

The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Being-in-the-World

A Confrontation between
St. Thomas Aquinas and Martin Heidegger

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Preface

Chesterton once reminded us that there exist basically three types of Western man.¹ First there is Roman Man, the citizen of that great cosmopolitan realm of reason and order, the man who makes straight roads and clear laws, and for whom good sense is good enough. Then there is, according to Chesterton, the Man in the Forest, who is harder to speak of. He walks behind us on every forest path and wakes within us when the wind wakes at night. He is the man of origins, the man in the forest. Heidegger is such a man and his thinking has the vastness, the depth and the seductiveness of a dark wood. And then there is Christian Man, who unites the numinous obscurities natural to origins with the simple clarities of public things, and who incarnates a mystery.

My book is an analysis of the irreconcilable confrontation between Heideggerian and classical notions of intentional being-in-the-world, with St. Thomas Aquinas as the supreme representative of the classical tradition. Consequently, some remarks on format and methodology are in order to enable the reader to orient himself. First, this analysis is not intended to be a historical glossing of notions of being-in-the-world, but rather a theoretical research into its essential nature, and is intended methodically to address the factors and essential confrontations that played their necessary roles in the metaphysical enunciation of Being at the historical origin of philosophy.

Being-in-the-world affirms that "*I am the other as other*" because "*the soul is in a way all things*," because "*the same is for thinking as for Being*." But the question remains as to the way in which the soul is all things and the way in which thinking and Being are the same without negating either the extra-mental reality or otherness of the world or man's radical dependency on becoming it for all his knowledge.

For St. Thomas Aquinas and for Heidegger intentional being-in-the-world roots the progressive revelation of Being to consciousness in an asking into the Being of truth (what we call truth and why) as well as into the truth of Being (how or why it is that something is true or is truly); it is at its

core profoundly *aletheiological*. But how truth is a relation; how, one must ontologically ask, into the source and nature of that relation irreconcilably separates the thought of St. Thomas from Heidegger. In a word, how or why such a relation insists itself between man (“ex-sistence”) and Being (“sub-sistence”) is the central question: the question of truth’s in-sistence.

The inquiry into this essential confrontation will be delimited by the need to grasp the genuine nature of truth as it is consistently identified in the act of intentional being-in-the-world. The analysis will be anchored by what I understand to be the four central components of classical being-in-the-world. The *aletheiological* orientation of classical being-in-the-world reveals itself through a fourfold intentional presuppositional structure; this structure is found in every genuine asking into the question of the meaning of Being.

This fourfold comprises (1) finitude; (2) the intentional presence (i.e., the knowing subject or privileged being, who participates in the meaning and the *formation* of Being; (3) causality; and (4) the *ananke stenai*, the necessary stop in the order of explanation that fully ratifies our knowledge of existence as genuine. The constitutive elements of the fourfold nature of the intentional presupposition are hermeneutically designated as mutual implications and are therefore the demonstrable components of man’s nondemonstrable presuppositional being-in-the-world as a knower.

The irreconcilable difference between a metaphysical and a phenomenological understanding of intentionality rests in Heidegger’s isolation and rejection of two critical constitutive elements, namely causality and the *ananke stenai*. For him, these are founded upon an illegitimate reductio of the meaning-phenomena into the merely present-at-hand and are then mistaken as the primordial mode of understanding Being-as-such.

To articulate the metaphysical-intentional enterprise, its *aletheiological* structure must be shown to be the genuine thinking of Being. It is not a ladder of reduced beings relegated to partial effects in terms of a higher Being, but the framework of the intentional and ineluctable ground—*the same is for thinking as for Being*—in which the knower becomes the known, again and again, in ever intensifying degrees of *likeness*. To demonstrate this point it is essential to return to the beginning through a direct examination, a close reading of the essential texts of three thinkers: Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. The intent of this interpretive methodology is to remain close to the primary texts in an effort to show the essential interdependency of each of the elements of the fourfold.

As a historico-theoretical tracing of the fourfold, the first chapter is dedicated to an intensive historical tracing of the formation of the fourfold.

Poem of Parmenides, Plato's *Parmenides* and Aristotle's *De Anima* will help us to uncover the essential confrontations and conceptual difficulties that accompany these primordial askings into the meaning of Being. These texts are particularly important for each contributes essentially to announcing the primary components of classical intentionality at its very origin, even if only implicitly; indeed even where the unsaid is more important than what is said.

1. The *Poem of Parmenides* articulates man's intentional nature as the primary fact of existence. Intentionality is not itself knowledge precisely because it is the ground of all knowledge. Therefore it first announces itself in a manner that befits this distinction, i.e., in the hieratically compact Parmenidean pre-cognitive presupposition: the same is for thinking as for Being. This announcement gives birth to the chasmic divide between Heideggerian and metaphysical notions of the meaning of truth and cannot, therefore, be passed over.
2. Once that ontological proclamation is made, it is thereafter necessary to unpack epistemologically this compact intentional presupposition. Plato's dialogue *Parmenides* is the pivotal but overlooked dialogue for the delineation of the problematic of the intentional presupposition. The problematic of the dialogue is to take the totality of Parmenides' compactly announced epistemology—the *same is for thinking as for Being*—and expand it conceptually without reducing it to a founded doctrine that forsakes the world and its intelligibility. The dialogue fails repeatedly to accomplish this task, each argument entering frustrating infinite regressions, the antitheses of the *ananke stenai*. But by doing so, the dialogue has grasped the core of metaphysical intentionality, and the kind of truth that corresponds to it.
3. While Plato's *Parmenides* exposes the *ananke stenai* as the necessary precondition of truth *qua* knowledge, framing and completing the intentional experience of the ultimate Other as other, Aristotle's *De Anima* goes a long way in epistemologically laying bare its necessary structure. The *De Anima* is the concise account of the insights, failures and accomplishments of the earlier thinkers leading to the hallmark of classical intentionality: *the soul is in a way all things*.

The second chapter is an organic explanation of the fully realized *fourfold structure* in its supreme representative, St. Thomas Aquinas. The metaphysics that form the total structure of the fourfold will be laid bare; the elucidation of its onto-theo-logical structure will ultimately divide Heidegger from St. Thomas Aquinas.

Anchored in Heidegger's commentary on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the third chapter examines the irreconcilable difference between a causal and a phenomenological understanding of intentional being-in-the-world as resting on Heidegger's isolation and rejection of the latter two constitutive elements, causality and the *ananke stenai*. For Heidegger, these latter two elements inject an illicit otherworldliness (i.e., the entrance of the deity into philosophy) that effectively reduces *aletheia* to *veritas*, to a causality of correctness, rectitude and exactness that have come to dominate not only the perception but the very appearances of Being. This chapter will trace the fourfold as it enters its own recoil in modernity, altering decisively the meaning of each constituent. For example, in the classical vision, finitude is the vehicle of transcendence, while in modernity it becomes the stumbling block to knowledge. We will show how Heidegger attempts to utilize these *fourfold reversals* in a more primordially nonsystematic manner. But his effort to rid ontology of the deity and thereby to ground the phenomenological lived-world leaves him in a deontological impasse as the most unique idealist in the history of thought.

The final chapter is devoted to bringing into the clearing the *fourfold intensities*. The essential confrontation between Heidegger and St. Thomas is intended neither to merge the two in some facile reconciliation, nor to make of Heidegger a straw man with which to beat modernity in favor of a thirteenth-century theology. This confrontation will uncover the fourfold as it is embedded in the very core of Being, at the original source of the beginning *qua* end of the asking into the meaning of Being. Heidegger himself remarked in his own work on Nietzsche: "Confrontation is genuine criticism. It is the supreme way, the only way, to a true estimation of a thinker. In confrontation we undertake to reflect on his thinking and to trace it in its effective force . . . in order that through the confrontation we ourselves may become free for the supreme exertion of thinking."² The intensities will bring forth, as best possible, the *what-it-is* of the ground at which we necessarily come to a stop in the order of explanation and in the order of Being. At this point the "uncanny" or the un-familiar will emerge as the divine. The questions of the *aeviterna*-historical structure of man, of his *deiformitas*, of his freedom and of the *radical possibility of Christian Philosophy* as the context in which he asks into the meaning of Being will be seen as umbilically linked to the fourfold.

Chapter 1

The Fourfold Historical Origin of Metaphysics

But that is not what you were asked, Theaetetus. You were not asked to say what one may have knowledge of, or how many branches of knowledge there are. It was not with any idea of counting these up that the question was asked; we wanted to know what knowledge itself is or am I talking nonsense.

Plato, Theaetetus, 146e

* * *

Tracing I: How the Deity Entered Philosophy

Parmenides' philosophy is a speculation on the Eon, on Being. The symbol "Being" appears for the first time; and without exaggeration it can be said that with Parmenides the history of philosophy proper, as the exploration of the constitution of Being, begins . . . Parmenides has no predecessors, and his concept of Being has no prehistory. The historical process which results in the concept of Being does not itself move on the level of philosophical speculation; it rather is the process of the soul in which Being as absolute transcendence comes ultimately into experiential grasp.¹

The Return to the Origin

The mares that carry me, as far as desire might reach, were taking me as far as my heart desired, when they brought and placed me upon the much-speaking route of the goddess.

Poem of Parmenides, 1 1–2

We are already confronted with the disposition of the specifically human self-transcendent intentional presence. Characteristically erotic, man is carried *as far as desire might reach* into the presence of the goddess. Eros is a natural metaphor for the intentional structure of consciousness in its other-directedness. It is the privation that betokens the human need for understanding, anticipating Aristotle's famous "all men by nature desire to know."² This erotic tension, while presupposing division, is released into union, just as the permanence of Being mediates generation and destruction at the origin of both processes, or as the way the now balances the difference between past and future by underlying time, and as the threshold of the Gates of Justice mediates the split between night and day by underlying both ways.³ Several interpretive points must be noted regarding the nature of this self-transcendent human presence erotically striving toward that which underlies, mediates and unifies:

1. The route of the goddess is *much-speaking*. Language: this is perhaps an anticipation of the nature of Being to be the same as thinking: ". . . that the dictum of the thinker speaks by bringing into language the word of this goddess."⁴ Man as oracle of Being, the possibility of which requires an affinity, and even more than that, between man and Being.
2. The goddess *is truth*. Truth is not a mere characteristic or accidental property of the goddess, like a man who is indifferently either tall or short. Truth is the essential ontological condition of the Being of the goddess. In other words, goddess as Truth and thus as goddess, i.e., as divine. As Heidegger remarks, not the goddess of truth but the goddess as truth.⁵
3. Man is *brought, placed upon* this much-speaking route of the thinking-*qua*-Being of the goddess who *is* Truth. Man as knower is already the known. By entering onto the route of the goddess has he not become what the goddess is and knows? Again, the goddess is Truth and when man becomes the known he becomes the true. "Thus, the inherent compatibility of Thought and Being is built into the way things are; i.e., thinking is essential to being human . . . we choose to participate Being by becoming one with the way things really are."⁶
4. Can we simply disregard the "personification" of truth as the goddess as a mere remnant of a mythological vision; or does the goddess reveal a fundamental relational presence, the being-with and being-toward-the-world among the activities of human knowing, and thus a sharp contrast to the ideational abstractness that has infiltrated the notion of truth as the supposed condition of universality? Heidegger was one of the first to notice that this device of "hypostatizing" universal concepts as divinities

is not merely in order to give more fullness and color to otherwise “abstract” thoughts.⁷ The goddess is, as truth, the paradigmatic exemplar of the Other.⁸

If intentionality is this relational being-with and being-toward-the-world, what possible constituents of the true allow for a real other to be really other, i.e., existentially distinct from man? In a word, if relational being-with and being-toward-the-world demands that the real (not abstract) other appear in the face of the “I,” then hasn’t man been already presented with a definite stop in the order of his intentional being when he comes face to face with this existential otherness, face to face with the object of his *need* or desire to understand? Is this stop only an origin or one that also conditions the knowledge of existence only in the framework of an end, the need to come to a stop as *arché* and *telos* of man’s existential presence?

These four problematics compactly announce the profoundly “*aletheiological*” orientation of being-in-the-world. It is “a ‘thoughtful’ experience of things, a ‘meditative’ thinking in which we let things emerge and rise up in their own presence”⁹ in order to be brought to and placed upon the much-speaking route; it is the conversion of the knower to the known, by becoming the known. Parmenides’ truth is essentially intentional and his intentionality is profoundly *aletheiological*. What does this mean within the context of our discussion?

Aletheia as the Critical Indicator of Man’s End

Let us suppose that when the philosopher is placed on the much-speaking route, this placement signals a kind of stop which enables a start, an end to the action that had brought the narrator to the route, but which functions as the beginning of wisdom. The end is his entrance into the knowable. The intentional act reaches its culmination or *telos* in the it-Is: this is no empty presupposition, but the presupposition with which I, as a knower, must begin. Intentionality is directed to the what only in consequence of the recognition of the it-Is of presence.¹⁰ But what is the proper condition and fulfillment of this direction?

Daughters of the Sun were hastening to escort me, after leaving the House of Night for the Light, having thrown back their veils from their heads. There stands the gateway of the paths of Night and Day . . . (fr. 1 10–18)

This passage is our first hermeneutic clue as to whether *aletheia* for Parmenides has as its *telos* a metaphysical or phenomenological end. The Daughters of the Sun who dwell in the House of Night move toward the light by throwing back the veils from their heads and escorting the philosopher out of the night and into the light. Is their ascent into the light an anticipation of Plato's allegory of the cave and of the metaphysical ladder of Being that man must ascend to be a knower, "the cathartic way that will lead man from the Night of the mortals (the submarine existence of Plato) to the Light of eternal truth?"¹¹ The paths of Night and Day suggest that Truth is found in the mutual interpenetration of the dark and light, the former the concealed and the latter the unconcealed. The Daughters of the Sun, the offspring of Truth, do not reside in the light alone for they dwell in the dark and must remove their veils in order to return to the light. The veils, as Gadamer notes, are "a symbol of the light of truth into which they are now entering."¹² They throw back the veils but they are not cast off completely. The veils are still attached, merely pulled aside for the moment of clarity: the time of unconcealment. The fact that the veils are only partially removed indicates they are to be used again. Does this characterize metaphysical truth or a phenomenological sense of the mutual interpenetration of the concealed and unconcealed? In a word, doesn't this conversion of the dark into the light, that "alludes to a concealedness in every unconcealedness"¹³ support a phenomenological sense of truth, wherein truth is the endless Event (*ereignis*) of bringing Being out of its concealedness only to let it retreat again? But then again, mustn't the prisoner return to the cave?

