Immigration and Conflict in Europe

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1

Introduction

What explains immigrant conflict? Why do we observe clashes between immigrants and natives in some locations, but not in others? When do cities experience confrontations between immigrants and state actors? Why are some immigrant groups likely to become targets of native opposition, while others are more often engaged in conflicts with the state? What accounts for change in immigrant conflict within locales over time?

This book explains why, where, and when immigration leads to conflict in the areas of immigrant settlement. Immigration has been changing the faces of neighborhoods, cities, and countries across Europe, North America, and beyond. The large-scale inflow and permanent settlement of migrants is no longer confined to traditional immigration countries. In 2005, the share of foreign-born residents reached 12.5 percent in Austria and 12.1 percent in Germany, compared with 12.3 percent in the United States. In many other European countries approximately one in ten residents is born abroad (see Figure 1.1). Moreover, countries that have long been exporters of labor, such as Spain and Italy, have begun importing foreign workers and their families in large numbers. The magnitude of immigration manifests itself even more strikingly at the local level: Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, and New York are just some of the cities whose foreign-born residents constitute more than one-fourth of the population (Migration Policy Institute 2008).

Immigration is unlikely to abate in the near future. Confronting declining fertility rates, ailing pension systems, and pressing labor market needs, advanced industrialized economies provide the "pull" factors that drive international migration, while economic hardship and political unrest in less developed countries furnish the necessary "push" factors. Moreover, amid ongoing, sizeable migrant movements across borders, millions of previously settled immigrants are becoming permanent members of their adopted home countries; the number of foreign residents acquiring citizenship has followed an upward trend in



FIGURE 1.1. Percentage of foreign-born residents in selected countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (*Source:* OECD 2008).

many Western democracies.[1] Immigration is thus bound to have an enduring impact on the political systems and social fabrics of receiving societies.

As immigration and migrant settlement continue to be important, so will the need to recognize the conditions and mechanisms that link migration to conflict. While contemporary debates can give rise to the impression that the presence of immigrants and the ethnic communities they build necessarily spells strife, the incidence of immigrant conflict has in fact varied widely across settings and over time.[2] To help us understand why immigrant conflict occurs, this book begins with the observation that not all confrontations involving immigrants are the same. As I elaborate more fully in Chapter 2, I group immigrant conflict into two phenomena: immigrant–native conflict and immigrant–state conflict. *Immigrant–native conflict* involves the sustained confrontation between members of the immigrant and the native populations in a given locality. It consists of violent and nonviolent native opposition against immigrants, such as the local electoral success of xenophobic parties or physical attacks directed against

[1] Chapter 8 discusses these trends at greater length.

[2] I use the terms "immigrant" and "ethnic minority" interchangeably. I use the term "native" to refer to the white indigenous population who has lived in a given country for many generations. For a discussion of these labels, see Chapter 2.

migrant settlers. *Immigrant–state conflict* involves the sustained confrontation between members of the immigrant population and state actors in a given locality. Low-level flare-ups as well as major disturbances between immigrant-origin minorities and state actors, most often the police, are common indicators of this type of conflict.

Both faces of immigrant conflict display considerable variation across groups, cities, and countries. Concerning immigrant–native conflict in Great Britain, which is the main focus area of this book, the arrival of postcolonial migrants prompted the rise of the xenophobic National Front in London's East End. Nevertheless, many ethnically diverse western London boroughs as well as immigrant destinations farther north, such as Manchester or Liverpool, did not witness an electoral backlash against the newcomers. In the summer of 2001, major disturbances between Pakistani-origin youths and white residents hit the streets of Bradford; when Pakistanis first arrived, however, the city had been lauded as "the standing refutation of the argument that multi-racial communities are inevitably beset by racial troubles" (Spiers 1965, 154). Concerning immigrant–state conflict, large-scale confrontations between immigrants and the police shook British inner cities in the 1970s and 1980s. As I show in later chapters, however, not all ethnically diverse urban areas were affected, and not all immigrant groups participated equally in these clashes: Migrants of West Indian descent have tended to be involved in confrontations with the state, while their South Asian counterparts have been more likely to be targeted by native white Britons.

Compared to developments in Britain, the arrival and settlement of guest workers in Germany – another case discussed later in this book – has been associated with relatively lower levels of organized resistance on the part of the indigenous population. Large-scale riots between these migrants and their German neighbors or local electoral victories of the far right have been less pronounced. The same cannot be said, however, of the brief but vicious local campaigns that coincided with the migration of ethnic Germans[3] and political refugees in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The other face of immigrant conflict, confrontations between immigrants and state actors, has generally not been extensive in Germany, especially when they are placed in comparative perspective. Nevertheless, in the early 2000s, relations between the police and minority residents became strained in Berlin and elsewhere.[4]

Such variation in immigrant conflict outcomes is not unique to Britain and Germany. In France, for example, both types of conflict reveal checkered patterns. The far-right *Front National* has served as a model to many anti-immigrant movements in Europe. Its success, however, has fluctuated over the years and across towns. Furthermore, clashes between immigrants and the forces of law and order have not spread evenly throughout the country. Such

[3] Ethnic German migrants (*Aussiedler*) hail from Eastern Europe and countries in the former Soviet Union, but they are of German descent. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed definition.

