

RETHINKING THE GOSPEL SOURCES

VOLUME 2: THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF Q

by

Delbert Burkett

Society of Biblical Literature
Atlanta

CONTENTS

Preface.....	vii
Abbreviations.....	ix
Abbreviations and Symbols in Tables.....	x
1. The Necessity of Q.....	1
2. Q: Unity or Plurality?.....	33
3. The Core of Q.....	51
4. Other Q in the Double Tradition.....	61
5. Q Material Unique to One Gospel.....	69
6. The Original Order of Q.....	87
7. Causes of Verbal Disagreement in Q Parallels.....	93
8. Combination of Q with the Markan Source.....	113
9. Combination of Q with M.....	135
10. Combination of Q with L.....	171
11. Other Causes of Differences in Wording.....	207
12. Summary and Conclusions.....	213
Appendices	
A. “Editorial Fatigue” as an Argument against Q.....	217
B. Features of Style and Theme in Q.....	221
C. Q in Matthew’s Order.....	231
D. Q in Luke’s Order.....	239
E. Did the Evangelist Compose Matthew 13:36–43 and 13:49–50?.....	245
Works Cited.....	251
Index of Ancient Sources.....	261
Index of Modern Authors.....	279

THE NECESSITY OF Q

The Gospels of Matthew and Luke have a good bit of non-Markan material in common. Two primary explanations for this material have been proposed. According to the Two-Document hypothesis, Matthew and Luke drew this material from the same source, traditionally known as “Q.” The primary alternative to the Q hypothesis proposes that this material originated with the Gospel of Matthew and that Luke took it from there.¹ Several theories adopt this alternative, including Farrer’s theory, the Three-Source hypothesis, the Augustinian hypothesis, and the Neo-Griesbach or Two-Gospel hypothesis.² Proponents of Farrer’s theory in particular have argued against the Q hypothesis in favor of the view that Luke used Matthew. I will therefore examine the arguments on both sides of the issue. From that examination, I conclude that the arguments for Luke’s use of Matthew lack substance, while the arguments for Q are quite strong.

ARGUMENTS FOR LUKE’S USE OF MATTHEW

Proponents of the Neo-Griesbach hypothesis have provided few arguments for Luke’s use of Matthew. When William R. Farmer revived Griesbach’s theory,³ he directed most of his effort toward criticizing the priority of Mark rather

1. Less common is the view that Matthew used Luke: Ronald V. Huggins, “Matthean Posteriority: A Preliminary Proposal,” *NovT* 34 (1992): 1–22; repr. in *The Synoptic Problem and Q: Selected Studies from Novum Testamentum* (ed. David E. Orton; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 204–25; Martin Hengel, *The Four Gospels and the One Gospel of Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Collection and Origin of the Canonical Gospels* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2000), 169–207.

2. For a brief explanation of each of these theories, see Delbert Burkett, *Rethinking the Gospel Sources: From Proto-Mark to Mark* (New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 1–5.

3. William R. Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Macmillan, 1964; repr. Dillsboro, N.C.: Western North Carolina Press, 1976).

than producing new arguments for Luke's use of Matthew.⁴ Some of Farmer's successors have produced a volume demonstrating how they think Luke used Matthew,⁵ but for two reasons this volume does not demonstrate that Luke did so. First, the volume presupposes the theory; it does not provide evidence for it. From the perspective of the Neo-Griesbach hypothesis, it demonstrates, given the assumption that Luke used Matthew, how Luke would have gone about doing so. But this is not the same thing as demonstrating that Luke did in fact use Matthew. The authors do point to a few details of Luke's usage that seem to support this view. However, I responded to these in my previous volume.⁶ Second, since the authors suppose that Luke used not only Matthew but also certain hypothetical "non-Matthean traditions," their objection to Q as a hypothetical source loses credibility.⁷

The most comprehensive case for Luke's use of Matthew has come from proponents of Farrer's theory. Michael D. Goulder in particular has championed this view.⁸ However, his work has been criticized extensively by others, so I will not discuss it further here.⁹ I will instead examine more recent

4. Antonio Gaboury, *La structure des évangiles synoptiques* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 27–28.

5. Allan J. McNicol, with David L. Dungan and David B. Peabody, eds., *Beyond the Q Impasse—Luke's Use of Matthew: A Demonstration by the Research Team of the International Institute for Gospel Studies* (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996).

6. Burkett, *From Proto-Mark to Mark*, 46–47, 53, 54–55.

7. This point is made by Robert A. Derrenbacher Jr., "The Relationship of the Gospels Reconsidered," *TJT* 14 (1998): 83–88, esp. 85, 87.

8. E.g., Michael D. Goulder, *Midrash and Lection in Matthew* (London: SPCK, 1974); idem, "On Putting Q to the Test," *NTS* 24 (1978): 218–34; idem, "The Order of a Crank," in *Synoptic Studies: The Ampleforth Conferences of 1982 and 1983* (ed. C. M. Tuckett; JSNTSup 7; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1984), 111–30; idem, *Luke: A New Paradigm* (2 vols.; JSNTSup 20; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989); idem, "Is Q a Juggernaut?" *JBL* 115 (1996): 667–81; idem, "Self-Contradiction in the IQ?" *JBL* 118 (1999): 506–17.

9. Christopher M. Tuckett, "On the Relationship between Matthew and Luke," *NTS* 30 (1984): 130–42; idem, "The Existence of Q," in *The Gospel behind the Gospels: Current Studies in Q* (ed. Ronald A. Piper; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 31–45; rev. and repr. in idem, *Q and the History of Early Christianity: Studies on Q* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 1–39; David R. Catchpole, "Did Q Exist?" in idem, *The Quest for Q* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 1–59; Mark Goodacre, *Goulder and the Gospels: An Examination of a New Paradigm* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996); John S. Kloppenborg Verbin, "Goulder and the New Paradigm: A Critical Appreciation of Michael Goulder on the Synoptic Problem," in *The Gospels according to Michael Goulder* (ed. Christopher A. Rollston; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2002), 29–60; Robert A. Derrenbacher Jr., "Greco-Roman Writing Practices and Luke's Gospel: Revisiting 'The Order of a Crank,'" in Rollston, *Gospels according to Michael Goulder*, 61–83.

arguments for this position put forward by Mark Goodacre and some of his associates.¹⁰ Goodacre takes what he believes are the strongest aspects of Goulder's work and expands on them. In his work *The Synoptic Problem*, he presents six negative arguments that seek to refute arguments for Q, and four positive arguments for Luke's use of Matthew. His subsequent work, *The Case against Q*, expands on nine of these ten arguments. Several scholars have previously responded to some of these arguments.¹¹ I will begin my own response by addressing Goodacre's four positive arguments for the view that Luke used Matthew. In the subsequent section, where I consider arguments for Q, I will address the attempts of Goodacre and others to refute these arguments.

1. Goodacre first argues that the minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark show that Luke depended on Matthew.¹² He gives three examples of significant minor agreements which, in his view, test the Two-Document hypothesis and find it wanting. He also criticizes several defensive tactics that proponents of the Two-Document hypothesis use to minimize the problem posed for their theory by the minor agreements.

In making these arguments, Goodacre is clearly in dialogue with proponents of the Two-Document hypothesis, and that fact is both the strength and the weakness of his presentation. On the one hand, Goodacre is correct that the minor agreements pose a serious problem for the Two-Document hypothesis. And his critics have not adequately responded to this argument. Kloppenborg consciously omits consideration of it, and Foster simply repeats the same defensive tactics that Goodacre criticizes.¹³ Since Goodacre wrote, the minor agreements have become even more of a problem for the Two-Document hypothesis. Prior to my own work, the discussion of minor agreements focused almost exclusively on agreements of inclusion, that is, places where Matthew and Luke include wording that differs from Mark's. My own work showed that agreements of omission, places where Matthew and Luke both lack what is in Mark, pose an even greater problem for the Two-Document

10. Mark Goodacre, *The Synoptic Problem: A Way through the Maze* (The Biblical Seminar 80; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 144–56; idem, *The Case against Q: Studies in Markan Priority and the Synoptic Problem* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2002); Mark Goodacre and Nicholas Perrin, eds., *Questioning Q: A Multidimensional Critique* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2004).

11. F. Gerald Downing, "Dissolving the Synoptic Problem through Film?" *JSNT* 84 (2001): 117–19; Paul Foster, "Is It Possible to Dispense with Q?" *NovT* 45 (2003): 313–37; John S. Kloppenborg, "On Dispensing with Q? Goodacre on the Relation of Luke to Matthew," *NTS* 49 (2003): 210–36; Christopher Tuckett, review of *The Case against Q: Studies in Markan Priority and the Synoptic Problem* by Mark Goodacre, *NovT* 46 (2004): 401–3.

12. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 144–48; *Case against Q*, 152–69.