There is, though, something *between* Night and Day, the concealed and unconcealed, that is often overlooked but gives us another clue to the kind of end or *telos* this Truth-Goddess embodies:

Appeasing her with gentle words, the maidens cunningly persuaded her to push back the bolted bar for them swiftly from the gates; and these, opening wide, made a yawning chasm in the door frame . . . (fr. 1 15–18)

There is a *yawning chasm* when the gates between night and day have been opened. Let us focus on the two words, *yawning* (*achanês*) and *chasm* (*anap-tamenai*). The latter perhaps signifies an absence, a nothingness between Night and Day. Does this mean that there is nothing-of-importance between Night and Day or does nothingness characterize what Parmenides understands to be a fundamental Other-at-work between the concealed and unconcealed? Doesn't this Other that cannot be characterized seem to indicate that there is something underlying and guaranteeing the order

of explanation? The chasm describes this stop in the order of being that cannot be articulated or explained like Night and Day but is their ground or unity. If this is not the Heideggerian unity, i.e., the ontological difference, an equiprimordiality among beings, but one reflecting hierarchical degrees of being, then is it the onto-theo-logical difference, serving to elevate the duality between Night and Day, the unconcealed and concealed, into its fundamental and necessary unity? If this chasm more closely adheres to the metaphysical *ananke stenai*, then wouldn't its yawning/gaping perhaps best describe the strangeness or other-worldliness of this radical Other-at-work between Night and Day? The yawning of the gate creates a hollow sound that augurs the uncanny into which man has entered; he has reached his limit as a knower, the end in the order of explanation, the point at which man reaches the door to the divine. The gates yawn because of the rarity of such an experience to be recognized for what it is: the ground of Otherness for which all things are appropriated because the beginning is the end. "The message might be that Parmenides' shamanic voyage is one that only few, if any, mortals are allowed to share in this life. Perhaps the gates of justice are so immense that they cannot but produce such an extraordinary sound. The message might be that the Gates are not man-made, that the journey itself is supernatural."¹⁴ "Parmenides' 'roadway' (*hodos*) is nowhere to be found on this earth; it is rather the way of salvation."¹⁵ Parmenides further expresses the rarity of this intentional experience that lies far indeed from the beaten path of ordinary men:

Welcome! For it is no bad fate that has sent you forth to travel upon this route (for it lies far indeed from the beaten path of ordinary men), but right and justice. And it is right that you should learn all things, both the steadfast [immovable] heart of well-rounded truth and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true trust. But nevertheless you shall learn these as well, how the things deemed to be ought to have been deemed to be fully, pervading all things completely. (fr. 1 26–32)

An Epistemological Digression/Discursus

In order to unpack the Parmenidean *arché/telos* expressed in the goddess' telling remark "it is all one to me where I am to begin; for I shall return there again," (fr. 5) we must first examine the meaning of *aletheia* in the poem. If man becomes the true or known in the form of the knower, what

is this Truth? Heidegger famously recognizes the a-privative in the Greek *a-letheia* and translates truth as unconcealedness over and against the Latin *veritas*.

We are pursuing the four directives provided by the name *a-letheia* as translated “unconcealedness”. In this way we hope to experience something of the primordial essence of Greek thought. First, un-concealedness refers to concealment. Concealment hence permeates the primordial essence of truth. Secondly, un-concealedness indicates that truth is wrenched from concealment and is in conflict with it. The primordial essence of truth is conflictual. What “conflict” means here remains a question. Thirdly, un-concealedness, in accordance with the just mentioned characterizations, refers to a realm of “oppositions” in which “truth” stands. Since it is on the basis of the “oppositional” essence of unconcealedness that its conflictual essence first becomes visible, we have to consider more closely the question of the “opposition” in which truth stands. Western thinking accounts untruth the sole opposite to truth. “Untruth” is identified with “falsity” which, understood as incorrectness, forms the evident and obstrusive counterpart to “correctness.” The opposition holding sway at the beginning is known to us under the names *a-letheia kai pseudos*, *veritas et falsitas*, truth and falsity. We interpret the latter opposition as correctness and incorrectness; but truth as “correctness” is not of the same essence as truth in the sense of “unconcealedness”. The opposition of correctness and incorrectness, validity and invalidity, may very well exhaust the oppositional essence of truth for later thinking and above all for modern thinking. But that decides nothing at all concerning the possible oppositions to “unconcealedness” thought by the Greeks. We must therefore ask how the primordial thinking of the Greeks sees the opposition to “unconcealedness”.¹⁶

Verum, ver-, meant originally enclosing, covering. The latin *verum* belongs to the same realm of meaning as the Greek *a-letheia*, the uncovered—precisely by signifying the exact opposite of *a-letheia*: the closed off. The Roman *verum*, strictly speaking, should be taken as equivalent to the Greek *pseudos*, if the latter is indeed the counter-word to *a-letheia*. But the Roman *verum* not only does not coincide with *pseudos*, it is precisely the opposite of *pseudos* as understood in latin, i.e., *falsum*.¹⁷

Heidegger understands the latinization of “truth” not only to be fundamentally incompatible with the Greek *aletheia* but that its dominance on

Western thought has resulted in a systematic restriction/dilution of being-at-hand to mere present-at-hand, ultimately undermining man's relatedness in and to the world. For Heidegger *aletheia* becomes *veritas* when *metron* becomes *meson* and *meson* becomes *mensura* and man becomes *mens*, and the entire apparatus of causality, correctness, rectitude and exactness come to dominate not only the perception but the very appearances of Being.¹⁸ His potent etymological defense of this position is, if correct, a complete overthrowing of the deeply embedded notion that the comportment of the ontologic attitude is not only to arrive at the onto-theo-logic but to recognize it as the fulcrum and the confirmation of man's and Being's nature. And so before returning to the poem, we need to set the issue compactly but clearly:

1. Has truth as *verum* relegated truth as *aletheia* to a staid and static realm of factual and abstract assertion with no real bearing on actual existence, and is this perhaps the predecessor to the clear and distinct ideas of the idealist by way of the Platonic "correct vision" of the allegory?
2. Has metaphysics denied the essential role of the Parmenidean concealedness to bring forth the unconcealed (*a-letheia*) i.e., "*pseudos* involves a covering that simultaneously unveils,"¹⁹ when it polemicized and destroyed the relationship between truth and pseudo, letting the former become mere correctness and the latter mere incorrectness?
3. And if indeed metaphysics has opposed truth to falsity in this way, has it thereby rendered all beings ordered by the supposed highest Being to have the Good, the Beautiful and the True only in the form of participated effects and not as the primary and inseparable ontological characteristics that fully ratify and authenticate man's ontic commerce with and to the world? And don't these effects signal the systematic lessening of being-at-hand to mere presence-at-hand, converting the phenomenological lived-world into a founded causality?
4. In what way can *pseudos* (concealed) be the necessary conflictual contrast to *a-letheia* (unconcealed), and still maintain its existential and irreducible distinction from it and not collapse into an idealistic system similar to either Hegel's or Schelling's? The very moral *entelechy* of human knowledge and its unity in Being depends on the legitimacy and nature of such a distinction.

For Heidegger, the goddess carries the concealed-unconcealed in a kind of reciprocity where there is no priority or hierarchy among truths and, as such, there can be no sense of truth in the form of *veritas* to stand

against and in real distinction to the false. “The realm of the ‘concealed-unconcealed’ is, if we do not deceive ourselves, more immediately familiar and accessible than what is expressed in the banal titles *veritas* and ‘truth’. Strictly speaking, the word ‘truth’ does not give us anything to think and still less anything to represent ‘intuitively’.”²⁰

But can there be the intentional ground without the causal *ananke stenai* reached by the labor-intensive discrimination between true and false if the phenomenon is endless and endlessly shifting between the concealed and the unconcealed? Doesn’t this approach a fundamental anti-theological groundlessness? If for Parmenides the goddess is not only unnamed, but because his understanding of Is does not even have a grammatical subject, aren’t these factors hinting at a resolute unity of Night and Day in a higher theological Otherness?²¹

Let us suppose the goddess actually carried her two aspects *a-letheia kai pseudos*, the unconcealed and the concealed, equiprimordially. Wouldn’t the unity of the two be a self-transcendence which could not lead to a greater Other beyond the phenomena or beyond the order of explanation and thereby not terminate in a genuinely mutual transcendence? The groundless appropriation of all things subsumes man into the other when he finds himself at an origin which is abysmal, which absorbs but does not contrast. Parenthetically, wouldn’t then the distinction between good and evil be lost and its repercussions far reaching: the loss of the Christian God, the absence of the *ananke stenai* and causality and the problem of the moral constitution of man? But then Heidegger never claimed to have an ethical enterprise and the very loss of the Christian God and its self-same *ananke stenai* would rid philosophy for him of its alien elements.²²

The charge that metaphysics forgets the nature of the concealed to bring forth the unconcealed and that it separates them into two opposed categories of mere correctness and incorrectness is not without merit. But are these charges fundamentally acceptable?²³

Veritas as the “*Aletheia*” that Corresponds to Finitude

The concealed and unconcealed have not been displaced by metaphysics but elevated into their proper and unitary form. *Veritas* as enclosure maintains their unity and their distinction, but the need for truth as *veritas* has not yet been explicated. To identify the need for *veritas*, let us first examine in greater detail the kind of unity of which the goddess speaks.

For if it came-to-be, it is not, nor [is it] if at some time it is going to be. Thus, coming-to-be is extinguished, and perishing is not to be heard of. Nor is it divisible, since it all alike is; nor is it somewhat more here, which would keep it from holding together, nor is it somewhat less, but it is all full of what-is. Therefore it is all continuous; for what-is draws near to what-is. Moreover, changeless in the limits of great bonds it is unbeginning and unceasing, since coming-to-be and perishing have been exiled and true trust have thrust them out. (fr. 8 20–28)

From this fragment, Parmenides understood that the recognition of the unbeginning and unchanging Is/Being arises from within the limits of great bonds. How can we reconcile the hegemonic infinite nature of Being with the clear and definite symbols of finitude as perfection?²⁴ Several positions have arisen to defend this paradox against its possible contradiction, yet they fail to grasp its essential reasoning. On the one hand they argue for this reconciliation from the vantage point of Parmenides' many circle-metaphors or on the other hand from the idea that there is really no limit at all, but only an analogy designed to "account for balance, truth and infinite cosmic expanse in all directions."²⁵ The core of this paradox is the finite human presence in confrontation with its otherness. It is precisely his being a finite effect that enables and requires man to recognize that the terminus and origin of all his acts depend upon his existential involvement with the what-is.²⁶ We can understand what Heidegger means by calling man the shepherd of Being²⁷: once man enters into the framework of the concealed and unconcealed, the structure of truth is realized. This realization is the conversion of the unconcealed into something other; the elevation of the concealed and unconcealed into the specifically human enclosure of *veritas*.²⁸

The elevation of the concealed and unconcealed into a kind of enclosure (*veritas*) does occur in the poem with the arrival of the specifically human self-transcendent intentional presence:

Remaining the same and in the same, it lies by itself and remains thus firmly in place; for strong Necessity holds it fast in the bonds of a limit, which encloses it. (fr. 8 29–31)

There are two fundamental and interrelated points in defense of the metaphysical resolution of *a-letheia* into *veritas*. The first lays the ground for the *ananke stenai*, revealing man not only to be a participant in the meaning

of Being but also in its formation. From there, this participation reflects the fullness of the metaphysical intentional act to be not only an elevation of *a-letheia* into *veritas* but an elevation that signals a kind of need. In a word, the *aletheiological* character of the *Poem of Parmenides* in its goal or *telos* most acutely reflects the metaphysical need for an Other in divine terms to satisfy and secure man as a knower in the world.

Strong Necessity conveys the finite intentional presence directed toward the what-is. If finitude is man's motive for and vehicle of self-transcendence, his way of and to Being is bound by a kind of necessity (*Ananke*) to adhere to the truth of that way. "Because man must be able to hold it fast, Being must not be unbound, but held by powerful *Ananke*"²⁹ and, by doing so, he has entered the ground of knowledge, the *ananke stenai*. The *ananke stenai* is man's *noetic* beginning and end and that which he has always and necessarily held fast; it is both the necessary precondition for his knowledge and the terminus (*stenai*) of his acts that gives him this knowledge. The intentional interplay between man and Other is the meeting ground of the *ananke* and the *stenai*. Call the former necessity, finite, mortal, and the latter Other, End, Divine: their union is found in the *ananke stenai*: the finite intentional presence meeting and recognizing as a necessity of thought the most radical Other. The *ananke stenai* "comes to be known," so to speak, by participation: man is the articulator of and as such assists in the formation of the meaning of Being. The Other is the meaning and is the ground for such a formation; because this Is cannot be predicated like its effects, it is not knowledge but the origin, condition and terminus of all knowledge. "This immortal being is determined as to its nature by the necessity of the Logos; and the same necessity determines its cognitive articulation."³⁰ Man becomes the what-is, not in its limitlessness but in the conceptual form of the knower who is marked by the finite bonds of a limit. As man holds fast in the bonds of limit to the what-is, i.e., the unconcealed, he encloses it. Because the known enters under the form of the knower, once unconcealedness as the known enters the knower it takes on the characteristic of the enclosedness or *veritas* of judgment. Why it takes on the form of *veritas* for Parmenides is not yet completely illuminated, except for that fact that there is a need for the unconcealed to be *veritas* when in the judgmental act of the knower.

The Formation of the "Same Is for Thinking as for Being"

This need that elevates *aletheia* into *veritas* and implies a kind of causal directedness, and where the unconcealed and concealed in man are not an endless

Event or conversion into each other but elevated into a teleological movement toward a definite Other in which all things including man co-inhere; this need presents an intentionality that is necessarily onto-theo-logically directed. The Truth that unites as “same” thinking-and-Being expresses the specifically metaphysical goal of self-transcendence.

In the poem the goddess assures the philosopher that she will reveal to him the “steadfast” heart of “well-rounded” Truth. As Voegelin points out “the attributes of Truth which appear in this assurance are the same (atremes, eukylos) that appear later as predicates of Being. The result of the speculation, thus, is not only a truth about being; it is the Truth of Being voiced through the ‘knowing man’ . . . the philosopher reproduces Being itself.”³¹ By becoming the Other, the philosopher gains access into the necessary prerequisite of Night and Day, the concealed and unconcealed, that which pervades all things completely. This notion of pervading all things completely describes pre-thematically the metaphysical hegemony of Being and the prerequisite of intentionality. Intentionality is not knowledge but the presuppositional ground of all knowledge, requiring but transcending all things, because Being is in all things. “The same is for thinking as for being” is the epistemological articulation of that presuppositional prerequisite and the philosopher learns of that which pervades all things completely by holding fast to what is.

See how beings which are absent are, all the same, firmly present to mind; for [mind] will not cut off what-is from holding fast to what-is. (fr. 4)

He is able to know because he is able to hold on, and he is able to hold on because the same is for thinking as for Being. The mind will not separate from its *telos*—to *eon*—if it holds fast to it. Does this express a contemplative gaze that lets the truth of Being come to light in a phenomenological or in a metaphysical sense? For the former, the act of metaphysical judgment artificially reorders beings, not allowing Being to be. But for the latter, the contemplative gaze is characterized by a necessary abstraction that allows man to see firmly as present what-is even in its absence. To *eon*, as Gadamer says, “implies that it has nothing to do with the diversity of experiences, the listing of them, but rather that without the unity of being all of this no longer exists. This certainly means to *eon* cannot be separate from *tou eontas*; what Is possesses is cohesion (continuity) and unity. Obviously the universe [is meant] as universe in its unity, and this universe in its unity means at the same time the concept of being. To put it more precisely, it is not yet the concept but it is a full abstraction of the diversity of things. The singular is like an indicator of the beginning of the conceptual-speculative reflection.”³²

On this account it is not right for what-is to be incomplete; for it is not lacking; but if it were, it would lack everything. And the same is there for thinking and is that for the sake of which thought is; for not without what-is, to which it stands committed, will you find thinking; for nothing else is or will be besides what-is, since Fate has bound it to be whole and changeless. It is in reference to it that all names have been spoken. (fr. 8 23–40)

The fourfold intentional presupposition is aboundingly present in this passage.

