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Faith and Power

 *Religion and Politics
in the Middle East*

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Europe and Islam

IN THE LATE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, THE PEOPLES OF Europe embarked on a great movement of expansion that by the mid-twentieth century had brought the whole world, to a greater or lesser degree, into the orbit of European civilization. The expansion of Europe took place at both ends—from the west by sea, from the east by land. In some regions, this expansion led to the domination and to the assimilation or exclusion of primitive peoples, and to the settlement by West and East Europeans of what were seen as empty lands. In others, the expansion brought Europeans into contact and often into collision with ancient civilizations and powerful states. By the twentieth century, all but a few of these states had been defeated and subjugated, and their peoples and territories laid open to European political, cultural, and economic penetration. And even those few that managed to survive in a European-dominated world did so at the price of the large-scale adoption of European ways.

In the course of their expansion to Asia and Africa, the Europeans encountered three major civilizations, those of India, China, and Islam. While the heartlands of Islam were in the regions now known as the Middle East and North Africa, inhabited predominantly by Arabic-, Persian-, and Turkish-speaking

Muslims, there were also vast Muslim populations and numerous Muslim states in the Eurasian steppe, the Indian subcontinent, the peninsula and islands of Southeast Asia, and important parts of black Africa.

In the developing relationship between an expanding Europe and these three established Afro-Asian civilizations, there was an important difference between Islam and the other two. Before the voyages of discovery and the expansion, India and China had been remote from European horizons, half-legendary countries known only from fragmentary references in the scriptures and classics and from the occasional reports of intrepid travelers. Among Indians and Chinese, even less was known of Europe, the very name of which, and of its peoples, had no place in the historic and literary records of these civilizations.

In the Islamic world, too, the name of Europe was virtually unknown. It appears in a few early Arabic translations or adaptations of Greek geographical texts, but it did not become part of the accepted geographical and political usage of medieval Islam and did not pass into general use until the late nineteenth century, when European political and hence also intellectual dominance brought the general acceptance of European nomenclature.

But if the name of Europe was unknown, the reality it denoted was old and familiar. Unlike its neighbors and predecessors, the Islamic polity defined itself by a religion, as a society in which identity and allegiance were determined by the acceptance of a common faith. For medieval Muslims, the world was divided into two: the house of Islam, where the faith and law of Islam prevailed, and the rest of the world, known as the house of war, to which the faith and law of Islam would, in due time, be brought by the Muslims. From an early date, Muslims learned to distinguish between the societies to the east and to the south, whose leaders professed no recognizable revealed religion and whose people could be seen as teachable recruits to Islam, and the peoples to the north and to the west, who professed

Christianity. If the name Europe meant nothing, the name Christendom meant a great deal.

Christendom and Islam had been neighbors, and more often than not enemies, since the advent of Islam in the seventh century. Between the two, there was an old relationship and even—though rarely explicit in either medieval or modern times—certain basic affinities.

What, then, did Islam and Christendom have in common? This question may be answered in both moral terms, as a shared heritage, and in material terms, as a shared—or, rather, disputed—domain.

Christianity and Islam, with their common predecessor Judaism, were all born in the same region and shaped by many of the same influences. The two later religions were both heirs to the ancient civilizations of the Middle East and to what came after them. Both were profoundly affected by Judaic religion, Greek philosophy and science, and Roman government and law. Both shared a wide range of memories and beliefs concerning prophecy, revelation, and scripture. These affinities, expressed in theology and even language, created a possibility of disputation and thus also of dialogue that could not have arisen between either Christians or Muslims on the one hand and exponents of Eastern religions like Hinduism or Buddhism on the other. Christians and Muslims alike denounced each other as infidels—and in so doing expressed their common attitude to religion.

As well as the shared heritage, there was also a shared domain. The expansion of the Muslim faith and state in the seventh and eighth centuries was largely at the expense of Christendom. From the Empire of Persia, the advancing Muslims took Iraq, by then a predominantly Christian country; from the Christianized Roman Empire and some other Christian states, they took Syria, Palestine, Egypt, North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, and Sicily. Nowadays we think of Spain and Portugal as part of Europe lost to Islam and then recovered—but in the

Levant and North Africa, Christianity was older and more deeply rooted than in southwestern Europe, and its loss, especially that of the Holy Land, was a far heavier blow to medieval Christendom. Later, the expansion of the Mongols into Eastern Europe, and their subsequent conversion to Islam, brought much of the East European landmass under Islamic control. And while the Islamized Tatars dominated Russia and the steppelands, their kinsmen, the Ottoman Turks, were driving through the Balkan Peninsula toward the very heart of Europe.

Christianity and Islam alike had some difficulty in admitting the existence of the other as a major religion, a rival faith and civilization with an alternate message to humankind. Both sides expressed this unwillingness by the practice of denoting the adversary with ethnic rather than religious names. Muslims referred to European Christians as Romans, Slavs, or Franks; Europeans spoke of Muslims as Saracens, Moors, Turks, or Tatars, depending on which group they had encountered. But each was keenly aware that the other possessed and offered another revelation and dispensation; both expressed this awareness with such epithets as unbeliever, infidel, *paynim*, and *kafir*.

In chronological sequence, Christianity is the earlier and Islam the later religion. This had important consequences for their mutual attitudes. Each saw itself as the final revelation of God's purpose for humanity. For the Christian, the Jew was a precursor and, as such, could be accorded a limited and precarious tolerance. His religion was authentic but corrupted and incomplete. The Muslim could see both Jews and Christians as precursors, with holy books deriving from authentic revelations, but incomplete and corrupted by their unworthy custodians and therefore superseded by the final and perfect revelation of Islam.

