

Islam in Europe

Integration or Marginalization?

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Islam in Europe: Manifestations of Marginalization

In January 1989, Muslim activists staged a demonstration in the city of Bradford in north-central England, the culmination of which was the burning of a copy of British author Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*. Organized by the Bradford Council of Mosques (BCM) in response to what it perceived as a derogatory portrayal of Islam in general and the prophet Muhammad specifically in the novel, the event received extensive local, national and international media coverage. It followed an unsuccessful request by the United Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs three months earlier for the British government to ban the release of Rushdie's work for public perusal. Subsequently, Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini issued an Islamic decree (*fatwa*) demanding Rushdie's execution, a measure that garnered the support of the BCM and served to heighten Muslim-Christian tensions across the United Kingdom.¹ As British journalist Adam LeBor notes, the "scars on both sides still run deep, still shaping perceptions, strengthening stereotypes and entrenching mutual acrimony."²

Eight months after the onset of the imbroglio in Bradford, three female students of North African ethnic extraction attempted to wear their traditional Islamic head scarves (*foulards*) while attending classes at the Gabriel Havez Secondary School in Creil, a small town just north of Paris. School officials excluded the girls from classes on the premise that their *foulards* were a form of religious expression and thus in violation of the French government's 1905 law separating church and state affairs. Ultimately, national officials backed the Creil decision, albeit through an ambiguous ruling suggesting that future disputes of that nature be handled on a case-by-case basis at the local level.³ The *foulard* affair sparked a vigorous national debate that focused both on the particulars of the Creil episode and the broader standing of Muslims in French society, the most significant result of which to date was the National Assembly's February 2004 passage of a law specifically banning all prominent religious symbols from public schools.

Nearly a decade following the eruption of the *foulard* affair, a similarly divisive series of developments highlighted broadly similar ethnic, religious, social and political tensions in Germany. In January 1999, the government of the southeastern German *Länd* of Bavaria deported a 14-year-old boy of Turkish descent to Istanbul on the pretext of a series of minor criminal infractions. The youth—identified generically in media accounts as Mehmet—was born in Munich to Turkish immigrant parents and had lived there throughout his life. However, he did not possess German citizenship, a circumstance that enabled Bavarian authorities to enact deportation proceedings.⁴

Furthermore, Mehmet's deportation was carried out concurrent with the development of a heated national debate over a proposal by the ruling Social Democratic Party (SPD) government to reform a 1913 law mandating that only those of purely German ethnicity receive citizenship.⁵

Though separated by time, space and contextual distinctions, these three sets of developments are related in that they reflect a fundamental societal divide between the Christian and Muslim segments of the population of a given state in contemporary Western Europe. Such divisions, in turn, have grown out of religious as well as ethnic, racial and socio-economic differences pitting native-born majorities against non-European minority groups within nation-states across the region over the past half-century.

The exclusion of Muslims of myriad ethnic backgrounds from the economic, political and social benefits afforded to the majority populations of European Union member states generally and those situated in France, Germany and the United Kingdom specifically is a modern manifestation of this long contentious relationship. The marginalization of Muslims in these states is driven in large part by widespread Western misperceptions of Islam as a monolithic faith whose adherents possess a universal penchant for the proliferation of radical religious fundamentalism, irrespective of their variegated ethnic and national backgrounds. The fact that Islam permeates both public and private life in often highly visible inanners—the wearing of headscarves or full veils by women and calls to prayer over loudspeakers, for example—fuels such misjudgments in societies within which these types of behavior are not the norm.⁶ As John Esposito notes, the "modern notion of religion as a system of personal belief makes an Islam that is comprehensive in scope, in which Islam is integral to policy and society, 'abnormal' in so far as it departs from an accepted 'modern' secular norm. Thus, Islam becomes incomprehensible, irrational, extremist, threatening."⁷

In Western Europe, where governments advocate and most citizens accept the tempered practice of Christian faiths such as Protestantism and Catholicism in the context of overtly secular societies, strict adherence to the tenets of Islam appears out of place. However, the permanent exclusion of Muslims from the mainstream is not an acceptable solution. Rather, it is essential that members of the majority and minority attempt to develop an inclusive society with room for a European brand of Islam that will serve the spiritual needs of second, third and fourth generation Muslims born and raised on the continent. Tariq Ramadan, a second generation European Muslim of Egyptian descent, has proposed precisely such an approach. According to Ramadan, "[w]e need to separate Islamic principles from their cultures of origin and anchor them in the cultural reality of Western Europe. I can incorporate everything that's not opposed to my religion into my identity and that's a revolution."⁸ If pursued in a balanced manner, such an integration process is likely to enhance rather than detract from the respective identities of the majorities and minorities involved. As Ramadan argues, "[i]nstead of thinking in cold, formal terms of a passive integration of Muslims, we should be looking enthusiastically to make a positive contribution in building a new

Europe. Their presence is a source of richness: it contributes to reflection on the place of spirituality in secularized societies and on the egalitarian promotion of religious and cultural pluralism."⁹

The issue of Islam in Europe is relevant at present primarily because of the increasing prevalence of Muslims both regionally in the context of the EU and nationally in its most economically and politically influential states—France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Currently, there are approximately four to six million Muslims residing in France,¹⁰ 2.8-3.24 million in Germany¹¹ and 1.6-1.8 million in the United Kingdom.¹² The communities in which they live are composed primarily of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians in the French case, Turks, Kurds and Bosnians in the German case, and Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians in the British case. At the broader regional level, there are approximately 12-15 million Muslims living in EU member states, with that total expected to climb to 23 million by 2015.¹³ Put simply, such demographic projections suggest that the need to integrate Western Europe's Muslims will only grow more pronounced in the future.

Research Questions

With the aforementioned anecdotal and statistical evidence providing a necessary contextual foundation, this book will address the following research questions:

- First, what causal factors have engendered the development of waves of Muslim migrants and subsequent establishment and entrenchment of Islamic communities in France, Germany and the United Kingdom since the end of World War II? To what extent are these factors related?
- Second, at present, what cultural, economic, ethnic, linguistic, political, religious and social characteristics distinguish Muslims from the societal majorities in France, Germany and the United Kingdom?
- Third, to what extent have such characteristics served to exclude Muslims from acceptance by the majority populations of France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the accompanying economic, political and social benefits?
- Fourth, how effectively have the French, German and British governments facilitated the integration of Muslims—individually and communally—within their respective societies over the past two decades?
- Fifth, at what level of government—local, regional, national or supranational—are policies fashioned to fully integrate Muslims in France, Germany and the United Kingdom likely to prove most effective?
- Sixth, what benchmarks are likely to prove most useful in judging the extent of integration of Muslim minorities within the French, German and British societies?
- Seventh, what domestic and international consequences have the failure to fully integrate Muslims in France, Germany and the United Kingdom entailed over the past two decades? How are the roles of Muslims most likely to change vis-à-vis

the political processes in those states in the future?

- Eighth, to what extent can the EU assist France, Germany and the United Kingdom in developing more inclusive policies with regard to their respective Muslim communities over both the short and long terms?
- Ninth, what is the most likely course for interaction among ethnically and religiously distinctive Muslims and Christians in the contexts of Western Europe generally and France, Germany and the United Kingdom specifically in the future?