1. Intentional presence in that man stands committed in his thinking and his being to the that of what-is.
2. Finitude in his emergence as the privileged being from the Fate that has bound Being to be whole and changeless.
3. Causality in that his finite intentional becoming is the necessary response and contrast to this origin *qua* end, and his causal tracking (naming) of Being.
4. *Ananke stenai* because man is capable of the above cited three only because the ground of what-is, is the necessary reference point, i.e., the *ananke stenai* in which all names have and can be spoken. These names are not “affixed by man . . . but by Necessity,” outside time in the “super-sensible where the tension between opposite forces in nature is arrested in contemplative oneness with nature.”³³

The Parmenidean Origin *qua* End as the *Ananke Stenai*

The foundation reached through the *ananke stenai* is that which gives all names but is itself beyond all names because it is the limit of explanation. In the poem the *ananke stenai* is personified in the unnamed goddess and it is in reference to the goddess *qua* stop that all is known. She represents the necessary stop in the order of explanation, the self-same stop in the order of Being that lets being be and the meaning of Being to be spoken. And we know this —“because the same is for thinking as for Being.”

If everything is in reference to this stop/start-beginning/end, this referential standpoint signifies: (1) everything else to be “causal” effects of that end in some fundamental sense; (2) Parmenides, like Aristotle and St. Thomas, understood that there cannot be an infinite regress in the order of explanation and therefore in the order of Being; that there must

be something that exists and is not dependent on its effects; thus, whose existence is separate from the existence of the world, that is, whose existence can be separated from the world.

The *ananke stenai* marks the irreconcilability between Heidegger's and St. Thomas' intentionality. Even if the goddess' understanding of Truth in its ground and application is pre-thematically metaphysical and as such the Greek/Parmenidean unconcealedness can be reconciled with the Latin *veritas*, we have not resolved whether metaphysics has relinquished and forgotten the trans-ontic non-entitative fullness of Being. Does metaphysical knowledge have none of the initial fullness, but only additions or semblances of a higher founded Being? Parmenides' hesitation to use the subject *Eon* with *Is*, or to speak in terms of an object when Being is no such thing echoes Heidegger's *Sein* and St. Thomas' *Esse* when they assert the primacy of existence over essence to safeguard the ontological, unifying, constitutive role for the act of being—actual existence—to play in our formation of knowledge. But whereas Heidegger sees only the loss of Being when it is distributed as causal effects from beginning to end, Parmenides in fact understands this to be the necessary precondition of knowledge. Unlike Heidegger, Parmenides saw compactly what St. Thomas sought to elaborate: that the privilege and possibility to assist in the formation of Being is the core of self-transcendence, and that this privilege is made possible by causal insight:

The progress on the way towards the Light culminates in an experience of a supreme reality that can only be expressed in the exclamatory *Is!* . . . As far as predicates of a transcendental subject are concerned, the matter has been cleared up on principle by the Thomistic *analogia entis*.³⁴

A discursus on the specifically Thomistic understanding of the nature of predication will later serve to make explicit what Parmenides understood ontologically only implicitly: beings, in their essence and existence, are effects ordered by a higher Being but these predicates are not additions to Being, rather they are each in themselves an essential visage of Being.

Intentionality and Its Onto-Theo-Logic Directedness in the *Poem of Parmenides*

The genius of Parmenides was to recognize that the unity of the limitless Being when in the form/identity of the knower/participant is this stop

formed by man's limit or finitude. This relativity or relatedness of truth in knowledge is in point of fact that which insures the metaphysical independence of each term of the relation (*noesis-noema*), thus eschewing *ab origine* the possibility of any idealistic understanding of understanding. Being's onto-theo-logical difference provides both the backdrop for defining man as finite and for making possible this kind of participation. In itself, Parmenides' Being is "temporally without limits,"³⁵ but their "identity" signals a higher unity, whereby the onto enters the theological. "At this time the strongest religious motive for viewing the world philosophically still lies in the concept of unity. But Parmenides gives it new strength by endowing this unity with the properties of completeness, immobility, and limitation."³⁶

At the origin/end of the order of Being, the onto-theo-logic has emerged. It reveals that man transcends the ontologic and enters into the theo-logic without ever leaving the world. The relationship between the immanent act of knowledge unfolding within the assimilatively self-transcendent act of becoming the known indicates man to be, by his very *noetic* structure, onto-theo-logically inclined. The interplay between the immanent and self-transcendent is the very formation of the causal *entelechy* that directs man via predications to the character of the foundation. The goddess' movement between the unconcealed and the concealed, *a-letheia* and *pseudos*, does not immanentize all things and divinize man, effectively obliterating the distinction between the two. She is the paradigmatic personification of metaphysical transcendence through levels of insight and predication. The immanent union of thinking and Being is upheld only in the self-transcendent participation with the Other wherein the concealed and unconcealed are elevated into their ultimate Truth.

When Heidegger asks, "How does the deity enter in philosophy"³⁷ he is questioning the validity of the onto-theo-logical unity characteristic of metaphysics, specifically of the ancient and medieval metaphysicians. The structure of metaphysics for Heidegger is oriented toward discerning the difference between Being and beings, while the question of Being as such remains inauthentically concealed and historically utterly forgotten. The experiential relationship of the subject and object and their corresponding appropriation in Being understood by intentionality is not the subject and object relationship of metaphysics, particularly not the transformationally theological metaphysics of someone like Aquinas. As Heidegger asserts, "both the contention that there are 'eternal truths' and the jumbling together of Dasein's phenomenally grounded ideality, with an idealized absolute subject, belong to those residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematics which have not as yet been radically extruded."³⁸

For Heidegger, radically to free philosophy of its Christian residues is to return to the beginning and think about, as did Parmenides, Being itself. But, what is there to think of Being itself outside the onto-theo-logic, if the deity had not entered philosophy from the beginning as the beginning, with the *Poem of Parmenides*? “We need not ask whether his study of pure Being has a religious purpose, such as proving the existence of God in the traditional Christian manner; our question is rather whether his speculations about true Being strike him as having some significance that is in any sense religious, even though he does not call this Being God.”³⁹

Myth expands the realm of Doxa to include the incarnation of Truth. If the articulation of the Parmenidean range of problems would proceed in the same direction beyond Plato, we might anticipate an expansion of the Doxa to include the revelatory sphere itself; the Doxa as Revelation would be a truth beyond the Parmenidean truth of Being. This final step was taken, not within Hellenic philosophy, although its logic was immanent in its course, but only in the Hebrew-Christian revelation.⁴⁰

The struggle between the Ways of Truth is the fundamental issue of Western intellectual history from the blending of Hellenism and Christianity to the present. And Parmenides is the thinker who has created the ‘type’ for this world-historic struggle through his unshakable establishment of the Way of Logos.⁴¹

In sum, we see in the goddess’ explication of Being an intentional relationship of the knower to the known: it is both the primal and terminal act of being, framing the threshold of human existence as its *arché* and *telos* and constituting the two necessary interdependencies of immanence and self-transcendence. Intentionality is the radical maintenance of the specifically human self-transcendence through an immanent act, the act of knowledge itself. The four aspects of the intentional presupposition (the charter of metaphysics!) and the interplay between immanence and self-transcendence are essential to the poem and must needs be present to sustain man as a knower in the world: man is identical to the world and yet the world is existentially distinct, the beginning is the end but both stand apart in such a way that the immanent act of knowledge cannot be without self-transcendence. As a whole we can call the delicate and vital balance between the knower and the known the intentional presence. The breakdown of this conclusion is as follows:

1. “The lesson of the poem may just be that philosophy begins with transcendence, by passing through the gates of Justice, and not with the

- search for viable explanations of what is the case or what is true exclusively to this temporal world.”⁴²
2. That a beginning requires an end so much so that an origin is a *telos*, an intentional ground is an *ananke stenai*.
 3. Because of its onto-theo-logical directedness, the beginning is the end; this does not signal the collapse of the real distinction between self-transcendence and immanence but upholds it in the face of irreducible Otherness, in the onto-theo-logical difference.
 4. Knowledge is the first possibility and last effect of intentionality, and never leaves the intentional ground. From within this ground, man discovers the fourfold intentional presupposition that characterizes human becoming in the face of existential otherness: intentionality, finitude, causality, the *ananke stenai*, in a word, metaphysics.
 5. We shall see that every substitute and surrogate for knowledge is founded on the loss of one of the aspects of the fourfold intentional presupposition that ultimately collapses the real distinction between, or denies the existence of, either immanence or self-transcendence.
 6. And yet, this analysis has perhaps done nothing more than show Parmenides to be the first among many metaphysicians. How metaphysics alters or elevates being-in-the-world in terms of the theological must be further examined.

Parmenidean Origin versus Heideggerian *Ereignis*

The *aletheiological* origin of the Parmenidean what-is cannot be reconciled with *Ereignis*. The interplay between Night and Day, the concealed and unconcealed does not originate in time, not even in Heidegger’s most primordial time. Heidegger’s *Ereignis* cannot be a dialectical relationship between Being and time, it is not his “intention to resolve the mutual interplay between Being and time into some higher concept which unite the two in their higher truth.”⁴³ But the Parmenidean origin is the resolution and unity of the relationship between the concealed and unconcealed; its beginning *qua* end is quantitatively closer to the metaphysical/intentional *ananke stenai*, than to Heidegger’s in-time *Ereignis*.⁴⁴ Parmenides’ “same is for thinking as for being” reflects the intentional presupposition specific to metaphysics; the known enters in the form of the knower only insofar as the knower belongs in, and in reference to, a higher Being. “The essence of the poem is that beings cannot claim the worldly essences that belong peculiarly and severally to them without there necessarily existing a transworldly,

sourceless, and timeless Essence which gives of itself in the now.”⁴⁵ Gadamer has noted that Heidegger sought to secure Parmenides’ intentional presupposition (the same is for thinking as for Being) as an identification of the ontological difference over and against the metaphysical difference. “I can well understand why Heidegger wanted to hold onto that idea that Parmenides’ main theme was identity (to auto). In Heidegger’s eyes this would have gone beyond every metaphysical way of seeing and would thereby have anticipated a thesis that is later interpreted metaphysically in Western philosophy and has only come into its own in Heidegger’s philosophy. Nevertheless, Heidegger himself realized that this was an error and that his thesis that Parmenides had to some extent anticipated his own philosophy could not be maintained.”⁴⁶ But even if Parmenides cannot be subsumed by Heidegger we are still left with a major problem: is he just the first among many to have the metaphysically inclined disposition, i.e., the other-worldly temptress beckoning man to forsake the world of the existent and the particular in the search of a founded eternity? Does the metaphysical nature of causal predication inevitably invite man to pass over being-in-the-world in its epistemology? Or, contra Heidegger, does not the identification of Being and phenomenological appearing emasculate Being? Is it not deprived of an essential dimension: reality?⁴⁷ Our defense of classical intentionality and its metaphysical epistemology, it is to be hoped, will show that intentionality requires onto-theo-logic directedness not only in order not to end in an Idealism,⁴⁸ but much more positively to show that the denial of metaphysics is the denial of the mystery of Being, and thus of wonder, and thus of thought.

Again, Parmenides’ intentional presupposition is

. . . not a vague supposition, for there is an uninterrupted tradition here. A confirmation can be found, for instance, in the sixteenth fragment, which consists of the only four undoubtedly authentic lines that are quoted by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* T5, 1009b 21). The text reads: *hos gar hekastot echei krasin meleon polukampton*—‘as the relationship of the limbs of the organism develops itself’—*tos noos anthropoisi paristatai*—‘so nous appears in human beings.’ Put another way: thinking as consciousness of something, as intellectual perception, is related to the constitution of the organism; the one exists as soon as the other is present . . . *To gar auto kai panti*—‘it is always the same thing that thinks (namely) the composition of the organism in each and every person’; *to gar pleon esti noema*—‘that which is perceived is always what predominates,’ like the light that fills everything.⁴⁹

Plato's dialogue *Parmenides* is next to follow in this uninterrupted tradition. It anticipates the Husserlian epistemology that Heidegger ambivalently rejects. The inseparability and immediacy of the perceived and the perceiving in Parmenides' presupposition is elaborated in the dialogue in such a way as to make the *Parmenides* the critical dialogue for the delineation of the problematic of the intentional presupposition. The problematic of the dialogue is to take the totality of Parmenides' compactly and hieratically announced epistemology—the same is for thinking as for Being—and expand it conceptually. All of the epistemological ways from the Platonic Forms to a pre-thematic anticipation of Husserl's phenomenology are a result of this explication. The goal of future thinkers will be to reconcile the Parmenidean presupposition with its appropriate conceptually predicative elaboration.

* * *

Tracing II: Plato's *Parmenides*

Those on one side drag all things down out of the heavens and the invisible realm, literally grabbing rocks and trees with their hands. They grasp all such things and maintain strenuously that that alone is which allows for some touching and embracing. For they mark off beinghood and body as the same; and if anyone from the other side says that something is that has no body, they despise him totally and don't want to listen to anything else. That's why those who dispute with them defend themselves very cautiously out of some invisible place on high, forcing true beinghood to be certain thought-things and disembodied forms. But the bodies of their opponents and what these men call truth, they bust up into small pieces in their arguments and call it, instead of beinghood, some sort of swept along becoming. And between these two, Theaetetus, a tremendous sort of battle over these things has forever been joined.

Sophist, 246a–c

Why the *Parmenides*?

Plato's *Parmenides* is, in every manner, from structure⁵⁰ to content, a perplexing series of contradictions that have left serious thinkers to assume it to be a game,⁵¹ an esoteric exercise⁵² or comic drama.⁵³ Parmenides himself in the dialogue calls his gymnastic a "worklike game."⁵⁴ It is a game, even a jeu

d'esprit, but its "worklike" structure has a deadly serious goal.⁵⁵ This structure is a systematic unpacking of the intentional presuppositions: "the same is for thinking as for Being," and the necessity to come to a stop within the order of explanation. With particular emphasis on the meaning of the same and, as such, on the question of predication, this "game" is more like a wager: what happens to the knowledge of Being if the intentional ground is lost, and most importantly whether and which constituents of the fourfold intentional presupposition preserve that ground as intelligible?⁵⁶

If Plato desired to lay forth his own epistemological doctrine in the *Parmenides*, mightn't he have done just that by means of a concise and ordered approach, as for instance in the *Phaedo* or in the famous "diagram of the line" in the *Republic*? But he did not. This dialogue must be examined less for its doctrinal content than for the aporetic invalidity of various meta-approaches, themselves critical indicators of something more fundamental than, but essentially related to, the knowledge of Being itself. In order to understand the dialogue, one must learn to think metaphysically.⁵⁷

The most fundamental irreconcilability between a classical and a Heideggerian phenomenological intentionality is their contentiousness over whether, for the former, a causal *ananke stenai* or, for the latter, a phenomenological endlessness is the genuine prefiguration of *noetic* presence. For this reason, an analysis of Plato's *Parmenides* is of incalculable importance. The dialogue's seemingly unending series of hypotheses and contradictions not only provoke infinite regressions but also, by doing so, set forth the primary ontological questions implicit in this debate. The dialogue's rival contentions of the "One is-not"/"One is" lead the reader into an *aporia*, and into the sophist's thicket of nonbeing, of paradox and of contradiction. Within this *aporia*, that which always remains concealed, the intentional ground of knowledge, is exposed to be Necessary and metaphysically oriented. In a word, these infinite series of absurdities call to mind nothing other than the ontological need for a stop in the order of explanation—the *ananke stenai*. Therefore, it is the often overlooked but fundamental dialogue in support of a metaphysically directed intentionality, and indispensable to a historical tracing of the idea of intentionality.