13. Kloppenborg, "On Dispensing with Q" 226–27; Foster, "Is It Possible," 324–26.

hypothesis. These “omissions” represent a level of Markan redaction that is completely unknown to either Matthew or Luke, a clear indication that neither Matthew nor Luke used Mark as a source.¹⁴

On the other hand, Goodacre draws an erroneous conclusion from the minor agreements. He claims that they show that Luke used Matthew. He bases this claim on the assertion that “if Luke sometimes agrees with Matthew against Mark in important ways, then Matthew and Luke were not written independently of one another.”¹⁵ This assertion, however, is erroneous. Agreements between Matthew and Luke can be explained without assuming that one depended on the other. In fact, several theories besides the Two-Document hypothesis explain the minor agreements of Matthew and Luke while still maintaining that Matthew and Luke worked independently. These include the theory of a primitive Gospel used by all three Synoptics, as well as theories of a Proto-Mark or Deutero-Mark. In my own theory, most of the minor agreements arose when Matthew and Luke both preserved the reading of Proto-Mark, while Mark revised it. Since in this theory all the Synoptics are independent of the others, Luke did not use Matthew, so the need for Q remains.

Goodacre’s argument thus fails because he assumes that if the Two-Document hypothesis cannot account for the minor agreements while his own theory can, then his own theory must be true. He fails to consider that other theories can also account for the minor agreements. Goodacre’s argument does contain one element of truth: Luke’s minor agreements with Matthew, as traditionally conceived, pose less of a problem for Farrer’s theory, in which Luke knew Matthew, than for the Two-Document hypothesis, in which he did not. Even that claim, however, must now be abandoned in light of the evidence that I presented in my previous volume.¹⁶ The agreements of omission that I consider there are inconsistent with any theory of Markan priority and thus pose just as much of a problem for Farrer’s theory as for the Two-Document hypothesis.

In his book *Goulder and the Gospels*, Goodacre identified six striking minor agreements featuring language that he judges to be positively Matthean and at the same time un-Lukan.¹⁷ Robert H. Gundry compiled a more comprehensive list of these, arguing from the perspective of the Three-Source

14. Burkett, *From Proto-Mark to Mark*, 7–42.

15. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 145.

16. Burkett, *From Proto-Mark to Mark*, 7–42.

17. Goodacre, *Goulder and the Gospels*, ch. 3. These six examples were reviewed by Frans Neirynck, “Goulder and the Minor Agreements,” *ETL* 73 (1997): 84–93. Goodacre includes one of these in *Synoptic Problem* (146–47) and *Case against Q* (154–55).

hypothesis.¹⁸ Gundry discusses twenty-four such agreements, finding that they contain non-Lukan or anti-Lukan features, which indicate that Luke did not compose them. They do, however, exemplify characteristically Matthean interests and diction, an indication that Matthew did compose them. Gundry therefore concludes that Luke drew them from Matthew.¹⁹

The flaw with this argument is that, for the most part, it identifies Matthean and Lukan redaction by assuming the priority of Mark. Gundry assumes throughout that Matthew and Luke copied Mark and explains differences from Mark as the result of redaction by Matthew and/or Luke. For example, where Luke 8:10 and Matthew 13:11 agree on the reading δέδοται γνῶναι τὰ μυστήρια against Mark 4:11, τὸ μυστήριον δέδοται, Gundry assumes that Mark preserves the more original reading, that Matthew revised this, and that Luke followed Matthew's revision.²⁰ If, however, we take seriously the problems with Markan priority that I have mentioned above, such differences from Mark must be explained otherwise.²¹ In this instance, Matthew and Luke agree because they both preserve the more original reading, while Mark has revised it. If so, Gundry bases his identification of Matthean and Lukan redaction on a false premise.

Thus the argument from minor agreements, as presented by either Goodacre or Gundry, does not necessitate the view that Luke used Matthew. While the minor agreements do require some explanation other than Markan priority, they do not require the explanation that Luke used Matthew. And if Luke did not use Matthew, then we still need Q.

2. Goodacre's second argument focuses on "passages in which Mark is not the middle term," i.e., passages described as "Mark-Q overlaps" in the Two-Document hypothesis.²² As an example, he cites John's prediction of the

18. Proponents of this theory accept the Two-Document hypothesis in general but find it inadequate to account for the minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in the triple tradition. To account for these agreements, they suppose that Luke knew Matthew as well as Q.

19. Robert H. Gundry, "Matthean Foreign Bodies in Agreements of Luke with Matthew against Mark: Evidence That Luke Used Matthew," in *The Four Gospels 1992* (ed. F. van Segbroeck et al.; 3 vols.; BETL 100; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 2:1466–95. Neiryndck and Gundry spar over one of Gundry's examples: Frans Neiryndck, "Luke 10:25–28: A Foreign Body in Luke?" in *Crossing the Boundaries: Essays in Biblical Interpretation in Honour of Michael D. Goulder* (ed. Stanley E. Porter et al.; Biblical Interpretation Series 8; Leiden: Brill, 1994), 149–65; Robert H. Gundry, "A Rejoinder on Matthean Foreign Bodies in Luke 10, 25–28," *ETL* 71 (1995): 139–50.

20. Gundry, "Matthean Foreign Bodies," 2:1470–71.

21. Burkett, *From Proto-Mark to Mark*, 7–42.

22. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 148–51; *Case against Q*, 163–65.

greater one to come (Matt 3:11–12; Mark 1:7–8; Luke 3:16–17). He argues that such a passage poses a problem for the Q hypothesis because the overlap between Mark and Q must have included some verbatim agreement, which is odd if Mark and Q were independent. By contrast Farrer’s theory is “much more straightforward” in explaining this passage as a place where Matthew elaborated on Mark and was followed by Luke. Support for this explanation comes from the fact that Matthew’s presumed elaboration features characteristic themes of Matthew, such as judgment, separation, and hell-fire. Passages of this type contradict the assertion that Luke never features Matthew’s modifications of Mark in the triple tradition.²³ They also establish a continuum that makes good sense in Farrer’s theory: they stand in the middle on a scale of Matthew’s influence on Luke, between triple tradition passages that feature minor agreements, and double tradition passages where Luke depends solely on Matthew.

Goodacre might be correct if the passage he cites were the only one that required explanation. We should start with the “more straightforward” theory and use it until it proves inadequate. The problem is that Farrer’s theory soon proves inadequate once we move on to other passages of a similar kind. Let us take for example the pericope on the unforgivable sin (Matt 12:31–37; Mark 3:28–29; Luke 12:10), shown in table 1.1.

TABLE 1.1. UNFORGIVABLE SIN

Matthew 12:31–37	Mark 3:28–29	Luke 12:10
31 For this reason I say to you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven to men,	28 Amen I say to you that all the sins and the blasphemies will be forgiven to the sons of men,	
	however much they blaspheme,	
but the blasphemy of the Spirit will not be forgiven.	29 but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit has no forgiveness	

23. This positive argument for Luke’s use of Matthew overlaps with Goodacre’s attempt to refute one of the arguments for Q, namely the argument that Luke does not include Matthew’s additions to Mark (Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 128–31; *Case against Q*, 49–54). Goodacre’s attempted refutation, but not his positive formulation of the argument, is addressed by Kloppenborg (“On Dispensing with Q” 219–22) and Foster (“Is It Possible,” 326–28).

32 And whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man, it will be forgiven to him;		10 And everyone who will speak a word against the Son of Man, it will be forgiven to him;
but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven to him,		but to the one who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven.
neither in this age nor in the one to come.	forever, but is guilty of an eternal sin.	

According to Farrer's theory, Mark came first, Matthew elaborated on Mark, while Luke followed Matthew. The problem is that here Luke does not follow Matthew but only Matthew's elaboration. Luke strangely omits everything in Matthew that would have come from Mark (Matt 12:31, 32c) and includes only the material that Matthew would have added to Mark (Matt 12:32ab). It is as though Luke were following not Matthew, but Matthew's additions. And that recognition leads directly to the Q hypothesis: Luke was following not Matthew, but the source from which Matthew made these additions. And we call that source (or those sources) Q.

Another example is similar. F. Gerald Downing (see below) makes the same point with respect to the Beelzebul debate.²⁴ Luke follows not Matthew, but only Matthew's elaboration. Again, it is more likely that Luke was following not Matthew, but the source from which Matthew added the extra material.

Thus while the theory that Luke used Matthew might explain a few of the Mark-Q overlaps, it soon runs out of steam, and we must move on to the next most "straightforward" theory, namely that Luke used the same source as Matthew. This theory can explain those passages that the first theory cannot, as well as those that it can.

Goodacre thinks it odd that Q should overlap with Mark even to the extent of verbatim agreement in some cases. I suggest that it is odd only if one has a preconceived idea about what should be the case. As Christopher M. Tuckett observes, "the theory that some parts of the gospel tradition were

24. F. Gerald Downing, "Towards the Rehabilitation of Q," *NTS* 11 (1964/65): 169–81; repr. in *The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal* (ed. Arthur J. Bellinzoni Jr., Joseph B. Tyson, and William O. Walker Jr.; Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1985), 269–85, esp. 277.

preserved in more than one strand is not inherently unlikely.²⁵ If so, then one might expect some agreement in wording in the overlaps.