[4] *Die Tageszeitung*, "Jugendliche fallen über Polizisten her," November 16, 2006.

violence first surfaced in the 1970s, appeared on a larger scale in the early 1980s, and erupted most forcefully in the fall of 2005 – yet some towns have largely escaped these confrontations. Marseille has generally not produced violent antistate disturbances, and much media attention indeed focused on the port city's record of relative calm during the 2005 riots. Just over a decade earlier, however, anti-immigrant activities had turned the city into the "racist capital of Europe."[5]

In neighboring Belgium, violent disturbances between the police and immigrant youths have taken place in some Brussels municipalities, while local anti-immigrant mobilization has been particularly striking in Antwerp, where the racist *Vlaams Blok* represented the largest party on the city's council between 1994 and 2006 and racist murders provoked riots and public outcries.[6] But while the xenophobic vote has enjoyed spectacular results in Flanders, in the Walloon region the racist *Front National* never achieved such success, despite similar shares of non-EU immigrants across regions.[7]

Beyond Europe's borders, local anti-immigrant mobilization and hate crime gained momentum in the United States in the 2000s. Public agitation led some towns to enact ordinances aimed at stopping the arrival of Hispanic migrants. At the same time, so-called sanctuary cities welcomed these newcomers with immigrant-friendly policies.[8] South Africa became the site of anti-immigrant killings in 2008, when a "spasm of xenophobia" hit its cities. A series of gruesome attacks against Zimbabweans, many of whom had settled in the area years ago, swept Johannesburg neighborhoods.[9] In sum, immigrant conflict has varied widely within and across receiving countries. Although clashes between immigrants and natives, as well as between immigrants and the state, continue to claim lives, cause property damage, and impede the integration of immigrants more generally, we still know very little about what causes these confrontations to emerge.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I present a brief overview of the book's theory of immigrant conflict. I then situate the argument in the existing theoretical and empirical debates in the second section (Chapter 2 contains a more extensive treatment of the theoretical framework and the state of the literature). In the third section I identify some of the main problems that scholars face when they attempt to explain the causes of

[5] See Singer (1991, 376). Chapter 8 follows immigrant conflict in France more closely.

[6] In 2002, the murder of a teacher of Moroccan origin by a white neighbor sparked off riots on Antwerp's streets; four years later, renewed racist killings led over 15,000 local residents to stage a protest march through the city. See *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, "Belgier demonstrieren gegen Rassismus," May 26, 2006.

[7] In 2000, 2.2 percent of Flanders' population and 2.1 percent of Wallonia's population were non-EU citizens; the total share of noncitizens is higher in Wallonia (10.1 percent) than it is in Flanders (4.9 percent); see Martiniello and Rea (2003).

[8] On the political debate about sanctuary cities, see *The New York Times*, "A Closer Look at the 'Sanctuary City' Argument," November 29, 2007.

[9] See, e.g., *The New York Times*, "South Africans Take out Rage on Immigrants," May 20, 2008.

immigrant conflict. The final section indicates how this study seeks to overcome these limitations by presenting an overview of the remaining chapters.

The Argument in Brief

This book develops a theory to explain why, where, and when immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict occur. I argue that the interaction of two variables – economic scarcity and immigrant electoral power – accounts for the incidence of immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict. Both kinds of conflict only occur in the context of local economic scarcity, when immigrants and natives compete for goods whose supply is relatively fixed in the short term. Differences in immigrants' electoral clout in turn lead to variation in the *type* of conflict we observe. When immigrants can back up their claims for scarce economic goods with pivotal votes, local politicians will allocate these resources to this new constituency. Natives are in turn likely to protest such distribution by turning against immigrants, producing immigrant–native conflict.

Conversely, in the absence of political leverage, immigrants are left with few resources during times of economic shortage. This state of affairs may leave natives content, forestalling immigrant–native conflict, but it is more likely to cause immigrants to engage in conflictual relations with state actors, producing immigrant–state conflict. Immigrants who do not possess the local political power to commit local politicians to disbursing scarce goods to them hope to effect a more favorable distribution of resources by inflicting costs on the state in the form of property damage and injury. Finally, I maintain that both types of conflict are more likely to occur when the state (rather than the market) is in charge of disbursing scarce goods; state actors are more sensitive than market actors to the costs that anti-immigrant (and obviously antistate) activities impose. The next chapter develops these propositions more fully.