On this account it is not right for what-is to be incomplete; for it is not lacking; but if it were, it would lack everything. And the same is there for thinking and is that for the sake of which thought is; for not without what-is, to which it stands committed, will you find thinking; for nothing else is or will be besides what-is, since Fate has bound it to be whole and

changeless. It is in reference to it that all names have been spoken. (*Poem of Parmenides*, fr. 8 23–40)

Then if you say it once do you address whatever possesses the name, but if you said it many times you don't address this thing? Or whether once or many times you utter the same name, doesn't a great necessity force you always to mean the same thing? (*Parmenides*, 147d)

The *Parmenides* is of great importance because of its repeated attempts to unpack the meaning of the “same” between thinking and Being, anticipating both classical (the soul is in a way all things) and phenomenological (consciousness is always consciousness of) intentionality. The “same” is a question of predication and in the dialogue the question is specifically: How do the relative and the many relate to the universal, whether that be the Forms or the One, whether Being or something beyond and more original than Being?

Throughout the dialogue, this “same” is expressed in a multitude of ways: univocally, equiprimordially, idealistically and analogically. The first three expressions in varying degrees contribute ultimately to a phenomenological predication. Each turns away from the factual, pre-cognitive, presuppositional ground of intentionality and into a series of absurd hypotheses that remove the ground of Being, constituting an infinite regress. These types of predications accomplish this because either they do not start with the intentional presupposition (the nondemonstrable but descriptive fact of existence), but rather assume it to be one or another hypothesis in need of proof. Or, on the other hand, they begin with the descriptive facticity of intentionality but do not follow the presupposition to its necessary metaphysical conditions and in effect remain stranded in description, unable to turn toward the knowledge of the other as other.

This manifold analogical “same” of thinking and Being is grasped within the context of a twofold Necessity within the dialogue. In the *noetic* interplay between man and Other, or the different things and the One, Necessity is found to be their forceful adhesive. We maintain here that Necessity is known on the side of man as positive finitude and on the part of the Other as the *ananke stenai*. Both necessities are aspects of Necessity itself, constituting and appropriating man's *noetic* relationship with the world as onto-theologically directed. Finitude is the self-transcendent act moving naturally toward its end or *ananke stenai* unless derailed *contra naturam* by a failure to keep the fullness of the intentional presence. This framework alone allows

man to turn toward thinking about Being through proper participation in and predication of Being.

The dialogue's attempts to conceptualize the hieratically compact "the same is for thinking as for Being" dead-end at the "notion" that the "One is-not." Just as the "same" between thinking and Being has several overlapping and even contradictory readings so does the idea that the "One is-not." These notions of the "One is-not" can be divided into two categories each with a number of implications:

1. The deprivation of beinghood: the primary conclusion for the "One is not." This deprivation or nonexistent One results from the loss of the factual quality of the intentional ground. The arguments enter into absurdity in their struggles to grasp the One by attempting the impossible, hypothesizing the unhypothetical, the ground of all knowledge, the "unhypothetical ground,"⁵⁸ and by doing so, systematically extrude Being from existence.
2. No-thing: of crucial importance, it signals that the One is not-a-thing like everything else within the order of Being. This notion of no-thing is the final conclusion to all the arguments, even those that postulate the One to be deprived of beinghood. The absurdity in arriving at that deprivation expresses the need for the *ananke stenai*.⁵⁹ The two arguments of particular importance for expanding this idea of no-"thing" will be the "instants" and the "heaps;" the former supports that need while the latter compactly expresses the repercussions of rejecting it, in favor of a kind of phenomenological endlessness.

Both the problem of the Platonic forms and a pre-thematized Heideggerian groundlessness (within the argument of "heaps") are ontological offshoots of this second conception of the One is-not (no-thing). While the former can be viewed as a predecessor to Idealism, they are as well a defense against it. The unrelatability of the forms with the different things expresses a kind of no-thingness that must ground or give consistency or universality to knowledge, but this self-same unrelatability or inability of predication leaves it susceptible to an Idealist rendering that subsumes those qualities into the "I." Heideggerian groundlessness, on the other hand, arises when no-thing is denied any relation to, or anticipation of, the *ananke stenai*, and is thus not the *telos* of predications onto-theo-logically directed. As such this phenomenological no-thing ends in a deprivation of beinghood.

As the dialogue attempts to unpack the intentional presupposition, it presents a series of confrontations between the I and Other, the oscillation

between the One is or the One is-not, and the question of phenomenological or analogical predication. At its core, these confrontations are directed at (1) the question of Necessity, and (2) how, epistemologically, does that which is finite, limited, relative relate to or know the infinite, unlimited, universal.

This confrontation is expressed in the very linguistic/hermeneutic structure of the dialogue, in a confrontation between two kinds of necessity, “Strong Necessity” and a lesser logical necessity. “Strong Necessity” is a profound expression of the intentional presupposition and its aforementioned onto-theo-logic understanding of twofold Necessity (finitude and the *ananke stenai*) as the linchpin of thinking and Being. Strong Necessity stands apart briefly, before reentering the argument’s *reductio ad absurdum*.

The latter by necessity is a derivation of the intentional presupposition. Without relationship to Strong Necessity, it is a polemic between the two constituents, thinking and Being. By necessity needs Strong Necessity to convert the logico-analytic enterprise into its proper ontology, as ontological. In the dialogue by necessity stands alone, signaling the argument’s affirmation or negation to be necessary in a purely logical, deductive manner. In a word, “the domain [by necessity] under consideration is solely the rational domain attainable by ‘for the same is for thinking and for being.’ And, in this domain, there is no room for contingency.”⁶⁰

Our intent is to examine both necessities for their fundamental meaning. The goal and meaning of the dialogue express (1) the need for the intentional ground to be origin *qua* end, and (2) that without the *ananke stenai* an ontology of Being is ultimately a deontologized infinite regress. Our analysis of necessity, particularly the emphasis on Strong Necessity as the true meaning of the “same” between thinking and Being, will prefigure the cardinal issues between Heideggerian and Thomistic intentionality.

The First Infinite Regress

The dialogue just commenced, young Socrates has laid out his theory of the forms to Parmenides and Zeno. The serious problems of the forms are recognized: if the different things can by no means participate in the form because such partaking would dissolve the latter’s unity, how then do we posit these forms that need to-be in order for the different things to-be without committing the forms to suffer becoming? A resolution is proposed:

I think that you think that each form is one because of this: whenever many things seem to you to be great, it seems probable to you, as you look

over them all, that there is some one and the same idea. From this you conclude that the Great is one . . . (Plato, *Parmenides*, 132a)

However this attempted resolution of Socrates falls into an infinite regress:

But what about the Great itself and the different great things—if, in the same way, you look over them all with your soul, will there not appear, in turn, some great thing that makes all of them, by necessity, appear great. (132a)

But this necessity that makes all great things great does not in fact reflect the need for a stop in the order of the hypotheses, but on the contrary demands, as necessary, a continuation of its “logical” enterprise: “a different form of Greatness, then, will be revealed, in addition to what was Greatness itself and the things that partake of it. And above all of these, in turn, another, that makes all of them great. And so each of your forms will no longer be one, but will be boundless in multitude” (132a–b).

The argument has posited the forms’ unity, favoring a stream of hypotheses that will ultimately commit the greatest violence to the form, rendering it to be utterly impotent epistemologically. Because the form has become boundless in multitude, the argument has entered its first of many infinite regresses.

A Brief Move toward, and Rejection of Idealism

When the unrelatability of the forms to the different things provokes an infinite regress, a fundamental problem arises. Isn’t this boundless in multitude fundamentally contrary to the unitary nature of the form? And if this boundlessness must persist where then can the forms be posited as one and not suffer becoming?

Socrates’ answer anticipates the move to a sort of nominalist/conceptualist/conventionalist idealism and even to the I-constitution of the world as the necessary prerequisite for the forms as clear and distinct ideas: “couldn’t it be that each of these forms is a thought and properly comes to be nowhere but in souls? Then each in fact could be one and would not still suffer the things you just mentioned . . .” (132b). Parmenides responds, noting that since each thought is a thought of or about something, the inherent danger of reducing the form to a thought originating nowhere but in the soul is as an abstract existence solely of thoughts where “either each

thing consists of thoughts and everything thinks or, although thoughts, they're thoughtless" (132c).

After Parmenides rejects that idealistic variant of the forms, Socrates concedes that the forms and the different things must participate in one another. He relates the two in a kind of analogy of likeness wherein the "forms stand in nature like paradigmata. The different things resemble them and are likenesses, and so the different things' participation in the forms turns out to be nothing else than to be made in their likeness!" (132d). At this point, the first Great necessity appears to give an onto-logical foundation to the "same" or likeness in Socrates' analogy:

But doesn't a great necessity force the like, along with the thing like it, to partake of one and the same form? (132d-e)

In a way, this great necessity elevates the first by necessity's logical intelligibility into its onto-logical necessity, whereas the former only spoke of a great thing that makes all else appear great, the latter recognizes the different things must, in order to appear at all, themselves partake in that necessity or unity in order to be a genuine likeness.

The argument then runs aground in its hypothetical aspect and the problem of likeness drifts into a characteristic infinite regress. The differentiating factor or unhypothetical aspect within that first great necessity, one that would ground a genuine likeness, is overlooked. The hypotheses of likeness continue in a vicious and endless series of conclusions that undermine their initial advance: "Nothing then, can be like the form nor can the form be like anything else. Otherwise there will always appear a different form beyond the form; and if that is like anything, another still. And there will never be an end to the genesis of new forms as long as the form becomes like the thing that partakes of it" (132e-133a).

If it is true, then, that nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything else, are we not left at an impasse as to what this form is, that appears not to-be? By continuing in the same logico-hypothetical manner, thought becomes involved in a conceptual undermining, wherein the initial posited form becomes nothing existent at all.

The One, deprived of its beinghood as the ground of appropriation for all things like it or in reference to it, dissolves: "for knowledge among us would be only of the truth among us, because none of the forms is known by us and therefore we do not partake of Knowledge itself" (134a-b). If the form is not among us, but must be posited as is, who then possesses the forms?

Perhaps a god would possess it, for he presumably possesses the most precise knowledge. But that assertion fails to rescue the One, for if indeed this god possesses Knowledge itself, he can't know the things among us, because the things among us cannot partake in the Forms (134d).

In a word, between thinking and Being the "same" has broken down; knowledge among us does not reflect the knowledge of Being itself. This breakdown is far reaching, for that god would be outside the possibility of thinking or speaking Being: "What an altogether wondrous speech, if it strips the gods of knowing!" (134e)

The forms must by necessity have these problems and many more still, if there are these ideas of the beings and if one distinguishes each form on its own. The result is that whoever hears this hits a dead end and argues that these things are not; and if, at most, they should be, well, then, great necessity keeps them unknown from human nature. . . . Only a naturally gifted man could learn that there is a certain kind and beinghood, in itself, for each thing; and only a still more wondrous person will discover all these things and be able to teach someone else to judge them clearly and sufficiently for himself. (134e–135a)

The argument at this point has recognized the logical conundrum of the forms: if the form cannot be related to the many things, it cannot be spoken of; if it cannot be spoken of, does it exist? The very Great Necessity by which the forms are required is seemingly subverted by its own purely logical difficulties. In a word, the same between thinking and being has been annihilated. The result is a dead end, wherein the logical aspect of this argument hits a thoughtless, beingless impasse in which the man of this domain can't help but speak that these things are not.

But is this dead end in fact the locus at which the logical aspect necessarily merges into that which it needs in order to be logical, i.e., an ontological directedness? The forms or One that cannot be known signal a much more profound idea than mere deprivation of beinghood: What if this form or One or Being is really no-"thing" at all; what if it is the end in the order of explanation and is therefore something else altogether?

What does it mean when Parmenides states that great necessity keeps the forms unknown to human nature? Shall we say, quite pragmatically, that if it is unknowable, it might as well not exist? If only a god-like man could know or judge them for himself or teach them with clarity to others, how can it mean anything or apply to our everyday being-in-the world? And yet, on the other hand, this no-"thing," or perhaps Nonbeing, "puts its refuter

too, into perplexity, and that as a result, whenever someone attempts to refute it, he's compelled to contradict himself about."⁶¹

It seems that this no-thing is inescapable in language; it cannot be circumvented or suppressed, but neither can it be managed in the same way that everything else that appears is spoken of or predicated. There is something fundamentally necessary that accompanies the notion of the forms and without it, knowledge is lost:

If someone in turn, Socrates, after focusing on all these problems and others still, shall deny that there are forms of the beings and will not distinguish a certain form of each single thing, wherever he turns he'll understand nothing, since he does not allow that there is an ever-same idea for each of the beings. And so he will "entirely destroy the power of dialogue." (135b–c)

And dialogue itself is the manifestation of the dictum "the same is for thinking as for being" within our every day being-in-the-world. It is also, parenthetically, the ground of the moral and political order, custom, *nomos*, tradition, and of the pursuit of the realm of transcendence and the relationship between the open and closed societies in the domain of *paideia*.

Parmenides takes over the course of the dialogue at the point at which the One is-not is presented as a possible referent to a pre-predicative ground, prior to explanation and hypotheses. This proper method of his gymnastic is "not only to investigate the results of a hypothesis if each hypothesized thing is, but also hypothesize that this same thing is not" (135e–136a). Parmenides expresses his concern over commencing this deadly serious worklike game. He must be like the strong mares of his youth that had taken him to the goddess truth, but he is old, and knows fully both where this journey will lead and the strain and difficulty that must be accepted in order to understand:

Then Parmenides said, "Necessary it is to obey. And yet I seem to be suffering something like that Ibyceian horse, which, as a prizewinner but old, is about to take part in a chariot race and, being experienced, trembles at what is about to happen. Ibycus says that he resembles the horse since, although he is so old and unwilling, Necessity forces him to fall in love. And so I seem quite fearful, since I remember what sort of and how great a multitude of speeches I must swim through at my age. Nevertheless, I must show you this favor, especially since, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves." (136e–137a)

As the gymnastic commences, the problem of necessity will take on a new weight; not only will it waver between the logical and the ontological, but also, with the recognition of this no-thing, the question of the onto-logical will in turn reveal onto-theo-logical implications.

The Argument and Its Movements Understood through the Fourfold Intentional Presupposition

The first argument begins with the hypothesis that the One-is, and is in a sense an elaboration of the earlier pre-gymnastic discussion of the problem of the forms. It demonstrates through all these examples, parts to the whole, motion and rest, same and other, like and unlike, equal and unequal, younger and older, being and nonbeing, that if the likeness between the One and the different things is derived solely from within the logical order of univocal explanation and predication there will inevitably be a fundamental unrelatability between the universal limitless One and the negatively finite limitation of the different things.

Every sub-argument instigates an infinite regression that ultimately annihilates one of the bipolarities of Being. Every argument concludes that if the One is, it is nothing. This argument, like the result of the analysis of the forms, is juggling with notions of the One is-not; either it is nonexistent or it is a foundational no-“thingness.” The former ends in absurdity but the latter in the profound truth of the intentional ground.

Argument II contradicts argument I only insofar as each of its sub-arguments argues that if the One is, it is everything. But this argument’s underlying issue is the same, the problem of grasping a positive and genuine conception of finitude. If the different things are defined by limit, how then can they be related to the One, which must be, in order to be the One, boundless and without limit? We saw a variation of this issue or paradox in the *Poem of Parmenides*. This argument’s worklike game is directed toward confusing the notion of finitude, as something involved solely in a finite series of events rather than as a genuine dependency. These two notions are not opposed to one another, but the former reflects only the logical apparatus of finitude as limit, but on its own it cannot reflect a positive dependency that resides at the ontological (and perhaps onto-theo-logical) level. This confusion amounts to stating that the One is everything, but really amounts to nothing.