Here again there is an important contrast between the responses of Islam, on the one hand, and of India and China on the other to the European expansion. For Hindus, Buddhists,

Confucians, and others, Christian civilization was new and unknown; those who brought it, and the things they brought, could therefore be considered more or less on their merits. For Muslims, Christianity—and therefore by implication everything associated with it—was known, familiar, and discounted. What was true in Christianity was incorporated in Islam. What was not so incorporated was false.

On the Christian side, there was a similar difference in attitudes to the three major Asian civilizations, and for obvious reasons. Neither Indians nor Chinese had ever conquered Spain, captured Constantinople, or besieged Vienna. Neither Hindus nor Buddhists nor yet Confucians had ever dismissed the Christian gospels as corrupt and outdated and offered a later, better version of God's Word to replace them.

While Christians and Muslims may have had little respect or esteem for each other's religion, both were keenly aware of the dangers that threatened them from the hostile powers inspired by those religions. For a very long time, this meant, in practice, a threat by Islam to Europe. For most of the Middle Ages, Islam was seen as representing a mortal danger. Within little more than a century, Muslim armies had wrested the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean from Christendom; they had conquered Spain, Portugal, and part of Italy and were even invading France. In Eastern Europe, the invasions first of the Tatars and then of the Turks continued the Muslim threat into modern times.

It is nowadays fashionable to present the Crusades as the first Western exercise in aggressive imperialism into the Third World. This interpretation is anachronistic and indeed meaningless in the context of the time. Essentially, the advance of Christian arms in the eleventh century was an attempt to break the Muslim pincer grip on Europe and recover the lost lands of Christendom. The repulse of the Muslims in France, the recovery of Sicily, and the gradual reconquest of Spain were all part of the same

movement, culminating in the arrival of the Crusaders in the Levant at the end of the eleventh century. Like Spain and Portugal, Syria and Palestine were old Christian lands, which it was a Christian duty to reconquer, the more so since the latter included the holy places of Christendom. Their conquest by Islam was still comparatively recent, and they still held large Christian populations.

The recovery of southern Europe proved permanent, and Europe itself was in a sense delimited by the reconquest. In the Levant, the Crusaders failed. They encountered a new wave of Muslim expansion, led this time not by Arabs but by Turks, who had already conquered the greater part of Greek Christian Anatolia, and who were soon to bring Turkish Islam into south-eastern and—through the conquests of the Islamized, Turkicized Golden Horde—Eastern Europe. And this expansion in turn brought a further European response, in the rise of Muscovy and, centuries later, of the Christian peoples of the Balkans.

The great European expansion from the end of the fifteenth century, at both the eastern and western extremities of Europe, was in origin a continuation of this process of European self-liberation. The Spaniards and the Portuguese drove the Moors out of Iberia—and pursued them to Africa and beyond. The Russians drove the Tatars out of Muscovy—and pursued them far into Asia.

In the west, the Spaniards and the Portuguese were followed by the other maritime nations of Western Europe and later, to a lesser extent, by the landbound continentals. In Eastern Europe, the Russians had the field to themselves in their expansion eastward and southward to the Caspian, the Black Sea, and Central Asia. In time, Eastern, Western, and Central Europe all met in a new drive to the Middle Eastern heartlands, as the power of the Ottomans faltered, weakened and finally failed.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was no longer Europe that was caught in Muslim pincers, but the Islamic lands

in the pincers of European expansion. From the north, the Russians advanced into the Turkish- and Persian-speaking Muslim lands between the Black Sea and Central Asia. From the south, the maritime powers, from their new bases in South Asia and southern Africa, approached via the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. Farther west, the Spaniards, followed, later and with greater success, by the French and the Italians, invaded Muslim North Africa. By the early twentieth century, most of the Muslim world had been incorporated in the four great European empires of Russia, the Netherlands, Britain, and France. Even Turkey and Iran, the two Muslim empires that had managed to hold on to a precarious independence in the age of European domination, were deeply penetrated by European interests, institutions, and ideas at almost every level of their public and, increasingly, their private lives.

The rulers of the Islamic world, from an early stage, were conscious of this European advance and of the danger it presented in the political, military, and economic aspects. The Ottoman Empire, from the sixteenth century the leading power of the Islamic world, showed some though not great awareness of the Russian and Western European expansion into Asia, more especially after the incorporation into the Ottoman domain of Egypt, Syria, and later Iraq and the extension of Ottoman power to eastern waters. An Ottoman expedition was sent to India, and a smaller one as far away as Aceh in Sumatra. Ottoman officials in the sixteenth century examined plans for the opening of two canals, one through the Isthmus of Suez, to allow the movement of Ottoman fleets from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and beyond, and the other linking the Don and Volga rivers, to permit the deployment of Ottoman naval power from the Black Sea to the Caspian.

Nothing came of any of these projects, and in general, there seems to have been no real sense of urgency. Nor indeed was this likely, as long as the Ottomans were confident of their own

overwhelming superiority against a Christian Europe divided by religious, economic, and even dynastic struggles. Europeans might be sailing and trading in remote places beyond the oceans, but the Ottomans firmly controlled the crucial crossroads where Europe, Asia, and Africa met. Ottoman fleets dominated the eastern Mediterranean, where the Christian victory in the Battle of Lepanto was no more than a flash in the pan. Ottoman armies came and went freely in southeastern Europe. For a century and a half, a Turkish pasha governed in Buda, and Turkish armies twice besieged Vienna. There seemed little reason for the Ottomans to fear or take precautions against European power.

