle/center” or “moderately conservative,” as in “conservative Democrat.” Another reason is that the authors include faculties of two-year colleges, weighted to represent their large numbers throughout the United States—a controversial method, as clearly, beyond the classroom, faculty at two-year colleges have very little influence on research, scholarship, and public discourse. The first and second papers also include results of attitude questions about policy or university issues, and tend to show that only a minority of professors adopts the conspicuously “liberal” positions. Faia doubts whether self-identified “liberals” are really liberal.²²

The upshot is that different voices use terms differently. The “liberal” attribution, for example, can mean a range of things, here listed from widest to narrowest:

- All professors who do not show themselves to be Republican or “real” conservatives or classical liberals.
 - Professors who vote Democratic.
 - Professors who self-identify as “liberal.”
 - Professors who take “liberal” positions on issues.

We should expect scholars of different perspectives to use terms differently, since ideological differences entail differences over the understanding of the most important words. That said, communication with ideological “others” works best when it sticks to relative concretes, such as reported voting and policy views. Acknowledging various limitations, we review the “liberal versus conservative” findings here.

TABLE 2-7
 PERCENTAGES OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES, ALL FACULTY
 (CARNEGIE SURVEYS OVER TIME, INCLUDING TWO-YEAR COLLEGES)

	1969	1975	1984		1989	1997
Left and liberal	46	41	40	Liberal and moderately liberal	56	56
Middle-of-the-road	27	28	27	Middle-of-the-road	17	20
Moderately and strongly conservative	28	31	34	Moderately conservative and conservative	28	24

SOURCES: For 1969, 1975, and 1984: Hamilton and Hargens, "Politics of the Professors"; for 1989 and 1997: Zipp and Fenwick, "Liberal Hegemony?"

"Liberal versus Conservative": Self-Identification. Survey research commonly asks about political views in terms of "liberal versus conservative." One group of surveys that has done so is the Carnegie surveys of faculty, which collected data on academics in 1968, 1975, 1984, 1989, and 1997.²³ Published findings using these surveys appear in table 2-7.

Similar approaches were used in surveys by the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) of the University of California–Los Angeles,²⁴ by the North American Academic Study Survey (NAASS) in 1999,²⁵ and by the Institute of Jewish Community Research (IJCR) in 2005.²⁶ Results for these, as well as for the survey of Gross and Simmons, are summarized in table 2-8.²⁷

Some of the variation in findings reported in table 2-8 probably depends on wording and how the researchers bunch multipoint responses into three categories. Some of the variation also depends on different sampling strategies; the Carnegie, HERI, and Gross and Simmons surveys include two-year colleges, where conservative self-identification is substantially higher than for any other category of higher education, while the NAASS and IJCR do not.²⁸ Despite these kinds of discrepancies, the recent Gross and Simmons study helps to support the conclusion that self-identified conservatives have been declining.

TABLE 2-8
 PERCENTAGES OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES, ALL FACULTY
 (HERI, NAASS, IJCR, GROSS AND SIMMONS SURVEYS)

	1989	2001	1999	2005	2006
	—HERI ^a —		NAASS ^b	IJCR ^c	Gross and Simmons ^d
Liberal, left	42	48	62	50	44.1
Moderate, middle	40	34		32.3	46.6
Conservative, right	18	18	12	17.7	9.2

NOTES: a. HERI, "UCLA Study Finds Growing Gap in Political Liberalism between Male and Female Faculty," UCLA Higher Education Research Institute, 2002, http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/heri/act_pr_02.html; b. Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte, "Politics and Professional Advancement"; c. Tobin and Weinberg, *Profile of American College Faculty*; d. Gross and Simmons, "Social and Political Views of American Professors." Columns except NAASS sum to 100 percent: missings, others, don't knows, etc. have been suppressed. The NAASS column is incomplete because of insufficient reporting. Also, the NAASS numbers are the interpolations made by Rothman and Lichter as described in their chapter in this volume.

Humanities and Social Sciences. If we exclude the two-year colleges from the Carnegie 1997 data, the results line up quite well with the 1999 NAASS data on h/ss, as noted by Rothman and Lichter in their chapter in the present volume. Gross and Simmons provide the most recent data (which includes data for two-year colleges): humanities professors self-identify 52.2 percent liberal, 44.3 percent moderate, 3.6 percent conservative; social science professors self-identify 58.2 percent liberal, 36.9 percent moderate, 4.9 percent conservative.²⁹ Again, the findings of Gross and Simmons support the conclusion that self-identified conservatives have been in decline.