If the One and the different things interrelate solely on the logical level, the One is understood only in terms of mathematical primacy, as the

first in a numerical series or as the unity of a set of parts that fit together but amount to a whole no greater than its parts. And if the whole or the One is no greater than the parts, even though it is everything together, it amounts ontologically to nothing at all. The explaining away of finite dependency occurs because the One is not fully seen outside its logical framework; the whole is never fully surmised to exist outside its parts as their foundation. The possibility of a positive finitude rests on finding a different way in which Being is attached or related to the thing (144c).

It is quite true that “if a thing is it must necessarily be something and not nothing.” But how that finitude is attached to the thing will determine whether that statement avoids an infinite regress. The One is not genuinely attached if it’s been partitioned or divided up and then spread among the order of things, for in that case the One is-not. It must be attached in a qualitatively different way:

And yet a great necessity forces whatever has parts to be as many as its parts are. (144d)

The One’s primacy must be metaphysical; it is not the parts that determine the whole to be One or Whole. Rather, the parts must have a genuine dependency, on some no-“thing” outside and independent of their composite whole that forces them both to be as many, and to possess individual unity.

The dialogue returns to its *reductio ad absurdum*:

Therefore, not only is the being that is one many, but even the One itself, since it has been divided up by being, must, by necessity, be many. (144d)

The collapse of knowledge is twofold: Necessity loses its definitive quality, and finitude, its positive quality. Both are absorbed into the endlessness *qua* infinite regress of the phenomenon. “The One that is, then, is somehow both one and many, and a whole and pieces, and limited and limitless in multitude” (145a).

Without the twofold Necessity (*ananke stenai* and finitude) as that which expresses the relationship of the object to reason in its application to experience, or as the defining and distinguishing factor among things, or as distinguishing the I from the Other, how is the One distinguished from the different things or the different things as different from

each other? Isn't the One forced into the position of distinguishing itself from the many:

Insofar, then, as the One is Whole, its in something else. But insofar as it chances to be all those parts, it's in itself. And thus the One itself must, by necessity, be both in itself and in another. (145e)

But whatever is always in the same thing must, by necessity, without a doubt, always be standing at rest. (146a)

In both of these "by necessity's," the One has been placed in a position to define or defend the ontological distinction that makes, for example, a plurality of subjects possible. Placing the One within the many breaks up the existential unity that makes the One to be One and indivisible. When placing the many within the One, in order to keep the One as One, the many cannot really be many. Therefore the notion of the many as complete ontological unities is reduced to partial effects, appearances, semblances of the real or One. "Surely everything is to everything else like this: either it is the same or other, or if not the same and not other, it would be a part of whatever it is thus related to or it would be as a whole is to a part" (146b).

Genuine Necessity is the differentiating component between the One and the many that allows the things to be as they are because, in a way, it names or announces the object-at-hand to be what it is, and not merely an appearance. This name necessarily communicates the Being of the thing. Naming is the spoken unity of thinking and Being. And to name something means that each time it is named the "same" thing is spoken of each time. It is the Necessity of Being that it be what it is:

Then if you say it once do you address whatever possesses the name, but if you said it many times you don't address this thing? Or whether once or many times you utter the same name, doesn't a great necessity force you always to mean the same thing? (147d)

By naming the world "speculative thought achieves the leap to the metaphysical . . . for the world is Being."⁶²

This insistence on "force" reflects how great necessity is the organizing principle that puts into being all things and therefore names them as they are. Just as great necessity forces whatever has parts to be as many as its parts are and, as such, the sum total of the parts can not be equivalent to the whole or One, so great necessity also forces the thing to mean and be the same

thing no matter how many times it is named. Not only does this Necessity force the parts to be, but each part can never be anything else but its own part as this part or that part. When something is named it is named not as semblance or appearance or shadow but as the thing itself.

Because existence amounts to something more than the sum total of parts and because not everything is in its final place, there is then a reason beneath that limit, finitude or dependency. Rather than being seen as a stumbling block to the universals or on the other hand as obliterating the universal it becomes the crucial signate that names man's relatedness to something Other.

In argument II, there is a sub-argument specifically on the question of "touching." The argument confuses physical touching as the nature of the relationship between the One and the different things, but not to its detriment. This misapplied conception of their relationship actually exposes the motivating force behind this twofold Necessity as causality.

Metaphysical causality is the act of tracing the great chain of being until what is reached is something outside of and greater than the order of "things." Heidegger claims that this kind of self-transcendence misses the world of beings by reordering them in terms of a highest Being. If causality is not a passing over of the phenomenon of the world of being but rather the self-transcendent act of embedding oneself into its very origin or source, it must be shown that causality is the natural (not founded) act of being-with-others.

This sub-argument on "touching" begins with the assertion that if the One were in the different things, it would touch the different things, and in itself it would touch itself. But if it is to touch these different things, the question arises as to where it must be located so as to accomplish this touching of the different things while remaining as One. "And so, as though two, the One would do this and would come to be in two places at the same time. But as long as it is one, it won't be able to" (148e).

As the One, it cannot be like two and threes in the way it touches, for "the same necessity, then, that makes the One not to be two makes it not touch itself" (149a). The One, then, must touch the different things but not touch like everything else. If this touch is unlike everything else, how in the first place do the different things within the order of their kind of touch even recognize it? And if this utterly different touch of the One is at all necessary shouldn't it be known to man, shouldn't he be able to determine its presence and in its presence come to understand its necessity and thus his origin?

Causality is understood only in the world among the plurality of subjects that relate to or “touch” each other in every act of existence. Within every act of “touch,” and understood only within its framework, is the causal relationship of the “touch” to the that which is “touched.”

What is the *telos* of this being-in-the-world relationship? What does touch plus that which is touched “add” up to? What will each of the infinite additions lead to but an untouched touch, or more precisely, an uncaused cause: “And so, clearly, whenever one thing is added, one touch is also added and the result is that the touches are one less than the number of the multitude. For by an amount equal to that by which the first two exceeded the touches (by being more numerous than the touches), so every future number of things will also exceed all the touches. For in the future whenever one is added to the number of things, one touch will also be added to the touches” (149b–c).

What this means is that there is one more being than there are touches; something that just doesn’t fit into the equal order of things and yet is needed to originate this order. Couldn’t we call this an uncaused cause or untouched touch or unmeasured measurer, the unequal equalizer of all things, the ground in which all things find their affinity or accord or evenness? And hadn’t the natural and causal state of being-in-the-world directed us to it by great necessity:

Now, a great necessity makes whatever neither exceeds nor is exceeded be on equal terms, and it makes whatever is on equal terms equal. (150d)

The “Instants”: The Move to the Ground of Being

Argument II reengages a series of absurdities on such matters as the nature of greatness and smallness, equal and unequal, younger and older. Each provokes an infinite regression along the same lines as the earlier ones. Then the argument takes a sudden and important shift in style and content. It is on the nature of “the instants” and its shift from the earlier sub-arguments might lead one to treat it as a new argument bringing the total number to nine, or to consider it an appendix to argument II, contending that it is not a separate argument because, unlike the other eight arguments, it does not begin with Parmenides’ basic two hypotheses, that the One is or that the One is-not.

This argument is on its own. It does not begin with the two basic hypotheses because, perhaps, Plato intended it to reflect something qualitatively

different from the other arguments. It is, I believe, an argument that reaches the conclusion of the earlier arguments, not by means of their logic but in spite of it. For the most part, the earlier arguments' hypothetical gymnastic ends in contradictory statements, whereas the goal of "the instants" is to reach beyond this failing logical apparatus and to find the source of the truth, stability and relatability of the One in an ontology that allows the logical really to be logical.

While the earlier arguments debate the problem of participation within the world and endless order of explanation, and by doing so systematically deprive the One of beinghood, making impossible a genuine relationship between the One and the many, "the instants" is the first argument thematically to look for the ground or the end in the order of Being as the source of all things.

It gathers up the difficulties of the earlier arguments and asks the most penetrating question: How can the One participate in all these things mentioned, e.g., greatness and smallness, motion and rest, like and unlike, without both taking and releasing beinghood, coming to be and perishing (see 156a)? And while the earlier arguments had given, through great necessity, a hint that knowledge and the order of explanation required, in order to be meaningful, something like a causal *ananke stenai* to halt the infinite regress (and thereby promote a positive finitude), it is only in "the instants" that that claim is fully announced:

The instant. For the 'instant' looks like it signifies this very thing: something from which there is a change in either of two directions. For while still standing at rest something cannot change from standing at rest; nor while still in motion can it change from motion. Instead this sort of momentary, out-of-place nature lurks between both motion and rest and is not in any time. Thus, into this and out of this, whatever's in motion changes to standing at rest and whatever stands at rests changes to being in motion. (156d–e)

The problem of the "instants" is not only an attempt to solve how the One participates in the characteristic changes of the many, but just as much and perhaps more, it attempts to find that which can differentiate and separate these characteristic changes, giving each its own definable and irreducible name. What accomplishes this cannot be within the endlessness of the in-time realm of coming-to-be and perishing. For "certainly there is no time at which something could at once neither be in motion or stand at rest"

(156c). Therefore there is posited to be “this out-of-place” thing that permits and promotes this change (156d). The notion of an “out-of-place” thing seems not only to express the conversion from the logical to the ontological but also to the onto-theo-logical.

When Aristotle asks Parmenides what sort of thing this out-of-place thing is, the answer is that it really is no-thing at all (156d–e). This no-“thing” emerges at the end of the order of explanation as a necessity of thought allowing beings to be with and distinct from each other. “The ‘instant’ is not a moment in time. It cannot be arrived at by subdividing the time continuum: whatever two moments of time are chosen, close to each other as they may be, the instant of change will always be ‘between’ them without forming part of the time continuum itself, since at any point in the time continuum the thing must be either in motion or at rest. In this sense, then, the instant is in no time.”⁶³

As such, no amount of time will “add up” to this instant for it is the beginning *qua* end, the framework of time, in an ontologically primal sense. Likened to the whole understood onto-logically as qualitatively greater than its parts, the instant is the unmeasured measurer, the unequal equalizer, and without its original instant-of-Being, time and the different things would cease to exist. “The instant is itself a disruption of time’s continuity—a disruption, according to Parmenides’ argument, that is required for change to take place at all.”⁶⁴

Although the argument has advanced considerably toward anticipating a metaphysical foundation as a final end, it fails to recognize that the central defining quality of the One must be the “instant”; that they are indeed two aspects of the same Being (156e–157a). Instead, the One, the many and the “instant” are seen as three separate entities wherein the out-of-time instant is construed in order for the other two in-time constituents to relate. In this way, the One is again reduced to the logical apparatus whereby the distinction between the One and the many is relegated to a mathematical ordering. And as such, the insurmountable problems of participation and predication reemerge, particularly the problem of articulating meaningfully the intentional presupposition.

Before analyzing thematically the aspects of the intentional presence, it should be noted that argument III revisits the problem of partaking or participating in the One.⁶⁵ This difficulty sets the stage for the meaning and importance of the intentional presence. The first sub-argument regarding the whole and its pieces revisits the problem of articulating the Whole as something more than the sum total of its pieces but it also makes the move

toward a positive conception of predication when it remarks that each of the pieces must be a piece not of many but of a Whole:

And yet the very whole must be, by necessity, one thing made up of many things—this whole of which the pieces will be pieces. For each of the pieces must be a piece not of many but of a Whole. (157c)

And in fact, the same explanation also holds for each piece: it must, by necessity, partake of the One. For if each of them is a piece, then surely the “each” signifies that it’s one, when delineated from the rest, in itself—if in fact it will be “each”. (157e–158a)

Although this argument never really emancipates itself from the *reductio ad absurdum*, it nevertheless incorporates a decisive move toward a positive conception of predication. In particular, it grasps what is essential to the metaphysical intentional presence in terms of its referential relationship to Being. This relationship can be broken down in three ways:

1. the piece is utterly dependent on the Whole in order to be a piece; its name originates because it belongs in this whole—it is a piece not of many but of a whole;
2. and yet, that utter dependency must not invalidate the piece as a unity in itself;
3. while paradoxically, the complete unity of the piece occurs only within its unmitigated and essential reference to the Whole.

For the most part, the dialogue has been focused on the loss of Being in endlessness, but its effect on thought, the thinking that is the “same” as Being, has not been fully examined. In a word, every time the argument has entered an infinite regression, the One or Being has been systematically eliminated from existence and existentially nullified. If in fact this is the unfortunate result for Being, what then can come of thinking? Or more precisely, what happens to the intentional presence?

Intentional presence is the mode of being and the relational being-with and being-toward the world, the *noetic* bridge between man and world. Because of this the privileged being, man, announces or names or predicates that which is the “same” between thinking and Being. What are the preconditions for meaningful announcing and naming?

A genuine thinking of “same” analogically unites thinking and Being, and is understood under two aspects, finitude and the *ananke stenai*. As finite self-transcendence, man follows his onto-logical directedness, and

enters into a nearness by means of the *ananke stenai*. The *ananke stenai* discloses the ultimate Other *qua* foundation, and man's knowledge is prefigured upon this union. This union constitutes the intentional presence or man's pre-cognitive "knowledge" of the "Same" because at this point language has finally caught up to Being.

The intentional presence exists only within the framework of this metaphysical foundation *qua* origin and end. Without it, language will never catch-up to Being and the things themselves will be only appearances without reference to any genuine likeness. When language does not catch-up to Being, or when the intentional presence is relegated only to the initial description of the world, then beings are reduced to a chain of "differences" not even able to be known as difference. Difference as difference can only be seen in the analogical and metaphysical understanding of the "same" between thinking and Being; the two constituents are distinct and mutual transcendences.

As the privileged being who acknowledges that the "same is for thinking as for Being," his moral/intellectual livelihood depends upon maintaining thinking and being as distinct but mutual transcendences related to each other and ordered by that which constitutes their difference as difference. When even the gods could not possess the knowledge of the different things, the intentional presence was lost, destroyed amid the reduction of one of the two entitative components (134e). And when Parmenides recognized not only the flaw in but the need for something like the forms, he recognized that the privileged being could not know or speak meaningfully without a metaphysical end as the source of knowledge. Without an ever-same idea for every being the power of speech will be destroyed, for this ever-same idea reflects the need for something (or rather a no-"thing") to maintain that difference as difference:

If someone in turn, Socrates, after focusing on all these problems and others still, shall deny that there are forms of the beings and will not distinguish a certain form of each single thing, wherever he turns he'll understand nothing, since he does not allow that there is an ever-same idea for each of the beings. And so he will entirely destroy the power of dialogue. (135b–c)

And when Parmenides asserts that "surely there is nothing other besides them—something different than the One yet different than the different things, for everything is spoken of when one says, both the One and the different things" (argument IV, 159b–c), he grasps (before reentering the

infinite regress) the *telos* of the intentional presence, that makes it to be, in a word, intentional. In one way, it is quite true that everything is spoken when one says both the One and the different things, except their difference as difference. And in that case there is then something different from the One and different from the different things. But not a difference merely in terms of this being or that being, but that the reality of their distinction presupposes their composition in something Other, and that this difference presupposes the actual reality of their unity as the “same.” When this difference as difference is relegated in terms of this being or that, then the process of de-severing the One from the world will inevitably continue.

The intentional presence does not speak only about those things within the order of logical explanation; man’s privilege is that he can announce the fundamental Other by concluding to it by a Necessity of thought within the order of explanation pointing to something beyond. If it is reached as a Necessity of thought, it must exist in the order of Being as fundamentally dependent upon and in a necessary relationship with Being. Why? Because the same is for thinking as for Being. Argument V reaches critical mass wherein this privilege is fully realized: man can speak of the One is-not, he can think of that difference as difference.