There was even less reason for them to fear the onslaught of European ideas. European Christians in the Middle Ages had been keenly aware of Islam as a rival world faith, which at times seemed to threaten the very survival of Christianity. Countless Christians had embraced Islam. Indeed, of the early recruits to Islam outside Arabia, very many, probably the majority, were converts from Christianity. For European Christendom, the danger of Islam was religious no less than military. European Christian scholars learned Arabic, translated the Quran and other texts, and studied Islamic doctrine, for a double purpose. The first task, urgent and immediate, was to protect Christians from conversion to Islam. The second, more remote, was to convert the Muslims to Christianity. In this study of Arabic and Islam, we may discern the beginnings of what later came to be known as Orientalism. Some centuries passed before European Christians realized that the first task was no longer necessary and the second had never been possible. And in the meantime, with the Renaissance, the revival of learning, and the emergence of a new philological scholarship, the study of Arabic was assimilated to that of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew—classical and scriptural languages—in the European universities, and Orientalism entered a new phase that has continued ever since.

To these movements, there were no parallels on the Islamic side. While Christian power might at times have been seen as a threat, Christian religion was not, and the very idea was an absurdity. How could a Muslim be attracted by an earlier, abrogated version of his own religion, and moreover one professed by subject peoples whom he had conquered and over whom he held sway? Some knowledge of Christian beliefs was preserved in earlier Islamic literature, but there was no desire or attempt to learn European languages and to find out what was happening in Europe. The only exceptions were weaponry and more generally military technology, notably firearms and naval construction, and in these the Turks showed both skill and alacrity in acquiring, mastering, and sometimes improving the latest European inventions.

Of European cultural and intellectual life, virtually nothing was known. The Renaissance, the Reformation, even the wars of religion that convulsed Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, passed almost unnoticed among Christendom's Muslim neighbors. Of European literature and science, only a handful of books were translated, and most of these were treatises on medicine, geography, and especially cartography. The translators were neither Turks nor Muslims by origin. A few were converts to Islam, but most were Christian or Jewish subjects of the Turkish sultans. Even printing, introduced by Jewish refugees from Spain before the end of the fifteenth century and later adopted by Greek and Armenian Christians under Turkish rule, was permitted by the sultans only on the condition that the Jewish and Christian printers printed no books in the Arabic script.

A major change began during the last years of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the Turkish retreat from Vienna. For the first time since the entry of their armies into Europe, the Turks had suffered a major defeat on the battlefield and were compelled to relinquish and later to cede extensive

territories. Until then, only the periphery of the Islamic world had been affected—the Russians on the Caspian, the Dutch in Java, both of them very remote. The retreat from Vienna was a blow to the heart.

It was the first of a long series of defeats, which in the course of the eighteenth century, despite occasional rallies, brought a decisive change in the balance of power between Islam and Christendom. Especially painful were the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 1783 and the French occupation of Egypt in 1798. The Crimea was not the first territory lost by the Ottomans to a European enemy. But the previous lost lands, like Hungary, had been Christian provinces under Ottoman occupation, mostly of brief duration. The Crimea was old Muslim Turkish territory dating back to the thirteenth century, and its absorption by Russia was followed by that of the entire northern coast of the Black Sea. The French occupation of Egypt brought Western influence to the very center of the Middle East, almost within striking distance of the holiest places of Islam.

The debate began in Turkey after the first defeat and was renewed with every subsequent setback. It revolved about two questions—what is wrong, and how can it be put right. An extensive literature was devoted to this subject, in Turkish and then also in Arabic and Persian. At first, it was largely the work of government officials and military officers. Later, with the emergence of new literate elements who were neither servants of the state nor men of religion, the debate became general and public.

The early memorialists saw the problem in military terms. The Christian enemy had somehow managed to establish a transitory military superiority. To remedy this, it was necessary to identify the sources of this superiority and make the necessary changes in the Muslim forces so as to equal and once again surpass the previously despised enemy. But the remodeling of the armed forces, on land and sea, led much further than the first

reformers had intended or imagined. The new armies needed new supplies, and these involved developments in trade and industry. They needed better communications, and this meant roads, ports, railways, and the telegraph. They needed a new infrastructure, and this required administrative reforms and training civil servants of a new kind. They needed better intelligence concerning the enemy, and in a time of weakness, when diplomacy had to supplant or at least supplement military power in the defense of the empire, this meant political as well as military information and a study of the policies, politics, laws, and institutions of Christendom, of a type without precedent in the past. Above all, they needed new officers, and this in turn led to a demand for science and education.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, there were already European instructors serving with the Turkish armed forces or teaching in newly created military and naval schools. From the early nineteenth century, students were sent from Turkey, Egypt, and Iran to Europe in ever increasing numbers. At first, they were mostly officer cadets. Later, they included future diplomats and officials, and finally students in every field of study. To benefit from foreign instruction, whether at home or abroad, Muslim students had to accept a situation in which they were being taught by infidel teachers. Even more, they were obliged to learn infidel languages, a new and radical departure requiring a basic change of attitude. Contrary to all previous experience or at least belief, the knowledge of infidel languages became first useful, then esteemed, and finally—in almost every walk of life—necessary. For a while, Italian, then for a long time French, then English and in some areas German became keys to success and status in government, education, commerce, and—as they came into being—the professions.