The Refraction between D:R and L:C. Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte present Harris Poll data showing patterns in the U.S. public. We have pursued this line of inquiry using Harris and Gallup data from 1989 to 2004 in a response to Zipp and Fenwick.³⁰ We found that Democrats were more likely than Republicans to call themselves middle/center; called themselves "liberal" less often than Republicans call themselves "conservative;" and called themselves "conservative" more often than Republicans call themselves "liberal." Those are findings about the public at large, but presumably they carried over at least weakly to professors as well. The upshot would

be that social refraction causes D:R ratios to be substantially higher than liberal:conservative self-identification ratios.³¹

That refraction from D:R to L:C takes place is reinforced by Tobin and Weinberg.³² They find that among faculty describing themselves as moderates, in the 2004 presidential election 68 percent voted for Kerry and 27 percent for Bush. Also, they found that only 1 percent of professors who self-identify as liberal/very liberal voted for Bush, while 8 percent of professors who self-identify as conservative/very conservative voted for Kerry.³³

To summarize: (1) Self-identified “liberals” substantially outnumber “conservatives,” especially in h/ss and especially when two-year colleges are excluded.³⁴ (2) L:C ratios are much lower than D:R ratios. We would add that tracking “liberal versus conservative” through the years is fraught with problems, even when confined to self-identification data. Evidence from Gross and Simmons indicates that being “moderate” is on the rise.

An Aside on Marxism. Gross and Simmons included a question that gave respondents opportunity to characterize themselves as “Marxist.” We were surprised at how many did: 17.6 percent in the social sciences (including 25.5 percent of sociologists), 5.0 percent in the humanities, and 12.0 percent of all faculty at liberal arts colleges. Of the overall faculty of all kinds of schools, Marxists were 3.0 percent.³⁵

Surveys of Policy Views: Laissez-Faire versus Intervention

Party affiliation and political labels are valuable only to the extent that they usefully summarize substantive views about policy and social affairs. The ambiguity and controversy surrounding labels argue for focusing on such views.

Surveys ask professors about a wide variety of social issues—not just basic issues of public policy, but also contemporary events (such as wars), morals and culture, and university affairs. An individual “issue” question is of limited importance in isolation. Usually, researchers ask a set of questions. But a set will generate confusion unless it is part of a *conceptual scheme*.

Almost invariably, researchers have imposed on sets of questions a “liberal versus conservative” scheme. We think that this scheme is inadequate, and ultimately represents a kind of society-wide groupthink that

encompasses and joins “liberals” and “conservatives.” We offer an alternative scheme for questions of public policy: laissez-faire versus government intervention/activism, on an issue-by-issue basis. Over the range of issues, researchers can then categorize respondents in ways that defy the “liberal versus conservative” framework.

Policy Questions from Earlier Surveys. Earlier surveys included interesting policy questions. Unfortunately, the only reporting on responses takes the minimal form of constructed index scores.

In surveys conducted between 1959 and 1964, Spaulding and Turner asked fourteen excellent policy questions, very much along a laissez-faire–intervention spectrum, and called being more laissez-faire “conservative.”³⁶ They found (based on a policy index cutpoint) that the percentage of faculty who were conservative was 9 in philosophy, 10 in political science, 12 in sociology, 17 in history, 26 in psychology, 51 in botany, 54 in math, 61 in geology, and 66 in engineering. Thus, in the early 1960s, the sciences and math were laissez-faire-oriented to an extent that was very high relative to the h/ss fields, and surely high relative to today. Another survey conducted around 1963, summarized by Maranell and Eitzen, also shows science professors to be more “conservative.”³⁷

The 1969 Carnegie survey of professors asked about agreement with the statement “Marijuana should be legalized.”³⁸ The “strongly agree” percentages by self-identified political view were 59 for left, 17 for liberal, 5 for middle-of-the-road, 3 for moderately conservative, and 4 for strongly conservative. The left professors were the most laissez-faire on the issue, by far.

