

Between Kant and Hegel

Lectures on German Idealism

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Foreword: Remembrance through Disenchantment

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The subject of this book is the transition from Kant's transcendental philosophy to Hegel's idealism, and most narrowly, the different conceptions of the subject that emerged during this era. These are the hallmarks, but by no means the limits, of the work that German philosopher Dieter Henrich has undertaken over the past half-century. In 1973, while still professor of philosophy at Heidelberg, Henrich traveled to Harvard University's Emerson Hall to present the findings of his research, including interpretations of what were then newly discovered manuscripts dating from the period of classical German philosophy (1781–1844). The course of lectures he offered there forms the basis of this book. Apart from scholars specializing in this philosophical period, Henrich was then little known to the English-speaking world. But within these specialist circles, he had already established a reputation for path-breaking scholarship on Kant, Fichte, Hölderlin, and Hegel, particularly with his paper on the problems of self-consciousness.¹

The presence of an interpreter of the intricacies of German idealism

1. Among the early writings of Dieter Henrich, the following are especially notable for their continuing influence: "The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," *Review of Metaphysics*, 22 (1969): 640–659 [republished in *Kant on Pure Reason*, ed. R. C. S. Walker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 66–81]; "Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht," in *Subjektivität und Metaphysik. Festschrift für Wolfgang Cramer*, ed. Dieter Henrich and Hans Wagner (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966); English: *FOI*; "Hölderlin über Urteil und Sein. Eine Studie zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Idealismus," *Hölderlin-Jahrbuch*, 14 (1965–1966): 73–96; English: *HJB*; "Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik," *Hegel-Jahrbuch* 1974 (Köln, 1975): 245–256. For his paper on the problems of self-consciousness, see D. Henrich, "Selbstbewusstsein. Kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie," in *Hermeneutik und Dialektik. Aufsätze [Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 70. Geburtstag]*, ed. Rüdiger

in the Harvard philosophy department in the early 1970s was a notable anomaly. The analytic mindset of the department at that time harbored a skepticism, deriving in part from G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, toward the tradition Henrich was interpreting: their wariness deemed such thinking little more than a pastiche of metaphysical phantasmagoria.² Yet it was precisely such a skepticism that Henrich sought to address. If he could convince skeptics of the philosophical value of this material, then he could convince others of the importance of conversation that might begin to bridge the divide between the so-called “Anglo-American” and “Continental” traditions of philosophy.³ By joining insights from the “Anglo-American” tradition to his critical, but appreciative, interpretation of Kant and the post-Kantians, Henrich attempted to demonstrate in his lectures one way in which these traditions might enter into dialogue. In later years at Columbia University and Harvard (1975–1984), Henrich undertook a sustained effort to advance this same aim.

The climate of the time was largely unreceptive to his solicitations. The principal reluctance—to the extent that the sentiments of many in Emerson Hall were illustrative of the larger outlook of analytic philosophy—

Bubner (Tübingen: Mohr, 1970), pp. 257–284; English: *SCIT*. In later years, Henrich pursued the theoretical considerations of this essay in an attempt to design a theory of subjectivity. See Dieter Henrich, *Bewusstes Leben. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Metaphysik* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1999).

2. For an account of Russell’s (1872–1970) and Moore’s (1873–1958) break with idealism, see Peter Hylton, “The Nature of the Proposition and the Revolt against Idealism,” in *Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy*, ed. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); *id.*, *Russell, Idealism, and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

3. The terms “Anglo-American” and “Continental” are imprecise, if not misnomers. Although considerable scholarly discussion has surfaced around this topic, the terms nonetheless retain a certain currency. See, for example, Peter Dews, “The Historicization of Analytical Philosophy,” in *The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy* (London: Verso, 1995), pp. 59–76; Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1993), pp. 1–4; Richard Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,” in *Philosophy in History*, pp. 49–75; *id.*, “Introduction,” in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, by Wilfrid Sellars (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 1–12. I have therefore adopted a convention of placing these terms in quotation marks not only to signal their problematic character, but also to emphasize the deeper point that the exact nature of the split between the philosophical traditions remains a matter of dispute.

sprang from the general assumption that the philosophical problems of German idealism, in general, and of subjectivity in particular, were no longer pertinent.⁴ More focused opposition arose from those for whom even the mere hint of these topics caused more chill than Cambridge's winters, and who were bemused that students would endure either of these elements merely to hear Henrich. So encumbered, Henrich's hopes for dialogue were not substantially realized at that time.

What did materialize, however, were privately circulated but unpublished transcripts of the lectures that students prepared with Henrich's consent.⁵ Even though Henrich had worked largely from memory, his lectures nevertheless provided detailed accounts of philosophical materials largely unknown to all save a few. Within his lectures, as well, were the rudiments of a philosophical position that would later evolve into what is now known as the "Heidelberg school."⁶ Although word of the existence of these transcripts would occasionally resurface, eliciting surprise and interest, even this news seemed to remain within the confines of specialist circles. In the main, the lecture transcripts had been consigned to the archives of a few scholarly libraries and were largely forgotten.⁷

In the three decades since Henrich presented his lectures, patterns of scholarship have significantly changed. There is now a mounting body of "Anglo-American" scholarship in the fields of philosophy, literary and cultural studies, and theology on Kant and the post-Kantians.⁸ New scholarly

4. To be sure, followers of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), particularly those who have pursued the lines of thinking set out by G. Elizabeth M. Anscombe, have addressed issues of self-reference and self-ascription, but for the most part have conflated issues of self-consciousness with language and its use.

5. Stephen Dunning, David Pacini, and Camilla Ream prepared the transcriptions and the initial editing of Henrich's lectures in 1973.

6. Although in some scholarly circles, the use of the phrase "the Heidelberg school" has become a convention for speaking of the interests of Dieter Henrich and his students in problems of self-consciousness, my aim here is to expand this abstracted significance and restore it to its rightful context of a legacy of thinking about history, which evolved at Heidelberg from the time of Wilhelm Dilthey (ca. 1883) to Henrich (ca. 1989, his 1981 relocation to Munich notwithstanding).

7. The philosophy department at Penn State and the comparative literature department at Yale were notable exceptions to this trend.

8. A representative sampling of this new body of work is listed in the selected bibliography at the end of this foreword.

editions of the works of principal figures from this period have become available in English translation, many for the first time.⁹ In Europe, increased interest in the methodological insights of the “analytic” tradition, which Henrich has helped foster, is now evident. In 1985, Henrich initiated the Jena Project, an extensive program involving numerous scholars in the reconstruction of the intellectual situation in Jena during 1789–1795. The initial results of this project have contributed to further reassessments of this philosophical era.¹⁰

Owing in part to these developments, appeals for overcoming “the divide between traditions” have become more a matter of course. Peter Dews, Michael Dummett, Manfred Frank, Michael Friedman, Jürgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, and Ernst Tugendhat now number among those issuing such invitations.¹¹ A transat-

9. These include the following: Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Science of Knowledge: With the First and Second Introductions*, [1970], ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Friedrich Hölderlin, *Essays and Letters on Theory*, trans. Thomas Pfau (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); *id.*, *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo (1796–1799)*, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Immanuel Kant, *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, 13 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–); Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings (1797–1800)*, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994); Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill*, ed. and trans. George di Giovanni (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994).

10. Dieter Henrich, *Konstellationen. Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der idealistischen Philosophie (1789–1795)* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991). See also *id.*, “Hölderlin in Jena,” trans. Taylor Carman, in *CoR*, pp. 90–118. This essay was written exclusively for the English version (*CoR*) of D. Henrich, *GdA*.

11. Peter Dews, *The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy* (New York: Verso, 1995); Michael Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (LaSalle: Open Court, 2000); Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994); Hilary Putnam, *The Three-fold Cord: Mind, Body and World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Manfred Frank, *Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare. Studien zur neuesten französischen Hermeneutik und Texttheorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980, 4th ed. 2000); Manfred Frank, *Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989); English: *The Subject and the Text: Essays on Literary Theory and Philosophy*, ed. Andrew Bowie, trans. Helen Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jürgen Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken*.

atlantic research project involving American and European scholars of German philosophy is well under way and has begun publishing its work.¹² Many of these new endeavors routinely cite Henrich's findings as standards of interpretation against which their work must measure. Moreover, an increasing number of philosophers from the analytic perspective have taken up or share Henrich's concerns with the problems of self-consciousness.¹³ Within this climate, it seems likely that the publication of his "forgotten" lectures might now enjoy the receptive hearing and prompt the far-ranging discussion that earlier they did not.