With the knowledge of European languages came a first acquaintance with the values and ideas expressed in those languages. Muslim students were ordered to learn French to

follow courses of military instruction, but some of them found other reading matter more explosive and perhaps more destructive than anything in the officer school training manuals. A closer acquaintance with Europe brought to Muslim readers and visitors a keener awareness of their own weakness, poverty, and relative backwardness, and a desire to seek out and adopt the talisman that lay at the root of the wealth and power of the mysterious Occident. More and more, Muslim inquirers found the secret of Western greatness in the two most distinctive and alien features they had encountered—industry and freedom, the one achieved by technology, the other by laws. The answer, so it seemed to the cheerful optimists of the nineteenth century, was simple: for the one, schools and factories; for the other, constitutions and parliaments. And these in turn rested on European science and philosophy, access to which became easier as a result of other changes that had in the meantime taken place in Europe.

A decisive change in the Muslim attitude to European culture was made possible by the French Revolution—the first extensive movement of ideas in Europe that was in no sense Christian and that could even be presented as anti-Christian. This was indeed the line adopted by French spokesmen during their occupation of Egypt and later in propaganda conducted from their embassy in Istanbul. Secularism as such had no appeal for Muslims, but an ideology explicitly divorced from Christianity could be considered and perhaps even adopted by Muslims aspiring to master the new European technology and institutions. In the past, as a modern Turkish historian has aptly put it, the tide of European science had broken against the dikes of theology and jurisprudence. The enthusiastic and hopeful liberalism of the nineteenth century opened a sluice in the dike, through which first a trickle and then a flood of new ideas penetrated and then inundated the hitherto closed Islamic world.

In the course of the nineteenth century, increasing numbers of young Muslims from Turkey, Iran, and Egypt had the opportunity to visit or even reside in Europe and to observe the functioning of European society and institutions at closer quarters. They included students; diplomats, becoming more important as the Muslim states adopted the European practice of maintaining resident embassies; merchants; and from the mid-century, exiles, as the example of European liberalism began to produce a domestic political opposition in some of these countries.

The range and depth of European influence in the Islamic lands during the centuries of expansion varied enormously. In some remote areas, like the Arabian Peninsula or Afghanistan, the impact of Europe was minimal and hardly went beyond the adoption of European firearms, with which the whole process of Westernization first began. At the opposite extreme were those regions, such as French North Africa and Russian Transcaucasia and Central Asia, where Muslim countries were forcibly incorporated into a European empire and obliged to learn the language of their imperial masters and to accept the presence of European administrators and even colonists in their midst. In an intermediate position between the two extremes were those countries, notably the Persian and Ottoman empires, where Muslim rulers had managed, more because of European rivalries than because of their own defensive strength, to maintain a precarious independence, but where their way of life was fundamentally transformed under the impact of European economic, political, and cultural penetration. It was in these countries that radical Muslim Westernizers, like Sultan Mahmud II in Turkey and Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha in Egypt, or in a later generation, Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran, made far more sweeping changes than were ever possible for imperial rulers. These tended to be more conservative, and certainly more cautious, in their dealings with entrenched Muslim interests and institutions.

Until the latter part of the eighteenth century, Muslims visited Europe only as soldiers, prisoners of war, or diplomats. Their own religion did not encourage them to go; the religion of their European hosts did not encourage them to come, still less to stay for any length of time. While European Christians enjoyed much greater freedom to travel to Muslim lands, and even to establish themselves there as residents, this brought very little contact with the Muslims, whether the elites or the general population. The European colonies for the most part lived a segregated existence, and their necessary contacts with Muslim authorities were, so to speak, cushioned by intermediaries and interpreters drawn from the native Christian and, to a much lesser extent, Jewish population.

The nineteenth century thus brought a radical transformation. Young Muslims traveled to Europe and stayed there for some years to study. Their knowledge of European languages opened the previously closed doors to European literature, science, and thought. The reintroduction of printing and the establishment of newspapers and magazines in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish brought several significant changes: the opportunity, for the first time, to follow events inside and outside the Islamic world; the emergence of a new and more flexible language, with the conceptual and lexical resources to discuss these developments; and, in many ways most significant of all, the emergence of a new figure—the journalist.

Together with the journalist came another newcomer, whose appearance was equally portentous—the lawyer. In an Islamic state, there is in principle no law other than the Shari‘a, the holy law of Islam. The reforms of the nineteenth century and the needs of commercial and other contacts with Europe led to the enactment of new laws, modeled on those of Europe—commercial, civil, criminal, and finally constitutional. In the traditional order, the only lawyers were the ulema, the doctors of the holy law, at once jurists and theologians. The secular lawyer, pleading

in courts administering secular law, represented a new and influential element in society.

Education, too, in the old order, had been largely the preserve of the men of religion. This also was taken from them, as reforming and imperial rulers alike found it necessary to establish schools, and later colleges and universities, to teach modern skills and dispense modern knowledge. The new-style teacher, sometimes schoolmaster, sometimes professor, joined the journalist and the lawyer as an intellectual pillar of the new order.

With the new laws, there came also a new political system, expressed in the constitutional and parliamentary orders set up in one country after another. This political process, involving competition for the good will of the electorate, as well as of the sovereign, produced another new element—the politician. And he might be a journalist, a lawyer, or a teacher, as well as a member of one of the older governing elites.