Focusing on economic scarcity and immigrant electoral power in the local areas of migrant settlement yields a parsimonious model of immigrant conflict. A set of institutional and behavioral variables, however, shapes the ways in which these two key economic and political variables unfold locally. As I spell out more extensively in Chapter 2, immigration regimes may affect the degree of *economic scarcity* through their impact on the supply of, and demand for, economic goods in local immigrant destinations. While migrants generally tend to navigate toward areas where employment is plentiful, states may vary, for example, in the extent to which they match the recruitment of foreign labor with the supply of local physical infrastructures, such as housing or schools, leading to variation in local economic scarcity across countries. When governments encourage (or tolerate) immigration but do not take steps to help localities absorb the inflow of migrants, differences in economic conditions across cities and towns within countries will prove crucial. This situation characterizes post-war migration from Britain's former colonies to the mother country as well as much of the undocumented migration into the United States in the 1990s and 2000s.

Immigration regimes can also affect the level of migrant demands for economic goods. All else being equal, the same number of immigrants will put greater strains on local resources when the immigrants are parents and children as opposed to individual labor migrants. Political refugees arriving as families, for instance, are likely to place more demands on social and educational services than are young, single guest workers. Over time, however, primary economic migrants often reunite with their families in the host country, leading to increased demands on economic resources well after initial settlement.

National political institutions may also produce different levels of *immigrant political power*. Laws governing the acquisition of citizenship and access to local voting rights open up the potential for immigrant electoral influence. The ease with which immigrants can turn into citizens varies considerably across countries and, within countries, over time (Brubaker 1992; Howard 2006). Furthermore, some countries allow foreign nationals to cast votes in local elections, while others restrict this right to specific national-origin groups or citizens only (Bauer 2007). When immigrants and their descendents are entitled to participate in local elections, local electoral rules as well as immigrants' ability to mobilize co-ethnics may additionally impede or help their quest for local political power. Institutional and behavioral variables are therefore at work in molding patterns of immigrant political power. As I demonstrate in later chapters, South Asian migrants in Britain have often been able to draw on networks of kin and clan to facilitate impressive get-out-the-vote efforts, which – given this group's geographic concentration and Britain's ward-level elections – has made this group politically powerful in many British local authorities.

Synthesizing this information, I state that the variation in political institutions interacts with behavioral features of immigrant groups to generate systematic predictions about the likelihood of local immigrant political power. Furthermore, differences in economic institutions (i.e., the ways in which immigration regimes affect the supply of and demand for local economic resources) influence levels of economic scarcity in immigrant destinations. Together, immigrant political power and economic scarcity explain the incidence of local immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict.

The book's main interest lies in explaining why some cities witness sustained confrontations between immigrants and longer-settled native residents or continued clashes between immigrants and the state, while relations between immigrants, natives, and state actors remain peaceful elsewhere. As a result, it must be attuned to the *local* dynamics that shape these conflict patterns. At the same time, I maintain that *national* immigration and citizenship regimes bear on these outcomes by influencing the potential for local economic shortages and immigrant electoral behavior. As these national institutions change, so should the incidence of local immigrant conflict. Within-country variation in immigrant conflict therefore exists alongside aggregate national differences, or country effects. As later chapters will show, British cities have varied considerably in their experience with the two types of immigrant conflict, and we

can only make sense of these differences by isolating the economic and political dynamics that cause local conflict or peace. Nevertheless, we also observe country effects: Overall levels of local conflict involving postcolonial migrants in Britain exceeded overall levels of local conflict involving guest workers in Germany. I argue that policies that guided guest-worker migration (e.g., the provision of local resources, or the conditionality of migration and settlement on employment and housing) reduced the likelihood of competition over economic goods and hence lowered the incidence of immigrant conflict in the areas of settlement. Such regulations were largely absent in directing postwar migration into Britain. Differences in national institutions thus produce differences in local conflict outcomes across countries.

Existing Arguments

The purpose of this book is to identify the variables that cause local-level immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict. It aims to show how differences in national immigration regimes and political institutions shape and interact with differences in local economic conditions and immigrant political behavior to yield systematic variation in the occurrence of immigrant conflict across groups, cities, and countries. In this way, this book contributes to our understanding of immigrant conflict specifically and to ethnic conflict more generally. In examining why immigrants come to be involved in two types of conflicts, the book also generates insights about the social and political implications of large-scale immigration in advanced industrialized democracies.

The scholarship linking immigration to domestic conflict has thus far mostly focused on clashes between immigrants and natives; comparative research explaining confrontations between immigrants and state actors in the contemporary period is still in its early stages. In both cases, however, there have been surprisingly few attempts to systematically and comparatively study conflicts involving immigrants as these conflicts take shape on the ground. While there is a vast literature covering the incidence of ethnic conflict across the globe, only a small number of comparative works actually study the occurrence of such conflict in localities of immigrant arrival.[10] Numerous single-case histories provide rich accounts of the local immigrant experience, and this book draws on many of these. But these narratives generally do not aim for generalizable explanations. Even in the context of ethnic minority relations in the United States, a widely studied topic, "there have been remarkably few comparative studies that bring . . . locally specific work together" (Jones-Correa, 2001a, 2).