3. Goodacre's third argument is that the material ascribed to Q contains not only sayings material but also a narrative sequence in its first third. It therefore does not resemble a sayings source such as the Gospel of Thomas, so the discovery of Thomas does not make the existence of Q more plausible. Such a narrative sequence, however, would make sense on the view that it was generated by Luke's use of non-Markan material in Matthew. He finds this view confirmed by the presence of Matthean redaction in Luke's version of the sequence: for example, in Luke 7:1 (parallel to Matt 7:28–29; 8:5), Luke has a formula similar to that which Matthew uses at the end of each of his five discourses. Furthermore, the narrative sequence in Luke presupposes elements in Matthew that were not taken over by Luke, thus betraying its origin in Matthew.²⁶

Two points must be addressed here. First, the presence of narrative in Q does affect the question of its genre and its relation to Thomas. Q and Thomas exhibit both similarities and differences, and Goodacre's argument serves as a warning against focusing only on the similarities in assessing the genre of Q. However, other scholars have made the same point without denying the existence of Q.²⁷ Foster, while recognizing the differences between Thomas and Q, still finds that the discovery of Thomas makes the existence of Q more plausible:

what *Thomas* and the synoptic gospels do is mark endpoints on a continuum of Christian writings about Jesus, and to find that the genre of Q sits comfortably between these two extremes gives plausibility to inferring that the genre of reconstructed Q is well within the realms of possibility.²⁸

To this we can add that the question of Q's existence does not ultimately depend on the question of its relation to Thomas. Q existed as a theory before Thomas came on the scene, and even if Thomas had never existed, some form of the Q theory would continue to be the most plausible explanation for the double tradition. Questions concerning the genre of Q do not render

25. Christopher M. Tuckett, "Synoptic Problem," *ABD* 6:269.

26. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 151–54; *Case against Q*, 170–85.

27. E.g., Werner H. Kelber, "The Verbal Art in Q and *Thomas*: A Question of Epistemology," in *Oral Performance, Popular Tradition, and the Hidden Transcript in Q* (ed. Richard A. Horsley; *SemeiaSt* 60; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), 25–42.

28. Foster, "Is It Possible," 323.

the hypothesis itself untenable or show that Luke's use of Matthew provides a better theory.

The second point is addressed by Kloppenborg, who provides a detailed refutation of Goodacre's view that Luke drew from Matthew the narrative sequence that is generally ascribed to Q.²⁹ To this we can add a response to Goodacre's claim that Luke 7:1 provides an instance of Matthean redaction in Luke's version of the narrative sequence. Luke 7:1 does have a formula similar to Matthew's, but it provides no greater support for Farrer's theory than for the Q hypothesis, as I have shown elsewhere.³⁰ The Q hypothesis attributes the formula to Q and must explain why Matthew added several more instances of it; Farrer's theory attributes the formula to Matthew and must explain why Luke included only one instance of it and omitted the other four instances. Neither explanation has a clear advantage over the other in this particular case.

4. Goodacre's fourth and final argument is based on "editorial fatigue," a term coined by Goulder.³¹ According to this view, certain inconsistencies in narration are best explained as the result of inconsistent editing: an editor makes changes at the beginning of his source but fails to sustain the changes throughout the account. The editor becomes "fatigued" and lapses into "docile reproduction" of the source. Goodacre finds examples in the double tradition in Luke but not Matthew. With respect to these, he makes the argument that Luke became fatigued not with Q, but with Matthew, because

if the Two Source Theory is correct, one will expect to see not only Luke but also Matthew showing signs of fatigue in double tradition material... On the Q theory it does strain plausibility that Luke should often show fatigue in double tradition material and that Matthew should never do so, especially given Matthew's clearly observable tendency to become fatigued in his editing of Mark.³²

To fully address this argument requires that we examine the examples that Goodacre cites from Q. I have therefore postponed a full consideration of this argument to appendix A, following my examination of the Q material in the present study. Here I will simply summarize the conclusions that I reach in appendix A.

29. Kloppenborg, "On Dispensing with Q," 231–36.

30. Burkett, *From Proto-Mark to Mark*, 54–55.

31. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 71–76, 154–56. A fuller discussion appeared earlier in idem, "Fatigue in the Synoptics," *NTS* 44 (1998): 45–58.

32. Goodacre, "Fatigue in the Synoptics," 57–58.

This argument manifests several problems. The first is Goodacre's assumption that we should expect Matthew to show editorial fatigue when editing Q since he shows such fatigue when editing Mark. We do not know enough about the circumstances of Matthew's editing to make such an assumption. Perhaps Matthew was tired when he edited Mark (or Proto-Mark) but well rested when he edited Q and therefore less prone to fatigue. Perhaps he simply paid more attention to Q than to the Marcan source. The second is Goodacre's assumption that we should expect Matthew to show editorial fatigue when editing Q because Luke does. We have no reason to think that Matthew's style of editing Q would necessarily be the same as Luke's. Matthew may simply have been more careful than Luke in editing Q. Third, Foster argues that Matthew does show editorial fatigue at least once in the double tradition. Matthew tends to replace the phrase "the kingdom of God" with "the kingdom of the heavens," but in Matthew 12:28/Luke 11:20 he lapses back into using the phrase "the kingdom of God" from his source.³³ Fourth, not all of the six inconsistencies in Luke cited by Goodacre arose from editorial fatigue. Four of them probably arose because Luke conflated two somewhat inconsistent sources, neither of which was Matthew. And in the remaining instances, we can just as easily suppose that Luke used Q as that he used Matthew. Since Luke apparently created only a few such inconsistencies in the Q material, we should not take it as significant if Matthew created one or even none. Goodacre's argument therefore does not pose a problem for the Q hypothesis or make it more likely that Luke used Matthew than that he used Q.

ARGUMENTS FOR Q

I have not found Goodacre's arguments for Luke's use of Matthew persuasive. We must now consider arguments against Luke's use of Matthew. As these have been formulated by proponents of the Q hypothesis, they are at the same time arguments for the existence of Q. I will begin with eight arguments that in my opinion make the strongest case for Q. While some of these have been challenged by Goodacre and others, in my judgment they have not been overturned.

1. Streeter formulated the classic argument against Luke's use of Matthew:

subsequent to the Temptation story, there is not a single case in which Matthew and Luke agree in inserting the same saying at the same point in the Marcan outline. If then Luke derived this material from Matthew, he

33. Foster, "Is It Possible," 330-32.

must have gone through both Matthew and Mark so as to discriminate with meticulous precision between Marcan and non-Marcan material; he must then have proceeded with the utmost care to tear every little piece of non-Marcan material he desired to use from the context of Mark in which it appeared in Matthew—in spite of the fact that contexts in Matthew are always exceedingly appropriate—in order to re-insert it into a different context of Mark having no special appropriateness. A theory which would make an author capable of such a proceeding would only be tenable if, on other grounds, we had reason to believe he was a crank.³⁴

Streeter's argument actually combines two distinct aspects, one primary and one secondary. The primary aspect compares how Matthew and Luke position the non-Marcan material with respect to Mark: they never insert the same material at the same point in the Marcan outline. The secondary aspect compares Luke's placement of the non-Marcan material unfavorably with that of Matthew: Matthew places this material in more appropriate contexts than Luke does.

Table 1.2 illustrates the primary aspect, that is, the main point of the argument. While material in the Marcan outline is in standard font, selected instances of Q material are shown in bold italics.

TABLE 1.2. SELECTED Q MATERIAL IN MARK'S OUTLINE

	Matthew	Mark	Luke
<i>Region of Jordan</i>			3:3a
Isaiah 40:3	3:3	1:2a, 3	3:4
<i>Region of Jordan</i>	3:5b		
Greater one	3:11	1:7–8	3:16
<i>Wheat and chaff</i>	3:12		3:17
Jesus' baptism	3:16–17	1:9–11	3:21–22
Jesus tested	4:1	1:12–13a	4:1b–2a
<i>Three temptations</i>	4:2–11a		4:2b–13
To Galilee	4:12b	1:14b	4:14a
Jesus teaches	5:2	1:21b	4:31b
<i>Sermon on mount</i>	5:3–7:28a		

34. Burnett Hillman Streeter, *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins* (rev. ed.; London: Macmillan, 1930), 183; cf. G. M. Styler, "The Priority of Mark," in C. F. D. Moule, *The Birth of the New Testament* (3rd ed.; San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 285–316, esp. 302; Tuckett, "Synoptic Problem," 268.

People astonished	7:28b-29	1:22	4:32
<i>Centurion's boy</i>	8:5-13		
At Peter's house	8:14-15	1:29-31	4:38-39
Etc.			
Old and new	9:16-17	2:21-22	5:36-38
<i>Jesus and John</i>	11:2-19		
Plucking grain	12:1-4, 8	2:23-26, 28	6:1-5
Withered hand	12:9-14	3:1-6	6:6-11
Ministry to crowd	12:15-16	3:7-12	6:17-19
Jesus chooses 12		3:13-19	
Jesus beside himself		3:20-21	
<i>Sermon on plain</i>			6:20-7:1a
<i>Centurion's boy</i>			7:1b-10
<i>Jesus and John</i>			7:18-35
Beelzebul debate	12:24-29	3:22-27	
Unforgivable sin	12:31-32	3:28-30	
<i>Sign of Jonah</i>	12:38-42		
Jesus' true family	12:46-50	3:31-35	8:19-21
Parable of sower	13:1-9	4:1-9	
Reason for parables	13:10-13	4:10-12	
Sower interpreted	13:18-23	4:13-20	
Short sayings		4:21-25	
Growing seed		4:26-29	
Mustard seed	13:31-32	4:30-32	
Parable of leaven	13:33		
Use of parables	13:34	4:33-34	
Views of Jesus	14:1-2	6:14-16	9:7-9
Etc.			
On greatness	18:1-5	9:33-37	9:46-48
Unknown exorcist		9:38-40	9:49-50
Cup of water		9:41	
Offender's fate	18:6	9:42	
<i>Offender's fate</i>	18:7		
Cut off member	18:8-9	9:43-48	
Lost sheep	18:10-14		
<i>Correct a brother</i>	18:15		
<i>Forgive 7 times</i>	18:21-22		

<i>Sign of Jonah</i>			<i>11:16, 29–30</i>
Mustard seed			13:18–19
Parable of leaven			13:20–21
Spoiled salt		9:49–50	14:34–35
Jesus goes to Judea	19:1–2	10:1	
Teaching on divorce	19:3–8	10:2–9	
Ruling on divorce	19:9	10:11–12	16:18
<i>Offender's fate</i>			<i>17:1–2</i>
<i>Correct a brother</i>			<i>17:3</i>
<i>Forgive 7 times</i>			<i>17:4</i>
Jesus and children	19:13–14	10:13–14	18:15–16
Etc.			