The developments of the past three decades also make it possible to appreciate the perspicuity of Henrich's work in a way that none of us who attended his lectures could have grasped. Henrich's concern with the constitutive role of history in the formation of modes of rationality stands as both a criticism of and an antidote to certain trends that have achieved currency in philosophical quarters. His thinking poses an alternative to the ahistorical stance earlier "analytic" philosophy held, as is evident from its reading of past philosophers in strictly contemporary terms, just as it does to the historicist idea that "paradigm shifts" circumscribe historical thinking within the limits of particular discourses. Henrich's work compels us to question a primary assumption often underlying such standpoints: the rejection of tradition. He is not thereby proposing some grand return to "History" or "meta-history." For Henrich, anything—whether "History" or

Philosophische Aufsätze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); English: *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, trans. William M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); Ernst Tugendhat, *Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979); English: *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, trans. Peter Stern (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).

12. Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma, eds., *The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995); David Klemm and Günter Zöller, eds., *Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute, and Others* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).

13. See the essays of Roderick M. Chisholm, Arthur C. Danto, Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett, Paul Guyer, Colin McGinn, John Perry, Hilary Putnam, and Ernest Sosa in the Henrich Festschrift, *Philosophie in synthetischer Absicht*, ed. Marcelo Stamm (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998). See also Hector-Neri Castañeda, *The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-consciousness*, ed. Tomis Kapitan and James G. Hart (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999); Thomas Nagel, *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Sidney Shoemaker, *The First Person Perspective and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).

some other meta-term—that purports to be possessed of an immanent meaning, and to unfold according to a single principle, is suspect. At the same time, he is equally wary of postmodern pronouncements that “History” or “modernity” has ended and lies in wait of a decent burial. What is missing in all of these perspectives, according to Henrich, is an account of the genesis and formation of the *actual* issues that constitute philosophical modernism. Such an accounting is inseparable from the archival research that goes into the work of responsible history. Equally absent from the perspectives Henrich criticizes is a clear accounting for the genesis and formation of *their authors’ own* distinctive motives. Such motives not only drive these authors’ theorizing, but also become inscribed as presuppositions of the problems philosophical modernism pursued.¹⁴

Though Henrich views these perspectives as distinct, he also sees them as located within a constellation of related problems, in part because he discerns on their fringes the specter of Martin Heidegger’s philosophical problematic—one revived by Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, among others. Heidegger claimed that the development of Western rationality consists in the “forgetfulness of Being,” which culminates in strategies of domination by the modern subject. In his view, modern metaphysics both stands in a direct line with Greek metaphysics (as the continuation of its potentialities of relating to Being) and distances itself from it through the notion of the “worldview” (*Weltanschauung*). Heidegger interprets the modern metaphysical worldview as the objectivization of the subject’s self-assertion, one that no longer grasps the truth of Being. By linking modern metaphysical notions of the self, worldview (as objectified self-assertion), and will to power in a single constellation, Heidegger can contend that our distance from, and forgetfulness of, Being has led to self-assertion in the form of a confused struggle to gain world domination. Thus he insists on the surpassing of metaphysics in favor of the question of Being: “Why are there beings at all and why not rather Nothing?”¹⁵

14. D. Henrich, *ATS*, p. 114; English: *OTS*, p. 36.

15. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), “Was ist Metaphysik?” [1929], in *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. IX, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 122; English: “What is Metaphysics?” trans. David Farrell Krell, in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 112. Although Heidegger views Leibniz’s question as standing at the borders of metaphysics, he also claims that it nonetheless remains metaphysical. Hence for Heidegger, Leibniz’s question falls short of arriving at an appropriate understanding of ‘Nothing’ as a horizon of *Seyn*.

Although Henrich judges Heidegger's account as the only consistent alternative to ahistorical or historical-developmental perspectives, he nonetheless detects in it a "critical rejection of civilization."¹⁶ Heidegger's program cannot account for "world-historical lines of development having *equal* right and nevertheless being able to meet in a process amounting to more than a global loss in the essenceless (*Wesenlose*)."¹⁷ Henrich's judgment stems, in part, from his assessment that Heidegger collapses the twin principles of modern philosophical thinking—self-preservation and self-consciousness—into Baconian self-assertion.¹⁸ Heidegger's historiography, rooted in a questionable conception of fate and destiny, thus shows itself to be driven by a programmatic agenda. Such an agenda, in the words of Richard Rorty, is "self-justificatory," inasmuch as Heidegger deploys the Baconian condensation to legitimate his own critique of modern Western rationality.¹⁹

Henrich maintains that the twin principles of modern philosophical thinking issue not merely in a will to power, but also in an awareness of our dependence on unfathomable conditions not subject to our control. For this reason, a variety of perspectives arise in modern thought that move beyond Baconian self-assertion toward other ways in which the modern subject confirms its being. Some of these focus on the subject's sense of being "at home" in a totality that is much like it (Leibniz and Hegel), some on the undemonstrable conditions on which the subject is dependent (Schulze and Jacobi), and others on the subject as an epiphenomenon of a more fundamental life process (Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud).²⁰ In light of these varying responses, Henrich's aim should come as no surprise: he wants to provide the philosophical basis for a perspective that respects what is to be learned from the Heideggerian critique of modern Western rationality, but that ultimately extends beyond it. He seeks a basis that, above all, resists ahistorical, historicist, or programmatic-historical perils.

In what follows, I propose to offer some explanatory remarks about Henrich's historiography that will simultaneously throw light on the Heidelberg school of interpretation. I will then offer a brief sketch of the intel-

16. D. Henrich, *ATS*, p. 112; English: *OTS*, p. 34.

17. D. Henrich, *ATS*, p. 112; English: *OTS*, p. 34.

18. D. Henrich, *GmP*, pp. 115–116; English: *BSMP*, pp. 14–15.

19. Richard Rorty, "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres," in *Philosophy in History*, p. 61.

20. D. Henrich, *GmP*, pp. 116–117; English: *BSMP*, pp. 15–16.

lectual framework within which he interprets classical German philosophy. Finally, I will suggest that Henrich's interpretation of recollective thinking as *remembrance* provides a helpful challenge to Heidegger's interpretation—one that might also apply to certain trends in current philosophical and theological thinking.

Historiography

Toward the end of his lectures, Henrich proposed a title change. Originally called "From Kant to Hegel," he now urged that they be called "Between Kant and Hegel." This shift reflected his conviction that the alternatives that emerged during the period of classical German philosophy remain open prospects for current exploration. He holds no brief with any story that announces in advance a steady progression "*from Kant to Hegel*."²¹ Despite declarations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers who tell such stories and claim that they have "solved" problems left unanswered by their predecessors, Henrich remains convinced that these estimates are overblown. Further work within these perspectives is not only possible but also necessary, albeit from methodological approaches that differ from those of their originators.

This commitment to the viability of further exploration rests on a second conviction: historical artifacts—literary fragments, correspondence, manuscripts, and other archival records—teach us that a linear or stage-developmental interpretation of the relation among philosophical perspectives cannot do justice to their actual evolution.²² Neither the developmental scheme nor its variant, the "paradigm" or "discourse" typology of historical interpretation, is structured to take into account the full range of historical artifacts. As a result, such schemes remain fragmented or incomplete. For Henrich, evidence garnered from these artifacts—as, for example, from some of Reinhold's neglected papers—is necessary because it introduces different interpretations of the relationships among theoretical perspectives. Further, it reopens the question of the ongoing viability of heretofore dominant philosophical stances.

In Henrich's view, artifacts body forth everyday attempts to give "form" to certain questions that life has urged on us. Prominent among them are

21. The stair-step theory is as true of Hegel's own account of how classical German philosophy culminated in his own work as it is of Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1961).

22. D. Henrich, *ATS*, p. 111; English: *OTS*, p. 35.

our interests in self-preservation, in our relation to others, and in our relation to the universe. Artifacts not only embody particular conceptual forms, but also something of the preconceptual or pretheoretical dimension of life that first motivates the desire to shape answers to fundamental questions. By this Henrich means that all of us, in some elemental way, are given to philosophical questioning or to the penchant for fashioning speculative thoughts that integrate life experiences—social and intellectual, relational and theological.²³ Historical interpretation at its best keeps in view *both* the preconceptual motivations to, *and* the specific constellations of, the ‘ordering’ that artifacts embody. Here Henrich appropriates an insight from the historian and philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, whose influence on the Heidelberg school remains formative: pretheoretical life situations and their requirements are incommensurate with, or distinct from, the kinds of rationalities and corresponding theoretical conundrums that we articulate in response to them. Dilthey urges us both to protect this distinctiveness from metaphysical exploitation and to uphold empirical patterns or connections (that endow life experiences with meaning) as candidates for historical scrutiny.