Some Recent Policy Questions. The 1999 NAASS survey included a few policy questions and reported for all faculty.³⁹ “Agree” percentages (combining “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”) are as follows: “Government should work to ensure that everyone has a job,” 66; “Government should work to reduce the income gap between rich and poor,” 72; “More environmental protection is needed, even if it raises prices or costs jobs,” 88. The questions are a bit ambiguous, but the results indicate that on those issues, professors mostly support government intervention. The survey also asked about abortion; 84 percent agreed that “it is a woman’s right to decide whether or not to have an abortion.” On that issue, there is special difficulty

in applying a “laissez-faire versus intervention” framework, but we see pro-choice as the laissez-faire position.

The 2001 survey of economists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists sponsored by Brookings asked respondents to complete the statement “Generally speaking, government programs should be . . .” by choosing along a six-point range from “cut back to reduce the power of government” to “expanded to deal with important problems.” Even economists leaned toward “expanded,” the others strongly so—sociologists, super strongly.⁴⁰

The IJCR survey of Tobin and Weinberg focused on foreign affairs but also contained a few “laissez-faire versus intervention” questions.⁴¹ One asked whether the powers granted to the government under the Patriot Act should be strengthened, reduced, or left pretty much unchanged, and among all professors, 83 percent of Democrats responded “reduced” and 1 percent “strengthened,” while for Republicans the percentages were 22 and 17, respectively. On that issue the Democrats are more laissez-faire. On other issues, Republicans are more laissez-faire. Two-thirds (66 percent) of Republicans agree and 16 percent disagree with the statement “People in developing countries benefit more than they lose from involvement of global corporations,” while 27 percent of Democrats agree and 44 percent disagree.⁴² Almost three-quarters (74 percent) of Republicans disagree and 17 percent agree with the statement “Although capitalism helped bring prosperity to this country, it is not well-suited to accomplish the same thing today in most developing nations,” compared to 43 percent of Democrats who agree and 38 percent who disagree.⁴³

Summary of the 2003 Policy Survey of Six Associations. We conclude with a summary of results from our 2003 survey.⁴⁴ We asked eighteen policy questions, each positing an existing government intervention and providing a five-point scale from “support strongly” to “oppose strongly.” The format of the questions was uniform and lent itself to the construction of an index, with lower numbers being more interventionist, higher being more laissez-faire. The survey was sent to random samples of six scholarly associations. The lists of anthropologists, economists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists all came from the major American association for each group. The philosophers came from the American Society for Political and

Legal Philosophy. We treated those employed in academia as professors, and restricted the results to that group (n = 1208).

The eighteen policy issues were tariffs, minimum wage, workplace safety regulation, FDA drug approval, air and water regulation by the EPA, discrimination by private parties, “hard” drugs, prostitution, gambling, guns, government ownership of industry, redistribution, government schooling, monetary policy, fiscal policy, immigration, military aid or presence, and foreign aid.

The important results are as follows:

- On twelve of the eighteen policy issues, the Democrats were at least noticeably, often substantially, more interventionist than the Republicans.
- But Republicans were more interventionist on immigration, military action, prostitution restrictions, and drug prohibition.⁴⁵
- Generally, the Democrats and Republicans fit the stereotypes, except that neither group is strongly laissez-faire on the issues that one might expect. The policy-index averages (which can range from 1 to 5, with lower being more interventionist, higher more laissez-faire) were Democrats 2.12, Republicans 2.69.⁴⁶ On the whole, Republicans gave laissez-faire supporters nothing to write home about, except perhaps their disappointment.
- The Democrats not only dominate, but they have a significantly narrower tent. Summing the standard deviation for each group’s eighteen policy responses yields the contrast: Democrats 17.1, Republicans 23.1. Thus, whereas the Republicans usually have diversity on a policy issue, the Democrats very often have a party line—with almost no support for laissez-faire. It is clear that there is significantly more diversity under the Republican tent.
- Economists are measurably less interventionist than other disciplines but still, on the whole, lean toward intervention; rumors of widespread laissez-faire support among economists are very wrong. Only in relative terms does economics stand out.