Although comparative research on the local manifestations of immigrant conflict remains scarce, scholars have addressed the topic at different levels of aggregation. Much of the research explaining domestic opposition against immigration thus speaks to variation at the national or at the individual level. Cross-national studies show how macrolevel variables such as unemployment

[10] For exceptions, see Weiner (1978), Olzak (1992), Karapin (2002), and Hopkins (2010).

rates, immigration levels, economic restructuring, and electoral institutions can account for the success and failures of national far-right, xenophobic parties.[11] Moreover, survey research has employed political economy models to examine individual responses to the distributional consequences of immigration.[12] I follow these studies in focusing on the economic winners and losers of immigration, but I also identify the conditions under which native residents find it necessary to protect their economic welfare by mobilizing against immigrants in their neighborhoods. In doing so, I show that the extent to which immigration has an impact on natives' (as well as immigrants') material well-being hinges on systematic features of immigration regimes that may lead to local resource shortages and on electoral variables that may enable immigrants to make economic claims at the expense of native residents.

Examining individual attitudes, scholars have also argued that identity-based fears can outweigh economic anxieties and point to the cultural threats that cause individuals to reject the inflow of ethnically distinct newcomers.[13] The public debate about immigrant integration has also often focused on the alleged incompatibility between the behavioral norms and cultural values (as well as the skin colors) of migrant newcomers and those of the host country's majority population. In the United States, for example, Benjamin Franklin expressed serious concerns that "Palatine Boors . . . herding together . . . will Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion" (cited in Fraga and Segura 2006, 280). Several hundred years later, Hispanic immigrants have taken the place of German settlers in the United States. Across the Atlantic, public discussion has singled out Islam as the main impediment to native acceptance and immigrant assimilation, prompting the question, "can one be Muslim and European?" (cf. Zolberg and Woon 1999, 6; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2005).

This book's emphasis on the economic dimensions of immigrant conflict challenges arguments that locate the main source of conflict in immigrants' racial, cultural, or religious backgrounds. Ethnicity, broadly understood, clearly matters in shaping social relations, such as friendship, marriage, or business transactions, both between immigrants and natives and among immigrants

[11] Cross-country studies of far-right parties include, e.g., Kitschelt (1996), Golder (2003), Carter (2005), Givens (2005), and Norris (2005). Scholars have begun to extend this line of work to within-country variation in the electoral performance of the extreme right; see, e.g., Kestilä and Söderlund (2004).

[12] See, e.g., Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) for the U.S. case and Mayda (2006) for a cross-national analysis. See Freeman and Kessler (2008) for a review of the political economy of migration and migration policy.

[13] Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004) demonstrate that both economic and cultural threats drive hostility toward immigrants among Dutch citizens. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) and Sides and Citrin (2007) find that economic factors matter less in shaping European attitudes toward immigrants than cultural values and beliefs, which in turn are mediated by respondents' educational attainment. Fetzer (2000) also addresses both cultural and economic bases of opposition.

themselves. Indeed, although my central argument centers squarely on the primacy of economic interests in the production of immigrant conflict, I do not claim that ethnic identities are irrelevant. In my account, however, group identities are not the drivers of sustained conflict. They matter in so far as they help immigrants mobilize politically to bolster economic demands; failure to organize politically may cause economically deprived immigrants to protest against the state, while successful mobilization in economically hard times may invite a native backlash. By themselves, though, ethnic difference or the strength of ethnic ties do not produce sustained conflict. I thus do not argue that identity-based differences between immigrants and natives are inconsequential in the social realm or even in the political arena.[14] Rather, as I elaborate in the following chapters, on their own, immigrants' ethnic or religious backgrounds cannot explain the wide variation in both faces of immigrant conflict we observe within and across countries.

Studying Immigrant Conflict

Demonstrating that the economic needs and political strategies of ethnically distinct migrants bring about immigrant conflict requires an empirical approach that can pull apart ethnic identities, economic shortages, and electoral mobilization. Moreover, any convincing explanation of local immigrant conflict must be firmly rooted in an understanding of local processes. For theoretical and practical reasons, much of this book therefore seeks to explain differences in the occurrence of both types of conflict in local immigrant destinations within one country, Great Britain. But it does so without losing sight of the importance of national frameworks in structuring the inflow and settlement of migrants: The book also contrasts immigrant conflict in Britain with an analysis of developments in Germany, and it briefly examines broad patterns of subnational conflict and calm in France.