Dilthey’s insight illumines those features of empirical investigation that work against the encroachments of metaphysical foundationalism. In Henrich’s estimation, however, Dilthey’s later emphasis on patterns of meaning tended to overshadow, if not subsume, the difference between life situations and the modes of rationality that emerge in the course of interpretation. His reason for this reservation is clear: while the patterns and connections that endow experience with meaning serve as a “frame of consciousness,” or what Dilthey called a “worldview type,” and as an initial point of departure for historical interpretation, they also conceal the enabling conditions, inner motivations, and theoretical possibilities that lead to the development of a new perspective.²⁴ The historical framework Dilthey proposes lends itself too readily to the dissolving of certain oppo-

23. Dieter Henrich, *Fluchtlinien. Philosophische Essays* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), p. 7. An English translation of Henrich’s “Selbstbewusstsein und spekulatives Denken” (*Fluchtlinien*, pp. 125–181) appears as “Self-Consciousness and Speculative Thinking” in *Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute, and Others in Classical German Philosophy*, ed. and trans. David E. Klemm and Günter Zöllner (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), pp. 99–133. See also “Philosophy and the Conflict between Tendencies of Life,” an essay Henrich composed in English, in D. Henrich, *Konzepte. Essays zur Philosophie in der Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp. 117–127.

24. D. Henrich, *ÜSS*, pp. 125–127.

sitional elements crucial for the interpretation of “conflictual” situations, such as the development of inner motivations. For Henrich, Dilthey’s discovery of the structural and conceptual parallelism between the teachings of the Stoa and the forms of modern thought is a case in point.²⁵ In Dilthey’s accounting, both exhibit a parallel departure from a concept of nature as a self-sufficient dynamic system and develop into an ethic of self-knowing activity, which has virtue as its goal. While upending the view that modernity could trace its origins to Descartes’ assault on Pyrrhonist skepticism, Dilthey’s analysis nonetheless failed, in Henrich’s view, to penetrate the theoretical potential of the tension between self-consciousness and self-preservation. Such tension not only motivated Stoic thought, but also holds together the original, varied perspectives within which the modern subject attempts to confirm its being.²⁶

Just as Dilthey’s account overlooked this issue of motivating potential, so also, in Henrich’s view, do “paradigms,” “discourses,” and “developmental approaches.” These frameworks “do not reach, nor do (they) speak from, that point where transformations in the frame of consciousness occur.”²⁷ Because paradigm and discourse frameworks are guided by principles of the theorists’ own devising, they inevitably fail to incorporate the range of motivating factors at play in the historical formation and interpretation of problems.

To correct this oversight, Henrich invokes another formative influence on the Heidelberg school: Max Weber, who radicalized and recast Dilthey’s insight.²⁸ By claiming that reason emerges from conditions that are not of its own devising and that it does not fully comprehend, Weber could infer that reason remains bound to material facts that both limit it *and* make its distinctive features possible. He directed this assessment toward methodological considerations within the social sciences, including both the interests of the investigator and the historical circumstances that determine

25. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), “Der entwicklungsgeschichtliche Pantheismus nach seinem geschichtlichen Zusammenhang mit den älteren pantheistischen Systemen” [1900], in *Wilhelm Diltheys Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. II, ed. Georg Misch (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1921), p. 315.

26. D. Henrich, *ÜSS*, p. 125.

27. D. Henrich, *ATS*, p. 110; English: *OTS*, p. 33.

28. Henrich encountered the work of Max Weber early in his studies at Marburg, and underwent training in the rigorous scientific methods of *Urgeschichte* at the direction of Gero Merhart von Bernegg. Henrich subsequently wrote his doctoral dissertation on Weber, “Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers” (Tübingen, 1952).

these interests. To those of his Heidelberg students who read him as a philosopher, this insight was necessarily applicable to Weber's own life, as well. They observed that the conditions necessitating and guiding his reflections were manifested in the "restrained pathos" permeating his entire work.²⁹ Weber's way of grasping in a single thought *both* talk of fate *and* of the postulate of a rational order governing both knowledge and life, without making the relationship explicit, struck them as rife with philosophical implications. Doubtless, there was latent in his thinking an organized "whole" of possible knowledge. Weber made no attempt, however, to establish such a relation between fate and rational order in terms of some cognitive totality. Consequently, his Heidelberg readers discerned in Weber's themes resonances with Kant's notion (in his theory of ideas) that though we never can grasp a totality concretely, we nonetheless bend every effort of our understanding toward what remains an unattainable outcome.

With this notion in mind, Weber's Heidelberg philosophical interpreters recognized the impossibility of assigning any objective scientific status to self-understanding. They understood that even the "person," insofar as it signifies an *idea* of totality, resists concrete objectification and unification. Henrich interprets these early appraisals to mean that Weber's "restrained form of pathos," precisely by eluding objectification, expresses a dimension of conscious experience that cannot be excluded from historical analysis.³⁰ The immediacy of this pathos, however, can only be mediated through artifacts. Thus literary and aesthetic creations, as material conditions effecting the limits and distinctiveness of a rationality, have a distinct place in the interpretation of motivating forces within a particular ethos. Henrich's account of Hölderlin's success in prevailing upon Hegel to abandon a Kantian interpretive framework turns on considerations of this order: Hölderlin argued that Kant's theory could not capture or convey the enthusiastic sympathy generated by the French Revolution, which had ignited the intellectual fervor of their seminary days.³¹

Equally compelling for Henrich's historiography is an insight gleaned from Karl Jaspers. In his 1916 and 1917 essays on the sociology of religion, which joined comparative studies of rationality types with an examination of underlying life-forms that embody various modes of world rejection,

29. D. Henrich, *KJ*, p. 532.

30. D. Henrich, *KJ*, p. 537.

31. D. Henrich, *HuH*; English: *HaH*.

Weber had effectively linked *in a new way* two dimensions of Kant's framework: the theory of ideas and the theory of antinomies.³² Jaspers made this connection explicit and began to interpret Weber's revisionary insight anew. By Jasper's lights, Weber's claim could now be seen to mean that the understanding's unending effort to comprehend the whole inevitably collides with irreconcilable antinomies. The latter, in turn, determine the way in which the individual undertakes his or her endeavors. Henrich retrieves from this reformulation a resistance to superficiality that serves as a necessary propaedeutic to seeing what "moves" and "speaks" through a work.³³ By holding in view the antinomies that both make possible and limit a distinctive form of rationality (whose ground we therefore cannot penetrate), we can come to the following recognition: whatever the factors organizing this ground might be, their *analysis* must differ from those techniques used to trace the conceptual factors that this form of rationality employs to organize the world and structure knowledge.³⁴

To keep these antinomies in sight, Henrich commends an overview of an epoch's "problem condition."³⁵ Such an overview requires us to respect and maintain an historical distance from those in the initial throes of discovery. Without such distance and without new methods of inquiry, he argues, we would become subject to the pitfall of captivity both to the methods and to the conclusions that theorists within the era proposed. In such captivity, we would likely fail to take into account documents of "minor" figures—for example, Gottlob Ernst Schulze³⁶ and Immanuel Carl Diez³⁷—writing at the outset of classical German philosophy. Still less would we pursue the suppressed traditions of Spinozism (as Protestant sects practiced it in the Netherlands), the popular philosophy of love (of which Anthony, third Earl of Shaftsbury is a representative), or the popular theology of the spirit (which Lessing tried to bring to academic attention). We

32. D. Henrich, *KJ*, p. 536.

33. D. Henrich, *KJ*, p. 536.

34. D. Henrich, *ATS*, p. 112; English: *OTS*, p. 35.

35. D. Henrich, *ATS*, p. 113; English: *OTS*, p. 36. See also the report of the Jena Project in Dieter Henrich, *Konstellationen. Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der idealistischen Philosophie (1789–1795)*.