- Economists show the least consensus on policy issues. The differences between Democrats and Republicans are largest in economics, and the standard deviations are largest. A lack of consensus is a curious thing for the so-called queen of the social sciences.
- Younger professors tend to be slightly less interventionist than older professors. This result suggests that, although faculty in h/ss have grown increasingly Democratic, they have not necessarily grown increasingly interventionist.
- The cluster analysis based on the policy questions sorted the respondents into five groups, four of which correspond to familiar ideological categories: establishment Left (n = 470), progressive (n = 413), conservative (n = 35), and classical liberal/libertarian (n = 35).⁴⁷ (These are labels we attribute to the groups; they are not self-identifications.)⁴⁸ *The cluster-analysis results suggest that people tend to cluster as certain ideological types, as opposed to being spread more or less uniformly between convex combinations of those types.*
- Of the one thousand academic respondents from the six associations with sufficient data to be included in the cluster analysis, therefore, thirty-five can appropriately be called “real” conservatives and thirty-five can be called “real” libertarians, facts that call for two important remarks: (1) Conservatives and libertarians, so defined, are rare. Of those seventy professors, forty-eight (68.6 percent) were in either economics or political science. In the other four fields surveyed, substantive conservatives and libertarians are close to absent. (2) Libertarians are as numerous as conservatives. In some ways, the h/ss fields are more congenial to libertarians, who tend to be culturally liberal and not religious.
- On immigration, drugs, prostitution, and the military, the conservatives are the most interventionist of the four familiar groups.
- The policy-index averages were as follows: establishment Left 1.99, progressive 2.26, conservative 2.75, libertarian 4.12.⁴⁹ In other words, the people who often stand strongly opposed to status quo interventions tend to be those whose views fit a libertarian pattern.⁵⁰

Conclusion

Survey evidence and voter registration studies support the view that Democratic voters greatly outnumber Republican voters in academe. The estimate of 7:1 or 8:1 in the humanities and social sciences continues to hold up. There is evidence that the Democratic preponderance has increased greatly since around 1970 and is likely to continue to increase. In policy views, humanities and social science professors are mostly highly supportive of status quo interventions and lean left on issues such as redistribution and discrimination controls. Indeed, Gross and Simmons find a surprisingly high percentage of Marxists. Professors who vote Republican or self-identify as conservative seem to be in decline. Professors fitting a substantive conservative profile or a libertarian profile are very few in h/ss. Our analysis suggests that the substantive conservatives and libertarians are about equal in number. Economics is exceptional among h/ss for having a small but nonminiscule number of definite non-left professors.

Gross and Simmons report that moderates are on the rise and radicalism on the decline.⁵¹ One may discount their report of increases among moderates on several grounds.⁵² Meanwhile, however, Klein and Stern found a slight slope that says that the younger the professor, the less he supports government intervention overall.⁵³ Academe is a Democratic stronghold, but aggressive ideologies of state collectivism, such as socialism, continue to wane. Klein and Stern found that about 70 percent of humanities and social science professors who vote Democratic do *not* support government ownership of industrial enterprises.⁵⁴

Increasingly, academe is best understood as an agglomeration of disciplinary tribes and subfields, each consisting of individuals primarily interested in making a career and enjoying personal comfort and security. The academic agglomeration is one of America's most established, static, and caste-based domains. Like pragmatic people in business careers, social-democratic academics need to be "moderate," and most of them seem to give the presumption to mainstream Democratic views. It is quite possible that fervent idealists for solidarity, equality, and social justice get disproportionate attention, and that even they are often unwilling to advocate radical reforms of greater government control.

Conservatives and libertarians have great reason to complain about the ideological climate of academe. But to conclude on a note of slight optimism: perhaps a growing pragmatism among the professoriate will allow for better discourse about public policy and, in time, will offer to people who favor individual liberty slightly more opportunity in the academic establishment.

Notes

1. Everett Carll Ladd Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Michael A. Faia, “The Myth of the Liberal Professor,” *Sociology of Education* 47 (1974): 171–202.

2. Christopher F. Cardiff and Daniel B. Klein, “Faculty Partisan Affiliation in All Disciplines: A Voter-Registration Study,” *Critical Review* 17, no. 3–4 (2005): 237–55. In the Cardiff and Klein study, which achieved a high identification rate (about 71 percent) compared to other voter registration studies, 55 percent identified as either Democrat or Republican; the other 45 percent of the sample was divided among “not found” (19 percent), “decline to state/nonpartisan” (13 percent), “indeterminate because of multiple and conflicting listing of the name” (10 percent), “Green Party” (1 percent), and “other third parties” (1 percent). The indeterminates are white noise, but not-found and decline-to-state/nonpartisans may invite speculation.

3. Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern, “Political Diversity in Six Disciplines,” *Academic Questions* 18, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 40–52. This article did not originally specify exclusion of two-year colleges; the authors do so here following John F. Zipp and Rudy Fenwick, “Is the Academy a Liberal Hegemony? The Political Orientations and Educational Values of Professors,” *Political Opinion Quarterly* 70, no. 3 (2006): 304–26.

4. Cardiff and Klein, “Faculty Partisan Affiliation.”

5. Ladd and Lipset, *Divided Academy*.

6. Incidentally, we’d like to take this opportunity to note a minor error in Cardiff and Klein, “Faculty Partisan Affiliation,” 252. In reporting data by rank, the authors transposed the data for assistant and associate professors at Stanford and Berkeley. The data came from, and were reported correctly in, Daniel B. Klein and Andrew Western, “Voter Registration of Berkeley and Stanford Faculty,” *Academic Questions* 18, no. 1 (2004–2005): 53–65.

7. Stanley Rothman, S. Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte, “Fundamentals and Fundamentalists: A Reply to Ames et al.,” *Forum* 3, no. 2 (2005), <http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/art8/>.

8. Gary A. Tobin and Aryeh K. Weinberg, *A Profile of American College Faculty*, vol. 1, *Political Beliefs and Behavior* (San Francisco: Institute of Jewish and Community Studies, 2006).

9. Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, “The Social and Political Views of American Professors” (paper presented at the Harvard University Symposium on Professors and Their Politics, Cambridge, MA, October 6, 2007). Incidentally, regarding voting in the 2004 presidential election, Gross and Simmons report a quite surprising finding: among health sciences faculty—meaning mostly professors of nursing—48.1 percent voted for Kerry, 51.9 percent for Bush.

10. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens Jr., *The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958).

11. Stanley Rothman, S. Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte, “Politics and Professional Advancement among College Faculty,” *Forum* 3, no. 1 (2005), <http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss1/art2/>.

12. Tobin and Weinberg, *Profile of American College Faculty*, 1:24. We are surprised that this study did not find higher Kerry: Bush numbers. We do not know the composition/sampling of its “humanities” and “social sciences.”

13. Gross and Simmons, “Social and Political Views of American Professors,” 37.

14. Ladd and Lipset, *Divided Academy*, 193.

15. Klein and Stern, “Professors and Their Politics,” 265.

16. *Ibid.*, 288.

17. Gross and Simmons, “Social and Political Views of American Professors,” 33.

18. The rejuvenation we speak of refers to the movement led by such figures as Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman, who called themselves “liberal” and never “conservative.” That movement is now often called “libertarian” in the United States, and “neoliberal” in Europe. In Continental Europe, especially Eastern Europe, “liberal” usually still largely means what it originally did.

19. For a more thorough criticism of “liberal versus conservative,” see Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern, “Liberal Versus Conservative Stinks,” *Society* 2008, vol. 45: 488–95, which makes a thorough reply to Zipp and Fenwick on the ideological profile of faculty. The piece is available online at <http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/klein/papers.html>.

20. The second paper is Richard Hamilton and Lowell L. Hargens, “Politics of the Professors: Self-Identifications, 1969–1984,” *Social Forces* 71, no. 3 (1993): 603–27; the other three papers have been cited in full above.

21. Zipp and Fenwick, “Is the Academy a Liberal Hegemony?” 304.

22. Faia, “Myth of the Liberal Professor,” 171, 197.

23. The data collected within the framework of the Carnegie surveys are available to scholars through the Roper Center, <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/>.

24. Data collected by the HERI are available for scholars at <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/heri/index.php>.

25. Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte, “Politics and Professional Advancement.”

26. Tobin and Weinberg, *Profile of American College Faculty*.

27. The 2001 Brookings-sponsored survey of political scientists, economists, historians, and sociologists found that 58 percent of each group on average self-identified as very liberal/liberal, while 8 percent on average self-identified as very conservative/conservative. See Paul C. Light, “Government’s Greatest Priorities of the Next Half Century,” *Reform Watch*, no. 4 (December 2001), Brookings Institution.