The three pillars of traditional authority—the soldiers, the officials, and the men of religion—were all divided among themselves, and there were Westernizers and anti-Westernizers, sometimes in violent conflict, in all three groups. But in the nature of things, it was the officers who were the most consistent Westernizers and the strongest supporters of modernization. It was they, after all, who had encountered the problem, and the need for a solution, in the most brutal and direct form. And it was they who were the first to realize that change might well be a condition of survival. This idea was, however, by no means universally accepted, and the history of Muslim attitudes to the West and to Westernization shows a sequence, almost a cycle, of response, reaction, rejection, and return.

At the present time, the dominant attitude in most of the countries of the Islamic world toward the West is one of hostility—the explosion of a long stored-up resentment, after years of domination and humiliation at the hands of what is seen as an alien and infidel enemy. For the greater part of their

history, Muslims had been accustomed to a position of supremacy and domination. During the formative centuries that conditioned their collective memories, Islam had advanced and unbelief retreated; Muslims had ruled, unbelievers had submitted, and the leaders of the infidels, both abroad and at home, had recognized the superiority of Islam and the supremacy of the Muslims. In the broad realms of the Islamic empires, the Christian populations had either embraced Islam or accepted a position of tolerated subordination. Even the unsubjected Christians beyond the imperial frontiers were compelled to accept the reality of Muslim power. In peacetime, they came as supplicants, seeking, and usually receiving, permission to trade. In wartime, they were taught the lessons of Islamic superiority on the battlefield.

The expansion of Europe, leading first to the loss of the Islamic dominions in Europe and eventually to the European invasion even of the heartlands of Islam, had changed all this. In a succession of defeats and humiliations, the Muslim had lost on all sides. By defeat in battle, he had lost his supremacy in the world. By the penetration of European influence and the adoption of European ways, notably by the emancipation of his own non-Muslim subjects, he had lost his supremacy in his own country and city. With the European-inspired emancipation of women, even his supremacy in his own home was threatened.

The resulting resentments have been building up for a long time. The events of the second half of the twentieth century—the discrediting of the West after its two self-destructive world wars, the retreat of empire, the growth of Western self-doubt and self-criticism, and finally the new and powerful weapon placed in the hands of Muslims by the Western discovery and exploitation of oil and by the money oil gave them—brought these resentments to a head and provided the means and the opportunity to express them.

In principle, this hostility was directed against Eastern as well as against Western Europe, since both had invaded Islamic lands and disrupted Islamic societies. In practice, however, the hostility was more strongly felt and more explicitly directed against the Western world—first against Western Europe and then against those other lands beyond the oceans, which were seen, not unreasonably, as an extension of European civilization.

There are several reasons for this difference in the Islamic reactions against Eastern Europe and against Western Europe. One obvious reason is the difference in the continuing relationship. While Western influence remains, Western power has retreated, and the countries formerly under Western domination are now free—or rather those who rule them are free—to choose their own ways. The Islamic regions affected by the expansion of Eastern Europe are still so affected; indeed, at the present time, these are the only parts of the Islamic world still incorporated in a Europe-based political system. In these countries, therefore, the reaction has either not begun or, if it has begun, its expression is severely impeded.

Even in those parts of the Islamic world not directly controlled from Eastern Europe, there was a well-grounded recognition of proximate power and the proven willingness to use it. This recognition imposed respect or at least caution, particularly in groups and countries within reach of that power.

More important, however, than such reasons is the unquestionable fact that in the greater part of the Islamic world the effective source of change was, indeed, the Western world—not only by the intervention of Western powers but also, and at the present time far more, by the penetration of Western ideas and the imitation of Western institutions. These have reshaped Islamic society and, in the course of time, have given rise to the changes that are now causing so much distress and anger. Certainly, the most conspicuous outward signs of the crass materialism denounced by the Islamic revivalists—the flaunting

indecenty of cinema and television, the crude self-indulgence of the consumer society—are of unmistakably Western provenance. No one could accuse the Soviet East of either popular entertainment or spendthrift consumerism.

There are, of course, many specific problems causing friction between Middle Eastern and Western states, and each of these is of paramount concern to those directly involved. But increasingly, such concern is limited to those directly involved, while other parts of the Muslim world are preoccupied with their own specific problems. A vivid illustration of this was the remarkably limited response to such events as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 or the American bombing of Tripoli in 1986. A few years earlier, these would have brought mass demonstrations of anger and outrage all over the Muslim world. This time, there was little more than perfunctory diplomatic protests.

Far more important than any of these specific issues and the hostility they arouse is an underlying generalized resentment, directed against the intrusive and disruptive forces that have shaken and riven Islamic society. This resentment has causes far deeper than this or that policy or action of this or that government. What confronts us is not a quarrel between governments but a clash of civilizations, with issues that can hardly be formulated, let alone discussed and resolved, at the level of intergovernmental negotiations. And in this clash, in this generalized mood of resentment, every difference is exaggerated, every quarrel exacerbated, and every problem—one may hope for the time being—is insoluble.

In this mood of revulsion against Western civilization, it is natural that hostility should be directed most strongly against those powers, or that power, seen as the leader of the West and less strongly against those seen as minor and weaker figures in the Western world. It is equally natural that some should turn, with hope and expectation, toward those seen as the strongest and most dangerous enemies of Western power and the Western

way of life, in politics and strategy, economics and ideology. So it was in the 1930s and early 1940s; so again during the cold war.