Studying Immigrant Conflict within and across Countries

From a practical standpoint, studying within-country variation in immigrant conflict outcomes allows us to better isolate the variables that cause these clashes. Even within countries, immigration regimes and citizenship laws can vary across immigrant groups and over time. In France, for instance, postwar labor migration coincided with inflows of refugees that fled the war in Algeria. In Germany, migrants of German lineage from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were granted automatic access to citizenship, but regulations were successively tightened in the mid-1990s. By contrast, the guestworker population initially faced stringent naturalization requirements that were later liberalized. Moreover, the skills and economic resources of earlier ethnic German migrants generally surpassed those of later waves, while the

[14] On the distinction between ethnic salience and ethnic conflict, see Laitin (1986), Chandra (2001), and Fearon (2006).

socioeconomic profiles of descendents of guest workers have also become more differentiated. Countries may thus simultaneously receive inflows of immigrants who vary in their capacity to participate in the electoral process; differ in the amount of pressure they put on local economic resources; and diverge in their ethnocultural backgrounds. Within countries, this diversity may provide us with excellent research opportunities. In a comparison across countries, these differences will be magnified and further coincide with potential competing explanations (such as national political cultures and institutions or historical legacies) that could conceivably influence immigrant conflict. Convincingly identifying which variables cause multiethnic conflict or harmony cross-nationally is thus challenging.

Furthermore, measuring immigrant conflict consistently across countries is extremely difficult. Data sources that exhaustively catalog immigrant–native riots within or across countries and over a substantial period of time are still lacking, although there have been related efforts.[15] Systematic, over-time and across-space information on large-scale confrontations between immigrants and the state is also currently not available. Reports on the smaller clashes and flare-ups that make up the anatomy of everyday immigrant–state conflict tend to come to light only once major disturbances have taken place, if at all. Since state actors are involved in these confrontations – as the target audience and direct participants – one good data source for these lesser events is government archives, and this book draws on archival evidence from Great Britain and Germany.

Data on smaller-scale events pertaining to immigrant–native conflict are not as challenging to obtain, but nevertheless pose problems with regard to cross-national comparability. While figures on racist violence have been collected for a set of countries in the very recent past, different legal definitions on what constitutes hate crime more generally and racist violence in particular (as well as widely diverging collection and dissemination procedures) make it inadvisable to compare these statistics across countries. As Mudde (2007, 286) notes on the cross-national analysis of racist violence, "serious comparative studies are at this stage impossible, given the huge inconsistencies in data collection between European countries." Indeed, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and

[15] Susan Olzak (1992) tracks "ethnic collective action" in seventy-seven cities in the U.S. from 1877 through 1914. Ron Francisco has assembled an excellent data set covering protest and coercion events across twenty-eight European countries from 1980 to 1995 (see http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html). Since the data were not collected with the specific aim of capturing immigrant conflict, the categories do not map onto the conflict dimensions I study here. The innovative MERCI project (Mobilization over Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigration) has gathered very interesting data on so-called political claims making by ethnic minority actors or those in the migration and ethnic minority relations field (including political actors opposing immigrants), covering Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland from 1992 to 1998. See http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/eurpolcom/research_projects_merci.cfm and Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy (2005) for an encompassing account of the findings generated by MERCI. All three sources are based on the coding of newspaper articles.



FIGURE 1.2. Immigration and the local anti-immigrant vote, Great Britain, 1970s.

Xenophobia advises researchers to analyze trends in racist violence within but not across countries, which is also the approach adopted in this book.[16] Finally, we need to proceed with caution when comparing anti-immigrant parties across countries. The National Front in Britain, for example, is a more extreme, neofascist party than the more populist *Front National* in France (Golder 2003). Though both parties clearly espouse anti-immigrant platforms, the more extremist appearance and rhetoric adopted by the British Front might suppress overall levels of support when compared to its French counterpart. To arrive at valid conclusions about the scale and intensity of immigrant–native conflict across countries, we would thus have to take into account additional indicators, such as anti-immigrant rallies or riots.

Given these constraints, this book first examines within-country conflict dynamics in Great Britain before moving on to other national contexts. The initial focus on the British case has the advantages of allowing for valid measurement and holding constant potentially confounding variables that diverge cross-nationally, while still leaving us with a significant amount of variation in the local political and economic features of immigrants and immigrant destinations, producing remarkable differences in conflict patterns. A first glance at the local electoral fortunes of anti-immigrant parties in Great Britain illustrates some of this local-level diversity. Figure 1.2 depicts the correlation between the share of New Commonwealth immigrants (originating mostly from the Indian subcontinent and the West Indies) and local election results of xenophobic parties in immigrant destinations over the course of the 1970s.[17] As is visible from

[16] See European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005, 158–159). For a more detailed discussion of racist violence data, see Chapter 4.

[17] Specifically, Figure 1.2 includes localities where immigrants from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan constituted at least 5 percent of the overall population (according to the 1981 census)



FIGURE 1.3. Muslims and the local anti-immigrant vote, Great Britain, 2004.

the figure, the presence of ethnically distinct residents does not necessarily provoke a negative native response at the ballot box. Anti-immigrant candidates foundered in several local authorities with a high percentage of immigrants. The relationship between the immigrant presence and the anti-immigrant electoral backlash is not particularly strong (the correlation is $r = .27$, $p = .12$, and falls to $r = .18$, $p = .30$, once the observation displaying the highest vote share is removed).