Theses

In addressing these research questions, the book will present and discuss the following interconnected theses:

- First, the growth of Islamic communities concurrent with the aging of the majority populations of France, Germany and the United Kingdom over the past half-century has created an as yet unmet need to fully integrate Muslims of variegated ethnic backgrounds within the societies of those states. That need is certain to grow more pronounced as the proportion of Muslims residing therein increases.
- Second, the failure to fully integrate Muslims within the societies of France, Germany and the United Kingdom has the potential to foster social and political instability in those states over both the short and long terms.
- Third, the construction of an effective framework to fully integrate Muslims within the French, German and British societies—and, ultimately, in the broader Western European context—over the long term will necessarily entail interactive policy formulation, coordination and implementation at the local, regional, national and supranational levels. However, given the prevalence of Islamic communities in particular localities and the resultant higher degree of interaction among Muslims and governmental authorities in those environs as opposed to the limited dispersion of Muslims regionally and nationally in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, a local-level approach is more desirable in the short term.
- Fourth, once the full integration of Muslim minorities—or at least positive progress toward the achievement of that objective—is realized within given municipalities in France, Germany or the United Kingdom, wider-ranging regional, national and supranational level projects are likely to prove more feasible in light of insights drawn from the local level.

Structure of the Book

The book addresses the research questions and theses through the presentation of six related chapters. Collectively, these chapters both examine past contributions and

present original ideas on Islam in Europe generally and the integration of Muslims within France, Germany and the United Kingdom specifically. In particular, the forthcoming chapter lineup includes:

- A review of the relevant literature and placement of the book within and beyond those contributions, followed by a brief presentation of the methodology utilized.
- A case study of Islam in France.
- A case study of Islam in Germany.
- A case study of Islam in the United Kingdom.
- A case study of the broader Western European regional level with the EU as the focal point.
- A concluding section drawing linkages among the case studies, and explaining the overarching significance of the book's findings.

A general summary of these chapters appears below, in the context of which the French, German and British case studies are addressed in the same sub-section.

Literature Review

This chapter consists of two sections, the first of which necessarily dwarfs the second. The first section reviews the relevant literature on the issues of international migration, Islam and the West, and the construction of individual, communal and national identities and the pertinence of these issues vis-a-vis the integration of minority groups within given states in three parts. First, it divides the international migration literature into sections on fundamental and hybrid explanatory theories before discussing which frameworks are most useful in the Western European context. Second, it divides the Islam and the West literature into subsections on general and Western European regional approaches, placing emphases on those most applicable to France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Third, it also divides the literature on identity and minority integration into general and Western European subsections, with the latter directed primarily toward the country and regional case studies. The second section explains the significance of the book in the context of the literature discussed in the first section.

Case Studies of Islam in France, Germany and the United Kingdom

These chapters are all structured in the same manner in order to provide a clear framework to analyze the distinct evidence associated with each national context. The eight-section structure is as follows:

- An anecdotal introduction to set the scene.
- An examination of the causal process resulting in the development, establishment and entrenchment of Muslim minorities in a given country.
- An evaluation of the present level of inclusion or exclusion of those minorities

through the use of demographic, economic, socio-religious and political indicators.

- A comparison of the similarities and differences in the prevailing Muslim communal and majority national—and, where applicable—local and regional identities in that country.
- An examination of the integration models utilized by the government vis-à-vis Muslim minorities in that country, stressing both the strengths and weaknesses of those approaches.
- An evaluation of the implications of the successes and failures—sub-divided into economic, social, security and political categories—associated with the integration models employed by those countries.
- The development of a framework to improve the integration of Muslim communities in that country, with an emphasis placed on the requisite articulation of a set of uniform benchmarks for progress.
- A set of conclusions.

Case Study of Islam in Western Europe

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses the contentious history of Muslim-Christian relations as pertains to Western Europe. The second section describes the transformation of Western European identity in the aftermath of World War II. The third section examines the evolving role of the EU in facilitating improvements in the integration of minority groups generally and Muslims specifically in the societies of its member states. The fourth section evaluates the potential for the development of a hybrid Euro-Islamic identity in the twenty-first century and beyond.

Conclusions

This chapter consists of six sections. The first section explains how the chapter fits into the structure of the book—in short as an analytical means to develop an effective framework to integrate Muslims into Western European societies by comparing and contrasting the four case studies. The second section examines domestic level similarities and differences in the case studies with respect to Muslim communities. The third section distinguishes domestic level similarities and differences in the case studies from the perspectives of the French, German and British governments. The fourth section denotes similarities and differences between the domestic and Western European regional case studies. The fifth section discusses the potential for the cultivation of a more ethnically and religiously inclusive Western Europe over the long term through a synthesis of linkages among the case studies. The sixth section evaluates the theses in light of the evidence presented in the case studies, and concludes by explaining incisively the significance of the study as relates to the development of a deeper understanding of the issue of Islam in contemporary Western Europe.

Methodology

This topic was chosen for three fundamental reasons. First, the growing presence of Islam has had a considerable impact on the governance of societies across Western Europe generally and those of France, Germany and the United Kingdom in particular over the past half-century. Yet, it has been neglected by scholars relative to the attention given to more high profile issues such as transatlantic cooperation, European integration, and national and supranational politics and leadership. This book endeavors to fill at least part of that void in research and interpretation. Second, examining the integration of Muslims in the French, German and British societies also affords one an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of related issue areas—most notably domestic and international economics, politics and security. Third, the increasing relevance of Islam in each of the above national constructs has affected the wider EU deepening and widening processes. As a result, it is essential to address supranational as well as national trends and developments germane to the evolving relationship between Islam and Christianity within and beyond the continent.

Although by no means exhaustive, the domestic and Western European regional case studies explain in a reasonably comprehensive manner how Muslim communities have had an impact upon and been affected by governments, citizens and institutions across the region. The domestic case studies draw on past research and recent statistical data in order to provide credible descriptions of the similarities and differences in the characteristics of Muslims living in France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the roles they have played in those societies. The regional case book addresses the broader implications of the presence of Islam on the continent in terms of the evolution of the definition of European identity and the extent to which that definition will become inclusive enough to accommodate Muslims as well as Christians in the future. Articulating explicitly the many linkages between the case studies, in turn, allows for the presentation of insights that might otherwise be overlooked.

The selection of countries to feature in the case studies was not difficult. France, Germany and the United Kingdom possess the largest communities of Muslims in Western Europe and are also the most economically powerful and politically influential states in that region. While challenging in terms of the scope of the research undertaken, the inclusion of all three states is necessary in order to fully address the impact of Islam in the region. The structural similarity of the domestic case studies provides a common link from one chapter to the next. The potential for repetition this format entails—while a valid concern—is by no means insurmountable if handled through explicit explanation in sections that draw on the same general evidence (the description, for instance, of the five pillars of Islam). The European regional chapter, on the other hand, avoids repetition by focusing on many of the historical elements of the relationship between Islam and Christianity on the continent and intergovernmental and supranational issues that are not addressed in the domestic case studies.

The order in which the chapters are presented is designed to facilitate a smooth progression from discussions of the specificity of the integration of Muslims in particular domestic contexts to an examination of the broader regional implications of the presence of Islam in Europe over the long term. Similarly, the chapter comparing and contrasting the domestic and regional cases links the arguments made in each and—in so doing—highlights the study's distinctive scholarly contributions overall. The concluding section, although necessarily repetitive because of the need to revisit the theses, emphasizes the extent to which the evidence presented in the case studies validates those theses.

The book uses a variety of primary and secondary sources to support its arguments. The fact that the secondary sources exceed the primary sources markedly is a reflection of the relatively limited scope of available primary source materials on the Muslims of Western Europe. Those primary sources that were consulted and utilized are particularly germane to the descriptions of Muslim communities in the domestic case studies and the articulation of the EU's treaty-related contributions to the handling of the issues of immigration and minority integration in the regional chapter. These sources are qualitative as well as quantitative in nature and include government censuses and other data collected by national statistics offices, treaties and reports published by European supranational institutions, media accounts, polls and studies conducted by non-governmental organizations. The evidence drawn from these sources has both strengths and weaknesses, with the former naturally outweighing the latter. The book, for example, lacks a single database upon which to rely and thus loses uniformity across case studies. As a result, it does not rely on the use of elaborate statistical tests, the reliability of which typically demands such uniformity. However, by consulting a range of national and supranational governmental, non-governmental and Muslim communal sources, it gives credence to the viewpoints of a variety of actors affected by the issue of Islam in Europe.