36. G. E. Schulze, *Aen*.

37. Immanuel Carl Diez (1766–1796), *Briefwechsel und Kantische Schriften. Wissensbegründung in der Glaubenskrise Tübingen-Jena (1790–1792)*, ed. Dieter Henrich (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997).

would also overlook the resurgence of the popular “philosophy of unification” (*Vereinigungsphilosophie*) whose Platonic outlook found notable proponents in Franz Hemsterhuis, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Friedrich Schiller. Because each of these strands sprang up largely outside academic philosophy, they have tended to escape philosophical notice. Only as we delineate the history of philosophical discovery within this period does it become clear that these other tendencies, despite their peripheral status, enjoyed significant influence.³⁸

Such an overview of an epoch’s constellation of problems, which forms the keystone of Henrich’s historiography, also avoids a second pitfall. Rather than leading us into a questionable “notion of unity that both absorbs all these underlying reasons and releases them from itself,”³⁹ the historical interpreter should delineate the relationships among various concepts and principles of philosophical discoveries and imbue their form with a new notion of unity. This unity differs from “absorption,” however, because it embraces the working together of *irreducible* parts for a common end. We saw earlier that Henrich argues against the uncritical adoption of perspectives held by authors in the initial throes of discovery; now we also see him challenge the idea that a single, all-absorbing unity can dominate a given era. To grasp this distinction between different kinds of unity is to recognize the implausibility of those historical interpretations that revolve around epochal paradigms. It is to see that there is a profoundly unstable relation between (1) the pretheoretical antinomies of life situations and (2) objective life situations themselves, including the conceptual organization of the world. From this perspective, it is clear that those who assume that a self-evident unity governs a given time period are thus mistaken. Henrich’s work repeatedly shows that we stand at the threshold of the disappearance of a conception of “The One” in which we previously saw all unity, even as we encounter the prospect of a different “one” arising before us, and so also, of a “new voice.”⁴⁰

Henrich has shown, for example, that Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s 1789 *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens* (Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation) and

38. D. Henrich, *HuH*, pp. 11–15; English: *HaH*, pp. 121–125.

39. D. Henrich, *ATS*, p. 111; English: *OTS*, p. 34.

40. D. Henrich, *KJ*, p. 542.

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's expanded *Über die Lehre des Spinoza (Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza)* engendered an enthusiastic reception among their younger contemporaries, precisely because these works introduced the possibility of new philosophical voices.⁴¹ Even though the two books exhibited no material or conceptual relation to one another, some readers found in them the intimations of a constellation of ideas that might bring both conceptions into relation.

Let me draw together the distinctions Henrich—and by extension, the Heidelberg school—strikes in his historiographical outlook. These are (1) between life situations that introduce their own requirements and conceptual schemes that humans devise to address these requirements; (2) between the historically mediated immediate pathos of an epoch and the forms of rationality to which it lends both limits and distinctive features; (3) between the inscrutable ground of irreconcilable antinomies that determine a mode of rationality and the factors conceptually organizing the world and structuring knowledge; and (4) between a preconception of “The One” in which we see all unity and the “one” or altered conception of unity that emerges when life moves us into a rationality in which we are not fully at home. We may readily recast these distinctions, derived from reflection on empirical observations, into methodological principles. These principles require us to place documents in historical context and to interpret antinomies as factors that not only inform the shape of conceptual schemes but also generate new theoretical possibilities. Grounded on these principles, Henrich's historiography thus attempts to provide a versatile or differentiated means of orientation into the problems of the classical period of German philosophy. By avoiding far-flung flights into metaphysical speculation, the reductive pitfalls of ahistorical or historicist paradigms, and the oversights of programmatic history, Henrich offers an alternative to dominant historiographical trends within the last century of philosophy. His historiography depends neither on a methodological “new beginning” nor on a dismissal of certain philosophical problems as illusory or outmoded. Instead, it explores the concrete formations of the philosophical problems of modernity in their variance and complexity, and it does so by employing artifacts culled from both well-known and suppressed traditions.

41. D. Henrich, *ATS*, pp. 118–126; English: *OTS*, pp. 40–46. See also K. L. Reinhold, *VTV*; and F. H. Jacobi, *Spin*.

Intellectual Framework

The above principles commend to our attention the relation between the constellation of ties and tensions that connect life situations to theoretical frameworks and “an overview of the problem condition of an epoch.” At the least, this linkage suggests that life processes stand as integral to what counts as a “problem” in the historical interpretation of philosophy. Philosophy is not complete, in Henrich’s view, without an historical interpretation of the formation of problems within their life contexts. His view also implies the thematic importance of recollection as a process by which philosophical thinking holds such problems in mind—an issue that Henrich thinks requires urgent consideration in contemporary philosophical contexts. In the sections that follow, I will take up each of these suggestions in turn.

In his lectures, Henrich coordinates his interpretation around five theoretical problems that accrue to the modern subject of knowledge and the life situations within which they were formed.⁴² While not unknown to other philosophers, these issues become distinct in Henrich’s presentation by the manner in which his historiographical framework delineates their multiple forms of interrelatedness. The first issue is whether there is a principle that unifies all reason. In Henrich’s interpretation, this problem emerges in the conflict between Kant’s belief that “the advance of knowledge is the honor of all mankind” and his belief, taken from Rousseau, that “to honor man, one must contribute to the rights of mankind.”⁴³ In service of the first, Kant posed a solution to the riddle of metaphysics—why it failed to make steady progress as knowledge—which he anchored in the principle of self-consciousness. Our thinking is neither solely empirical nor solely rational, but stands as a necessary combination of intuitions and concepts and as governed by the ‘highest principle of all our knowledge’ (self-consciousness). Therefore, we need not become lost in metaphysics as an ‘ocean without banks’; metaphysics has appeared to be a riddle simply because—until now—it failed to grasp the necessity of the combination of our faculties.⁴⁴

In service of his second belief, Kant taught that moral awareness consists

42. In a subsequent lecture course at Harvard in the spring of 1975, Henrich developed a second interpretation from the perspective of practical reason.

43. I. Kant, *Bem*, pp. 44–45.

44. For Henrich’s own investigations into these and other epistemological themes, see

in the spontaneous double act of giving ourselves the law of just conduct *and* a capacity to fulfill this law. To overcome the conflict between a theory that assumes a necessary combination of faculties in our knowledge and a theory that assumes an independence from necessary combination in our moral awareness, Kant attempted to prove that freedom is a principle both of insight and of real connection. As a principle of insight, freedom is the awareness of our capacity to act from law (duty) alone. As a principle of connection, freedom provides systematic links among understanding, reason, and the total compatibility of all human actions.⁴⁵ To safeguard this claim from mystical speculation, Kant carefully circumscribed the limits of rational inquiry to the principle of self-consciousness. Even so, his definition of reason as a spontaneous activity that in some way links recollection and autonomy is, in Henrich's opinion, a decisive consideration that recurs in subsequent theoretical formulations of the modern subject.⁴⁶

The second problem concerns the nature of the activity of the knowing subject. Karl Leonhard Reinhold attempted in his 1789 *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens* (Attempt at a New Theory of the Faculty of Representation) and in his 1790 *Neue Darstellung der Hauptmomente der Elementarphilosophie* (A New Presentation of the Main Aspects of Elementary Philosophy) to strengthen Kant's critical philosophy with a principle of methodological monism.⁴⁷ He aimed to rebuild the entire conceptual apparatus of the critical philosophy, deriving it from foundational justifications and definitions that Kant had never clearly provided. Gottlob Ernst Schulze's searing criticisms of these attempts appeared in *Aenesidemus*, a book without apparent influence on Reinhold

Dieter Henrich, *Identität und Objektivität. Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendente Deduktion* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1976).

45. For his development of these ethical considerations in the contemporary context, see Dieter Henrich, "The Contexts of Autonomy: Some Presuppositions of the Comprehensibility of Human Rights" [1983], in *Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World*, ed. Eckart Förster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 59–84; *id.*, "Nuklearer Frieden," in *Konzepte*, pp. 103–113; *id.*, *Ethik zum nuklearen Frieden* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990).

46. Dieter Henrich, *GdA*, p. 78; English: *CoR*, p. 221. For a concise introduction to Henrich's systematic thinking about Kant, see Richard Velkley, "Introduction: Unity of Reason as Aporetic Ideal," in *The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy*, by Dieter Henrich, ed. Richard Velkley (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 1–15.

47. K. L. Reinhold, *VTV*; *id.*, "Neue Darstellung der Hauptmomente der Elementarphilosophie" [1790], in *Beytr. I*, pp. 165–254.

but with considerable impact on subsequent thought.⁴⁸ Its shattering effect on the Kantian convictions of the young Johann Gottlieb Fichte prompted a forceful response. In his *Aenesidemus Review*, Fichte contended that Reinhold's first principle of consciousness was conceptually faulty. At the same time, he pointed out that Schulze's empirical orientation had blinded him to the basic self-referential character of the mind—that is, to the fact that the mind can only be understood in terms of mental activity.⁴⁹ These considerations pressed Fichte beyond the limitations Kant had established for inquiry into the principle of self-consciousness. He moved toward the recognition that the basic act of mental life is not a synthetic unity, as Kant had supposed, but an opposition that precedes unity. Fichte's elaboration of the life of the mind—its imagining, longing, and striving, together with its sequences of self-images—in terms of this oppositional structure of activity constitutes a considerable portion of Henrich's analysis.