On their own, these correlations of course do not constitute a test of the argument that ethnic difference causes intergroup conflict. Collective anti-immigrant mobilization can manifest itself in additional ways not captured in this simple graph. Moreover, it might be the case that identity-based threats are more intensely felt once immigrants have settled for longer periods of time and have had a chance to express their religious beliefs and pursue their cultural practices in the public realm, for example through the building of mosques and temples and the enactment of multicultural policies. Indeed, as Figure 1.3 illustrates, more recently the relationship between the xenophobic vote and the Muslim presence seems to be stronger ($r = .38$, $p = .004$), apparently supporting those who fear that a clash of civilizations will fracture Europe's cities. However, it is also the case that Britain's open citizenship regime, as well as Muslims' capacity to get out the community vote, has turned this group into a pivotal electorate in many localities. To examine whether Muslims' electoral

and shows the highest vote share that the National Front received over the course of the 1970s. In one case (Bradford), I use vote shares of the "Yorkshire Campaign against Immigration." Election data come from Rallings, Thrasher, and Ware (2006); demographic data are available at www.nomisweb.co.uk.



FIGURE 1.4. Muslims and the local anti-immigrant vote, controlling for Muslim political power, Great Britain, 2004.

clout provokes xenophobic opposition at the polls, I coded all elected councilors according to their religious backgrounds.[18] As revealed in Figure 1.4, once we take into account localities' share of Muslim councilors, the relationship between the Muslim presence and the far-right vote vanishes completely.[19]

These figures serve to illustrate patterns and to raise questions, rather than to test or refute arguments. Although they should instill a dose of skepticism among those who favor essentialist explanations for immigrant–native strife, on their own they cannot rule out the notion that identity-driven threats matter in producing conflict: In Great Britain, residential concentration can translate into local political power, at least for groups that mobilize on election day. Ward-level elections and geographically concentrated, high-turnout Muslim electorates therefore produce a very high correlation between the share of Muslims in the local population and the share of councilors this group elects.[20] Looking at snapshots only thus makes it tricky to identify whether religion, elections, or both cause conflict. Selecting contexts in which the immigrant

[18] Figures 1.3 and 1.4 are based on election results in the 2004 British local elections in the local authorities where candidates of the British National Party (BNP) ran. I chose the 2004 contests because (at the time of data collection) information on the first and last names of candidates and councilors (which allows for more reliable coding than reliance on last names alone) was available electronically only for 2004 (see www.andrewteale.me.uk/2004/index.html). I first coded all names according to their religious background (Muslim or non-Muslim) myself and next repeated the exercise with the name-coding software program ONOMAP, with the help of Pablo Mateos (see also Mateos 2007). The correlation between these two measures is $r =$ .99. The share of the Muslim population, first measured in the 2001 census, is available at www.nomisweb.co.uk.

[19] The straight line in Figure 1.4 represents the slope coefficient of percentage Muslim, which drops to $b = -.08$ ($SE = .33$), once percentage of Muslim councilors is controlled for.

[20] In the present sample the correlation is $r = .94$ ($p = .000$, based on 56 observations); the full sample (including local authorities where the BNP did not run) shows a correlation of $r = .88$ ($p = .000$, based on 144 observations).

presence does *not* lead to immigrant electoral power would get us closer to the true sources of conflict. More fine-grained evidence that tracks local processes over time would further reveal how and if immigrant political behavior links up with conflict outcomes and whether immigrant electoral mobilization is a cause, rather than an outcome, of xenophobic opposition.

Still, students of immigrant conflict may encounter additional difficulties. Migrants' economic characteristics, for instance, often correlate with their national and ethnic backgrounds. Compared to other faith groups, Muslims in Great Britain are most likely to live in economically deprived areas and to suffer from unemployment and low earnings themselves (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2006; Saggar 2009). Similar trends are present elsewhere. In France, the employment rate of those born in Portugal is 72 percent, compared with 50 percent among those born in Morocco, while in Norway this figure reaches 48 percent among Pakistani-born residents, 60 percent among those born in the former Yugoslavia, and 79 percent among migrants from Denmark (OECD 2008, 128–129). More generally, the fact that the degree of ethnic distance between a particular group of migrants and the majority population often coincides with the group's degree of economic disadvantage (at least in the contemporary European setting) casts doubt on accounts that, without taking into consideration these economic realities, view cultural predispositions or religious beliefs as the principal drivers of immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict. Such arguments gained currency in the aftermath of the 2005 French disturbances (cf. Schneider 2007). Across the channel, a common view also held that the cultural background of West Indian youths was to blame for this group's involvement in the antistate riots of the 1980s (see Chapter 3). This book aims to show that such analyses are misguided.