There had been several such upsurges of hostility in the past, usually provoked by some significant advance of European power at Islamic expense. One such occurred in the 1830s and 1840s, when charismatic Muslim personalities emerged and led movements of armed resistance, ultimately unavailing, against the French conquest of Algeria, the Russian subjugation of the Caucasian peoples, and the British pacification of Sind. Another such movement extended from the 1860s to the 1880s, when the Muslim world reacted with horror to a new tide of European conquest, which brought the Russians to Samarkand and Bokhara, the French to Tunis, and the British to Cairo. Another came in the aftermath of the First World War, when the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided between the British and the French, and the former Muslim provinces of the Russian empire were, after an interlude of separate political existence, reincorporated in a new political system with its center in Moscow. Even the retreat of the Western empires after the Second World War aroused new hostilities, in the struggles for Algeria, Palestine, and Java, and the passions and bitterness to which these struggles gave rise.

At first sight, there seems no obvious reason for the present surge of anger. European political domination has long since ended, and while the one remaining European empire seems to advance rather than retreat, it is not primarily in that direction that hostile attention is turned. European economic control in the Muslim lands has also ended and has given way to a European dependence on Middle Eastern oil and markets. The major conflicts are now regional rather than international—Iraq versus Iran, Turkey versus Greece, Morocco versus Algeria, as well as the ethnic, sectarian, ideological, and social conflicts within many individual countries. Even the Arab struggle against Israel, which was once seen as the last outpost of European imperialism,

has now become more and more a regional, even a local issue, in which the European powers have virtually no part, and the superpowers appear as cautious patrons and sponsors, rather than direct participants.

The principal political objectives set in the past have indeed been achieved, and it is not surprising that the classical nationalist movements of the kind that flourished in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have lost much of their attraction. In their place have come loyalties that might perhaps be more accurately described as patriotic rather than nationalistic, concerned primarily and often exclusively with the interests of the various individual states, rather than with larger and vaguer ethnic or cultural entities. And these states have been much more concerned with the shifting pattern of alliances and rivalries within the region than with the outside world. Pan-Arabism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Iranism, for the time being at least, are in abeyance, and it is the foreign policies of Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and the rest that must now concern us. In this respect, the Arab states of the Middle East appear to have followed the pattern set by the various republics of Latin America after the ending of Spanish Empire and, centuries earlier, by the kingdoms of Europe.

But the yearning remains for some greater and older identity, for some larger community and loyalty transcending the petty sovereignties of the new states fashioned from the ruin of empires, some authority nobler than the increasingly disreputable and tyrannical governments that rule these states. To this need, Islam—not just a religion in the limited Western sense of the word, but a complete system of identity, loyalty, and authority—provides by far the most convincing and the most appealing answer. This appeal is greatly strengthened by the feeling, by now widespread in Islamic lands, of having been violated, humiliated, and forcibly changed by infidel and hostile forces from outside. At a time when the economies, societies, and

politics of these countries are being subjected to severe strains, the call to abandon evil foreign ways and return to true Islam evokes a powerful response.

This response takes many forms, which it has become customary to lump together and designate, loosely and inaccurately, as Muslim fundamentalism. There are, in fact, many movements of Islamic revival and militancy, often differing quite considerably from one another. Some are old, some new; some are traditional and conservative, some radical and revolutionary. Some spring from the grass roots; some draw their strength from the sponsorship and financing of one or other Muslim government. Three governments are principally engaged in this work, those of Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran, and they diverge greatly in their policies, purposes, and methods. All of them agree on the need to return to the pure, pristine Islam of the Prophet and his Companions; to restore the rule of the Holy Law; and to undo the changes wrought in the era of foreign rule or influence. And all of them, including the leaders of the Islamic revolution in Iran, reveal a certain ambivalence in defining the changes to be undone and the manner of their undoing.

In the realm of material things—the infrastructure, amenities, and services of the modern state and city, most of them initiated by past European rulers or concession-holders—there is clearly no desire to reverse or even deflect the process of modernization. Nor, indeed, are such things as airplanes and automobiles, telephones and television, tanks and artillery seen as Western or as related to the Western philosophies that preceded their invention.

More remarkably, there seems to be little desire to abolish the Western-style political systems that now exist in most Islamic countries—the constitutions and legislative assemblies, the systems of secular laws and law courts, even the patterns of political organization and identity. Of the forty-odd sovereign states that now exist in the Muslim world, only two, Turkey and Iran,

were independent sovereign states in 1914. A few more—such as Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen—had been sovereign states in the past and had retained some form of autonomy under foreign rule. Most of the remainder were new, created from old imperial provinces or dependencies, with new frontiers, new political structures, and sometimes even new or reconditioned names. Iraq and Jordan were the names of medieval caliphal provinces, not coterminous with the present states bearing those names. Syria and Libya are names borrowed from Europe—derived, in that form, from Greco-Roman antiquity and introduced to the inhabitants of these countries, for the first time, by Europeans in the modern period. And yet, in spite of their novelty and their alien origins, the new states, under these names, are now solidly established in the sentiments and loyalties of their peoples, and all awareness of their alien origin seems to have disappeared. Even more striking is the case of Palestine, another Greco-Roman term brought back from Europe. Its history as the name of a separate political entity began and ended with the British mandate, and yet, without a state and without any historic memory of separate sovereignty or even identity, it has become the focus of a compelling political cause.