After the temptation narrative, Matthew and Luke never agree in placing the same Q material at the same point in the Markan outline. For example, Matthew places the “Sermon on the Mount” between Mark 1:21 and 1:22,³⁵ while Luke places his corresponding “Sermon on the Plain” later between Mark 3:21 and 3:22. Matthew has the material “Jesus and John” between Mark 2:22 and 2:23, while Luke has it later between Mark 3:21 and 3:22. Likewise, Matthew and Luke disagree in their placement of all the rest of the Q material. The only exceptions are at the beginning, where Q overlapped with Mark. Both Mark and Q included “Greater one,” followed by “Wheat and chaff” in Q; and both included “Jesus tested,” followed by “Three temptations” in Q. Since in both cases, the Markan parallel determines the position of the Q material, it is to be expected that Matthew and Luke would agree here in their placement of the Q material. Apart from these exceptions, Matthew and Luke always disagree in where they place the Q material with respect to the Markan outline.

This disagreement poses a major difficulty for the view that Luke used Matthew, particularly in the theories of Augustine and Farrer, in which Luke used both Matthew and Mark. If Luke used Matthew, we would expect to

35. On this point, see Hajo Uden Meijboom, *A History and Critique of the Origin of the Marcan Hypothesis 1835–1866: A Contemporary Report Rediscovered* (trans. and ed. John J. Kiwiet; New Gospel Studies 8; Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1993), 152, 154; Frans Neiryneck, “The Sermon on the Mount in the Gospel Synopses,” *ETL* 52 (1976): 350–57; repr. in *Evangelica: Gospel Studies—Études d'évangile: Collected Essays* (ed. F. van Segbroeck; BETL 60; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1982), 729–36; idem, “Matthew 4:23–5:2 and the Matthean Composition of 4:23–11:1,” in *The Interrelations of the Gospels* (ed. David L. Dungan; BETL 95; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 23–46, esp. 23–25, 46.

find the Markan and Q material combined in much the same order in Luke as in Matthew, since Luke would have inherited from Matthew the order in which Matthew combined these two types of material. For Luke to use Matthew in these theories, he would have to do so in a peculiar way, by going through Matthew, leaving the Markan material where it was, but taking the Q material out of its place in Matthew and transferring it elsewhere in his own Gospel. In so doing, Luke would have effectively concealed the fact that he knew Matthew, since he would have removed all trace of Matthew's order from his own Gospel, leaving only Mark's order and, to a lesser degree, the order of Q. But if Luke lacks any trace of Matthew's order in his own Gospel, we have no reason to think that he knew Matthew at all. If he knows the order of the Markan source and the order of Q, but not the order of Matthew, it is probable that he knew the Markan source and Q separately, not as they were combined in Matthew.

What would constitute evidence for the view that Luke used Matthew? It would help the theory if the Markan and non-Markan material were combined in the same order in Luke as in Matthew. One could then infer that this combination arose in Matthew and was copied by Luke. Since that is not the case, the theories of Augustine and Farrer start from a deficit, a lack of evidence that Luke used Matthew. Proponents of these theories must therefore make up the deficit by explaining why this particular evidence for their theory does not exist. And they attempt to do so essentially by claiming that Luke destroyed the evidence. At every point where Luke allegedly used Matthew, he hid the fact by separating the non-Markan material from the Markan and moving it elsewhere. And at every point where Luke did this, proponents of these theories have to speculate as to why. To put the matter generously, this alleged editorial procedure of Luke does not commend itself as the most obvious explanation for the lack of evidence that Luke used Matthew.

The first aspect of Streeter's argument poses a different problem for the Neo-Griesbach or Two-Gospel hypothesis, since in this theory Luke knew only Matthew—Mark had not yet come along. Thus Luke knew no Markan or non-Markan material, but only Matthean material, some of which he kept in the same order as Matthew and some of which he rearranged. Later, Mark came along and omitted this rearranged material (i.e. Q) precisely because Matthew and Luke disagree regarding its placement. The problem for this theory, then, is the lack of evidence that Mark ever knew this material that he supposedly omitted.

While the different placement of non-Markan material in Matthew and Luke thus poses a problem for the assumption that Luke used Matthew, it is precisely what we would expect to find if Matthew and Luke indepen-

dently combined the non-Markan material with the Markan source. Working independently, Matthew and Luke would rarely if ever place the same non-Markan material in the same place with respect to the Markan outline. Thus it appears most likely that Matthew and Luke each used some form of the Markan source and one or more sources containing non-Markan material. And this non-Markan material that they shared we call Q.

The secondary aspect of Streeter's argument compares the organization of Matthew with the organization of Luke. He finds that Matthew places the Q material at points in Mark's outline that are "always exceedingly appropriate," but that Luke places them at points "having no special appropriateness." It is therefore unlikely that Luke used Matthew, since it is not likely that Luke would have turned Matthew's appropriate organization into something less appropriate. In Streeter's work, this aspect of the argument played a subsidiary role in support of the main point. In the subsequent debate, however, it has taken on a life of its own. Reginald H. Fuller, for example, stated it thus:

Matthew has tidily collected the Q material into great blocks. Luke, we must then suppose, has broken up this tidy arrangement and scattered the Q material without rhyme or reason all over his gospel—a case of unscrambling the egg with a vengeance!³⁶

A few opponents of the Q hypothesis have tried to counter Streeter's argument. E. P. Sanders, for example, addressed the main point, in trying to show that Luke does sometimes have the non-Markan material at the same place in the Markan outline as Matthew.³⁷ He cites two passages as "Points where Matthew and Luke agree, to some extent at least, in placing the same material at the same place in the Markan outline, where such agreement cannot be attributed to the influence of Q."³⁸ Sanders cites as the first such passage the parable of the leaven (Matt 13:33/Luke 13:20–21). However, it is not the case that Matthew and Luke place this parable "at the same place in the Markan outline." It is true that both Matthew and Luke place it after the parable of the mustard seed, but as table 1.2 shows, Matthew places these between Mark 4:29 and 4:33, while Luke places them between Mark 9:48 and 9:49. Thus Matthew and Luke agree in having the two parables together, but they do not agree on having them at the same place in the Markan outline as Sanders claims.

36. Reginald H. Fuller, *The New Testament in Current Study* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), 74.

37. E. P. Sanders, "The Argument from Order and the Relationship between Matthew and Luke," *NTS* 15 (1968–69): 249–61; repr. in Bellinzoni, *Two-Source Hypothesis*, 409–25. In citing page numbers I refer to the reprint.

38. Sanders, "Argument from Order," 424.

The second passage of this type listed by Sanders is Matthew 18:10–22/Luke 17:3–4, where following a saying on offenses that all three Synoptics have (Mark 9:42; Matt 18:6–7; Luke 17:1–2), both Matthew and Luke have sayings on correcting a brother (Matt 18:15/Luke 17:3) and forgiving seven times (Matt 18:21–22/Luke 17:4). However, once again it is not true that Matthew and Luke have their parallel material “at the same place in the Markan outline.” As table 1.2 shows, Matthew has two versions of the saying “Offender’s fate,” one parallel to Mark 9:42 (Matt 18:6) and one immediately after (Matt 18:7). Matthew has the other two elements of this material, “Correct a brother” (18:15) and “Forgive seven times” (18:21–22), between Mark 9:48 and 9:49. Luke has all three elements together, between Mark 10:12 and 10:13.

Thus neither passage adduced by Sanders provides the type of agreement that he attributes to them. It remains true that Matthew and Luke do not put the non-Markan material at the same place relative to the Markan outline. This fact suggests that Matthew and Luke independently added the non-Markan material (Q) to material that they shared with Mark.

Goodacre has replied to both aspects of Streeter’s argument, which he refers to as an argument concerning “Luke’s order.”³⁹ His first point is that Streeter mischaracterizes the evidence by misrepresenting an important fact.

As he well knew, most of the pieces of Luke’s double tradition do not appear in a “different context of Mark,” whether appropriate or otherwise, because hardly any of Luke’s double tradition occurs in a Markan context at all. That is, whereas Matthew often features Q in Markan contexts, Luke rarely does, for most of Luke’s Q material occurs in 6:20–8:3 and 9:51–18:14, and there is famously little use of Mark in these sections.⁴⁰

Goodacre appears to have misinterpreted Streeter’s meaning. When Streeter speaks of Luke moving non-Markan material to “a different context of Mark,” the context of Streeter’s statement makes clear that he means to a different “point in the Markan outline.” And all of the Q material can be related to some point in the Markan outline. It is true, as Goodacre notes, that Luke has put together several items of Q material in Luke 6:20–8:3. Yet this entire section occurs at a particular point in the Markan outline, specifically between Mark 3:21 and 3:22 (see table 1.2). Understood properly, Streeter’s statement does not mischaracterize the evidence.⁴¹

39. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 123–28; *Case against Q*, 59–61, 81–132.