Therefore he first means something known and then something other than the different things, whenever he says “one,” whether he adds being or not-being to it. For whatever is said not to be is nonetheless known, and it is known to differ from the different things. In this way, then, we must say from the beginning, if one is not, what must be. First of all this must, so it looks, be the case concerning it: there is knowledge of it. Otherwise there’d be no way to know what is said whenever someone says, “if one is not.” (160c–d)

This passage stresses the privilege of the intentional presence to understand all things in terms of difference as difference. The One is-not does not mean a mere deprivation in beinghood. If it was not known in any capacity, it could not be spoken of. How then would man think of the One or Being if it is different from all else? If it does not correspond ontologically to the order of explanation how do we think of it in terms of difference as difference? Man understands because he is ordered by a foundational Being. This is not a founded idea but the horizon of intentionality, realized in its privileged being. Man knows that the qualitative distinction between Being and beings belongs to Being: “For whenever someone says that the One is other than different things, he doesn’t mean that otherness belongs to the different things, but rather to it” (160e).

By understanding this Otherness by means of difference as difference, man grasps something else altogether. What then is this thing or no-“thing” that is reached causally and intentionally by means of human finitude? Isn’t this no-thing, this unmeasured measurer that gives measure to all else the *ananke stenai*, that stop required by the very nature of thought in the presence of Being?

Because each aspect of the fourfold intentional presupposition is inseparably interrelated, and are joined in a hegemonic unity within the *ananke stenai*, our examination of it will be something of a reiteration of the whole analysis. This section does not intend, though, merely to repeat but to bring into fullness the nature of the fourfold intentional presupposition.

If the One is-not reflects pre-thematically the *ananke stenai*, what then does this “is-not” imply:

So it’s not possible for the One to be, since it really is not, but in no way is it prohibited from partaking of many things; in fact, its necessary for it to do this, if indeed that One and not something different is not. However, if neither the One nor the ‘that’ will not be, then the speech is about something different and nothing can be uttered. But if the One and nothing else is hypothesized not to be, then it’s necessary for it to have a share in the “that” and many different things. (160e–161a)

There is a categorical difference between the not-being of everything else compared to the One. And this difference as difference resides in some unitive and likening quality, some foundation, origin and *telos*.

And when, “nothing else but the One is hypothesized not to be, then it’s necessary for it to have a share in the ‘that’ and many different things.” This One therefore has a meta-physical nature. This One is-not has a share in everything else because it is the no-“thing” likening agent in which all other beings are ordered by the foundational Being. Thinking meets Being in the feature that differentiates them; in that which constitutes their difference as difference. That which constitutes that difference is reached at the end/stop in the order of explanation but it is neither beyond being nor beyond knowledge. The *ananke stenai*, then, has an onto-theo-logic direction, implication and realization.

The One is-not, i.e., the *ananke stenai* is understood in a threefold manner:

1. it is the very core of that difference as difference grasped causally;
2. it maintains finitude as the proper vehicle of dependency to recognize the genuine “same” and otherness between thinking and Being;

3. and it gives the intentional presence the privilege to articulate that presupposition as a presupposition with which man as knower must begin. It is therefore not a hypothesis; it is the unhypothesized precondition of thought.

All else is in reference to and ordered by this no-thing. To speak truly of the things themselves is to understand them in their context, that there is an order or rather an orderer to their appearances that makes them not only apparitions but beings.

This no-“thing” does not change or move or transcend or perish, if indeed the “same” is for thinking as for Being. “The One cannot change from itself, whether it is or is not. For then this speech would not still be about the One—if in fact it changed from itself—but rather about something different” (162d). Therefore the different things must change only on the condition of the recognition or presupposition of the unhypothesized One:

And yet indeed it is in motion, a great necessity forces it to change. For in whatever way it be moved, in this respect it no longer is as it was, but is otherwise. (162e–163a)

That which is reached by means of the *ananke stenai* has the ontological primacy wherein the sum total of the parts can never add up to the Whole; it is the converting or likening factor among all things that allows the soul to be, in a way, all things *because* the same is for thinking as for Being. And without concluding to this great necessity, the balance between thinking and Being cannot remain. This balance is likened to the way in which the beginning is the end, or in which the first principle is the final principle.⁶⁶ They are not the same in any sort of descriptive immediacy of being-in-the-world but rather find their “sameness” reflected only when their difference as difference enables man to arrive at the end and upon his arrival or necessary stop the end gives itself over as the beginning or the first all along, and thus enables knowledge to begin.

The “Heaps”: In Anticipation of Phenomenology

In keeping with the dialogue’s characteristic pattern of remaining within the thicket of NonBeing even when it places us in an *aporia*, the soul that was discovered to be in a way all things is soon given no way to be at all. In argument VI, the soul is lost. The is-not, the *telos* of all beings, is again conceived as nonexistent: “But whenever we say ‘is not,’ does it signify anything else than

a deprivation of beinghood for whatever we say is not” (163c). This reverting from the argument’s prior advances prepares us for the problem of the “heaps.” The heaps are a solely appearance-based “stop” in the order of explanation; they endlessly become different phenomena upon closer inspection, denying any real stop in the order of Being. This phenomenon serves as a prime example of the far-reaching effects of the loss of the *ananke stenai* in the role of meaning and Being.

At the end of argument VI, there is a slight but important change in the notion of is-not from not only deprived but to having “no state at all” (164b). It opens the door to one of the most essential arguments, the “heaps” which anticipates the potential danger of phenomenological phenomena. This argument, in confrontation with the “instants,” reflects prethematically the dispute between metaphysical and phenomenological intentionality. If this Being has now no state at all the question is:

Will there be of the “that” or the “to that” or the “something” or the “this” or the “of this” or “of a different thing” or “to a different thing” or “once” or “hereafter” or “now” or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else of the things that are concerning the thing that is not. (164a–b)

The problem of the “heaps” anticipates the difficulty of acquiring any knowledge within the anti-*ananke stenai*, anti-onto-theologic endlessness of the phenomenon. The “heaps” are in utter opposition to the “instants.” Even with all the ontological shortcomings of the “instants,” it was the first thematic argument within the dialogue to attempt to ground existence in some momentary out-of-place and out-of-time no-“thing” that, in a sense was looking for the meta-of physics. On the other hand, the “heaps” not only deny this meta ground but are in themselves their own in-time “beginning.” The elaboration of their nature hieratically but profoundly grasps that the same problem attached to an endless chain of hypotheses is present in the endlessness of the phenomenon, namely an infinite regress and the loss of the relationship between *noesis* and its *noematic* content.

The argument begins with the different things and how are they differentiated, if the One is in no state at all. It is surmised that “they’re different than one another, then. For this is all that’s left to them, or else they’re different than nothing” (164c). But for the different things, to differentiate themselves is rendered only an appearance or seeming differentiation:

Then they’re all different from one another in multitude; for they could not be so one by one, since one is not. Instead each heap of them, so it

looks, is limitless in multitude. For even if someone shall grasp what seems to be the smallest thing, just like a dream in sleep there appears instantaneously a many in the place of what seemed to be one, and in the place of the smallest thing there appears something very great in relation to anything chopped off from it. (164c–d)

Positive finitude, necessity and limit are lost in this endless realm of seeming distinctions.

And so will there be many heaps, each appearing to be one but not really so, if in fact there'll be no one? . . . And number will seem to belong to them, if in fact each seems to be one while they are many . . . And so some will appear to be odd and other even—but they won't be so in truth, if in fact there'll be no One. (164d–e)

But they won't be so in truth: the different things will be an endless chain of appearing to be, odd and even, equal and unequal, great and small—concealed and unconcealed for there is no One or truth, or end or *ananke stenai* to ground these appearances in their reality. This is the no-way of the *Poem of Parmenides* (fr. 6): “the one from which mortals knowing nothing wander, two-headed; for helplessness in their breasts guides their distracted mind; and they are carried deaf and blind alike, dazed, uncritical tribes, by whom to be and not to be have been thought both the same and not the same; and the path of all is backward-turning.”

And, to be sure, each heap will be thought to be equal to the many small things. For it would pass from greater to less, it appears, before seeming to enter into the middle—but this would be an appearance of equality. And so, while having a limit in relation to a different heap, does it have in relation to itself neither beginning nor limit nor middle? (165a)

If then there is no end to these heaps can there be a beginning? Can there be anything Other at all? Can there be the same between thinking and being? And if not, what about knowledge, and those who try to grasp the “heaps”?

Because whenever someone, by his understanding, takes hold of one of these things as belonging to such heaps, then a different beginning will always appear before the beginning, and another end will be left over after the end, and in the middle there'll be different middles more middle

than the middle—but smaller, since we can't grasp each one of them because the One is not. (165a–b)

The descriptive immediacy of the phenomenon brings a genuine appearance of otherness but without the necessary move toward its reference in Being itself, doesn't this description lose itself in endlessness and therefore lose its initial thrust toward intelligibility?

And so to anyone seeing such a thing from afar and faintly, won't it necessarily appear to be one? But to someone thinking about it up close and sharply, doesn't each one appear limitless in multitude, if in fact it's devoid of the One that is not? Just as to someone standing far from a drawing, everything there, appearing to be one, appears to have experienced the same situation . . . But when he comes closer they appear many and other and, by the appearance of the Other, of another sort and unlike themselves. (165c–d)

That which appears, the things themselves, are the initial entrance into truth in the form of the concealed-unconcealed, but it cannot be the final word. Just as the beginning is known to be the end only in the end, or the final principle is the first but only insofar as the final principle has been grasped, so the immediacy of being-in-the-world sustains its world in transcendence. This entrance into truth in the world is directed toward an end as en-closure, the very *veritas/verum* Heidegger rejects. And without it there is, as seen in the final argument, no mode of Being and no truth at all.

Because the different things have no community—no way, no how—with any of the things that are not; nor do any of the things that are not relate to any of the different things. For the things that are not have no part . . . Then there would be no opinion about anything that is not among the different things, nor any appearance, and—no way, no how—whatever is not is not opined by the different things. (166a)

The dialogue has demonstrated the need to connect and secure knowledge to its origin *qua* end, the presuppositional intentional ground. It has shown this through its repeated failures to grasp the nature of the relationship between Being and thinking, I and other, universal and particular. At the core of each failure is the failure to come to a necessary stop which in turn promotes infinite regressions. If indeed the *ananke stenai* is the necessary precondition of knowledge, framing and completing the

intentional experience of the ultimate other as Other, then one of the essential questions of intentionality must be the question of attachment. In a word, if the *ananke stenai* reveals that fundamental Other upon which man structures his knowledge, how then is man related or attached to this Other? Uncovering the nature of this attachment lies in a fully ratified and faithful epistemological expansion of the fourfold intentional presupposition. And while Plato's *Parmenides* has brought forth this need in its radicality, Aristotle's *De Anima* goes a long way in epistemologically laying bare its necessary structure.

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Tracing III: Aristotle's *De Anima*

This tracing of intentionality arrives at its first organized epistemological explication in Aristotle's *De Anima*.⁶⁷ His examination into the breadth and nature of the soul raises the onto-epistemological question of attachment: what must be presupposed in order for the soul to be, in a way, and therefore to think, all things? In the order of investigation the question of what an agent does precedes the question of what enables it to do what it does.⁶⁸ And what it does of course involves the object of its activity. And thus the only starting point is, in a sense, the end of the activity, from which is tracked the nature of its operation, from which is further tracked the enabling ontological principle. What does this mean if not that we start from where we are and not from where we are not. And where are we? In the sensible world. While his predecessors arrived at the need for a first principle as the defining origin within Being to which existence and knowledge must relate, they had not been able to give a satisfactory account of that relationship of fittingness and attachment. The *De Anima* examines the attempts of both pre-Socratic thinkers and Plato, giving an account of their shared fatal flaw: their first principles could not withstand infinite regressions and consequent epistemological dead ends. By placing as "first" a property which operated within the material order, the pre-Socratic materialists had overlooked to their detriment the possibility that something qualitatively different must be the proper onto-logical first and as such the necessary origin and end in the orders of explanation and Being. Aristotle's overview of their ontological shortcomings uncovers the essential need for and working unity of each aspect of the intentional presuppositional fourfold. Therefore, it is necessary to begin this examination of Aristotle's

De Anima with his critique of his predecessors. In particular, the questions of the *ananke stenai* and finitude or attachment and the notion of “touch” as an analogy for the entire metaphysical-intentional apparatus of being-in-the-world serve to illuminate his understanding of how the soul is in a way all things.

Aristotle’s Critique of Earlier First Principles

Aristotle’s treatment of the various pre-Socratic theories can be divided into several themes, each pointing toward a fundamental interrelationships within the problem of knowledge: (1) confusing the nature of the First Principle as that which belongs within the elemental order of material explanation; (2) this confusion is occasioned by a further epistemological fumbling of the presupposition that “like is known by like,” relegating that likeness to the material order; (3) the inevitable result of this problem is infinite regression and, as in Plato’s *Parmenides*, each regression is a systematic annihilation of Being and therewith genuine knowledge; (4) as man enters this *aporia*, this thicket of nonbeing, Aristotle points toward the lack of and need for a genuine unifying or combining principle—a stop and end in the order of explanation—the proper complementarity to knowledge that makes it to be bounded or enclosed, i.e., that makes it to be knowledge. This notion of bounded calls to mind the question and nature of *veritas*. For Aristotle, truth is the form of knowledge in the way that the soul is the form of the body, the essence which gives the matter shape, limit, dependency and existence.

The theory handed down from the Pythagoreans seems to entail the same view; for some of them have declared that the soul is identical with the particles of the air, and others what makes these particles move. These particles have found their place in the theory because they can be seen perpetually in motion even when the air is completely calm. Those who say that the soul is that which moves itself tend towards the same view. For they all assume that movement is the distinctive characteristic of the soul, and that everything else owes its movement to the soul, which they suppose to be self-moved, because they see nothing producing movement which does not itself move. (Aristotle, *De Anima*, 404a19–25)

Empedocles, for instance, thought that the soul was composed of all the elements, and yet considered each of these to be a soul. (404b10–12)

In these passages, the primary mistake of the earlier thinkers was to consider the First Principle to be of the same substantial nature as the things that refer to it, namely material movement. With Empedocles the First Principle is rightly reflected within and by the soul, but unfortunately he does not separate the nature of the soul from the nature of that which it apprehends, thereby negating the reality of the soul *qua* soul, or as that which can exist for the sake of itself.

For Aristotle, that which can consider all things must be able to take on the form of the object, and as such must be potentially its object. Therefore the soul must be qualitatively different from that which it apprehends. If the soul were one or another material element within the order of explanation it could not become the other in thought, i.e., the apple cannot become the orange; at best it could only become another apple.