Empirical Approach

Without probing the political and economic circumstances that immigrant groups face locally, inferences about the relationship between culture and conflict are difficult to sustain. Moreover, the snapshots just given here cannot disentangle whether ethnic difference, electoral behavior, economic conditions, or their interactions are behind immigrant conflict. To overcome these problems, I adopt a set of empirical approaches that, when taken together, aim to isolate the causes of immigrant conflict. Within Great Britain, I study the incidence of both types of immigrant conflict across groups that share many characteristics, but that vary in the degree of political power they wield locally. I do so by analyzing cross-group patterns of immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict as well as by examining the dynamics that underlie smaller-scale acts of racist violence. To better identify the processes that link economic shortages and immigrant electoral clout to conflict outcomes, I further investigate the occurrence of immigrant conflict in four locations over time. In the first pair of cases, immigrants are politically powerful but economic scarcity varies; in the second pair, economic conditions are held constant but immigrants differ in their electoral clout. Additionally, in two cases in which immigrant groups

are politically pivotal, economic conditions, and as a result immigrant–native conflict, change over time, giving us more confidence that the variables identified by the theory – as opposed to unobserved city-level factors – generate conflict outcomes. Moving beyond Great Britain, we see that an examination of immigrant conflict in Germany demonstrates the significance of immigration regimes in influencing economic scarcity in local immigrant destinations, while a briefer investigation of the French case reveals the important interactions between economic shortages and immigrant electoral power in shaping local conflict outcomes.

Finally, though the theory advanced in this book is meant to apply to many democratic settings, I should mention why I chose the countries I did. First, for the purposes of the study of immigrant conflict, Great Britain is a good case because it provides researchers with wide variation in local economic conditions, as well as with differences in ethnic minorities' political behavior. As mentioned, Britain's postwar immigration regime initially did not impose strict rules and guidelines; postcolonial arrivals were not subject to settlement restrictions within Britain and central government did not provide immigrant-receiving localities with much support. As a result, immigrants faced varied local economic conditions.

Second, while unemployment rates among two of the major immigrant groups (those originating from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent) were quite similar during the first decades after initial arrival and these two groups' destination locales exhibited comparable economic conditions (see Chapter 3), levels of local electoral participation and hence political power varied significantly across the two groups. More generally, it is thus also not the case that migrants' local electoral participation hinges on economic contexts. Migrants have failed and succeeded to mobilize in settings where economic goods are undersupplied; local turnout is not correlated with economic conditions (see Chapter 2).

Third, studying British localities offers practical advantages, in that qualitative and quantitative data tend to be more readily available when compared with that of other countries. I was thus able to draw on a host of town histories and reports dealing with local experiences of immigrant settlement as well as ward-level data on residents' country of birth and their ethnic self-identification (the latter since 1991). Information on residents' ethnicity is generally much more difficult to obtain in other European countries. Finally, and again in contrast to many other countries, detailed data on racist violence are available at the level of the local authority, albeit only for more recent years, and are also deemed to be of higher quality than those collected by most other European countries (Oakley 2005; Goodey 2007).

In terms of the cross-national comparisons, Germany and Great Britain make for a good pairing. The two countries share a host of similarities: Both opened their borders to large-scale immigration in the postwar period, resulting in the settlement of immigrant communities that are ethnically, culturally, and religiously distinct from the indigenous population and, on average, of

lower socioeconomic status than their native counterparts. While Germany is a federal system and Great Britain formally a unitary state, local government has significant discretion over the allocation of public resources in both settings. Local electoral laws differ across countries – based on proportional representation in Germany and plurality in Great Britain – but should, if anything, make it easier for small, anti-immigrant parties in Germany to gain votes; for most of the period under study, this has not been the case. The main relevant features that distinguish the two countries are the economic foundations of their immigration regimes and the stringency of their citizenship laws, and it is these differences that account for the observed cross-country variation in local immigrant conflict. The next section provides an overview of the book and lays out the empirical strategies in greater detail.

Plan of the Book

The rest of this book is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the central theoretical framework in greater detail. I discuss my conceptualization and measurement of immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict; provide fuller definitions of economic scarcity and immigrant political power; and explicate the logic that links local economic scarcity and immigrant political power to the two faces of immigrant conflict. I next clarify the assumptions that underlie my explanatory model and the conditions under which I expect it to hold. The chapter also spells out how this book speaks to the wider scholarship on immigrant and ethnic conflict.