40. Goodacre, *Case against Q*, 84–85; cf. *Synoptic Problem*, 124.

41. Foster points out that this particular critique of Goodacre “does not seem to answer Streeter’s fundamental charge” (“Is It Possible,” 317). While this is true, Goodacre does address the fundamental charge subsequently.

Goodacre's second point is that the argument from Luke's order depends on "a dubious value judgment."⁴² In making this point, Goodacre is addressing the secondary aspect of Streeter's argument, in which Streeter claims that Matthew places the Q material at points in Mark's outline that are "always exceedingly appropriate," while Luke places them at points "having no special appropriateness." As we saw above, other scholars have reiterated this view. Following Sanders,⁴³ Goodacre objects that comments such as these are based on a purely subjective value judgment that regards Luke's order and arrangement as inferior to Matthew's. Such a negative judgment of Luke, he says, is difficult to maintain since literary critics are able to make good sense of Luke's order and literary design. Jeffrey Peterson and Mark Matson have made similar arguments.⁴⁴

These scholars make a valid point, which should serve as a corrective to unsupported claims that Matthew's organization is superior to Luke's or that Luke's order lacks any rhyme or reason. However, two considerations blunt the edge of this point somewhat. First, most Q scholars today would probably agree with Goodacre that Luke's order shows evidence of literary design. Christopher Tuckett, for example, asserts that "no one today would deny that Luke's ordering can be seen to have some rhyme and reason to it."⁴⁵ Second, while Goodacre's point is well taken against the subsidiary aspect of Streeter's argument, it does not touch the main point. As Tuckett points out, "The argument⁴⁶ is not that Luke's order per se is incoherent; it is that Luke's *changes to Matthew's order* may be difficult to conceive."⁴⁷

Goodacre's third point does address the main point of Streeter's argument. He claims that "it is easy to see why Luke might have wanted to alter [Matthew's order]," since "Luke would not have found Matthew's restructuring of

42. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 124–25, 126–27; *Case against Q*, 85–86.

43. E. P. Sanders and Margaret Davies, *Studying the Synoptic Gospels* (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1989), 114.

44. Jeffrey Peterson, "Order in the Double Tradition and the Existence of Q," in Goodacre and Perrin, *Questioning Q*, 28–42; Mark A. Matson, "Luke's Rewriting of the Sermon on the Mount," in Goodacre and Perrin, *Questioning Q*, 43–70.

45. Tuckett, review of *Case against Q*, 402. Tuckett may go too far, however, when he states that "No one has ever doubted that Luke's order may make (Lukan) sense" (402). Stein, for example, refers to Luke's arrangement of the material as "artistically inferior" to that of Matthew: Robert H. Stein, *Studying the Synoptic Gospels: Origin and Interpretation* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 104.

46. I would correct this to "the *primary* argument."

47. Tuckett, review of *Case against Q*, 402. Foster makes the same point ("Is It Possible," 318–19).

Mark congenial.⁴⁸ Goodacre mentions two primary ways in which Luke found Matthew's presentation uncongenial. First, Luke objected to Matthew's order.⁴⁹ In Luke 1:3, where Luke states that he will set out the story "in order," Luke shows that he is critical of his predecessors' work, specifically its order.⁵⁰ Goodacre supposes that Luke had known Mark for some time before he discovered Matthew. He therefore kept Mark's order for the most part, but thought that he could do a better job than Matthew of integrating Matthew's non-Markan material into Mark.⁵¹ Since most of this material consisted of sayings, he felt greater liberty in rearranging it than he did with rearranging Mark's narrative. Second, Luke objected to Matthew's long discourses. In *The Synoptic Problem*, Goodacre follows Goulder in arguing that Luke "has a certain reticence over lengthy discourses" like those in Matthew, and so would have been concerned to shorten them.⁵² Both Kloppenborg⁵³ and Tuckett⁵⁴ take issue with this claim, and Goodacre himself in *The Case against Q* refines it: Luke "does not dislike lengthy discourses *per se*" but objects to them when they impede the flow of the narrative, as Matthew's Sermon on the Mount does.⁵⁵

To illustrate and make plausible the view that Luke reordered Matthew, Goodacre focuses on Luke's supposed reordering of Matthew's Sermon on the Mount.⁵⁶ According to Goodacre, this discourse does impede the flow of the narrative, so Luke would want to shorten it. He would also want to eliminate Matthean emphases that he found uncongenial, such as Matthew's emphasis on the Law. Since the last half of the Sermon consists of "a series of loosely related sayings,"⁵⁷ Luke redistributed these to appropriate contexts. Goodacre argues that narrative criticism makes good sense out of Luke's reordering of the Sermon on the Mount.⁵⁸ Furthermore the way that modern Jesus films

48. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 125.

49. *Ibid.*, 127–28; *Case against Q*, 86–91, 103–104.

50. Foster finds little support for this view in the text of Luke ("Is It Possible," 319–21).

51. Kloppenborg allows the plausibility of this view ("On Dispensing with Q," 227); Foster doubts it ("Is It Possible," 318).

52. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 125–26, esp. 125.

53. John S. Kloppenborg Verbin, *Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the Sayings Gospel* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 16–17; Kloppenborg, "On Dispensing with Q" 229–30.

54. Tuckett, "Existence of Q," 41; *Q and the History of Early Christianity*, 26–27.

55. Goodacre, *Case against Q*, 91–96, 97, esp. 95.

56. Goodacre, *Case against Q*, 96–132; cf. Matson, "Luke's Rewriting of the Sermon on the Mount."

57. Kloppenborg takes issue with this assertion ("On Dispensing with Q" 227–29).

58. Goodacre, *Case against Q*, 105–120.

have treated the Sermon resembles the way Luke would have used Matthew.⁵⁹

The length and detail of Goodacre's argument tend to obscure its most important point. Goodacre has attempted to imagine a plausible scenario in which Luke might have treated Matthew in the way required by Farrer's theory. That is, he has tried to make plausible the view that Luke took almost every piece of non-Markan material out of its place in Matthew and moved it to a different place in Mark's outline. Essential to this endeavor are Goodacre's suppositions that Luke had a preference for Mark because he knew it before he discovered Matthew, that he did not like the way Matthew added material to Mark, and that he thought he could do a better job.

Is this scenario possible? Yes. Is it plausible? Opinions may differ. Is it probable? No. To make a theory probable, one must do more than simply imagine that it might have happened. One must provide some sort of evidence to suggest that it actually did happen. And whether plausible or not, Goodacre's scenario does not provide evidence to suggest that Luke used Matthew. We have no evidence that Luke ever knew this material in the combination that it has in the Gospel of Matthew. Those scholars who claim that he did must argue that Luke destroyed all such evidence by completely rearranging this material.

Thus the main point of Streeter's argument for Q remains unanswered, and this argument makes it probable that Luke did not use Matthew. The essential and indisputable point is that Luke's combination of Markan and non-Markan material differs from Matthew's. Luke shares with Matthew the order of the Markan source and, to a lesser degree, the order of the non-Markan material; but Luke does not share with Matthew the order in which Matthew has combined these two types of material. On the one hand, if Luke used Matthew, we would expect to find some evidence that he knew Matthew's order. The fact that Luke lacks any trace of Matthew's order in his own Gospel makes it probable that he did not use Matthew. On the other hand, since there is evidence that Luke knew the order of the Markan source and the order of Q separately, it is probable that he knew the Markan source and Q separately, not as they were combined in Matthew. Thus the more probable explanation is that the Markan material and the Q material came from different sources that Matthew and Luke independently combined.

59. *Ibid.*, 121–32. This chapter appeared previously as “The Synoptic Jesus and the Celluloid Christ: Solving the Synoptic Problem through Film,” *JSNT* 80 (2000): 31–44. Downing criticizes Goodacre for using anachronistic comparisons (“Dissolving the Synoptic Problem”). Goodacre responds in Mark Goodacre, “On Choosing and Using Appropriate Analogies: A Response to F. Gerald Downing,” *JSNT* 26 (2003): 237–40.