28. Gross and Simmons, “Social and Political Views of American Professors,” 29.

29. *Ibid.*, 28.

30. Klein and Stern, “Liberal Versus Conservative Stinks.”

31. Gross and Simmons, “Social and Political Views of American Professors,” 35, reports findings at variance with the tendencies we find in the poll data. It should be

noted, however, that Gross and Simmons asked questions and categorized data in ways that tended to swell the ranks of the “moderates” and “independents,” and they have not as yet provided the more refined data, nor, it seems, reported what percentage of “moderates” voted for Kerry in 2004.

32. Tobin and Weinberg, *Profile of American College Faculty*, 27.

33. Tobin and Weinberg also found that only 1 percent of professors who self-identify as Democrat voted for Bush, while 13 percent of the self-identified Republicans voted for Kerry. This remarkable asymmetry may say something about how professors self-identify by political party, something about the 2004 contest between Kerry and Bush, or both.

34. Similar findings for Canadian professors are reported in M. Reza Nakhaie and Robert J. Brym, “The Political Attitudes of Canadian Professors,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 24, no. 3 (1999): 329–53.

35. With each label, Gross and Simmons, “Social and Political Views of American Professors,” asked respondents to indicate how well, on a seven-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely well, the label fit them. They reported Marxists were those who marked a score of 4 or higher.

36. Charles B. Spaulding and Henry A. Turner, “Political Orientation and Field of Specialization among College Professors,” *Sociology of Education* 41, no. 3 (1968): 247–62. In those days, with the New Deal only a few decades old and the rejuvenation of classical liberalism just beginning, the “conservative” attribution made more sense than it does today. These authors consider interventionists to be liberal. Note that they never present “liberal versus conservative” numbers.

37. Gary M. Maranell and D. Stanely Eitzen, “The Effect of Discipline, Region, and Rank on the Political Attitudes of College Professors,” *Sociological Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (1970): 112–18. The exact year of the sampling is not specified, but Eitzen and Maranell, “Party Affiliation of Professors,” noted that the sampling was based on college catalogues of 1962 (147).

38. Faia, “Myth of the Liberal Professor,” 171, 194.

39. Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte, “Politics and Professional Advancement.”

40. Light, “Government’s Greatest Priorities,” 55.

41. Tobin and Weinberg, *Profile of American College Faculty*, 35–39.

42. Only 21 percent of humanities professors and 38 percent of social science professors agreed that global corporations offered net benefits.

43. Gross and Simmons, “Social and Political Views of American Professors,” 43–44, asks a few questions about government policy, but we omit this study because it is more concerned with goals rather than specific policy measures. Also, in two cases, the “neither” response is so large as to make the results hard to interpret.

44. Klein and Stern, “Professors and Their Politics.” We say “our” survey, but Stern did not become involved until after the survey was conducted. Blame Klein for all survey-design flaws.

45. On two issues—gambling and using monetary policy to fine-tune the economy—the parties appeared about evenly divided; the latter issue isn't clearly of the *laissez-faire* type, anyway.

46. The twenty respondents who reported voting mostly Green had an average policy-index score of 2.30, while the thirteen who reported voting mostly Libertarian had 4.24.

47. The fifth group, $n = 47$, is odd: center-left on most issues, but with rather permissive views on personal issues and somewhat hawkish.

48. Of the thirty-five attributed libertarians, fourteen (40 percent) vote Republican and twelve (34 percent) vote Libertarian. Of the thirty-five attributed conservatives, twenty-three (66 percent) vote Republican and none votes Libertarian.

49. The average for the other group (of forty-seven), which did not fit a familiar ideological type, was 2.53.

50. In fact, the minimum of the sum of position dissimilarity on each issue between the libertarians and any other group is greater than the maximum of sums of dissimilarity between any pair of other groups.

51. Gross and Simmons, "Social and Political Views of American Professors," 40–41.

52. See Klein and Stern, "Liberal Versus Conservative Stinks."

53. Klein and Stern, "Professors and Their Politics," 288.

54. *Ibid.*, 268.