The second part examines the occurrence of the two types of immigrant conflict across groups and economic conditions in Great Britain. In Chapter 3, I study how the incidence of immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict has differed across immigrant groups and over time, from 1950 until 2008. Disaggregating immigrant conflict in this way reveals intriguing patterns of variation. First, when looking at large-scale immigrant–native and immigrant–state riots, we observe that the majority of both types of conflict have occurred during economic downturns and in economically deprived settings. Second, in comparing South Asians and West Indians, I show that immigrant groups who share many characteristics (such as economic characteristics at the level of the individual and the settlement locality or prejudicial attitudes directed against them), but who vary in the extent to which they have been able to translate their presence into local political power, also differ with regard to their involvement in immigrant conflict. In addition to laying out these patterns, the chapter presents an overview of Great Britain's postwar immigration and citizenship regime as well as politicians' approach to the new electorate, thus providing the local political and economic contexts in which immigration and hence immigrant conflict are embedded.

Chapter 4 focuses on explaining one indicator of immigrant–native conflict, smaller-scale acts of racist violence. The aim here is not to argue that racist violence strictly adheres to the logic of immigrant–native conflict proposed

here, but rather to show that individual acts of racist violence can be part of the larger fabric of such conflict. To do so, I first demonstrate that this type of hate crime covaries with the success of anti-immigrant parties across Britain's local authorities. Next, the chapter employs data on racist violence in Greater London's thirty-two boroughs (local authorities) to establish that the in-migration of politically powerful South Asian migrants provokes increased attacks against this group, which are further compounded by rising levels of economic deprivation. Conversely, in-migration of politically less powerful migrants of Caribbean an African origins has no effect on the victimization of this group. Differences in economic conditions across boroughs magnify these effects.

Part III presents structured comparisons of four cases to test my theory of immigrant conflict.[21] Whereas Chapters 3 and 4 show that variation in the economic and political factors that I highlight coincides with variation in immigrant conflict patterns, Chapters 5 and 6 deploy local-level evidence to trace the processes and causal pathways connecting local economic conditions and immigrants' electoral leverage to conflict outcomes. The case selection and over-time study pulls apart economic conditions, immigrant political power, and immigrant ethnic backgrounds, while the narratives contain the in-depth, microlevel information that links causes to effects and establishes that immigrant electoral mobilization is not a product of xenophobic agitation.

The first two cases, that is, Ealing and Tower Hamlets, are two London boroughs that were both characterized by immigrant political power and economic scarcity in the first two decades of settlement. Whereas pressures on state-controlled resources did not persist in Ealing, though, the shortage of such goods intensified in Tower Hamlets. As a result, Ealing has overcome immigrant–native conflict even as the electoral power of its immigrant population has expanded. Tower Hamlets witnessed a deterioration of intergroup relations over the same time period, and, moreover, immigrant–native conflict has varied within the borough as a result of a decentralization experiment that resulted in varied housing-allocation rules across wards. I next contrast two Midlands cities, Leicester and Birmingham, that shared similar economic trajectories but have varied in immigrant political power. In the first decades of immigrant arrival, amidst increasing economic scarcity, immigrants in Leicester were politically powerful, while their counterparts in Birmingham lacked electoral clout, leading to immigrant–native conflict in the former and immigrant–state conflict in the latter. Additionally, economic scarcity declined in Leicester over time, easing intergroup tensions and earning the city its reputation for multicultural harmony.

Covering immigrant groups of different backgrounds, these cases show that economic conditions and immigrants' political behavior, rather than national or ethnic origins per se, account for conflict outcomes. The major immigrant groups in Ealing and Leicester are of Indian descent and include Sikhs and

[21] On structured comparisons in case study research, see George and Bennett (2005).

Hindus, while the largest minority group in Tower Hamlets consists of Bangladeshis (most of whom are Muslim). Birmingham is home to sizable shares of Indian, Pakistani, and West Indian migrants (the latter are predominantly Christian). As I discuss later, other sources of variation and similarity, such as residential concentration or demographic balance, also fail to map onto conflict dynamics.

Part IV takes a step back and addresses national differences in immigrant conflict. In Chapter 7, I apply my theory of immigrant conflict to the German context. Here, guest-worker migration is associated with lower levels of local conflict than both the inflow of political refugees (asylum seekers and ethnic Germans) into Germany and the postcolonial migration into Britain. I argue that the regulations that guided guest-worker migration reduced the likelihood of local economic shortages and hence the incidence of immigrant conflict. Such guidelines were largely absent in the two other migration regimes. Chapter 8 investigates how the features of France's postwar immigration regime interacted with the country's political institutions to produce high but varying levels of both immigrant–native and immigrant–state conflict. This analysis is followed by a discussion of recent trends in immigration, naturalizations, economic scarcity, and decentralization across European countries, developments that influence the likelihood of the two faces of conflict. Chapter 9 concludes by restating the main findings and discussing some of the book's theoretical and policy implications.

In advancing my argument, I exploit different sets of sources, such as government and party archives, local and national newspapers, census statistics, elite interviews, and the secondary literature. Quantitative sources include data on racist violence and xenophobic party vote shares, surveys measuring immigrant political behavior, and native attitudes. Interested readers can find more details on my use of respective sources in the upcoming pages.