2. As Streeter's second argument for Q, he affirms that

Sometimes it is Matthew, sometimes it is Luke, who gives a saying in what is clearly the more original form. This is explicable if both are drawing from the same source, each making slight modifications of his own; it is not so if either is dependent on the other.⁶⁰

If Luke drew the double tradition exclusively from Matthew, Matthew would always have the more primitive version of it, while Luke's version would always be secondary. Goulder, representing Farrer's theory, argues that such is the case: "I have given reasons for thinking that at all points the Lucan form is secondary, carrying over Matthean expressions and theology, and adapting them with Lucan expressions and theology."⁶¹ Proponents of the Q hypothesis, on the other hand, claim that it is sometimes Matthew and sometimes Luke that appears to have the more primitive version of the double tradition.⁶² Tuckett, for example, cites several instances where Luke seems to have the more primitive version: some of the Beatitudes (Matt 5:3, 6/Luke 6:20–21), the doom oracle (Matt 23:34/Luke 11:49), the Lord's Prayer (Matt 6:9–13/Luke 11:2–4), and the saying concerning the sign of Jonah (Matt 12:40/Luke 11:30).⁶³

Goodacre discusses this argument under the heading "alternating primitivity."⁶⁴ He first attempts to minimize the degree to which Luke can be viewed as having the more primitive reading. He argues that when "Matthean language" appears in Matthew's version of a Q saying but not in Luke's, Q theorists assume that Matthew added it and that Luke preserves the more original version.⁶⁵ However, such logic works only if one has already assumed the Q hypothesis. If one instead assumes that Luke used Matthew, one expects to see Luke eliminating Matthean language in the process of rewording the Matthean original.⁶⁶ To illustrate this point, Goodacre shows how Matthew's version of the blessing on the hungry (Matt 5:6) can be viewed as more original than Luke's version (Luke 6:21) if one accepts the view that Luke used

60. Streeter, *Four Gospels*, 183.

61. Goulder, *Midrash and Lektion in Matthew*, 452. Cf. A. M. Farrer, "On Dispensing with Q," in *Studies in the Gospels: Essays in Memory of R. H. Lightfoot* (ed. D. E. Nineham; Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), 55–88; repr. in Bellinzoni, *Two-Source Hypothesis*, 321–56, esp. 332.

62. E.g., Styler, "Priority of Mark," 302; Catchpole, "Did Q Exist," 1–59.

63. Tuckett, "Synoptic Problem," 268.

64. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 133–40; *Case against Q*, 61–66, 133–51.

65. Kloppenborg objects that Goodacre misstates the usual procedures for reconstructing Q ("On Dispensing with Q," 223–24).

66. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 134.

Matthew. He makes a similar demonstration for the blessing on the poor (Matt 5:1b–3/Luke 6:20).

Goodacre is correct that a scholar's presuppositions about sources affect that scholar's judgment as to whether Matthew or Luke has the more primitive version of a saying. His argument therefore illustrates the need to distinguish between two different enterprises, both of which involve evaluations of primitivity. One enterprise is conducted by scholars who presuppose the Q hypothesis and wish to reconstruct the original wording of Q. In this enterprise, scholars legitimately take the Q hypothesis as a starting point and make evaluations of primitivity from that perspective. The other enterprise is conducted by scholars who are making an argument for a particular source theory, such as the Q hypothesis or the view that Luke used Matthew. In this enterprise, scholars must be careful that their argument does not presuppose the theory for which they are arguing. Goodacre seems to confuse these two enterprises, since his argument is directed against those who assume the Q hypothesis.

The relevant issue here, however, is Streeter's argument, which affirms that, without presupposing one theory or the other, we can find double tradition passages in which Luke has a more primitive version than Matthew. For example, Luke probably preserves the more original form of the sign of Jonah (Luke 11:30/Matt 12:40). It is easy to understand why Matthew would have added a reference to Jesus' resurrection, but less easy to understand why Luke would have removed it had he known it. Likewise, in the Beelzebul debate, Luke's "finger of God" is probably more original than Matthew's "Spirit of God" (Matt 12:28/Luke 11:20). It is unlikely that Luke, who elsewhere adds references to the Spirit (Luke 10:21; 11:13), would have substituted a different expression if he had found "Spirit of God" in his source. So too in the pericope on faithful and unfaithful slaves, Luke's "unbelievers" is probably more original than Matthew's "hypocrites" (Matt 24:51/Luke 12:46). While Luke shows no aversion to the term "hypocrites" (Luke 6:42; 12:56; 13:15), Matthew shows a positive affinity for it, using it fourteen times. It is more likely therefore that Matthew introduced the term than that Luke dispensed with it. If in these and other instances⁶⁷ Luke preserves a more original form of the Q material than Matthew, then Luke did not get it from Matthew. We should not imagine therefore that Luke used Matthew, but that both Matthew and Luke used Q independently.

In Goodacre's second main response to this argument, he acknowledges that Luke may occasionally have a more primitive version of a saying than

67. Other instances are proposed by Kloppenborg, "On Dispensing with Q," 224–25.

Matthew in the double tradition. He attributes this, however, not to Luke's knowledge of Q but to Luke's knowledge of oral tradition. He gives two examples of such sayings: the words of institution of the Eucharist, and the Lord's Prayer.⁶⁸ According to Goodacre, "The number of such passages is probably not large."⁶⁹

Ultimately, then, Goodacre fails to refute Streeter's second argument for Q. He has to acknowledge that Luke sometimes has the more original version in the double tradition. His appeal to oral tradition to account for these does not help his case, since this explanation may work for liturgical tradition like the two examples that Goodacre gives, but is less likely to explain Luke's priority in nonliturgical passages such as those mentioned above.⁷⁰ Furthermore if he can appeal to hypothetical oral traditions known to Luke independently of Matthew, then he has no basis for objecting to a hypothetical written source such as Q.⁷¹ He has thus eliminated the main appeal of Farrer's theory, which Farrer and Goulder framed precisely to avoid any need for hypothetical sources.⁷²

3. A third argument for Q, similar to the second, affirms that sometimes Matthew, sometimes Luke, preserves a more original form of the triple tradition. Goodacre does not respond to this argument, perhaps because it speaks especially against the Griesbach and the Augustinian hypotheses. Since in these theories Matthew was the first Gospel, Matthew should always have the more original form of the tradition, whether double or triple. Yet it sometimes seems that Matthew's version of the triple tradition is secondary to that of Luke. For example, Peter's confession in Matthew, which identifies Jesus as "the Christ, the son of the living God" (Matt 16:16), is probably less original than the versions of Mark and Luke, which identify him only as "the Christ" (Mark 8:29) or "the Christ of God" (Luke 9:20). It is easy to see why Matthew would have added an identification of Jesus as the son of God, but not easy to see why Mark and Luke would have omitted it, had they known it from Matthew.

This type of argument does not in every instance affect Farrer's theory, specifically in those instances in which Mark preserves the earliest form of the tradition. Since Farrer's theory assumes that Mark was the first Gospel, its

68. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 138–39; *Case against Q*, 63–66.

69. Goodacre, *Case against Q*, 66.

70. Kloppenborg, "On Dispensing with Q," 224; Tuckett, review of *Case against Q*, 403.

71. As Tuckett points out, "if appeal is made too often to parallel traditions (oral or otherwise) available to Luke independently of Matthew, some form of 'Q' starts creeping in by the back door again!" (review of *Case against Q*, 403).

72. Foster, "Is It Possible," 321–22.

proponents can argue that both Matthew and Luke received the triple tradition from Mark and that either could sometimes preserve the more original form of it. However, if Luke has a more original form of the tradition than either Matthew or Mark, such instances speak against every form of the theory that Luke used Matthew. Since Matthew provided the triple tradition in the Griesbach hypothesis, and Mark did in Farrer's theory, the Gospel of Luke should never have the earliest form of the triple tradition in any of these theories. Yet there is good reason to think that it does. One example occurs at the end of the story about plucking grain on the Sabbath (table 1.3).

TABLE 1.3. PLUCKING GRAIN

Matthew 12:5–8	Mark 2:27–28	Luke 6:5
5 Or have you not read in the Law that on the Sabbaths the priests in the Temple defile the Sabbath and are guiltless? 6 But I say to you that something greater than the Temple is here. 7 But if you had known what 'I desire mercy and not sacrifice' means, you would not have condemned the guiltless.		
	27 And he said to them,	5 And he said to them,
	"The Sabbath was made for humans and not humans for the Sabbath.	
8 For the son of man is Lord of the Sabbath."	28 So the son of man is lord even of the Sabbath."	"The son of man is lord of the Sabbath."

Here both Matthew and Mark make secondary interpolations into the story, while Luke preserves the more original version without these interpolations. Matthew 12:5–7 is one of two places where Matthew interpolates the same scriptural quotation: "I desire mercy and not sacrifice." In the first instance (Matt 9:13a), its secondary character is shown by the fact that it interrupts the two parts of a comparison in which the sick represent sinners and the well represent the righteous. In both instances, Mark and Luke lack the interpolation. Since the theme of the interpolation would be acceptable

to both Mark and Luke, both writing for Gentile Christian audiences with no attachment to the Jewish sacrificial system, it is difficult to believe that either, much less both, would omit this theme twice had they known it. The agreement of Mark and Luke against Matthew shows clearly in this case that Matthew's interpolation is secondary. Likewise Mark interpolated the statement "The Sabbath was made for humans and not humans for the Sabbath" in Mark 2:27. As I have shown elsewhere, proponents of Markan priority have had difficulty explaining why Matthew and Luke, supposedly following Mark, do not include this saying.⁷³ Luke, in particular, would have welcomed it for its expression of the same theme as the parable of the good Samaritan (Luke 10:29–37): that human need outweighs the requirements of the law. More likely therefore, Mark added this saying for the same reason that Matthew added Matthew 12:5–7. The story of plucking grain provided a justification for the church's Sabbath conduct. Since the church tended to want more arguments for its position, not fewer, Matthew and Mark each added another justification to the original argument. Luke, who includes neither interpolation, thus preserves a more original form of the story's ending than either Matthew or Mark.