The third problem around which Henrich orients his lectures is the tension between the activity of the knowing subject and its relation to the self. Also emerging amid the reception of Reinhold's *Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation*, this issue achieves its distinctive form with the simultaneous reception of Jacobi's expanded *Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza*.⁵⁰ Reinhold's attempts to clarify the concept of representation incorporated the idea of a subject that both relates to and is distinguished from representations. His definition implied that even the subject's representation of *itself* must somehow follow the same procedure of relating and distinguishing.⁵¹ In a different manner, Jacobi questioned the relation between the conceptual structure underlying our knowledge of finite objects and an oppositely constituted structure underlying our mode of knowing. This latter structure is immediate and thus not susceptible to ordinary conceptual analysis. Rather than merely restricting the applica-

48. G. E. Schulze, *Aen.*

49. J. G. Fichte, *RA*.

50. K. L. Reinhold, *VTV*; F. H. Jacobi, *Spin.*

51. At the time of his 1973 lectures, Henrich was unaware that Reinhold had actually outlined a rudimentary theory of self-consciousness in his 1789 *VTV*. These sketches are absent from Reinhold's "Neue Darstellung der Hauptmomente der Elementarphilosophie" [1790] (in *Beytr. I*, pp. 165–254), on which both Fichte and Schulze relied in their critical responses to Reinhold, and to which subsequent scholarship on the period has habitually turned. Henrich recognized his oversight when he recovered the theory from Reinhold's earlier edition, and has since discussed it at length in D. Henrich, *ATS*, pp. 139–159; English: *OTS*, pp. 56–75.

tion of conceptual structures to particular spheres, Jacobi went a step further. He tried to limit the validity of all conceptual structures on the basis of their *internal* constitution.⁵² Although he thought ‘knowledge’ of the immediate could never be explained, he nonetheless asserted that conditioned knowledge of our own existence is simultaneously related to a ‘knowledge’ of the unconditioned.⁵³ This implied the possibility, in Henrich’s view, of an exceptional epistemic fact in which a distinct relation to the self effectively coheres with a consciousness of the unconditioned. In this Jacobi stood in stark opposition to Reinhold, who sought a single or “first” principle of philosophy.⁵⁴

For the young Friedrich Schelling and Friedrich Hölderlin, who read Reinhold and Jacobi at the Lutheran seminary in Tübingen, even more needed to be said. Their seminary teacher, Gottlob Christian Storr, had conceived of a way to indenture Kantian moral theory to the service of theological orthodoxy. With unswerving devotion to the Augsburg Confession and the Formula of Concord, Storr devised demonstrations of the certainty of revelation for finite knowledge. His proposals insisted that the biblical canon must be studied from a particular dogmatic perspective. As Schelling and Hölderlin saw matters, Storr’s subversion of Kantian moral theory diluted the integrity of Kant’s proposal to subordinate everything to the immediate consciousness of freedom. In resistance to such orthodoxy, the seminarians tried combining Reinhold’s notion of the consciousness of spontaneous activity with Jacobi’s notion of the unconditioned (which was now conceived as the basis of spontaneity and as operative through spontaneity). If they began with the unconditioned and construed it *both* as preceding consciousness *and* nonetheless as internal to it, then Schelling and Hölderlin might be able to dissolve the oppositions between God and freedom that Storr had exploited. But this would require an “exceptional language.” Such a language must both comprehend the relation to self that precedes the subject’s activity and stand in contrast to the ordinary concepts through which this activity and its productions are comprehended.⁵⁵

52. D. Henrich, *ATS*, pp. 159–165; English: *OTS*, pp. 75–81.

53. D. Henrich, *ATS*, pp. 159–165; English: *OTS*, pp. 75–81. Consistent with the pietist leanings of his upbringing, Jacobi steadfastly construed such knowledge of the unconditioned as belief in the personal God of theism.

54. D. Henrich, *ATS*, pp. 159–165; English: *OTS*, pp. 75–81.

55. D. Henrich, *ATS*, pp. 159–165; English: *OTS*, pp. 75–81.

As Henrich has shown in his later scholarship, both seminarians would attempt to fulfill this requirement in distinct yet related ways.⁵⁶

To introduce the fourth problem, let us recast the third as the problem of overcoming dependence on the mode of conceptualizing through which we ordinarily comprehend the activity of the subject. Recognizing this dependence, thinkers sought a distinctive way to signify the immediate and unconditioned relation of the subject to itself. Theological discourse, which Storr defined as mediated knowledge of the subject's activity in the world, could then be relocated to the arena of the unconditioned, alongside discourses of freedom. So understood, however, the third problem poses an implicit opposition between the language of the subject's relation to itself and that of its relation to the world. The fourth problem emerges from this repositing of the third: How can the opposites of self and world be unified? For Henrich, such a question requires a principle of unification that is distinct from the form of self-consciousness of the modern subject.⁵⁷

Henrich locates just such an approach in Hölderlin's theoretical sketches.⁵⁸ The approach Hölderlin pursued effectively distanced him from any search for a first principle and from the inferences one might draw from it. The rudiments of his view emerged within the intellectual strictures he endured while studying at the Tübingen *Stift*. At first he found mere solace in Jacobi's Spinoza book, which he studied and discussed with friends. Shortly thereafter he encountered Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, which gave him real hope. Fichte's conception of the unconditioned differed from Jacobi's in its refusal to subscribe to the personal God of theism. Fichte thus offered Hölderlin a substantial alternative to Storr's questionable linking of autonomous freedom and biblical revelation. Yet on further reflection, Hölderlin retrieved from Jacobi a way to articulate the "immediate" or unconditioned that Fichte could not provide, inasmuch as Fichte's notion of the oppositional character of conscious activity was one of reciprocal conditioning. In effect, Hölderlin took Jacobi to mean that

56. Dieter Henrich, "Philosophisch-theologische Problemlagen im Tübinger Stift zur Studienzeit Hegels, Hölderlins und Schellings," *Hölderlin-Jahrbuch* 25 (1986–1987): 60–92; English: "Dominant Philosophical-Theological Problems in the Tübingen *Stift* during the Student Years of Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling," in *CoR*, pp. 31–54.

57. D. Henrich, *HUS*, p. 78; English: *HJB*, p. 75.

58. D. Henrich, *GdA*, p. 77; English: *CoR*, p. 220.

something unconditioned must precede Fichte's first principle of opposition. Consequently, a different philosophical approach from the one Fichte had developed was now required.

Steeped in the thought of Jacobi, Spinoza, Kant, Plato, and Fichte, and experimenting with poetic writing in a manner akin to Schiller, Hölderlin wondered how or if all these considerations fit together. His peculiar way of weaving these thinkers into a single tapestry is evident in a fragment he composed on the flyleaf of a book. Subsequently titled "Judgment and Being," the fragment counterposes the original (lost) unity between subject and object—"Being"—with separation—"judgment."⁵⁹ Since he conceives of judgment (*Ur-teil*) as the original division between subject and object, Hölderlin is free to strike the distinction between object of knowledge and Being. In a manner explicitly differing from Fichte, Hölderlin's Being precedes the relation between subject and object and thus cannot become an object of knowledge. On Henrich's telling, Hölderlin's claim is this: Being, to the extent that we apprehend it, is grasped through an "intellectual intuition" that is fundamentally unlike the intuition characteristic of self-consciousness.⁶⁰

By posing the distinction between Being and self-consciousness in this way, Hölderlin's proposed solution to the opposition between the subject's relation to itself and its relation to the world assumes the form of an ongoing longing for reunification with Being. The finite subject cannot overcome her separation from an original unity. Nevertheless, she relates to Being through (1) building a rational world; (2) transcending finite objects by recollecting her origin and subsequent history; and (3) surrendering her mind, without losing her freedom, to the beautiful objects of the world that symbolize the unity she seeks. In each of these, the subject strives to move beyond the boundaries of her enworldedness. Her embrace of the beautiful, as that which intimates the complete truth, arrests and captivates her. This 'surrender' or 'love' helps her to escape the domination of the greatness of freedom, and thereby manifests 'true' freedom. But the conflict between the subject's active nature and receptivity to love perdures, marking the course she traverses.

59. F. Hölderlin, *US*; English: *JB*.

60. D. Henrich, *HUS*, p. 78; English: *HJB*, p. 75. For an interpretation alternative to Henrich's, see Andrzej Warminski, *Readings in Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, Heidegger*, intro. Rodolphe Gasché (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

In his final lectures, Henrich introduces the fifth problem accruing to the modern subject of knowledge. What conception of unification is appropriate to overcoming the oppositions between the subject's relation to itself and its relation to the world? Is the unification that overcomes this opposition (between the modes of the subject's relating to itself and relating to the world) best understood in terms of "primordial being" or in terms of the modes of interrelatedness within what is unified? If one appeals to primordial being that precedes conceptuality, then integration of conscious life remains indeterminate and, in some way, incomprehensible. But if one appeals to *modes* of interrelatedness, then perhaps there is a basic theoretical concept, which understands opposed elements in terms of a "totality" that emerges from their exchange, that would be suitable for analyzing rationality. Defining such a concept, however, would be tantamount to the requirement that we define the concept of relation itself.