Notes

1. Philip Lewis, *Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity Among British Muslims—Bradford in the 1990s* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 1-2; Adam LeBor, *A Heart Turned East: Among the Muslims of Europe and America* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 148-50.
2. LeBor, *A Heart Turned East*, 149.
3. Maxim Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Race and Citizenship in Modern France* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 1; Cynthia DeBula Baines, "L'Affaire des Foulards: Discrimination and the Price of a Secular Public Education System," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 29-1 (1996); Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe*, trans. Susan Milner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 180-90.
4. "Turkish Germans," *Economist* [London] (9 January 1999); Paul Geitner, "14-year-old

- Boy Finds Himself at Center of German Storm," *Associated Press* (23 September 1998).
5. "Turkish Germans." Only 160,000 of the 2.1 million Turks residing in Germany had German citizenship when the proposal was made following the September 1998 national election.
 6. Nazih N. Ayuh, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Third World* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 35. Ayuh notes that "Islam is indeed very much a social religion, seeking to organize the practices of social life, and above all the minute details of family life. This purpose, moreover, is not regarded as a personal pursuit, but as a social (collective) one."
 7. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 231.
 8. Quoted in Nicholas Le Quesne, "Trying to Bridge a Great Divide," *Time* (11 December 2000).
 9. Tariq Ramadan, "Immigration, Integration and Cooperation Policies: Europe's Muslims Find a Place for Themselves," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 3-4 (1998).
 10. Jean-Paul Gourévitch, *La France africaine: Islam, integration, insécurité: infos et intox* (Paris: Le Pré aux Clercs, 2000), 189-90; "Islam: France's Second Religion," *Time International* (10 June 2000); Christopher Caldwell, "The Crescent and the Tricolor," *Atlantic Monthly* 287-11 (2000): 22.
 11. Central Islam Institute Archives, *Muslims in Germany* (Soesen, Germany: Central Institute Islam Archives, 2001); German National Office of Statistics, *Foreign Population from a Choice of Islamic Countries in Germany* (Berlin: German National Office of Statistics, 2000); "Turkish Germans."
 12. British Office for National Statistics, *Census 2001: Ethnicity and Religion* (London: British Office for National Statistics, 2002); General Register Office, Scotland, *Census 2001: Ethnicity and Religion* (Edinburgh: General Register Office, Scotland, 2002); "A Map of Muslim Britain," *Guardian* [London] (17 June 2002); "How Many British Muslims?," *Muslim Council of Britain* (2001).
 13. Omer Taspinar, "Europe's Muslim Street," *Foreign Policy* 135-2 (2003); "How Restive are Europe's Muslims?," *Economist* (18 October 2001); M. Ali Kettani, "Challenges to the Organization of Muslim Communities in Western Europe," in *Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States*, ed. W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. Van Koningsveld (Kampen, Netherlands: KOK Pharos Publishing House, 1996), 33-34; Tariq Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim* (Leicester, UK: Islamic Foundation, 1999), 120.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

The topic of this study—the impact of Muslim immigration on society and governance in Western Europe in general and France, Germany and the United Kingdom in particular—bridges multiple academic disciplines. Most significantly, it is associated with the fields of economics, history, political science, psychology and sociology. Therefore, a review of the literature relevant to the topic must touch upon a variety of related but by no means identical theoretical frameworks. In order to address these themes incisively, this chapter employs an interdisciplinary approach categorized into three issue areas: (a) international migration, (b) Islam and the West and (c) identity/integration of minorities. After summarizing the literature germane to the topic in each of these areas, the chapter compares and contrasts the arguments made therein to those put forth in this book.

For the benefit of the reader, a summary of the chapter's format is instructive at this juncture. The chapter consists of the following four sections:

Review of Relevant Literature on International Migration

This section has two parts. The first part summarizes seven theories—the macroeconomic, microeconomic, new economics, dual labor market, world systems, networks and institutional models, respectively—that seek to explain international migration processes. The second part examines the theories among those presented in the first part that are most applicable to the Western European context and the reasons why.

Review of Relevant Literature on Islam and the West

This section is divided into two parts. The first part examines the prevailing global level theoretical approaches to the relationship between the Western and Islamic worlds—confrontational, cooperative and ambivalent. The second part focuses on the aspects of those approaches that are most germane to the Western European context generally and those of France, Germany and the United Kingdom specifically.

Review of Relevant Literature on Identity and Integration

This section also has two parts. The first part stresses the primacy of domestic over

systemic level theories with respect to identity formation and the integration of minority groups in general terms. Additionally, it evaluates the utility of constructivism as an explanatory tool in this respect. The second part places an emphasis on domestic level integrative models applicable in the contexts of France, Germany and the United Kingdom in light of the distinctive identities of the majority and minority populations in these states.

Book's Contributions to the Existing Literature

This section makes three points regarding the book's contributions to the existing literature on the impact of Muslim immigration on society and governance in Western Europe generally and in France, Germany and the United Kingdom specifically. First, it emphasizes the need to draw linkages among the French, German, British and broader Western European regional case studies. Second, it develops a four-tiered integrative framework by way of a bottom-up approach proceeding from the local to the regional to the national and then to the supranational levels as a means to fully integrate Muslim minorities into the French, German, British societies. Third, it places an emphasis on Christian-Muslim relations as one of the defining issues of the twenty-first century as pertains to the completion of an inclusive, united Europe.

Review of Relevant Literature on International Migration

The field of international migration includes a variety of theoretical approaches to explain the movement of peoples from one state or region of the world to another, none of which is, in itself, wholly sufficient. As one renowned group of scholars in the field explain, present "patterns and trends in immigration . . . suggest that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline alone. . . . [Because] theories conceptualize causal processes at different levels of analysis—the individual, the household, the national and the international—they cannot be assumed, a priori, to be inherently incompatible."¹ For the purposes of this review, such theories are best addressed first in terms of seven general models, those associated with macroeconomics, microeconomics, new economics, dual labor markets, world systems, migration networks and institutions.

The macroeconomic model is one of the oldest and most well known explanatory approaches to international migration studies. Put simply, it attributes migration flows from one state or region to another to structural differences in the supply and demand for labor in those contexts. Such exchanges of labor usually prove beneficial on both ends of the transaction, with respect to the markets if not always the individual workers involved. Proponents of this model, which emerged concurrent with and partially in response to the increased demand for unskilled labor in Western Europe following the conclusion of World War II, include W. Arthur Lewis, Gustav Ranis, J.C.H. Fei, J.R.