Another example occurs in the Synoptic accounts of the Last Supper. Luke includes an account of the Passover meal and the Passover cup (Luke 22:15–18) followed by the bread and cup of the Lord's Supper (Luke 22:19–20). Matthew and Mark have an account in which these two meal traditions have been combined into one (Matt 26:26–29/Mark 14:22–25). This conflated version, however, left out the account of the Passover meal that Luke includes in 22:15–16.⁷⁴ Thus Luke again appears to preserve the most original form of the tradition. Such instances in which Luke preserves a more original form of the tradition than either Matthew or Mark are not consistent with any theory in which Luke used Matthew.

4. A fourth argument for Q is the fact that either Matthew or Luke sometimes includes an overlap between the Markan source and Q, i.e. two versions of the same material in the same Gospel. In some cases, the Gospel preserves the two versions separately, thus creating doublets; in other cases it combines the two versions into a single conflated version.⁷⁵ For instance, Matthew includes two versions of the pericope in which Jesus' opponents seek a sign from him, one shared with Mark (Matt 16:1, 4/Mark 8:11–13) and one shared

73. Burkett, *From Proto-Mark to Mark*, 232–33.

74. *Ibid.*, 217–20.

75. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, "The Priority of Mark and the 'Q' Source in Luke," in *idem, To Advance the Gospel: New Testament Studies* (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 16–23; Styler, "Priority of Mark," 303–304; Tuckett, "Existence of Q," 27.

with Luke (Matt 12:38–40/Luke 11:16, 29–30). Such a doublet suggests that Matthew found this pericope in two different sources: one shared with Mark (the Markan source) and one shared with Luke (Q).

We saw above that Goodacre's second argument for Luke's use of Matthew focuses on "passages in which Mark is not the middle term," i.e. passages described as "Mark-Q overlaps" in the Two-Document hypothesis. However, in examining that argument, we saw that Farrer's theory has difficulty explaining these overlaps, such as the saying on the unforgivable sin. In such cases, it appears that Luke followed not Matthew, but what Matthew added to the Markan source from another source, i.e. Q. Therefore the overlaps that Goodacre makes his second argument for Luke's use of Matthew are better regarded as part of our fourth argument for Q.

Another example of such an overlap is the Beelzebul debate (Mark 3:22–27 parr). Here Matthew stands as the "middle term," agreeing in part with Mark and in part with Luke, while Mark and Luke have few agreements against Matthew. F. Gerald Downing has made a detailed analysis of this pericope, finding that Luke includes none of the material in which Matthew reproduces Mark verbatim but almost all of the material from Matthew that has no parallel in Mark. He concludes that "Luke in fact seems to be using Matthew's extra material without Matthew's obviously Markan additions. *But Matthew's extra material without the Markan additions is not Matthew's gospel; it is Matthew's other source(s).*"⁷⁶ Here too it appears that Luke followed not Matthew, but what Matthew added from Q to the Markan source.

While the Q hypothesis provides a reasonable explanation for such overlaps, other theories do not. Christopher Tuckett describes the strange editorial procedure required of Luke by the Farrer hypothesis in such passages:

Mark must have written first, Matthew then adding to Mark. Luke, who usually follows Mark and ignores Matthew when they run parallel, must have decided here to remove very carefully all the Markan material from Matthew, retaining only the parts peculiar to Matthew.

Tuckett goes on to describe the strange editorial procedure required of Mark by the Neo-Griesbach hypothesis in these same passages:

Matthew must have written first; Luke, writing second, must have reproduced only some parts of Matthew. Then Mark, writing third, must have

⁷⁶ Downing, "Towards the Rehabilitation of Q," in Bellinzoni, *Two-Source Hypothesis*, 277.

taken an aversion to anything which Luke had taken from Matthew and so reproduced only those parts of Matthew which Luke had omitted.⁷⁷

The Q hypothesis relieves both Mark and Luke of such peculiarities: the Markan source preserved one version of these pericopes, Luke another (Q), while Matthew conflated the two. Thus the inability of other theories to account for these passages provides a positive argument for the existence of Q.

5. A fifth argument for Q represents a broader application of the fourth. It looks beyond the overlaps to include the wider phenomenon of the minor agreements rejected by any evangelist writing third. F. Gerald Downing presented this argument subsequent to the appearance of Goodacre's work.⁷⁸ He bases it on "the disagreements of each evangelist with the minor close agreements of the other two." The Neo-Griesbach hypothesis has Mark writing third, while Farrer's theory has Luke writing third.⁷⁹ Downing shows that in each theory, the supposed third author, in copying from the two earlier Gospels, very frequently refuses to copy his sources where they agree verbatim or very closely, even while precisely copying one or the other in the same context. While other ancient authors preferred to use material where their sources agreed, these authors would have gone to considerable effort to avoid copying such agreements. While the strange editorial procedure required of the author by these theories makes them implausible, such strange behavior is not required by a theory that incorporates Q.⁸⁰

6. A sixth argument for Q points out that the material common to Matthew and Luke does not begin until after the infancy narratives and ceases prior to the resurrection narratives. This suggests that what Luke shared with Matthew was not the Gospel of Matthew itself but only certain parts of Matthew between the infancy narratives and the resurrection narratives, i.e., Q.⁸¹

Against this argument, Goodacre finds evidence that Luke did know Matthew's birth narrative. Such knowledge appears in the fact that they agree on matters otherwise not found in the New Testament, such as Jesus' birth in

77. Tuckett, "Synoptic Problem," 269.

78. F. Gerald Downing, "Disagreements of Each Evangelist with the Minor Close Agreements of the Other Two," *ETL* 80 (2004): 445–69.

79. Downing does not discuss the theory of Matthean posteriority, which has Matthew writing third.

80. From his study, Downing draws the conclusion that "positing Mk and Q as the sources used independently by Mt and by Lk remains the only credible solution to the synoptic problem" ("Disagreements," 469). Here he overstates the case, since my own theory positing Proto-Mark and Q also avoids the problems that he points out.

81. Styler, "Priority of Mark," 302–303.

Bethlehem, the name of Jesus' father as Joseph, and the virginal conception. Furthermore they even have the same wording in the sentence "She/you will give birth to a son and you shall call him Jesus" (Matt 1:21; Luke 1:31).⁸²

Goodacre's argument founders for two reasons. First, most of the elements common to Matthew and Luke in the birth narratives do not involve any agreement in wording. Therefore these show only that Matthew and Luke knew some of the same traditions, not that one depended on the other. Second, the one sentence where the two Gospels agree in wording is a quotation of Isaiah 7:14. From this passage both evangelists include the sentence "She/you will give birth to a son and you shall call him. . . ." (Matt 1:21; Luke 1:31), and Luke also includes the phrase "you will become pregnant" (Luke 1:31). It is doubtful that Luke drew his version of Isaiah 7:14 from Matthew, since Matthew does not include all of Isaiah 7:14 that Luke quotes. Thus if one Gospel depended on the other, it was more likely Matthew drawing from Luke, not the reverse. However, the resemblance between Matthew and Luke here most likely results not from dependence of one on the other but from their common use of Isaiah 7:14. The one striking agreement is the substitution of the name "Jesus" for "Immanuel" in both Matthew's and Luke's quotation of Isaiah 7:14. However, one such agreement in the entirety of the birth narratives does not suffice to establish dependence of one narrative on the other. In this case, Matthew and Luke probably relied on a common tradition of interpreting Isaiah 7:14 as a prediction about Jesus.

7. A seventh argument for Q is the evidence that the Gospel of Matthew includes a layer of redaction that was unknown to either Mark or Luke. I set out much of this evidence in the previous volume in this series subsequent to Goodacre's work.⁸³ Not only passages, but also less noticeable features of Matthew's style such as recurring words, phrases, grammatical constructions, themes, and redactional techniques characteristic of Matthew are absent from both Mark and Luke. For instance, Matthew includes numerous quotations of Scripture that are introduced by a special formula, such as "This took place to fulfill what was spoken by the prophet" (Matt 1:22–23; 2:15; 2:17–18; 2:23; 4:13–16; 8:17; 12:15–21; 13:35; 21:4–5; 26:56; 27:9–10; cf. 2:5–6). Neither Mark nor Luke includes any of these, despite the fact that both evangelists agreed that Jesus fulfilled scripture. Similarly, Matthew uses the verb προσκυνέω with Jesus as object ten times (Matt 2:2; 2:8; 2:11; 8:2; 9:18; 14:33; 15:25; 20:20; 28:9; 28:17). Neither Mark nor Luke includes any of these, despite the fact that both use the same verb with Jesus as object else-

82. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 132; *Case against Q*, 56–57.

83. Burkett, *From Proto-Mark to Mark*, 43–59.

where (Mark 5:6; Luke 24:52; cf. Mark 15:19). Likewise, Matthew uses the verb μεταβαίνω six times, none of which are included by either Mark or Luke. These instances, and many others that I have cited elsewhere, are best explained as Matthean redaction that was unknown to either Mark or Luke.