On Henrich's account, Hegel was consumed with this task of defining "relation" in a way that overcomes the opposition between the subject's relating to itself and its relating to the world.⁶¹ Caught between the convictions of freedom (experienced in seminary with Hölderlin and Schelling) and the usurpation of Kantian teaching to serve dogmatic theology, Hegel sought an escape. While critical of Kant, Hegel's early theoretical proposals had done little to move beyond a fundamentally Kantian outlook. Conversations with Hölderlin and others convinced him, however, that in order to advance beyond Kant, he would have to reject the "I" as the highest principle of philosophy. In doing so, Hegel would renounce much of what Kant and Fichte had embraced.⁶²

Hegel argued that no primordial unity or totality precedes the opposing elements; thus he rejected Hölderlin's idea that origin and end are identical. In place of this unity, Hegel experimented with the idea that opposition leads to an increasing evolution or production of unity. Pivotal for this claim is Hegel's governing rule for the determination of the relation between opposites: namely, "negation."⁶³ In Henrich's estimate, negation is the *basic* theoretical concept propelling the process of making the indeter-

61. G. W. F. Hegel, *WL*¹ and *WL*². See also D. Henrich, *HuH*, pp. 34–40; English: *HaH*, pp. 136–140.

62. D. Henrich, *HuH*, pp. 20–25; English: *HaH*, pp. 128–133.

63. D. Henrich, "Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik," *Hegel-Jahrbuch* 1974 (Köln, 1975): 245–256.

minate (the groundless or emptiness) determine the production of reality.⁶⁴ Totality is thus simply *the process itself*, rather than consciousness of an “I” as antecedent to production. This amounts to the claim that the process itself is ‘the true,’ rather than a presupposition. Hence the modes of relating to the self and relating to the world are *not* primordial characteristics of *subjectivity* clarified by reflection, but are the later outgrowth of a clarification of *negation*. In short, for Hegel the indeterminacy to which relating to self points is the beginning of the process of rationality. The indeterminate shapes *by virtue of* its indeterminacy and without presupposition. Only thus does it become manifest in thought. So viewed, the process internalizes and transforms the past, and also presents it in a new way. In order to have meaning for the recollecting consciousness (as well as for the general sphere of intelligence), this continuum must come to be a possible object of thought. It thereby acquires an integration into the system of rationality.⁶⁵

In summary, the problems linked to the emerging theory of the modern subject—the principle that unifies reason, the activity of the subject, the tension between activity of the subject and its relation to the self, the unification of the opposing relation to the self and relation to the world, and the theoretical concept of unification suitable for analyzing the rationalities of relation to the self and relation to the world—form the constellation within which Henrich pursues his interpretation of classical German philosophy. Brought into view by a historiography that upholds irreconcilability, this constellation constitutes what Henrich calls “the problem condition of the epoch.” By virtue of his method, we also see these problems at a distance. We discern in them not only conceptual issues but also conflicts in what Dilthey would call their life situations. Within these conflicts we recognize, in a manner reminiscent of Weber, both the limitations of and openings for theoretical possibilities as they emerge in the interpretation of life processes. Henrich’s historiography thus compels us to incorporate not only conceptual thinking, but also modes of remembrance, intimacy, and the possibilities of transformation. Whoever would attempt to thematize this epoch and its problems must take all of these into account. Such reckoning alone would show that the search for unity within classical Ger-

64. Dieter Henrich, “Die Formationsbedingungen der Dialektik. Über die Untrennbarkeit der Methode Hegels von Hegels System,” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 36 (1982): 139–162.

65. G. W. F. Hegel, *WL*¹ and *WL*².

man philosophy is not, contrary to some critics, a homogenous drive for one idea. Instead, it is a distinctively nonunified endeavor; it remains intrinsically dialogical and multiple. Yet to conceive and understand such a complex of events and motivations presupposes both recollective thinking and a critical stance toward the theory of recollection—and its variants—lying at the core of classical German philosophy.

Remembrance

Hölderlin invokes the term “remembrance” (*Andenken*) to cast a particular light on recollection (*Erinnerung*). He stood as the fortunate heir to a new theory of recollection whose tenets, in broad outline, are as follows. New prospects for insight emerge when recollection figures in thinking as a fundamental dimension of experience—and when memory brings things together as they stood in the course of observation or as they appeared in the ruminations of imagination. Recollection allows us to hold before our eyes what is not “forever past” and to imagine a unity that holds life situations together. It helps transform both our self-understanding and our grasp of the conditions under which we stand, so that we see our world in a new light. Hölderlin’s use of “remembrance” to refine “recollection” intimates that remembrance preserves what is dear (*Angedenken*), while recollection preserves what is burdensome. As Henrich points out, Hölderlin was not alone in his misgivings about recollection. The ways in which recollective thinking should be conceived, together with the manner in which its insights should be understood, remained disputed.⁶⁶ Despite agreement that recollection’s insights in some ways surpass their originating events, theorists within the classical German period diverged in their accounts of the recollective process. Further, they differed in their estimates of the significance of recollective insight.

When Kant defined the original spontaneous act of consciousness as synthesis, he had in mind not merely apprehension but also recollection. If apprehension is only of events that would soon become forever past, we would never be able to form a comprehensive interconnection of our present conditions and motivations. Apprehension, for Kant, looks rather at something “soon to be past,” and so points to a recollection still to come.

66. See, for example, D. Henrich, *ÜSS*. See also D. Henrich, *Fluchtlinien. Philosophische Essays; id., BL; id., SuG*.

Precisely because we presuppose in all experience the interconnectedness this thinking establishes, recollection figures as the fundamental dimension of experience that makes understanding possible.⁶⁷ To the extent that recollection points to what is universal, extending over the entirety of conscious life, it makes possible the higher form of understanding, which defines those ends toward which life might be directed. Only as recollection intimates the universal do we become capable of inquiring into those ends and forming critical stances toward them. By virtue of these capacities, we are able, in Kant's view, to ascend from sensibility and understanding to the various manifestations of reason. Within these manifestations the interconnectedness—or better, the unity—of reason through “freedom” finally becomes evident.

For Fichte, the primordial activity of consciousness is oppositional rather than synthetic. Hence, recollection is more than a matter of understanding for purposes of recognition, or the subsumption of an (intellectual) intuition under a concept. Fichte was content to follow Kant in principle, assigning the “reproductive” imagination a formative role. Yet as Henrich's interpretation shows, he also discerned in recollection an intimation of the *productive* power of the imagination, or what is the same, the production of indeterminate intellectual intuition. Fichte emphasized the reciprocal roles—at a level distinct from the mediated knowledge of understanding—of productive and reproductive imaginative acts as constitutive for the process of recollection. Only in terms of *both* imaginative acts could a thoroughgoing interrelatedness between indeterminate and determinate intuition arise. For him, this interrelatedness gives form or unity to consciousness. Further, it allows recollection to become a universal faculty of conscious human life.⁶⁸

Considerations of recollection need not be limited to aspects of conscious life pertaining to concept formation or to knowledge of objects. One could also examine how recollection *constitutes* insight through questioning the orientations of conscious life. Such a focus, championed by Jacobi, opens a path to fundamentally unconditioned knowing as distinct from mediated knowing. As Henrich's lectures suggest, Jacobi concluded (in a deeply problematic way) that immediate knowing is simultaneously

67. D. Henrich, *GdA*, pp. 79–80; English: *CoR*, pp. 220–221.

68. D. Henrich, *GdA*, p. 80; English: *CoR*, p. 221.

knowledge of the unconditioned. This implies that recollection is inextricably bound to problems posed by immediate knowing: the disclosing significance of the subject's relation to itself always eludes the conceptual structures of its relation to the world. Jacobi construed this disclosing significance as belief in the personal God of theism. For this reason, recollection as the *recognition* of the unconditioned, of the living God, is from the beginning grounded in an orienting belief. As such, recollection indicates that the certitude shining through the limits of explanation is a *self*-certitude that emerges only as we attain an awareness of the unconditioned.

In a related way, recollective thinking may assume the form of a metaphysics whose structural contours do not require an external formulation of belief, as did Jacobi's construal of the unconditioned as the living God. According to Henrich, Hölderlin's point of departure is the multiplicity of orientations to conscious life. Together these illustrate the ways in which life strives to establish relation to that from which it has been separated. Whether striving to build a rational world, transcending finitude through recollection of history, or surrendering to the beautiful, each bespeaks a profound human effort to unite with a withdrawn origin. Hölderlin's is a gaze akin to Shakespeare's admonition in *King Lear*: "Look with thine ears." He grasps the legitimacy—indeed, the indispensability—of each particular orientation. Despite their irreconcilability, each remains essential to the stabilizing and securing of conviction in the face of dejection, futility, doubt, and lost love—or in Hölderlin's words, to the work of overcoming a lost unity with God.