Harris and Michael P. Todaro.²

The macroeconomic approach served as the basis for the development of a series of related propositions, as described by Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor. First, differences in wage rates between states trigger international migration. Second, the elimination of wage differentials causes such labor-induced population transfers to cease. Third, international flows of skilled workers respond to fluctuations in the rate of return on human capital, which differs at times from wage rates and thus may yield patterns of migration opposite to that associated with unskilled labor. Fourth, labor markets are the principal mechanisms producing international migration. Fifth, it follows that the manipulation of labor markets by governmental bodies is a useful means to control migration flows.³

As opposed to the macroeconomic framework, the microeconomic model of international migration emphasizes individual choice in the movement of workers from one state to another. It suggests that rather than responding exclusively to periodic fluctuations in the demand for labor, workers conduct short- and long-term cost-benefit calculations and elect to migrate only if they discern a positive economic return, whether reflected in terms of wages or quality of life. For example, workers from the developing world would not likely choose to relocate unless they expected to acquire jobs carrying improvements in the standard of living relative to that existing in their native countries. Advocates of this model include Todaro, Larry A. Sjaastad, Lydia Maruszko and George Borjas.⁴

The multiple factors involved in the decision-making process described in the microeconomic model lead to several additional conclusions that differ from those related to the macroeconomic approach. First, international migration is a product of differentials in both earnings and employment rates and thus will not occur in the absence of such disparities. Second, individual characteristics in terms of skill level with respect to labor categories (skilled vs. unskilled) result in differing rates of migration among particular social classes in given states. Third, the size of the differential in returns determines the level of the flow of migrants between states. Fourth, attractive living conditions in a particular state have the potential to draw migrants even without the guarantee of considerable wage increases in that context. Fifth, governments control migration primarily through the manipulation of wage rates and restrictive immigration policies rather than the manipulation of supply and demand in labor markets.⁵

In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars including Taylor, Oded Stark, D. Levhari, E. Katz and Jennifer Lauby advanced a "new economics" model of international migration that distinguished itself from the aforementioned neoclassical macro and microeconomic models by focusing on family units rather than individual or state-level actors. While similar to the macroeconomic model, the new economics approach places a greater emphasis on selectivity in migrant decision-making at the household level. It explains that as opposed to the involuntary dispersal of all males to occupy unskilled jobs in foreign lands, families often gain more collective benefits by selectively sending some members to work abroad while others pursue employment in their

country of origin contingent upon demand for their respective labor skills.⁶

The new economics model was the basis for the following set of theses, which altered appreciably the research agenda for international migration given the almost exclusive previous reliance upon the neoclassical models of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. First, families, households or other culturally defined entities are the most useful units for analysis with respect to migration flows. Second, there are strong incentives for households to engage in both international migration and local activities in pursuit of economic prosperity. Third, incentives for transnational movements will not always cease once overall wage differentials between states no longer persist; instead, family members may migrate to capitalize on a sector of the market that does not exist in their native country. Fourth, households' expected gains from migration are contingent upon their placement in the income distribution in a particular state. Fifth, governments can influence migration rates not only by manipulating labor markets but also through policies that shape insurance, capital and futures markets in manners that alter income distributions among families.⁷

While the neoclassical and new economics models are limited in scope to the decision-making of individuals and households, dual labor market theory focuses on the broader state and regional levels in explaining the causes of migration flows. Initially developed by Michael J. Piore, the dual labor market approach contends that immigration is the result of pull factors in receiving states rather than push factors in the sending states from which migrants originate.⁸ In short, demand for unskilled labor in industrialized societies draws workers from the developing world. Factors fueling that demand in receiver states include structural inflation, lack of motivation in the domestic labor force and the inherent dualism between labor and capital.⁹

Although the dual labor market model shares some similarities with the neoclassical economics, it also features four corollaries that differ from those associated with the micro-level decision-making approaches. First, international migration is based largely on a demand for labor that is met by the recruitment of foreign workers by governments and private corporations. Second, international wage differentials are not an indispensable element in the migration process; instead, the demand for labor emanates from structural economic needs and is expressed through recruitment practices. Third, low-level wages in receiving states do not rise in response to a dearth of immigrant workers; rather they are held constant through social and institutional mechanisms that do not respond to supply and demand. Fourth, because immigrants fill a demand for labor structurally built into modern economies, influencing this demand entails major organizational alterations in a given economy.¹⁰

On the other hand, rather than limit themselves to the characteristics of labor markets in particular domestic societies, Immanuel Wallerstein, Alejandro Portes, John Walton, Elizabeth M. Petras, Manuel Castells, Saskia Sassen and Ewa Morawska attribute international migration flows to the capitalist penetration of non-capitalist economies.¹¹ Known as the world systems model, this theory suggests that modern industrial states have triggered increased migration flows by consolidating land under foreign ownership, extracting raw materials, shifting labor markets to the detriment of

distinct social classes and shifting population centers from rural to urban areas in the developing world.¹² Examples include the past European colonization of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the modern expansion of multinational corporations in those regions.

World systems theorists' advocacy of the premise that international migration stems from the political and economic organization of the expanding global economy is articulated more explicitly in four corollaries to their general stance. First, labor flows out of developing states as capitalist investment foments changes that create mobile populations with growing affinities for the material benefits perceived as available on a larger scale in the core states of the developed world. Second, international migration is considerably more likely between past imperial powers and former colonies in light of their deeply ingrained cultural, linguistic, administrative, investment, transportation and communication links. Third, since migration waves are a result of the globalization of the market economy, governments can best influence those waves through the regulation of overseas investment by transnational corporations. Fourth, the failure of governments to protect investments via political and military intervention in the developing world, produce unwanted movements of refugees that foster political and social problems at home.¹³

Each of the above theoretical approaches offers useful explanations for the genesis of particular international migration waves. Alternatively, the networks model emphasizes the potential for interpersonal linkages among immigrants and family members and other acquaintances in their states of origin to lower the risks and increase the perceived long-term benefits associated with international migration. According to Hugo, Massey, Taylor, Felipe Garcia Espana, Douglas T. Gurak and Fe Caces, these connections cause the probability of migration to rise over time, which results in the establishment and eventual entrenchment of immigrant communities in receiving states.¹⁴

The networks approach provides a theoretical foundation for five general rules related to the examination of migration processes over time, particularly when limited to distinct regional contexts. First, international migration will increase until the network connections have diffused to such an extent within a given sending state that all who wish to emigrate from that state can easily do so. Second, the effects—if any—of wage differentials and employment rates on the promotion or discouragement of migration will diminish progressively as the falling costs and risks of population waves accompanying the development of migrant networks between states decrease. Third, as networks expand, migration waves become gradually more representative of the society of the sending state. Fourth, receiving states will have less success in stemming migration waves over the long term because the process of network formation lies largely outside governmental control. Family reunification programs undertaken by governments, for example, tend to strengthen rather than weaken migration networks.¹⁵

One offshoot of the networks model is the institutional theory of international migration promulgated by Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Taylor. This approach, which focuses on the development of public and private advocacy

groups to safeguard the rights of migrants, has two related elements. First, international migration tides will become increasingly institutionalized concurrent with the proliferation of organizations designed to support, sustain and promote international movement. Second, given the difficulties modern states have experienced in managing the growth and subsequent expansion of the powers of international and non-governmental institutions, whether at the global or regional level, governments will find it more and more difficult to control migration in the future .

Scholars have responded to the growing complexity of international migration processes by developing hybrid explanatory models that utilize a range of theoretical approaches that transcend multiple disciplines. Take the cumulative causation model originally proposed by Gunnar Myrdal and subsequently refined by scholars such as Massey, Taylor, Stark and Shlomo Yitzhaki.¹⁷ It has three related tenets. First, social, economic and cultural changes fostered by international migration tides between sending and receiving states instill a powerful momentum to the movement of populations over borders, one that is not easily influenced by governments. Second, by recruiting migrant workers to offset domestic labor shortages, governments render those jobs less desirable to natives. Third, as a result, even when the domestic labor supply increases, natives are unlikely to occupy those jobs filled in the past by immigrants, ultimately creating a demand for the recruitment of more migrants in the future.¹⁸

The migration systems model, advocated by scholars such as James T. Fawcett and Hania Zlotnick, is comparable to the cumulative causation approach in its overarching scope.¹⁹ However, it is more effective as a means to synthesize the most significant elements of world systems, networks and institutions constructs into a broad theoretical framework. This model is built around four precepts. First, migration systems are not conditioned by geographic proximity, given that population waves therein relate primarily to political and economic relationships rather than physical ones. Second, multipolar migration systems, through which a set of dispersed core states receives immigrants from a group of overlapping sending states, are possible if not probable. Third, multiple membership in migrations systems is more common among sending than receiving states. Fourth, stability does not imply a fixed structure in a particular migration system. Thus, as a system changes in accordance with the prevailing political and economic conditions, states may join or drop out.²⁰

While these theories are applicable to a variety of geographical contexts. However, not all are equally germane to Western Europe generally or France, Germany and the United Kingdom specifically. Four of the aforementioned and described theoretical constructs are particularly instructive as relates to these contexts: the dual labor market, new economics, networks, and cumulative causation models. The reasons why are discussed on a model-by-model basis below.