In a word, to the extent that a material thing can be said or conceived to “know” a thing, the only thing it could be conceived to “know” is of the same material nature, an apple to an apple and an orange to an orange; in no way could it know or become all things because knowledge is an inverse ratio to materiality. If the presupposition “like unto like” is confused as a comparison to the material order there is no genuine differentiation between the two likenesses. The conception of “same” would then reflect only a deprived state of being; they would be indistinct from each other, confined to their own posited identity. In the following passages this misapplied “like unto like” is exposed:

In the same way, in the *Timaeus*, Plato constructs the soul out of the elements. For he maintains that “like” can only be known by “like,” and that from these first beginnings grow the things which we perceive. (404b16–20)

Heracleitus also calls the first principle soul, as the emanation from which he constructs all other things; it is the most incorporeal and in ceaseless flux: he, like many others, supposed that a thing moving can only be known by something which moves, and that all that exists is in motion. (405a25–29)

This kind of “like unto like” presents the same difficulty evident throughout Plato’s *Parmenides*; the whole is no greater than the sum total of its parts and thereby ultimately ceases to have any real and distinct existence at all:

For they say that “like” is known by “like”; for since everything is known by the soul, they construct it of all the principles. (405b15–17)

Without an analogical and immaterial sense of “like unto like” wherein the likeness is based on a sameness of ratio or proportion between the respective terms or pairs, the presupposition will inevitably enter an epistemological absurdity, because ultimately whatever “likeness” posited is only to be unhinged in an endless and infinite series of existing things. That is to say, the order of explanation would go on to infinity “explaining” one thing that cannot account for itself by another thing which cannot account for itself, never reaching a stop and thus self-defeating as an explanation. If this likeness is not found in the respective ways in which the terms are related to each other in the two pairs, in a feature that differentiates the instances, then there is nothing different about the First Principle that really places it as ontologically first in the order of being as well as (and because) the stop in the order of thinking:

Its supporters assume that like is recognized by like, as though they thus identified the soul with the things it knows. But these elements are not the only things existing; there are many—to be more exact, infinitely many—other things, composed of elements. (410a6–10)

It is no use for the elements to exist in the soul, unless the ratios and the principle of composition also exist in it; for each element will recognize its like, but there will be nothing in the soul to recognize bone, for instance, or man, unless they too exist in it. (410a6–10)

In sum, reducing the metaphysical intentional presupposition “like unto like” to a base comparison of material factors, wherein the whole is no greater than its parts, provokes an infinite regress, wherein the mind can never grasp or exhaust the object it seeks to grasp:

For if it is a magnitude, how can it think? With any one of its parts indifferently? The parts must be regarded either as magnitudes or points, if one can call a point a part. In the latter case, since the points are infinite in number, the mind obviously can never exhaust them; in the former, it will think the same thoughts very many or an infinite number of times. (407a11–16)

And if the mind can never exhaust these objects that are infinite in number, can it ever come to rest, can the mind know anything at all?

Again, in each of these first principles there will be more ignorance than understanding; for each will know one thing but will know only one thing, but will be ignorant of many, in fact of everything else. On Empedocles’

view at least it follows that God must be most unintelligent; for He alone will be ignorant of one of these elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures will know them all; for each individual is composed of them all. (410b1–7)

The preceding passage mirrors quite strikingly the difficulty in Plato's *Parmenides* when the "same" between thinking and Being had broken down, when Socrates realized at a certain point in the gymnastic that the gods would be beyond any real possibility of thinking or speaking Being: "What an altogether wondrous speech, if it strips the gods of knowing!"⁶⁹ Similarly for Aristotle "like unto like" has collapsed epistemologically, for it lacked the feature that differentiates its likenesses. The result is quite clear: if the First Principle is not a real unifying or combining principle, and has no global role to play in the act of existence, then the knowledge of sensibles not only cannot reflect or relate to the being of knowledge itself but is actually opposed:

There would be a further difficulty in deciding what is the unifying principle, for the elements correspond to matter, and the force, whatever it is, which combines them is supreme; but it is impossible that anything should be superior to and control the soul or (a fortiori) the mind; for it is reasonable to suppose that the mind is by nature original and dominant, but they say that the elements are the first of all existing things. (410b11–16)

Aristotle's most remarkable insights concerning the difficulty surrounding the real nature of a First Principle are found in his criticism of Plato's identification of the movement of the soul with the spatial movements of the heavenly bodies. In effect Plato shares the same fatal flaw of the pre-Socratics: not grasping the idea that a genuine beginning negates the possibility of continuing *ad infinitum* within the order of explanation. "Clearly there is a beginning, and the causes of things are not infinite, either as a series or in a kind. For neither can one thing come from something else as from matter *ad infinitum* (for example, flesh from earth, earth from water, water from fire, and so on without end), nor can the source which begins motion (for example, a man is moved by air, air by the sun, the sun by Strife, and so on without limit) be such."⁷⁰ Again, a genuine beginning or first principle could not be valid if it allowed its referents to continue to infinity. This entails that a true and analogical understanding of "the soul is in a way all things," wherein "like unto like" and "the same is for thinking as

for Being” require that thinking has its limit in the *ananke stenai*, thus uniting thought to Being:

But, if it can only think when its whole circle is in contact, what does the contact of its parts mean? Again, how can it think that which has parts with that which has not, or that which has not with that which has? The mind must be identical with this circle; for the movement of the mind is thinking, and the movement of a circle is revolution. If then thinking is revolution, then the circle whose revolution is of this kind must be mind. But what can it be which mind always thinks?—as it must if the revolution is eternal. All practical thinking has limits (for it always has an object in view), and speculation is bounded like the verbal formulae which express it. (407a18–26)

Might we not anticipatorily compare the endless conversion of the Heideggerian concealed and unconcealed to the circle whose revolution reflects the mind’s thinking? And without an enclosure *qua verum/veritas*—a first principle or beginning *qua* end reached by the *ananke stenai*, in which speculation is bounded like the verbal formulae which express it, then what happens to thinking about Being?: “Moreover, the final cause is an end, and as such it does not exist for the sake of something else but others exist for its sake. Thus, if there is to be such one which is last, the process will not be infinite; but if there is no such, there will be no final cause. But those who introduce an infinite series are unaware of the fact that they are eliminating the nature of the good, although no one would try to do anything if he did not intend to come to a limit. Nor would there be intellect in the world; for at any rate, he who has an intellect always acts for the sake of something, and this is a limit, for the end is a limit . . . for without it, knowledge would be impossible.”⁷¹ And thus, even ethics and the political realm would be rendered meaningless.

Aristotle has made it quite clear that a material first principle annihilates Being and knowledge because this kind of “first” denotes nothing more than a position on a grid, a numeric “first” of infinite points on a line, a first stripped of its privileged status. This kind of “beginning” does not possess the ability to end its succession of events and if considered to be “first” onto-logically will unfortunately introduce an infinite series eliminating the nature of the good. The *ananke stenai* is the antithesis of an infinite regress; it is the necessary stop at the end of the order of explanation that allows knowledge to be possible as knowledge of Being.

In the *De Anima* the soul and its tools, the sensible organs, share a participated likeness in the *ananke stenai*. This likeness or “sameness” discloses the nature of the *ananke stenai*. But of course this “sameness” is understood analogically; the soul is the “same,” so to speak, because its total immaterial dependence on the *ananke stenai* is the framework of all knowledge. A concise account of the qualitative nature of the *ananke stenai* will answer how the soul is the form of the body as well as, in a way, all things.

When Aristotle’s analysis of movement begins with the notion “that it is not necessary that that which produces movement should itself move,”⁷² he has distanced himself immeasurably from the pre-Socratics. For he has discovered that if all things exist in the context of something else, then their cause-and-effect existence must necessarily be prefigured upon a Cause that in no way was in turn an effect of a prior cause, i.e., this Cause must exist in and for its own sake, in a word, movement must halt in order to be movement:

But that which has self-movement as part of its essence cannot be moved by anything else except incidentally: just as that which is good in itself is not good because of anything else, and that which is good for its own sake is not good for the sake of anything else. (406b13–15)

Aristotle appears to argue on behalf of this for-the-sake-of-itself-Cause, this need for a stop in the realm of causes and movements through the nature of the soul and its tools, the sense organs, as an analogy for the *ananke stenai*. He notes that if all movement is a displacement of that which is moved *qua* moved then the essential nature of the soul is lost, subsumed by an endless series of movements:

Moreover, if the soul moves itself, it is also itself moved, so that, if all movement is a displacement of that which is moved *qua* moved, then the soul must depart from its essential nature, if it does not move itself accidentally, but movement is part of its very essence . . . In general the living creature does not appear to be moved by the soul in this way, but by some act of the mind or will. (406b–26)

Isn’t this endless series of movements *qua* movements like a series of appearances wherein there is no real differentiation but only a seeming distinction between entities? Isn’t this kind of continual upheaval of one appearance by another similar to the difficulty in Plato’s *Parmenides* when “the heaps” anticipate the problem of phenomenological endlessness?

The problem of “the heaps” was that if the One is in no state at all, what then are the different things and how are they differentiated? The argument rejects a state of rest or meta ground in which being resides and is fully realized, and in a sense it affirms that movement *qua* movement can go on forever. It denies that “thinking seems more like a state of rest or halting than a movement” (407a32–33).

That the soul comes to a halt in thought reflects its participated likeness with the *ananke stenai*, the point to which all things necessarily refer in knowledge. This end evidenced in the soul’s halting in knowledge allows man to name because it is the origin of all names which have and can be spoken, thus establishing what neither Plato nor the pre-Socratics could, the possibility of an unchangeable knowledge of changeable things! This halting of movement within the order of explanation is illustrated, for example, when soul and its tools are said necessarily to perceive themselves. They are able to accomplish this because without it nothing including themselves could be named:

Since we can perceive that we see and hear, it must be either by sight itself, or by some other sense. But then the same sense must perceive both sight and colour, the object of sight. So that either two senses perceive the same object, or sight perceives itself. Again if there is a separate sense perceiving sight, either the process will go on *ad infinitum*, or a sense must perceive itself. (425b12–16)

Being-in-the-world is never outside the need to halt in order to accomplish the function of its respective faculty, from sensing to speculation. All things tend toward an end.

The *ananke stenai*, the non-entitative trans-ontic appropriating presence that causally defines entities, seems to be present both within and outside the soul as the combining or unifying principle or condition of all knowledge. “Within” the soul because the *ananke stenai* is evidenced by the soul as the form of the body. “Outside” of the soul because it is the reference point or *telos* of all the soul’s knowledge including its self-knowledge. The paradox of this within-and-without relationship lies in the notion that the soul is analogously the “same” as the *ananke stenai*. This “same” captures, through a marriage of immanence and self-transcendence, the unbreakable, inseparable unity of the soul to its body and to its world in its participated likeness with the *ananke stenai*. Of course, death breaks and separates this unity of soul and body, and thus the question of immortality is the soul’s natural problematic: does participation in the logos entail the immortality of the soul?

The *ananke stenai* is both within-and-without because it is not a thing, but rather as a no-thing, the combining or unifying causal principle that allows for the “same” between thinking and Being. The soul has an immanently existent sameness with the *ananke stenai* known self-transcendently. When an intellectual soul in act pursues an end, it pursues it in the immanence pertaining to its intellectual capacity. But the immediacy of the intellectual act is underscored paradoxically, but essentially, by the meaning of the soul as the form of the body. As the form of the body, the soul is, in a way, an exteriorized nature. In a word, the soul needs to be in the sensible world. Thereby the immanently speculative act is always accompanied by self-transcendence; this is not to its detriment but to its fulfillment, for self-transcendence is the onto-logical recognition that man’s origin is found outside the “I,” and thereby outside any idealist rendering. Through this marriage of immanence and self-transcendence, the soul is the “same” as the *ananke stenai*, but a sameness that is prefigured upon the soul’s utter and total dependency on the latter, and without which the soul would lose its self-identity.

Aristotle identifies the unifying principle as something like an unmeasured measurer, that which is the onto-logical end *qua* beginning of the measuring process because it is the discernible agent of itself and its opposite: “only one of a pair of contraries is needed to discern both itself and its opposite. For instance, by that which is straight we discern both straight and crooked; for the carpenter’s rule is a test of both, but the crooked tests neither itself nor the straight.”⁷³ Thus the combining principle must give all the things which correspond or refer to it their unity. Unity is not the same as the total of units, i.e., a series of numeric parts equaling a numeric whole. Nor is it the phenomenological endlessness of the “heaps” wherein the difference between one phenomenon and the next is solely in terms of their position or order of appearance, no matter how descriptively rich.

It would seem to make no difference whether we speak of units or minute particles; for if we suppose Democritus’ spherical atoms to be converted into points and to retain nothing but their quantitative nature, there will still be in each of them something which moves and something which is moved, just as in a continuum. . . . There must, then, be something to give movement to the units. . . . But how can this possibly be a unit? Such a unit must differ inherently from the others. But what difference can a unit which is a point exhibit, except position? . . . And yet if two units can be in the same place, why not an infinite number? . . . For

there appear to be points infinitely many, indeed—in all of them. And again how is it possible to separate the points. (409a10–29)

Unity means that the whole or the combining principle is immeasurably greater (perhaps onto-theo-logic in nature) than the sum total of its parts; otherwise, without it, the descriptive tracing of parts would proceed *ad infinitum*:

Some say that the soul has parts, and thinks with one part, and desires with another. In this case what is it which holds the soul together, if it naturally consists of parts? Certainly not the body: on the contrary the soul seems rather to hold the body together; at any rate when the soul is gone the body dissolves into air and decays. If then some other thing gives the soul unity, this would really be the soul. But we shall inquire again, whether this is a unity or has many parts. If it is a unity, why should not the soul be directly described as a unit? And if it has parts, the progress of the argument will again demand to know what is its combining principle, and thus we shall proceed *ad infinitum*. (411b5–15)

The combining principle evident in the soul's participated likeness with the *ananke stenai* must retain its identity when identifying and differentiating its referents, otherwise it would not be the soul, which is defined as, in a way, all things:

Since what is tasted is wet, the organ which perceives it must be neither actually liquid nor incapable of liquefaction; for taste is affected by the object of taste, in so far as it is tasted. Hence there must be liquefaction of the organ of taste without loss of identity, but not liquid . . . what is capable of tasting is that which potentially has these qualities; and the tasteable is that which actualizes this potentiality. (422b1–145)

In a word, if “the senses perceive each other’s proper objects incidentally, not in their own identity,”⁷⁴ then there must be an origin which does identify them in their identity. This origin is the combining or unifying principle that does not annihilate its constituents and thereby enables for identification.

Aristotle emerges from the Platonic *aporia* by relating the individual form to the particular sensible. The science of Being *qua* Being must extend also to the sensible universe and so to the causes peculiar to

changeable things.⁷⁵ Man as the knowing referent announces the meaning of Being because his soul is in a way all things because in knowing I am the other as other because the same is for thinking and Being. Herein and only herein can be found the resolution to the epistemological-metaphysical problem of universals, upon the wreckage of which in the late medieval nominalist-realist debate all of modern thought was founded.

When following the causal clues to the world and his origin *qua* end, man is not as phenomenology contends passing over the world of beings. Rather, it is this action that corresponds epistemologically to his uniquely privileged soul: "it [the mind or reasoning faculty] seems to be a distinct kind of soul, and it alone admits of being separated, as the immortal from the perishable."⁷⁶ Participation in the logos entails, or rather means immortality, at least for the reasoning "part" of the soul. Here Aristotle reveals himself a genuine phenomenologist, for immortality is a fact to be described, like knowledge itself, and not a hypothesis to be proved. Further if man is the privileged being who announces Being, doesn't this privilege entail not only that he assists in articulating the meaning of Being but that he is a participant in the formation of the meaning of Being? This does not mean man constitutes the Being of the world, but that he does constitute his knowledge of the world, and that this active and appropriative constitution is precisely that which defines man as a participant (with a participated likeness) in the formation of the meaning of Being.