To enter these orientations, however, belongs to the purview of poetry. For Hölderlin, poetry alone can unite antagonistic tendencies as they resound with feeling. His confidence in the poetic endeavor hinges on his displacement of visual metaphors with those of tonality and rhythm. Poetic endeavor committed to incorporating the *tonalities* of intimate experience cultivates a consciousness that grasps life's tendencies in a unity that differs from their distinctive moods and tones. Awareness of this unity momentarily interrupts and so sharpens these tones. Rather than *dissolving* oppositions among these resonances, however, poetry *preserves* them. It holds incompatible and antagonistic tendencies in a fragile harmony so that each distinctive tonality might be heard. In this moment, the *totality* of the poem is known *within* the poem, evoking a form that life bears out: "so that in the *primordial foundation of all works and acts of man we feel*

ourselves *to be equal and at one with all, be they so large or small . . .*⁶⁹ Poetic ‘insight’ is, as such, first and foremost recollective: it listens to the ways in which life’s necessities unfold over the ‘eccentric’ course we have traveled, grasps the ‘spirit’ of their infinite connectedness, and helps us internalize them in a way that prompts our thankfulness for life as a whole.

Hölderlin’s perception that the character of recollection is a preservation subject to demands of faithfulness was a formative impetus for Hegel. Even so, Hegel rejected Hölderlin’s metaphysics of a lost unity from God: How can one return to that which has been lost? On Henrich’s recounting, Hegel came to believe that the *goal* of unification (not the sorrow of alienation from a divine origin) impels us to preserve the infinite within us, even amid impediments to unification. Once we understand the modes of interrelation that give rise to the possibility of unity, we recognize that unification is a *process*, rather than a lost ground to which we long to return. In contrast to Hölderlin, Hegel sees recollection as an overcoming of the past. Such an overcoming transforms the past into something *new for us* into which we may venture freely.

While these stances differ markedly from one another, less obvious are the ways in which each corresponds to one of the theoretical problems accruing to the theory of the modern subject. For example, we could no more grasp Kant’s conception of the unity of reason apart from *his* theory of recollection than we could Fichte’s conception of the activity of the subject apart from his. Kant and Fichte, just as much as Jacobi, Hölderlin, and Hegel, construe the “withheld,” the “lost,” or the “withdrawn” in competing ways that befit their unique and embedded pathos—the rancor of lived conflict and the intimacies of, if not the union with, what they held most passionately. At a minimum, then, what we may take from these observations is this: any interpretation of the theory of the modern subject within classical German philosophy that fails to attend to distinctions among conceptions of recollection is bound to fall short of the mark. Henrich’s historiography indicates that such attempts will be historically anemic; they will lack the vitality born of incommensurable experiences and the perceptive hues such antagonisms produce. From this vantage point, ahistorical and historicist thinking appear to preclude such matters: what they gain by way

69. F. Hölderlin, “Der Gesichtspunct aus dem wir das Altertum anzusehen haben” (1799), ed. Friedrich Beissner, in *StA*, vol. IV,1 (1961), p. 222; English: “The Perspective from which We Have to Look at Antiquity,” in *Friedrich Hölderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory*, p. 40.

of reductionism, they lose by way of historical profundity. In the end, they fail to make the theory of modern subjectivity comprehensible.

Once we recognize the extent to which these conceptions of recollection differ, it becomes possible for us to bring into view not only a fuller conception of the dynamics of the theory of the modern subject, but also to notice an aspect of Henrich's historiography that earlier escaped our notice. Henrich's historical method aims at an internal structural examination of those attitudes—at once conceptual and preconceptual—that make up a particular sense of the world *and* of the development of this sense over time.⁷⁰ As such, Henrich's historiography is an implicit recapitulation of a mode of recollection that Hölderlin deemed *remembrance*. So understood, it bodies forth an implicit thematic whose force calls into question the interpretive stance of “programmatically history.” Precisely because Henrich's reading of classical German philosophy turns on this thematic, it becomes evident that he is questioning Heidegger's programmatic notion of the “forgetfulness of being.” Specifically, in asking how the attitudes of the modern world are related, Henrich points out what might otherwise remain overlooked: that Heidegger simply omits this question from his analysis. Consequently, the force of Henrich's analysis is to show how Heidegger presupposes its answer—self-empowered, unconditioned dominion of self-consciousness—in his interpretation.⁷¹ Moreover, the reach of Henrich's observation extends, in principle, to other programmatic histories, particularly those anchored in assumptions about the natural-scientific worldview and its physicalism. These, too, *assume* an understanding of the relations among formative attitudes (as segments of the networks of causal relations) but do not inquire into their philosophical underpinning.

Accordingly, to read classical German philosophy from Henrich's position is to see its emergence against the backdrop of modern thought forms anchored in self-preservation. Included in this backdrop are political anthropology (Thomas Hobbes), ethics (Benedictus de Spinoza), metaphysics (René Descartes), international jurisprudence (Hugo Grotius), physics (Isaac Newton), and economics (Adam Smith). These thought forms shared a lesson from their Stoic legacy: self-definition does not depend on a preexisting *telos* but arises out of the individual's striving. In turn, this led

70. D. Henrich, *GdA*, p. 82; English: *CoR*, p. 223.

71. D. Henrich, *GmP*, pp. 109–113; English: *BSMP*, pp. 9–13; *id.*, *ÜSS*, pp. 132–142; *id.*, *SKET*, pp. 279–284; English: *SCIT*, pp. 24–28; *id.*, *SuG*, p. 308.

to the decisive insight that, in the absence of an order of being proscribing the ends toward which humans must aspire, individual cognition must incorporate the capacity to devise its own aims, dreams, and ends.

At the end of the eighteenth century, alongside theoretical changes writ large in the French Revolution, a new philosophical doctrine of recollection emerged as just such an incorporation. However much individual conceptions of recollection differed, each attested to the plight of humans not at home in their world. Each, accordingly, could not conceive of recollection apart from foreseeing. This joining of recollection with envisioning was not mere apprehension about the future. Instead, it was foresight into the soon-to-be-past and thus of recollection, the soon-to-come. Recollection was not simply remembering what had been lost; it was an intuitive recalling of what *will be* and, in turn, of what will one day be lost. In the immediacy of transforming moments, thinkers of this period recognized that what now remained open before them would later become a treasured—even if tragic—memory, an event around which they might make sense of themselves and their time.

Despite obvious differences, theirs was a shared conviction whose force comes best into view by way of contrast with the great Augustinian conception of remembrance that had dominated premodern Western thinking.⁷² Augustine's view was that the shaping of the soul, the *distensio animae*, holds in an eternal present the not-yet and the no-longer. Because the soul and its form are gifts from God, the individual possesses confidence that the divine order of being (to which souls bear witness in their recollective form and illumination) embraces its strivings. These moderns, however, were convinced that the hour of Augustinian recollection had passed. They could no longer share its confidence that they were possessed by God, and attempted instead to glean from the work of recollection insight for their own fragmented experiences. They did so by attending not only to the diverse orientations of conscious life, but also to the questions these orientations posed about a possible interconnectedness. In the wake of the disappearance of Augustinian confidence, these moderns seemed fated both to attempt to bring these orientations together *and* to remain aware that the unity appearing in the throes of a truncated recollection will

72. Augustine, *Confessions* (ca. 397–400), vol. II, trans. William Watts (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931), pp. 108–111.

always bear the marks of the ‘withheld,’ the ‘withdrawn,’ and the ‘inscrutable.’

In the conclusion to his lectures, Henrich invokes Fichte’s confession: “We began philosophy in our wantonness. We discovered our nudity, and since then we have been philosophizing in an emergency, for our salvation.”⁷³ Here Henrich returns to his initial point of departure: the “Anglo-American” suspicion of “Continental” philosophy and the concomitant need to reintroduce his own theoretical tradition. Now, however, his solicitous gestures give way to a clarity that comes only with a knowledge of the materials and the perspectives in which they appear.