Dual Labor Market Model

This approach is an ideal means to explain the initial development of Muslim communities in France, Germany and the United Kingdom in the aftermath of World War II. These states lacked the requisite unskilled labor supply for physical and economic reconstruction in the 1950s and 1960s because of the reductions in their respective working-age populations. As a result, they recruited foreign workers, many of whom were Muslims, to satisfy a short-term labor demand. These projects were orchestrated by the governments of France and Germany and private businesses in the United Kingdom, drawing migrants from North Africa, Turkey and the Indian subcontinent.

New Economics Model

This framework is useful in explaining both the initial establishment and subsequent growth of Islamic communities throughout Western Europe. Young males in households in the developing world, whether North Africa, Turkey or the Indian subcontinent, took advantage of the French, German and British guest worker programs in order to boost their incomes, then sent the money to family members still residing in their countries of origin. Once the low-wage jobs filled by immigrants dried up concurrent with the economic stagnation that gripped Western Europe after the 1973-74 oil crisis, guest worker remittances decreased. Rather than remain separated, workers and their families reunited in their new homes in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, resulting in the long-term entrenchment of Muslim enclaves in those countries.

Networks Model

This approach is similar to the new economics model in its emphasis on the importance of the interpersonal linkages among migrants in Western Europe and their families and acquaintances abroad. Primarily because of such linkages, as Muslim immigrants reunited with family members, the character of the communities they established in France, Germany and the United Kingdom shifted from one characterized by cultural ambivalence to one featuring more of the ethnic and religious traditions associated with their respective homelands. While Western European governments enacted policies to stem the flow of new labor migrants in the mid-1970s, they also permitted family reunifications, which only strengthened the networks established and cultivated since the 1950s.

Cumulative Causation Model

This approach is particularly helpful in explaining both the allure of Western Europe to migrants from developing countries and the backlashes against those individuals

following periodic economic downturns in that region. The perception that they will achieve higher standards of living in Western Europe leads to increases in the number of migrants flowing into states such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, upon arrival, they find there is a dearth of jobs. The majority populations of those states, in turn, often mistakenly attribute rising unemployment levels to minority Muslims occupying jobs that natives would otherwise fill. However, in part because unskilled jobs are associated with immigrants, most members of the majorities express little interest in such occupations even when openings do exist.

Review of Relevant Literature on Islam and the West

The entrenchment and growth of Muslim communities in France, Germany and the United Kingdom over the past 25 years has engendered vigorous national debates over the place of Islam within and outside of Western Europe. While distinct in many ways, these discussions have transpired in the context of a broader international debate among academics and policymakers over the evolving relationship between Islam and the West.

During the Cold War, scholars and practitioners of international relations viewed the world primarily through a bipolar lens. The globe was split into Western and Eastern segments, with the United States and Soviet Union acting as the principal players in the former and latter contexts, respectively. Each side pursued a set of interests conditioned largely by disparate ideologies, which it either shared with or imposed upon the states situated within its sphere of influence. While the United States defined its interests in democratic political and capitalist economic terms, the Soviet Union adhered to and attempted to advance totalitarian political and communist economic philosophies. Given their geopolitical predominance, the United States and Soviet Union drove interactions among states throughout the system. Events were interpreted primarily on the basis of relations between the superpowers.

When the Cold War ended through the collapse of communist regimes across Central and Eastern Europe in the fall and winter of 1989-90, the unification of Germany in October 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, academics set to work developing new theoretical constructs to explain interactions among states in the international system. Few such approaches are as novel as that offered by Samuel P. Huntington in his provocative 1996 work *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.²¹ In contrast to the Cold War era, which featured states struggling for power on the basis of disparate political and economic philosophies, Huntington contends that contemporary international relations are increasingly conditioned by common cultural identities transcending state boundaries in regions across the globe. He asserts that "culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilizational identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the post-Cold War world," noting that individuals residing within these civilizations define themselves in terms of "ancestry,

religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions," identifying culturally with "tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations and, at the broader level, civilizations."²²

Huntington describes the emerging civilizational system as one divided between groups of Western and non-Western states, which are categorized into eight major civilizations—Western, Sinic, Islamic, Orthodox, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist and Latin American. He acknowledges that states will remain the central actors in international affairs, but also contends that interactions among those states are "increasingly shaped by civilizational factors."²³ The major civilizational players in the new system are those defined as Western, Sinic and Islamic, with the United States and China heading the first two and the third lacking any one predominant state actor. In particular, his approach vis-à-vis the Islamic civilization has attracted widespread public interest since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks carried out by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on the outskirts of Washington, D.C.

Huntington developed his paradigm as a means to synthesize four general post-Cold War models of order he classifies as *One World: Euphorias and Harmonies*, *Two Worlds: Us and Them*, *184 States* and *Sheer Chaos*.²⁴ The first model, of which Francis Fukuyama is the principal advocate, suggests a diminution of if not an end to conflict as a byproduct of the victory of the American-led West over the Soviet-sponsored East in the Cold War.²⁵ The second mirrors the Cold War system but replaces the ideological confrontation pitting the United States against the Soviet Union with cleavages rooted in religious, economic and cultural differences, which divide the world between North and South, Christianity and Islam, and Orient and Occident. The third reflects the self-help world of neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, with states striving to advance their interests unilaterally in an anarchical international environment.²⁶ The fourth, proposed by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Kaplan among others, focuses on the intensification of ethnic conflict manifested in a proliferation of failed states in regions as geographically diverse as Central Africa and the former Yugoslavia.²⁷

Huntington contends that his civilizational model serves as a useful lens through which to synthesize the most relevant aspects of each of the above approaches. He points out, for example, that "[v]iewing the world in terms of seven or eight civilizations . . . does not sacrifice reality to parsimony as do the one- and two-world paradigms; yet it also does not sacrifice parsimony to reality as the statist and chaos paradigms do."²⁸ Huntington's model has both strengths and weaknesses, the collective identification of which serves as an effective means to review the literature on Islam and the West in both the global and Western European contexts. The following discussion does so in four parts, those related to the shifting balance of civilizations, the emerging order of civilizations, clashes of civilizations and the future of civilizations.