Thus the idea of causality is not a founded conceptual apparatus or artificial template but a reflection of man's nature. In a word, his privilege is his knowledge of causal being, and this causality exists on the level not merely of material explanation but in terms of the soul which "alone is immortal and everlasting."⁷⁷ And his nature which is causal and referential points not only toward the onto-logic but, as somehow immortal, to the onto-theo-logic.⁷⁸

For Aristotle, all explanation of movement must come to a stop. The soul's participated likeness with the *ananke stenai*, particularly in the paradoxical interplay between immanence and self-transcendence, characterizes every act of human existence as rooted in its intentional structure. Therefore every act of this privileged being is directed toward an end *qua* beginning. The soul is a beginning for it is "the principle of animal life."⁷⁹ And it is the beginning *qua* end:

The soul is the cause and first principle. Also the actuality of that which exists potentially is its essential formula. Clearly the soul is also the cause in a final sense. For just as mind acts with some purpose in view, so too does nature, and this purpose is its end. In living creatures the soul

supplies such a purpose, and this is in accordance with nature, for all natural bodies are instruments of the soul. (415b14–20)

Within this framework, the soul can be, in a way, all things because within it, the “same” is for thinking as for being. Knowledge is always coming to terms with existence when it affirms analogically the existence of what-is. The nature of the “same” between thinking and Being reflects the framework of intentionality when the end is understood as the beginning.

Intentionality is the starting point of being-in-the-world, as the ineluctable and necessary ground of all knowledge. The irreconcilable divide between Heideggerian and Thomistic intentionality will be at its core the debate over the nature of this ground. Is it causal and metaphysical wherein the beginning is the end as an origin *qua ananke stena?* Or, is the “origin” quite the opposite, an in-time *Ereignis* grounding the appropriation of beings as they appear in a groundless and endless flux of the concealed and unconcealed? The answer lies in discovering whether it is a metaphysical or a phenomenological epistemology that “fits” and describes the intentional ground. Either the endlessness of the phenomena cannot account for knowledge because it never reaches the end and thereby never reaches Being, or metaphysical causality is a succession of artificially founded hermeneutic suppressions passing over the world of being-at-hand, reducing it to a mere and epistemologically manipulatable present-at-hand.

Our tracing of Aristotle’s epistemology and its relationship to the intentional ground is not intended to resolve this debate, but only to lay bare his epistemological method as points toward a further analysis of the kind of “fittingness” proper to intentionality.

When Aristotle surmises that “if there is no one common method of finding the essential nature, our handling of the subject becomes still more difficult,”⁸⁰ he has asserted the relation between the intentional ground and its epistemological manifestation. Just as the intentional ground must be the appropriating base of all things, its epistemological method must mirror it, possessing a “common method of finding the essential nature” of the subject. Without this common method or starting point a milieu of epistemological difficulties ensue from infinite regressions to double truths and absurdities.

What then characterizes this starting point? There appears to be in Aristotle’s epistemological methodology something framing or enclosing *qua veritas/verum* the intentional act of being-in-the-world. This enclosure is the epistemological abode of the end *qua* beginning evidenced by the starting point of knowledge as grasped within the underlying cause, i.e., the

essential nature of the subject or the entity as announced. It seems that being-in-the-world not only requires but is this enclosure (*veritas*) in its two levels of beginning *qua* end, the onto-logical/metaphysical and the order of appearances. These two sets of origin *qua* end are fundamental interdependencies carving out the framework for which man is in the world as a knower wherein the “same” between thinking and Being has been cast against its proper enclosure, so as not to negate the absolute hegemony of Being. If the onto-logic origin *qua* end was posited to exist alone over and against the order of appearances then the problem of the Platonic forms and its idealistic deviants would undoubtedly emerge. On the other hand, the order of appearances divorced from any onto-logical combining or unifying principle would reduce the world of being to shadow semblances because Being, like the heaps, would have no state at all.

For Aristotle, all sensation is a being-affected. This does not mean that sensation is only purely passive. As we shall see, sense knowledge plays a fundamental and indeed revelatory part in the enunciation of man’s being-in-the-world.⁸¹ Being-in-the-world exists only insofar as man is affected and conditioned in knowledge by the framework or enclosure (*veritas*) of this twofold end *qua* beginning. Within this necessary enclosure man exists as the knowing subject affected by and affecting the entitative world. His self-knowledge is prefigured by these causal relational affections which are halted in the order of explanation or appearance so that man may announce the meanings of their being. This twofold end *qua* beginning, the order of appearances and the ontological order, are mirrored in the soul’s paradoxical interplay of immanence and self-transcendence. As such, the soul’s ontological grasping of the origin *qua* end is dependent upon the order of appearances but this order is realized because, the soul does not merely register these appearances by marking off their order as they become unconcealed and then re-concealed, but understands them. Man is in a way a participant in these appearances themselves as the epistemological enclosure (*veritas*) around them. Without this active participation, man could not speak of the things themselves. Genuinely to be the privileged being-in-the-world means not only to assist in articulating the meaning of Being but also be a participant in the formation of that meaning.⁸² This active participation alone allows for thinking and Being to be the “same” while still maintaining the former as being-in-reference to the absolute hegemony of Being. His epistemological method culminates in the articulation of the most important definition of the intentional experience: “for in the case of things without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for speculative knowledge is the same as its object.”⁸³ Aristotle announces

this intentional truth, that the soul is in a way all things *qua* the same is for thinking as for Being, several times throughout the *De Anima*. An overview of the way in which the soul is the same as its object will lay the ground for articulating the core of classical intentionality.

The framework of beginning *qua* end allows for the real distinction and the real likeness between the soul and the world it apprehends. The likeness attained is based on locating the reality of the difference as difference i.e., “a thing is acted upon in one sense by like, in another by unlike; for while it is being acted upon it is unlike, but when the action is complete, it is like.”⁸⁴ When the action is completed, man has reached his end, his *telos*, the difference as difference, the combining/unifying principle, the *ananke stenai* because, he has, in a way, enclosed (*veritas*) the object in knowledge. This enclosure is not a static likeness in the univocal sense of the pre-Socratics or an unrelatable and irreducible difference found among the sensibles in regard to the Platonic forms. The “same” that resides between the soul and its object is a dynamic and appropriative unity grounded in the difference as difference.⁸⁵

This marriage of likeness and difference, immanence and self-transcendence is maintained within the soul’s participated likeness in the *ananke stenai*. This participation reflects that the soul is in a way all things only insofar as it acts within the framework of thought needing to catch-up to Being, its *telos* or *ananke stenai*. Therefore the analogous nature of the “same” underscores the way in which the soul is all things. In a word, the soul in knowledge is ordered always in terms of dependency. This soul needs to enter its unity with its *telos* in order to be the “same” as the object it apprehends.⁸⁶

This unity is achieved not because the soul passes over the world of beings in mere abstraction, rather, the soul needs to be an exteriorized existence in order to be the other in knowledge. Only in activity, in actuality, are the object and agent the “same.” As Aristotle notes, “knowledge when actively operative is identical with its object.”⁸⁷

If it [knowing] is analogous to perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is thinkable, or something else of a similar kind. This part, then, must (although impassive) be receptive of the form of an object, i.e., must be potentially the same as its object, although not identical with it: as the sensitive to the sensible, so must mind be to what is thinkable. It is necessary then that mind, since it thinks all things, should be uncontaminated, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may be in control, that is, that it may know. (429a12–19)

The potentiality to be the “same” is the necessary precondition of the privileged soul always in reference to its *telos*. In reaching its *telos*, the soul actualizes that precondition and becomes in a way all things, becoming the other in an immaterial act, enclosing the other in its knowledge. The soul does not reach this end by stepping outside the world. On the contrary, this end or sameness is reached only within the world. This end might be the door to the divine but it is not a reduction of the world; it is its fulfillment. This door is entered only through being a participant in the formation of the meaning of being and thereby acting in a manner that entrenches and exteriorizes the soul as being-in-the-world. The causal structure of the world is the door through which the soul becomes all things; it is a deepening of the intentional experience, that deadly serious game of trying to catch up in knowledge to Being. Where the soul is in a way all things *qua* the same is for thinking as for being, man discovers that the end was and is the beginning all along, in an eternity that unfolds in dependency, in being-in-the-world, reminding us of the goddess’ cryptic remark: “And it is all one to me where I am to begin; for I shall return there again.”⁸⁸

It is essential not to overlook that the soul is in a way all things *qua* the same is for thinking as for Being primarily because the way in which the soul is the same as its object requires being-in-the-world as dependency or finitude. Aristotle uses the notion of “touch” as an analogy for the way in which the soul is an exteriorized nature extended out into the world of Being.⁸⁹ The exteriority of the soul conveys immanence as necessarily involved in self-transcendence, just as the I depends upon the other for its self-knowledge or the universal is realized in the particular. This last notion—the universal as realized in the particular—is of great importance for understanding the way in which the soul is all things. As earlier noted, the soul is the form of the body and form conveys limit or boundary. The soul gives the body its shape as this or that particular individual. The soul encloses around the body giving it its form and *entelechy*. Because it is fitted or attached not merely to any body but to a certain kind of existence, this particularity denotes dependency. For Aristotle, finitude as embodiment is not an impediment to reaching the first principles, the Universal or the *ananke stenai*, but is the necessary prefigurement of self-transcendence.⁹⁰

Touch as Being-in-the-World

The distinguishing characteristics of the body, qua body, are tangible; by distinguishing characteristics I mean those which differentiate the elements. The tactile

organ which perceives them, i.e., that in which the sense of touch, as it is called, primarily resides, is a part which has potentially the qualities of the object touched. For perception is a form of being acted upon. Hence that which an object makes actually like itself is potentially such already. This is why we have no sensation of what is as hot, cold, hard, or soft as we are, but only of what is more so, which implies that the sense is a sort of mean between the relevant sensible extremes. That is how it can discern sensible objects. It is the mean that has the power of discernment; for it becomes an extreme in relation to each of the extremes in turn; and just as that which is to perceive white and black must be actually neither, but potentially both (and similarly with the other senses) so in the case of touch it must be neither hot nor cold.

(423b26–424a9)

Aristotle uses “touch” as an analogy for the soul as an exteriorized nature, as that which is potentially all things because it is the mean or the combining/unifying principle of its sensible constituents. Unlike the other senses, touch does not have a medium between the sensible and the sense organ, and therefore the world is immediately apprehended.⁹¹ In order for the other senses to employ a medium or distancing factor, they must depend upon an underlying and immediate involvement in the world so that their knowledge is genuinely entitative.⁹² This immediacy of apprehension and the exteriorization of the soul as a kind of “touching” of the world are thereby an important analogy for the legitimacy of classical and metaphysical intentionality. If classical intentionality requires the “organ of organs” to be an exteriorized nature, then it has understood being-in-the-world as the necessary and primary precondition of the intentional presence.

The world participates in the act of intentionality. Intentionality is an inescapable component of existence just as “the first essential factor of sensation that we all share, is a sense of touch.”⁹³ If the soul is like “touch” and “touch” exists only insofar as there is a world to grasp, then classical intentionality has recognized that what makes both touch and the soul the “most indispensable”⁹⁴ faculties are their inseparability from and immediacy within the world.

As the privileged being who participates in the formation, meaning and announcement of Being, man must be involved in the world, so much so that the soul is, in a way, the “same” as the world. Compared to other animals, the human touch must be much more discriminating and that is why of living creatures man is the most intelligent.⁹⁵ Therefore the combining/unifying principle or mean that allows for the soul to be in a way all things is not realized because the soul is postulated to be a “separate” existence apart

from the world. On the contrary, the privilege of the soul is the ability for the greatest involvement in the world. The soul, like touch, is potentially all things because it is the most available and most exteriorized to receive all things:

It is also clear why plants do not feel, though they have one part of the soul, and are affected to some extent by objects touched, for they show both cold and heat; the reason is that they have no mean, i.e., no first principle such as to receive the form of sensible objects, but are affected by the matter at the same time as the form. (424a34–424b3)

The soul is the form of the body as the combining principle unifying the sensations, because it never leaves the world to define it as such:

The other sense organs perceive by contact too, but through a medium; touch alone seems to perceive immediately. Thus no one of these elements could compose the animal body. Nor could earth. Touch is a kind of mean between all tangible qualities, and its organ is receptive not only of all the different qualities of the earth, but also of hot, cold, and all other tangible qualities. This is why we do not perceive with our bones and hair, and such parts of the body, because they are composed of earth . . . touch there can be no other sense, and the organ of touch is composed neither of earth nor of any other single element. (435a18–435b5)

The analogy of “touch,” discloses finitude *qua* being-in-the-world as the vehicle of self-transcendence. This conception immeasurably distances the classical notion of intentionality from any Idealistic epistemology. But for finitude to be efficacious it must function within the enclosure, i.e., the beginning *qua* end wherein the unconcealment and concealment of appearances are elevated by man from their endlessness into their necessary form or end or enclosure.⁹⁶

The elevation of the unconcealed into *veritas* discloses man as a participant not only in the articulation but in the formation of the meaning of Being. It is not possible ontologically to announce without this underlying formation of or adherence to or dependency upon Being. This formation occurs when thinking catches-up to Being, by means of the *ananke stenai*. At the point of reaching this end, knowledge is achieved but attached, with the radical understanding of our utter dependence on that end or formation or enclosure for our knowledge. To announce without formation would

be to presuppose falsely an inordinate separation between the world and its privileged being (as for instance in the naive notions of “objectivity” contained in copy theories). Nor is it merely a separation in terms of the epistemological ability to abstract and become the object without matter, which rather would deny the need for the world in the most fundamental sense, in the act of knowledge itself. In a word, for Aristotle, finitude exists in the framework of the beginning *qua* end, because, for him, “all practical thinking has limits, and speculation is bounded like the verbal formulae which express it.”⁹⁷ This is epistemological realism, and it has nothing to do with proving the existence of an external world or even the possibility of knowledge.

Pre-Socratics favored the unbounded, unending, indefiniteness of soul in any body, and thereby gained no real knowledge of the soul and the world of Being, plummeting into a *reductio ad absurdum*:

These thinkers only try to explain what is the nature of the soul, without adding any details about the body which is to receive it; as though it were possible, as the Pythagorean stories suggest, for any soul to find its way into any body, which is absurd, for we can see that everybody has its own peculiar shape or form. Such a theory is like suggesting that carpentry can find its way into flutes; each craft must employ its own tools, and each soul its own body. (407b20–27)

It is not a body, it is associated with a body, and therefore resides in a body, and in a body of a particular kind; not at all as our predecessors supposed who fitted it to any body, without adding any limitations as to what body or what kind of body, although it is unknown for any chance thing to admit any other chance thing (. . .) for the actuality of each thing is naturally inherent in its potentiality that is in its own proper matter. (414a21–27)

Finitude reflects man’s self-knowledge that holds man and world together, and without which man would cease to know and cease to be man. That which holds man and world together is the limit implicit in the order of explanation: the locus of the “same” is for thinking as for Being *qua* the soul is in a way all things. This power to preserve,⁹⁸ as found in the soul as the form of the body, means recognizing the prescribed limit of a thing as the crucial connective signate between the nature of its origin and the meaning of its end:

But in the addition to this, what is it that holds fire and earth together when they tend to move in contrary directions? For they will be torn apart, unless there is something to prevent this; but if there is anything of the sort this will be the soul, and the cause of growth and nourishment. To some the nature of fire seems by itself to be the cause of nutrition and growth; for it alone of all bodies and elements seems to be nourished and grow of itself. Hence one might suppose that it is the operating principle in both plants and animals. It is in a sense a contributory cause, but not absolutely the cause, which is much more properly the soul; for the growth of fire is without limit, so long as there is something to be burned, but of all things naturally composed there is a limit or proportion of size and growth; this is due to the soul, not to fire, and to the essential formula rather than to matter. (416a5–19)