Since these features occur repeatedly in Matthew, what requires explanation is not the absence from Mark and Luke of individual words or sentences in Matthew, but the absence of entire themes and recurring features of Matthew's style. And since these pervasive features of Matthew's style are generally benign, that is, neither grammatically nor ideologically objectionable, it is difficult to explain why either Mark or Luke would have omitted them had they known them. If Luke knew Matthew, then he either intentionally omitted these features of Matthew's style or he eliminated them unintentionally in the process of making other revisions. Since these features are generally benign, it is difficult to explain why he would omit them intentionally, especially since he uses some of them in contexts other than parallels to Matthew. Since they are numerous, individually and collectively, it is also difficult to explain how he could have unintentionally omitted them all in the process of making other revisions. Most likely, therefore, Luke did not include these stylistic features of Matthew because he did not use Matthew's Gospel. Instead, Matthew and Luke shared a non-Markan source or set of sources that each redacted independently. And we call such a source or sources "Q."

8. An eighth argument for Q takes into consideration form criticism and, as far as I know, appears here for the first time. In the stage of oral tradition, stories and sayings probably circulated independently or as part of short collections or discourses.⁸⁴ Luke's organization better reflects this early stage than Matthew's. While Luke has the Q material in short groups of sayings, such as the section "On prayer" (Luke 11:1–13) or the section "On light" (Luke 11:33–36), Matthew has combined this material into five much lengthier discourses, such as the Sermon on the Mount. Luke's organization thus appears to stand closer to the origin of the tradition than Matthew's and for that reason must be judged more primitive. But if Luke exhibits a more original form of organization than Matthew, then Luke did not use Matthew. Instead, both used Q.

84. This view is accepted even by more recent advocates of oral tradition: e.g., James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus Remembered* (vol. 1 of *Christianity in the Making*; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 245–48.

UNUSED ARGUMENTS FOR Q

I have now discussed eight arguments that appear to me to be the strongest arguments against Luke's use of Matthew and for Q. A number of other arguments for Q remain that I have not used. Here I briefly consider five of these, not only for the sake of completeness, but because Goodacre responds to some of these in his critique of Q.

1. Goodacre responds to one of the most common arguments for the existence of Q: the fact that Luke does not show any knowledge of Matthew's additions to Mark in the triple tradition. He finds this argument given by Kümmel, Tuckett, Fitzmyer, Kloppenborg, Allison, and Stein.⁸⁵ This argument is a nonstarter against the Neo-Griesbach hypothesis since, as it is usually formulated, it presupposes Marcan priority. Even in a more neutral formulation, such as that of Kloppenborg,⁸⁶ the argument presupposes Luke's knowledge of Mark. In the Neo-Griesbach hypothesis, which puts Matthew first and Mark third, there are no Matthean additions to Mark, and Luke does not know Mark. The material under consideration would result from Luke abridging Matthew, and Mark then following Luke's abridgment. So the problem does not exist in that theory.

With respect to Farrer's theory, which does presuppose Marcan priority, the argument is somewhat inaccurate. As Goodacre points out, in that theory, Luke does include some of Matthew's additions to Mark, such as those in the John the Baptist complex, the temptation narrative, and those passages labeled "Mark/Q overlaps" by proponents of Q. With respect to the Matthean additions to Mark that Luke omits, the question is whether it is reasonable to think that Luke would have omitted them in favor of Mark alone. Goodacre, at least, thinks that it is. Several proponents of Q have argued that it is not.⁸⁷ While I think that the proponents of Q make the better case, I have chosen not to use this argument because of its weaknesses.

85. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 128–31; *Case against Q*, 49–54, which expands and revises Goodacre, "A Monopoly on Marcan Priority? Fallacies at the Heart of Q" in *Society of Biblical Literature 2000 Seminar Papers* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 538–622, esp. 592–99.

86. "Or, to put it more neutrally, in Lukan material for which there are Matthean and Marcan parallels, Luke rarely reflects what is distinctive of Matthew when it is compared with Mark" (Kloppenborg Verbin, *Excavating Q*, 41).

87. Kloppenborg, "On Dispensing with Q," 219–22; Foster, "Is It Possible," 326–28; Tuckett, review of *Case against Q*, 401–2.

2. Goodacre also responds to the argument that Luke lacks the “M” material and therefore did not know Matthew.⁸⁸ This argument does not particularly discomfit either the Neo-Griesbach hypothesis or Farrer’s theory. Both have explanations for the material unique to Matthew. The former sees it as Matthean material that both Luke and Mark omitted; in the latter, it is Matthean material that Luke omitted. Goodacre thinks that Luke omitted it because it was not congenial to his own perspective, and Kloppenborg criticizes this view.⁸⁹ I have omitted the whole argument.

3. Goodacre points out an argument for Q that has emerged more recently than most other such arguments. This is the idea that Q is distinctive, that it “distinguishes itself from the other material in the Synoptics ... because it is held to have a special theology, vocabulary, history, structure, and style.”⁹⁰ Goulder disputes this view, claiming that the theology of Matthew and the theology of Q are indistinguishable. Goodacre also finds much overlap between the style of Q and the style of M. He does find that the double tradition material has a distinctive profile, but he explains this by Farrer’s theory: Luke chose the “Luke-pleasing” elements in Matthew’s non-Markan material (Q), but omitted the “Luke-displeasing” material (M). Kloppenborg defends the coherence of Q against Goodacre’s critique.⁹¹

It will be one of the primary tasks of the present volume to show that Q does in fact exhibit a stylistic and thematic unity. However, I do not use this unity as an argument for the existence of Q. Instead I establish the existence of Q on other grounds (the eight arguments above) and then proceed to identify the stylistic and thematic unity of Q. If the results of this study are persuasive, they may serve to confirm our initial conclusion that Q existed.

4. Goodacre responds to one further argument for Q, namely, that “the success of redaction-criticism” argues in favor of the two-source hypothesis.⁹² Goodacre criticizes this argument, among other reasons, for circularity. Kloppenborg agrees that this argument is hardly a compelling one.⁹³

88. Goodacre cites Fitzmyer and Stein as proponents of this argument (Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 131–33; *Case against Q*, 54–59).

89. Kloppenborg, “On Dispensing with Q,” 222–23.

90. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 140–42; *Case against Q*, 66–75, esp. 66–67.

91. Kloppenborg, “On Dispensing with Q,” 225–26.

92. Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 142–44; *Case against Q*, 75–77.

93. Kloppenborg, “On Dispensing with Q,” 226.

5. I include here one final argument that Goodacre does not mention: an argument from ancient scribal practices. Downing⁹⁴ and Derrenbacher⁹⁵ in particular have developed the view that plausible solutions to the Synoptic problem must take into account the normal practices of ancient scribes and the physical limitations that they faced as they produced manuscripts. Both scholars find that the Two-Document hypothesis is less problematic than alternative theories when viewed from the perspective of ancient scribal practices. These scholars have made an important contribution by highlighting what is known of scribal practice. I do not use their argument, however, for two reasons. First they imagine a scenario in which a single scribe alone produced a Gospel. However, as Christopher Tuckett points out, the author of a Gospel may have dictated to a scribe, in which case the physical limitations of a single scribe might be less relevant.⁹⁶ Jeffrey Peterson makes a similar point, with respect to the question of whether it was technically possible for the evangelists, specifically Luke, to relocate material from their sources:

this concern is addressed easily enough if we credit Luke's likely patron Theophilus with the resources and inclination to supply the Evangelist with a scribe (cf. Romans 16.22) and a quantity of *tabellae* for taking notes and composing drafts in wax before committing the finished product to papyrus.⁹⁷

Second, our knowledge of ancient scribal practice is sketchy and probably reflects what scribes did normally with normal projects. We do not know what ingenuity they may have exercised when confronted with an unusual task or when they wished to accomplish a task in an unusual manner.

94. F. Gerald Downing, "Redaction Criticism: Josephus' *Antiquities* and the Synoptic Gospels," *JSNT* 8 (1980): 46–65; 9 (1980): 29–48; idem, "Compositional Conventions and the Synoptic Problem," *JBL* 107 (1985): 69–85; idem, "A Paradigm Perplex: Luke, Matthew and Mark," *NTS* 38 (1992): 15–36; idem, "Word Processing in the Ancient World: The Social Production and Performance of Q," *JSNT* 64 (1996): 29–48; idem, *Doing Things with Words in the First Christian Century* (JSNTSup 20; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000).

95. Robert A. Derrenbacher Jr. "Greco-Roman Writing Practices"; idem, *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem* (BETL 186; Leuven: Peeters, 2005).

96. Christopher Tuckett, review of *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Gospels* by R. A. Derrenbacher, *JTS* 58 (2007): 187–90, esp. 189. Tuckett attributes this insight to his colleague, Dr. Andrew Gregory.

97. Peterson, "Order in the Double Tradition," 37.

CONCLUSION

Mark Goodacre's work marks a step forward for the view that Luke used Matthew, because he has formulated in a systematic manner the arguments for that position. Despite his best efforts, however, these arguments fall short of their purpose. The evidence is simply lacking to indicate that Luke used Matthew. To the contrary, at least eight arguments suggest that Luke did not use Matthew but that both used a common source or sources. Goodacre and others have attempted to refute some of these arguments but without success. Goodacre has envisioned "a world without Q,"⁹⁸ a dream apparently shared by other opponents of the Q hypothesis. Such a vision is destined to remain nothing more than a dream so long as the evidence strongly supports the Q hypothesis and fails to support the view that Luke used Matthew. In the rest of this volume, I presuppose the Q theory as the best way to account for the non-Markan material common to Matthew and Luke.

98. Goodacre, *Case against Q*, 187; idem, "A World Without Q" in Goodacre and Perrin, *Questioning Q*, 174–79.