While the world standard of living was highest among Western states during the twentieth century, Huntington suggests that overall power levels are presently shifting in favor of the Sinic and Islamic civilizations, with both entities demonstrating an ability to modernize without abandoning their distinctive cultural and religious

identities.²⁹ With respect to Islam in particular, he cites Maxine Rodinson's contention that "there is nothing to indicate in a compelling way that the Muslim religion [has] prevented the Muslim world from developing along the road to modern capitalism."³⁰ Additionally, Huntington argues that Western primacy is likely to diminish as the relative demographic, economic, military and political power of the Sinic and Islamic civilizations increase over the long term.³¹

In comparing the relative power resources of the Western and Islamic civilizations, Huntington points both to rising population levels throughout the Islamic world and increases in the number of Muslims residing in the West (most notably in the United States and Europe). He cites, for example, statistical estimates indicating that the percentage of the global population adhering to Islamic religious precepts rose from 12.4 in 1900 to nearly 20 percent at present,³² increases that have enabled Islam to establish itself as the second most practiced religion in the world behind Christianity with approximately 1.2 billion followers.³³ In light of these demographic trends and the increasing emphasis on distinctive cultural characteristics in the post-Cold War era, Huntington asserts that the potential for clashes among the most powerful civilizations is in a perpetual state of growth, predicting that future clashes are most likely to occur between the American-led West and the Sinic or Islamic civilizations—if not both—arising from a volatile "interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance and Sinic assertiveness."³⁴ Furthermore, Huntington contends that the "Islamic and Sinic societies which see the West as their antagonist, have reason to cooperate with each other against the West," particularly with respect to issues areas such as human rights, economics and the development of weapons of mass destruction.³⁵

Huntington is correct to acknowledge that American power has declined in relative terms over the past half-century. However, he underestimates the extent to which the United States remains a largely peerless power by virtue of its collective economic strength, military capabilities, political influence and global commercial outreach. Although qualifying his arguments with the caveat that the reduction of Western power vis-à-vis that of the Islamic and Sinic civilizations is a long-term trend, Huntington indirectly and unjustly downplays the short-term renewal manifested in the growth of the American economy over the past decade.

Similarly, in focusing on the rising popularity of political Islam from the late 1970s into the early 1990s, he fails to acknowledge explicitly the possibility that such dynamism was a transitory phenomenon rather than the harbinger of a permanent reconstitution of politico-religious philosophy. His approach in this context is somewhat ignorant of the complexity of change—past, present and future—in the Islamic world. For example, as John Esposito argues, the "history of contemporary Islam is a story of challenge and response, tension and conflict, atavism and creativity or renaissance, retreat and advancement, religious and intellectual retrenchment, reformation and revolution."³⁶ Similarly, Shireen Hunter notes that "Islamic civilization is a hybrid and a syncretic phenomenon that developed from early Islamic encounters with other regions and civilizations in the course of its historical expansion; the notion of Islamic civilization as a unique and coherent phenomenon does not

reflect reality. Like all civilizations, Islamic civilization is a living, evolving organism, constantly responding to new realities and circumstances."³⁷

Notwithstanding the growth in popularity and political strength of fundamentalist movements such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Algerian Islamic Salvation Front—particularly among the lower classes—in the 1990s, Huntington exaggerates these groups' present potential to challenge state authority in the Greater Middle East. More balanced scholarly approaches provide a clearer picture of the relationship between governance and political Islam in the contemporary Muslim world. As Hunter explains, "Islam's role is directly linked with struggles for power, influence and legitimacy within Muslim societies and in the context of their interaction with the outside world; thus Islam is used by various groups to acquire and maintain power and to legitimize and delegitimize existing power structures."³⁸ Similarly, as Olivier Roy notes, the "socioeconomic realities that sustained the Islamist wave are still here and are not going to change. . . . The Islamic revolution, the Islamic state, the Islamic economy are myths, but we have not heard the last of Islamic protestation."³⁹

More specifically, scholars often clash over the relevance of the state in modern Muslim societies. Bernard Lewis and Bassam Tibi, for example, emphasize an augmentation and a diminution, respectively, of the power of states in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and other Islamically oriented regions. Lewis contends that "present-day states in the Islamic world, even those claiming to be progressive and democratic, are—in their domestic affairs, at least—vastly stronger than the so-called tyrannies of the past."⁴⁰ By contrast, Tibi argues that "resurgent Islamic fundamentalism" is serving to undermine state power in the Greater Middle East and thus exacerbating the instability of the region."⁴¹

Huntington's suggestion that in the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States lacked clearly defined threats on the basis of which to prioritize its interests and develop policies to further those interests accordingly is reasonable and his identification of China as the leader of the Sinic civilization generally credible. However, his references to Iran and Turkey as candidates to develop roles as core states of the Islamic civilization are problematic. Iran is a majority Shiite state and would likely have difficulty mobilizing support among the Sunni Muslims who compose the vast majority of the population of the Muslim world. Turkey, on the other hand, is secular in political orientation and has greater potential to serve as a bridge between Islam and the West than as a leader of an emerging Islamic civilization, as evidenced by its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, aspirations to join the European Union and cooperative military relationship with Israel.

Huntington's forecast of an impending clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations is his least credible assertion. Selective cooperation among states in the Western and Islamic worlds is possible if not probable in the present and future contexts. As Esposito argues, "Islamic neo-modernists do not reject the West in its entirety; rather, they choose to be selective in approach. They wish to appropriate the best of science, technology, medicine and intellectual thought but to resist acculturation or the assimilation of Western culture and mores, from secularism and

radical individualism to the breakdown of the family and sexual permissiveness."⁴²

The 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, for example, demonstrated that most Muslim-majority states define their security primarily in traditional realist—as opposed to nascent civilizational—terms and act on that basis. Rather than side with Iraq against the American-led coalition in the Gulf War a diverse array of Middle Eastern states including Egypt, Saudi Arabia aligned themselves with the West, assisting in the expulsion of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. And while Kuwait was the only Arab state to offer overt support for a US-led coalition's liquidation of Saddam's regime in 2003, regional opposition was muted, particularly at the inter-governmental level.

While Huntington acknowledges correctly the need for a deeper American and Western European understanding of non-Western cultures, he misperceives the nature of the threat Islam poses to the West. As Lewis explains, "Islam is a powerful but still an undirected force in politics. As a possible factor in international politics, the present prognosis is not favorable. There have been in many attempts at a pan-Islamic policy, none of which have made much progress."⁴³ Instead, Muslim-Christian friction is more likely to emanate from interactions among Islamic communities and governments in the Western world—Western Europe in particular—than through civilizational relationships. Put simply, Huntington issues a warning as to the potential for instability rooted in a clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations that is actually more likely to develop as a product of rising ethnic and religious Muslim-Christian tensions in the West.

A common Western mistake is to link all Muslims, irrespective of geographic origin and characteristics of religious practice, with transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, which perpetrate acts of terrorism both within and beyond the Greater Middle East. Understandably, these misperceptions have grown even more pronounced since the events of 9/11. Tibi's description of the modern Muslim world as "a great variety of local cultures more or less embedded in a single great civilization," pursuing the "vision of a worldwide order based on Islam," for one, evokes Western images of the development of a threatening rather than cooperative or ambivalent Islamic civilization."⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the credence given to interpretations such as Tibi's in the West broadly and Western Europe specifically is at times buttressed by the adversarial nature of Christian-Muslim relations in the past. The first widespread interactions among individuals from the Islamic and Western Christian worlds unfolded in medieval Europe with the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by the Umayyad Caliphate in the eighth century. Regrettably, the nature of the relationships among adherents of these rival monotheisms has remained generally adversarial in the European geographical context ever since.