Along with the European-style constitutions and parliaments, which survive even in revolutionary Islamic Iran, and the European pattern of nationally defined sovereign states, there is still a general acceptance of the underlying European ideologies, especially of the concept of political nationhood, both with its topside of liberal patriotism, and its underside of ethnic chauvinism. An example of the latter is racially and theologically expressed anti-Semitism, a comparatively recent import from Europe to the world of Islam, where it has had a considerable impact. Two anti-Semitic classics, the fabricated *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and Canon Rohling's *Talmud Jew*, are among the most widely translated and widely read productions of the European intellectual tradition in the present-day Arab world.

Perhaps the most powerful, persistent, and pervasive of Western intellectual influences is the cult of revolution. The history of Islam, like that of other societies, offers many examples of the overthrow of governments by rebellion or conspiracy, and a few of challenges to the whole social and political order by leaders who believe that it is their sacred duty to dethrone tyranny and install justice in its place. Islamic law and tradition lay down the limits of the obedience owed to the ruler, and discuss—albeit with due caution—the circumstances in which a ruler forfeits his claim to the allegiance of his subjects and may, or rather must, lawfully be replaced.

But the notion of revolution, as developed in Europe in sixteenth-century Holland, seventeenth-century England, and eighteenth-century France, was alien and new. The first self-styled revolutions in the Middle East occurred in Iran in 1905 and in Turkey in 1908. Since then, there have been many others, and at the present time, a majority of Islamic states are governed by regimes installed through the violent removal of their predecessors. In some, this was accomplished by a nationalist struggle against foreign rulers; in others, by military officers deposing the rulers in whose armies they served. In a very few, the change of regime resulted from profounder movements in society, with deeper causes and greater consequences than a simple replacement of the people at the top. All of these, however, with equal fervor, claim the title revolutionary, which by now has become the most widely accepted claim to legitimacy in government in the Islamic world.

All these various kinds of revolutionary regimes, as well as the surviving monarchies and traditional regimes, share the desire to preserve and utilize both the political apparatus and the economic benefits that modernization has placed at their disposal. What is resented is foreign control or exploitation of the economic machine, not the foreign origin of the machine itself. Here again, there seems to be no great awareness of any link between the machine and the civilization that produced it.

In cultural and social life, the penetration and acceptance of European ways has gone very far and persists in forms that even the militants and radicals either do not perceive or are willing to tolerate. The first to change were the traditional arts. Already by the end of the eighteenth century, the old traditions of miniature painting in books and interior decoration in buildings were dying. In the course of the nineteenth century, they were replaced in the more Westernized Islamic countries by a new art and architecture that was first influenced and then dominated by European patterns. As early as the mid-eighteenth century, the great Nuruosmaniye Mosque in Istanbul shows strong Italian baroque influences in its ornamentation. The presence of European elements in something as central as an imperial cathedral mosque reveals a notable faltering of cultural self-confidence.

This became more evident in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The old arts of miniature and calligraphy lingered on for a while, but those who practiced them, with few exceptions, lacked both originality and prestige. Their place in the artistic self-expression of society was taken by European-style painters, working in oils on canvas. Architecture, too, even mosque architecture, conformed in the main to European artistic notions, as well as to the inevitable European techniques. More recently, there has been an attempt to return to traditional Islamic patterns, but often this takes the form of a conscious neoclassicism. Only in one respect were Islamic norms generally retained, and that was in the slow and reluctant acceptance of sculpture, seen as a violation of the Islamic ban on graven images. One of the main grievances against such secularist modernizers as Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and the Shah in Iran was their practice of installing statues of themselves in public places. This was seen as no better than pagan idolatry.

The westernization of art was paralleled in literature, though at a somewhat later date. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, traditional literary forms were neglected, except among

die-hard circles with limited intellectual impact. In their place came new forms and ideas from Europe—the novel and the short story, replacing the traditional tale and apologue; the essay and the newspaper article; and new forms and themes that have transformed modern poetry in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish alike. Even the language in which modern literature is written has been extensively and irreversibly changed, under the influence of European discourse.

The change is least noticeable in music, where the impact of European art music is still relatively small. In Turkey, where European influence has lasted longest and gone deepest, there are talented performers, some of them with international reputations, and composers working in the European manner. Istanbul and Ankara are now on the concert circuit, and there are audiences large enough and faithful enough to make it worthwhile. Elsewhere in the Islamic world, those who compose, perform, or even listen to European music are still relatively few. Music in the various traditional modes is still being composed and performed at a high level, and it is accepted and appreciated by the vast majority of the population. Of late, there has been some penetration of the more popular types of Western music, but even these are in the main limited to comparatively small groups in the larger cities. Music is perhaps the profoundest and most intimate expression of a culture, and it is natural that it should be the last to yield to alien influences.

Another highly visible sign of European influence is in clothing. That Muslim armies use modern equipment and weaponry may be ascribed to necessity, and there are ancient traditions declaring it lawful to imitate the infidel enemy in order to defeat him. But that the officers of these armies wear fitted tunics and peaked caps cannot be so justified and has a significance at once cultural and symbolic. When the pagan Mongol armies conquered the lands of Islam in the thirteenth century, even the Muslim armies that resisted them adopted Mongol dress and

accoutrements, and let their hair flow long and loose in the Mongol style. These were the habiliments of victory, and it was natural that others should seek to adopt them. It was not until some time later, when the Mongols themselves had embraced Islam, that a sultan of Egypt ordered his officers to shear their locks, abandon their Mongol dress, and return to traditional Islamic attire. In the nineteenth century, the Ottomans, followed by other Muslim states, adopted European-style uniforms for both officers and men, and European harness for their horses. Only the headgear remained un-Westernized, and for good reason. Traditionally, in the Middle East, headgear had served as a kind of emblem or sign by which men indicated their religious, ethnic, or even professional identity. They wore it as a badge throughout their lives, and it was carved in stone over their graves. The hat, with peak, visor, or brim, was seen as characteristic of the European and served to indicate him both in miniature painting and in popular shows. Such hats were particularly unsuited for Muslims, since they would obstruct the rituals of Islamic prayer. After the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, even this last bastion of Islamic conservatism fell. The Turkish army, along with the general population, adopted European hats and caps, and before long, they were followed by the armies and eventually even many civilians in almost all other Muslim states. Belted tunics and peaked caps are still worn in the armies of Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and there has as yet been no movement to return to traditional Islamic dress for men.