Fundamentally, Islamic-Christian tensions are rooted in the universal aspirations that believers of the two faiths have professed from the outset of their respective histories. While Muslims and Christians acknowledge and profess allegiance to the same God, each group adheres to a different set of rules promulgated by a unique prophet—Muhammad in the former case and Jesus Christ in the latter. Each faith

claims its *own* interpretation of the word of the *same* God as absolute. As Lewis explains, "[s]peaking in the same language at least in the figurative sense, using the same methods of argument and reasoning and adhering to identical or similar notions of what religion is about, Islam and Christendom could disagree meaningfully. When Christians and Muslims called each other infidels, each understood what the other meant, and both meant more or less the same thing."⁴⁵

Historically, Muslims and Christians have often lived in empires and states ruled by members of the other faith. Understandably, interpretations of the degree of freedom under those respective religions are often determined by the faith to which a given individual professes allegiance. As Daniel Pipes contends, "Muslims proudly point to their record of tolerance and contrast it with the attacks on their lands by the Crusaders, modern European imperialists and Zionists. Islam's critics emphasize the lack of equal rights for non-Muslims under Muslim rule and the persecution, insecurity and humiliation they must endure."⁴⁶

Muslims and Christians have long sought to gain deeper understandings of their counterparts' worldviews. However, scholars residing in states in the Islamic and Christian worlds and adhering to the cultural and religious precepts predominant within those contexts often approach the study of the outside world from ethnocentric perspectives that cloud their interpretation of concepts alien to one society and indispensable to another. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of Western scholarship on regions and states dominated by Muslims is that it is often generated in response to a rising fear of as opposed to a desire to understand and accept Islam. As Lewis asserts, "[s]ince its earliest recorded history, Europe has been looking at its neighbors in the East, sometimes with fear, sometimes with greed, sometimes with curiosity and sometimes with disquiet. For centuries, indeed for millennia, relations between the two have shown a pattern of conquest and reconquest, attack and counterattack."⁴⁷

Yet, the backdrop for Christian-Muslim encounters have changed markedly over time. In the past, they met as adversaries vying for territory, whether in Europe, Africa, the Middle East or South Asia. Over the past half-century, on the other hand, they have interacted as neighbors in Western European societies as a result of influxes of Muslim migrants from regions such as North Africa and South Asia. It is in domestic contexts such as those of France, Germany and the United Kingdom that challenges of inter-faith understanding must be met, most notably through the development of effective means to facilitate the full integration of Muslim communities in the future.

Review of Relevant Literature on Identity Formation and Integration

An evaluation of the integration of Muslim communities into the societies of France, Germany and the United Kingdom requires a review of the relevant theoretical literature on the related topics of identity formation and domestic integration. In order to distinguish clearly the similarities and differences relating to states and communities

of peoples within any region of the world or state situated therein, it is first necessary to define the term identity. Fundamentally, identity is a means through which human actors of disparate backgrounds decide and subsequently express who they are. The resultant definition a person constructs is based on factors ranging from blood to social class to religion to culture to political or economic ideology. In turn, the significance assigned to each factor is contingent upon the proclivities of individuals, which thus requires that scholars employ flexible approaches when attempting to draw distinctions among nations, states and communities in distinctive regional environments.

Lewis views the phenomenon of identity construction in a bifurcated manner. In historical terms, he emphasizes two relevant clusters of factors in the development of an individual's identity, which are associated with birth and allegiance to leadership, respectively. The first cluster includes blood, place and religious community. Those three elements are then subdivided, with blood detemanded by family, clan, tribe and ethnic nation, place by village, neighborhood, district, province and country, and religious community by a combination of local and immediate bonds. The second cluster features loyalty to a head of state, governor of a province, administrator of a district and headman of a village.⁴⁸ According to Lewis, these related clusters have grown closer over time, in large part through the ongoing globalization process. As he explains, in "modern times, under the influence of the West, a new kind [of identity] is evolving between the two—the freely chosen cohesion and loyalty of voluntary associations, combining to form what is nowadays known as civil society."⁴⁹

Huntington stresses the significance of a return to the past in the formation of identities in the post-Cold War era. Rather than economics, ideology or politics, he contends that individuals now define themselves more in terms of cultural background. Additionally, he emphasizes the importance of differences as opposed to similarities vis-a-vis cultural orientation, noting that individuals "define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups or tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and definitely when we know whom we are against."⁵⁰

Ernest Gellner takes a more general stance, but one that favors Lewis' emphasis on the changeable nature of identity in the modern era rather than Huntington's return to age-old cultural characteristics. At a time when modern technology has increased contact among individuals in disparate regions of the developed and developing worlds, Gellner views the accumulation and interpretation of knowledge—and thus the way in which people view their surroundings—as increasingly transitory processes. As he explains, in "a stable, traditional world, men had identities, linked to their social roles, and confirmed by their overall vision of nature and society. Instability and rapid change both in knowledge and in society has deprived such self-images of their erstwhile feel of reliability. Identities are perhaps more ironic and conditional than they once were."⁵¹

Occupying the proverbial middle ground is Craig Calhoun, who argues that

individual identities are more likely to develop through shared group experiences at the local level than as a result of opposition to outside entities at larger regional, national or civilizational levels.⁵² In short, he stresses that inside and outside influences are useful in creating particular individual and group identities, and, thus, over-reliance on either of these elements is counterproductive noting that

[t]ension between identity—putatively singular, unitary and integral—and identities—plural, crosscutting and divided—is inescapable at both the individual and collective levels.

Individuals face the challenge of knitting together the different phases of their existence, their different social relationships and roles. Groups never wholly supercede the individuals who make them up any more than individuals exist altogether apart from groups and social relations.⁵³

The formation of identities occurs not just at the individual level but also at the state level. As opposed to neo-realists of Waltz's and Mearsheimer's ilk, constructivists such as Alexander Wendt emphasize the relevance of myriad individual, local, regional, national and international factors in driving the behavior of states. Wendt, for example, stresses three critical elements of constructivist theory with respect to the identities of states. First, "states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory." Second, the "key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material." Third, "state identities and interests are in part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics."⁵⁴

Similarly, Ted Hopf articulates the particulars of constructivism in terms of six elements common to the conventional and critical theoretical strands of that approach. First, the "aim to denaturalize the social world by empirically discovering and revealing how the institutions, practices and identities people take as given are actually the product of social construction."⁵⁵ Second, the "belief that intersubjective reality and meanings are critical data for understanding the social world."⁵⁶ Third, the "insistence that all data must be . . . related to and situated within a social environment in which they were gathered in order to fully understand their meaning."⁵⁷ Fourth, the acceptance of the existence of a "nexus between power and knowledge" that takes the form of the "power of practice in its disciplinary, meaning-producing mode."⁵⁸ Fifth, the acceptance of the "restoration of agency to human individuals."⁵⁹ Sixth, an emphasis on the "reflexivity of self and society—mutual constitution of actor and structure."⁶⁰

The establishment of communities of minorities in states often results in clashes of identities. In the French, German and British cases under consideration here, for example, such clashes are rooted in both religious and more overarching cultural differences between the societal majorities and communities of Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds. Integration, which is also described by terms that include assimilation, absorption and incorporation, is one means to bridge these majority-minority identity gaps. A review of several general integrative frameworks is useful as a precursor to in-depth discussions of the integrative strategies of the French, German

and British governments in the ensuing case studies.