The position is different for women. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Europeanization of female attire was slower, later, and more limited. It was strongly resisted and affected a much smaller portion of the population. At many levels of society, where the wearing of Western clothes by men became normal, women still kept to traditional dress. Even Kemal Atatürk, the most ruthless of Westernizers and a pioneer

of women's rights in the Islamic world, dealt differently with the two cases. For men, the abandonment of traditional headgear and the adoption of European hats was promulgated and enforced by law. Women were urged and encouraged to abandon the veil but never compelled to do so. One of the most noticeable consequences of the Islamic revival has been a reversal of this trend and a return, by women though not by men, to traditional attire.

For men and for women alike, the interlude of freedom was too long, and its effects too profound, for it to be forgotten. Despite many reverses, European-style democracy is not yet dead in the Islamic lands, and there are some signs of a revival. In Turkey, after a military intervention that halted a slide to anarchy, there has been a determined effort to restore parliamentary and constitutional government, with free elections and a free press. In Egypt, after a period of sometimes harsh military dictatorship, there has been a gradual return to a freer society, with contested elections, an opposition press, and a relatively liberal economy. In a few other countries, there have been steps, still rather tentative, toward liberalization. As the era of Western European domination recedes from memory to history, and as Western European ideas and European ways come to be better understood and appreciated, one may hope that the long record of strife will at last come to an end.

In the year 1693, when the Sacra Liga was still waging its successful war against the retreating Ottomans, an English Quaker called William Penn, the founder of the city of Philadelphia and the colony of Pennsylvania, wrote a little book, *An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*, in which he proposed an organization of European states, to arbitrate disputes and thus prevent wars. Remarkably, for a man of his time, William Penn suggested that Turkey be included in this European association, the only condition for acceptance being

that the Turks renounce Islam and adopt Christianity. In the twentieth century, such a religious requirement, though still impossible, was, it seemed, no longer necessary. All the independent Muslim states existing at the time joined the Europe-based League of Nations. More recently, several Muslim nations have sought and been accorded associate membership of the European Economic Community. Turkey, legally a lay state but overwhelmingly Muslim in population and sentiment, has even applied for full membership. Much will depend, for the future attitudes both of the Turks and the other Islamic peoples, on the treatment accorded to that application.

Recent years have seen a major change—only the second such in many centuries—in the relationship between European Christendom and Middle Eastern Islam. For more than a thousand years, from the first irruption of the Muslim Arabs into Christendom in the seventh century to the second Turkish Muslim siege of Vienna in 1683, the pattern of the relationship between the two was one of Muslim advance and Christian retreat, and the issue of the struggle was the possession of Europe. From time to time, there were Christian rallies and advances—some of them permanent, like the recovery of the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily; others temporary, like the partial and limited recovery of the lost lands of Christendom in the Levant. The age of the discoveries brought an expansion of European trade in Asia and Africa, but it was a long time before trade was translated into power, and even longer before this power was extended farther from Asia and Africa to the Islamic heartlands in the Middle East and North Africa. Almost until the end of the seventeenth century, Europe was still under attack, and the Islamic heartlands were still inviolate, a region in which Europeans could enter, travel, and trade only by the revocable consent of the sultans and of the shahs.

The decisive change began with the Turkish defeat at Vienna and the subsequent withdrawal, culminating in the Treaty of

Karlowitz of 1699—the first ever to be imposed by a victorious Europe on a vanquished Turkey. For the next two and a half centuries, the pattern was one of European advance and Islamic retreat, involving the defeat and ultimate disappearance of the sultans and the shahs, the penetration and domination of their dominions, and the division of much of the Islamic world into European dependencies and spheres of influence.

Today, a second such major change is in progress. European economic domination has ended and in some measure been reversed, and once again, as in classical Ottoman times, it is Middle Eastern wealth and the need for Middle Eastern markets that influence, perhaps even determine, European policies. There is a reversal, too, in the military balance. Until the end of the Second World War, the European powers were in military domination of the region and even fought their own European battles on Middle Eastern soil. This, too, is now reversed, and Middle Eastern interests, in a different form of warfare, wage their conflicts on improvised European battlefields, both against Europe and against each other.

Perhaps more important than any of these, in the long run, is the new, massive presence in Western Europe of practicing Muslims, coming from North Africa and the Middle East, from Turkey, and from as far away as the Indian subcontinent. For the time being, the vast majority of these are immigrants or guest workers, and their political impact, though growing, is limited. But their children will be native-born and will be, and feel themselves to be, Europeans. In Britain and France, they will be citizens as of right, and even in Germany, where the laws of nationality are somewhat different, it will not be possible, in the long run, to deny them the citizenship to which they will feel that they are entitled. The emergence of a population, many millions strong, of Muslims born and educated in Western Europe will have immense and unpredictable consequences for Europe, for Islam, and for the relations between them.