Gary Freeman views the integration of minorities as part of a broader migration paradigm. His four-point theoretical construct functions as follows. First, it traces the development of the migration process, emphasizing the source of and impetus behind the original flow of individuals and families from sending to receiving states. Second, it focuses on the characteristics of the migrants. Third, it addresses the policies of a receiving state regarding its regulation of migration and treatment of immigrants. Fourth, it examines cultural, economic, social and political interactions among migrants and the indigenous population of the receiving state.⁶¹

Building on the latter two of Freeman's points, Myron Weiner lists three critical factors that affect relationships between governments and the minority group over which they preside. First, the extent to which a society "is willing to absorb migrants and, therefore, puts in place policies that grant migrants and their children the same legal status as that of the native population." Second, the "willingness of the migrants themselves to accept membership, both in the legal sense and by adopting a new identity." Third, the "structure of the labor market which enables the migrants to find a niche in the economy, one that frees them from excessive dependence upon the country's social services."⁶²

More specifically, Weiner denotes five interactive "categories" that define governmental-immigrant relationships. First, the extent to which immigrants engender social and economic problems for a given receiving state. Second, the ways they threaten the cultural identity of that state. Third, the manners in which they complicate relations between the sending and receiving states by opposing the government of the former. Fourth, the degree to which they threaten the political stability and internal security of the receiving state.⁶³ Given these factors, he concludes that considering "how complex and often divided are the political forces in most countries to choose policies that can promote integration . . . we can appreciate why the integration of immigrants in most countries remains so problematic and, especially in the short term, so conflictual."⁶⁴

The multicultural approach advocated by John Rex provides a contrast to Weiner's model in that it strikes a somewhat more optimistic tone. According to Rex, before grappling with the concept of the integration of minority groups, a government must accept as valid three principles, which will help to increase the tolerance of cultural diversity. First, "there are cultural values which separate groups regard as worth pursuing, and which do not threaten either the culture of other groups or the shared public political culture."⁶⁵ Second, "under conditions of the modern market economy individuals . . . seek the psychological and moral support of a group intermediate between the individual family and the state."⁶⁶ Third, "in order to fight for equality of their members, ethnic groups, like classes before them, rely upon ethnic solidarity as a valuable resource."⁶⁷

While Rex acknowledges the importance of the accommodation of the concerns of minority communities in a multicultural society, he also stresses that the individuals of which those communities are composed must accept the following set of rules vis-à-vis

interaction with the government and societal majority at large. First, recognition of the state's criminal and civil laws so long as those strictures are subject to reform in accordance with particular religious and cultural beliefs over the long term. Second, acceptance of a set of government institutions as binding within a state of residence, whether or not one feels a deep sense of loyalty or emotional attachment to that state. Third, acquisition and then use of the state's native language when interacting in the public sphere. Fourth, recognition that the practice of a particular religious faith is a private matter, albeit one that has the potential to spill over into the public arena regarding issues such as education, and government and military service.⁶⁸

Similarly, Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut approach minority integration through the presentation of a three-part construct focusing on the policies of the government of a receiving state, the forms of social reception experienced by immigrants in that state and the characteristics of the co-ethnic community that develops subsequently in that context. With respect to the first two of the segments of this construct, government policies are classified as receptive, indifferent or hostile, and the forms of social reception the migrants encounter are denoted as prejudiced or nonprejudiced.⁶⁹

Complementary to the aforementioned general theories, Yasemin Soysal and Tariq Ramadan offer models applicable to the Western European region in particular. Soysal's "regimes of incorporation" typology, for example, is subdivided philosophically and rationally. She describes four such regimes: corporatist [Sweden and the Netherlands], individualist [Switzerland and the United Kingdom], state-centralized [France] and mixed statist-corporatist [Germany].⁷⁰ This is a useful framework in that it allows for comparisons and contrasts among policies developed and pursued by the states—France, Germany and the United Kingdom—under consideration here.

Ramadan approaches the issue of integration from an alternate but equally effective perspective, that of Muslims residing in Western Europe. In arguing that Muslims can help to speed up minority integration processes in member states across the European Union, he offers five related observations. First, a "Muslim should see himself as involved in a contract, both moral and social, with the country in which he lives, and should respect that country's laws." Second, while secular in nature, European legislation allows Muslims to practice the fundamental tenets of their religion. Third, interpretations of the Koran that portray Europe as a *dar al harb* or anti-Islamic land of war are outdated and perceived as such by most French, German and British Muslims, who are continually offering ways to view the presence of Islamic communities on the continent in more positive terms. Fourth, Muslims "should see themselves as citizens in the fullest sense of the term and should participate (while at the same time seeking respect for their own values) in the social, organizational, economic and political life of the countries in which they live." Fifth, in "European legislation as a whole, there is nothing to prevent Muslims or any other citizens, from making choices that accord with their religion."⁷¹

Book's Contributions to the Existing Literature

The literature review is best viewed as a general foundation, upon which the forthcoming case studies build. The four theses presented in the introductory chapter of the book both relate to and proceed beyond particular arguments advanced in past contributions to the issue areas delineated as international migration, Islam and the West and identity construction and minority integration. This section explains briefly the similarities and differences between the existing literature and those theses.

With respect to the literature on international migration, four theoretical frameworks are relevant here—the dual labor market, new economics, networks and cumulative causation models. Collectively, these approaches provide a hybrid construct within which to examine the causative factors for the initial development and eventual entrenchment of Muslim communities in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The study draws on segments of each of the four models in order to explain these processes. The first accounts for the initial flow of Muslim migrants to Western Europe through the guest worker programs of the 1950s and 1960s. The latter three explain the entrenchment of Muslim communities via family reunification programs in the context of the establishment of migrant networks over the long term. Ultimately, the book's assertions complement the existing literature by linking the approaches germane both to the regional and domestic environments (Western Europe generally and France, Germany and the United Kingdom specifically) and time periods (the 1980s-2000s primarily and 1950s-1970s secondarily) under consideration.

The literature on Islam and the West is subdivided into strains that emphasize confrontation, cooperation and ambivalence, respectively, vis-a-vis relationships among Muslims and Christians, whether at the individual, local, state or international levels. Philosophically, the book fits in the middle ground between the cooperative and ambivalent approaches. It stresses the need to foster inter-faith cooperation in order to preclude inter-state conflict at the international level and ensure domestic stability in the Western European regional and French, German and British national contexts. However, it also acknowledges the changing nature of the challenges governments and individuals face in finding the common ground necessary to serve as a foundation for Christian-Muslim reconciliation.

Most notably, the study puts a unique spin on Huntington's clash of civilizations paradigm. It stresses that while Huntington is correct in noting the increasing potential for conflict between members of the Islamic and Christian faiths, that threat is greater with respect to interactions among adherents of these religions who reside in Western Europe than is the case regarding state- or civilizational-level relationships internationally. It is thus prudent to give primacy to the development of policies to more fully integrate communities of Muslims within Western societies in general and those in France, Germany and the United Kingdom to prevent increases in domestic instability across Western Europe this century.

Similarly, the arguments advanced here focus on the individual and domestic levels as opposed to the international systemic context. The work of scholars such as

Freeman, Rex and Ramadan is instructive in this respect for two reasons. First, collectively, they point to the need for the consideration of a variety of factors—whether class, cultural, economic, ethnic, linguistic, political or religious in orientation—in order to explain the process of identity construction in a particular case. Second, as a result, they also emphasize the need to bridge the gaps between groups in these issue areas to facilitate the equitable integration of a minority community in a given society. The case studies presented here contribute to these approaches by stressing the importance of first identifying and developing models to redress differences between minorities and majorities at the local level before addressing those issues at the broader regional, national and international levels.

Ultimately, the book enhances present interpretations of the related issues of international migration and Islam in the West by applying its latter two theses to each of the case studies. First, the construction of an effective framework to fully integrate Muslim minorities in Western European societies over the long term necessarily entails interactive policy formulation, coordination and implementation at the local, regional, national and supranational levels. However, because of the prevalence of Islamic communities in particular localities and the resultant higher degree of interaction among Muslims and governmental authorities in those contexts as opposed to the limited dispersion of Muslims regionally and nationally in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, a local-level approach is more desirable in the short term. Second, once the full integration of Muslim minorities—or at least positive progress toward the realization of that objective—occurs in particular localities, wider-ranging regional, national and supranational level projects are likely to prove more feasible in light of insights drawn from the local level.

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