After reading Henrich’s lectures, one finds it difficult to dismiss questions about subjectivity on the basis of ahistorical, historicist, or programmatic historical claims. Indeed, the temptations of such claims may give way to an invitation to enter an alternate and potentially transformative perspective. Beckoning from the pages of Henrich’s 1973 course lectures is a view in which *theological* or religious motifs remain immanent to our thinking about (at the very least) classical German philosophy. Henrich’s evocation of his point of departure implies that to follow the path of this period is to encounter distinctly religious dimensions at every turn. More precisely, to follow the contours of classical German philosophy is to experience competing claims as discordant tonalities that admit to little promise of resolution. Included among these claims are, of course, the polemics of nineteenth-century theologians, awash in crises of conceptual legitimation.

Precisely because Henrich locates the theoretical problems of modern subjectivity in antinomies that embrace the pretheoretical and the theoretical in their tensive relations, his historiography commends to us the modulating tones of pathos that embody immediate and mediated modes of knowing. Attending to these tones compels us to engage in a distinct kind of remembrance. Having shown that when upheavals interrupt pathos, human longings achieve a distinct pitch and, in consequence, a certain kind of ‘knowing’ emerges, Henrich directs our attention to the paths traversed by classical German philosophy. These thinkers’ way of knowing was a

73. J. G. Fichte, “Fichte an Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (in Altona?),” Osmannstädt, 30 August 1795, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob, in *GA*, vol. III,2 (1970), p. 393.

kind of interior certitude, a securing of convictions bound to adverse contingencies. It was also a knowing through which something transcendent emerged. Today we might call such knowing an “attunement” around which forms of life orient themselves. To incline our ear to this attunement would be to attend to that which lies beyond all places of dispute, but which is nonetheless manifest through local features of pathos. However much this attunement may provoke our proclivities toward inscription, it also evades our reach. For while a knowing of this kind remains bound to place, it is also placeless. As a mode of remembrance, it moves beyond the location wherein it has revealed itself toward a lasting insight.

Admittedly more poetic than philosophical, this insight shines through the form of an insuperable conflict between modern thinkers’ need to assert themselves against the world and their profound sense of being steeped in loss. Weber rightly named this conflict “disenchantment,” or the sense of anomie that issues from an insurmountable conflict of values that destabilize one another.⁷⁴ Within the domain of disenchantment, the path of classical German philosophy moved forward and backward. Bared from free access to traditional theological discourses, it nonetheless remained suspicious of the strictures of scientific rationality. Searching for a new word to name what had become for them nameless, these philosophers seemed fated to invoke, through the resonances of their pathos, (theological) language that had already passed its time. Only through the interruption of these resonances could silence transform a beleaguered consciousness into one of gratitude for what had gone before: the disparate and opposing thoughts that had struggled to surface this ‘word.’⁷⁵ So construed, remembrance through disenchantment brings thinking to a place of quiet acknowledgment. Such thinking does not forget the struggles of the past—or of the future. Rather, it remembers its ‘wantonness’ before the presence of the withdrawn God. Only therein does a new voice dare to speak.

74. Max Weber, “Wissenschaft als Beruf” [1919], in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1922; repr. 1988), p. 609; English: “Science as Vocation,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 152. This essay was originally delivered as a speech at Munich University in 1918.

75. D. Henrich, *SuG*, p. 312.

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1

Introduction

The time between the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781¹ and the 1844 publication of Kierkegaard's *Concept of Anxiety*²—the same year in which Marx wrote the *Early Economical Philosophical Manuscripts*³—is just sixty-three years. Shorter still is the time from the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the final step Hegel made in his philosophical development: the establishment of a speculative logic as the fundamental discipline of his system and not simply a negative introduction into it.⁴ This happened in 1804, the same year in which Kant died. What is astonishing about this very short period of time is that within it, the entire development from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel occurred. This unique development that unfolded during the late lifetime of Kant both invites and resists interpretation.

Anglo-Saxon philosophy has tended to regard the philosophical developments during these two decades as opaque and suspicious.⁵ From this

1. I. Kant (1724–1804), *KrV A*; English: *CPR*.

2. S. Kierkegaard (1813–1855), *Begrebet Angst* [1844], ed. A. B. Drachmann, in *Sv*, vol. VI (1963), pp. 101–240; English: *The Concept of Anxiety*, ed. and trans. Reidar Thomte with Albert B. Anderson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

3. K. Marx (1818–1883), *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844* [1932], ed. Rolf Dlubek, in *MEGA*, vol. I,2 (1982), pp. 189–438; English: *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. Martin Milligan (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959). Written between April and August 1844 in Paris, these manuscripts were not published until 1932.

4. G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), *SsP*.

5. Notable among these criticisms of philosophical idealism are certainly those of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore (1873–1958). Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript*, ed. E. R. Eames and K. Blackwell (London: Allen and

point of view, thinkers during this period made exaggerated claims for philosophy. They also appear to have made weak and loose arguments that lack a critical attitude toward the basic concepts with which they were working. Owing in part to these reservations, there has been relatively little good scholarship in the English language on the period, except on Hegel.⁶

By way of contrast, Continental philosophy has maintained that during these two decades philosophers did excellent work. For them, what distinguishes the time is its outstanding productivity. Many people have said—among the first was Henrich Heine, and Karl Marx repeated it—that what happened in France in reality happened at the same time in Germany in thought.⁷ Marx wanted to unify these two efforts, building political reality on philosophical inference.⁸

Unwin Press, 1984); Bertrand Russell, *Logical and Philosophical Papers 1909–13*, vol. 6, ed. J. Slater (New York: Routledge, 1992) (esp. Section 7—Critique of Idealism: “Hegel and Common Sense” and “The Twilight of the Absolute”); G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers* (London: Allen and Unwin Press, 1959) (esp. “A Defense of Common Sense,” “Proof of an External World,” and “Wittgenstein’s Lectures”).

6. Among these works are James Collins, *The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); James Collins, *God and Modern Philosophy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960); Emil Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension of Hegel’s Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967); J. N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination* (London: Allen and Unwin Press, 1958); H. S. Harris, *Hegel’s Development*, vol. 1: *Toward the Sunlight 1770–1801* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); H. S. Harris, *Hegel’s Development*, vol. 2: *Night Thoughts, Jena 1801–1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Quentin Lauer, *Essays in Hegelian Dialectic* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1977); idem., *Hegel’s Idea of Philosophy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983); A. V. Miller, *A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976); and Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

7. Heinrich Heine (1797–1856), “Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland” [1834], in *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, vol. VIII, 1, ed. Manfred Windfuhr (Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1979); English: “Concerning the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany,” in *The Romantic School and Other Essays*, ed. and trans. Jost Hermand and Robert C. Holub (New York: Continuum, 1985). Heine here compares the philosophical results of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* to the political effects of the Revolution in France: “[I]n 1789 nothing was talked of in Germany but Kant’s philosophy. . . . Some showed bubbling enthusiasm, others bitter annoyance, many a gaping curiosity about the result of this intellectual revolution. We had riots in the intellectual world just as you had riots in the material world, and we became just as excited over the demolition of ancient dogmatism as you did over the storming of the Bastille” (“Zur Geschichte,” p. 90; English: p. 212). In the pivotal essay “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” written at the end of 1843 and sent to Feuerbach in 1844, Karl Marx remarks: “The German nation is obliged to connect its dream history with its present circumstances. . . .

These divergent attitudes notwithstanding, this philosophical period was, from an historical standpoint, possibly more influential than any other. Three of its contributions continue to have a bearing on the ways in which we think today.

First, in Johann Gottlieb Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*,⁹ the romantic theory of art and poetry originated, which was the first modern poetic theory in terms of which we can still interpret many works of art from the nineteenth century. The early romantics considered themselves to be students of Fichte. They felt that without being deeply versed in Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*, it would have been impossible to develop the kind of poetry they were writing.

Second, Marxism is the product of the collapse of Hegel's philosophy. This alone would be a sufficient reason to study this period. In fact, that is what Marx himself claimed more than 150 years ago. While the philosophers of the new wave of empiricism and positivism in Europe were virtually ignoring Hegel, Marx did not. Instead, he maintained that he was the

The criticism of *German philosophy of right* and of the state, which was given its most logical, profound and complete expression by *Hegel*, is at once the critical analysis of the modern state and of the reality connected with it, and the definite negation of all the past *forms of consciousness in German jurisprudence and politics*, whose most distinguished and most general expression, raised to the level of a *science*, is precisely *the speculative philosophy of right*. If it was only in Germany that the speculative philosophy of right was possible—this abstract and extravagant thought about the modern state, whose reality remains in another world (even though this is just across the Rhine)—the *German* thought-version of the modern state, on the other hand, which abstracts from *actual man*, was only possible because and in so far as the modern state itself abstracts from *actual man*, or satisfies the whole man only in an imaginary way. In politics, the Germans have *thought* what other nations have done. Germany was their *theoretical conscience*." K. Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung" [1844], in *MEGA*, vol. I,2, pp. 175–176; English: *MEPW*, pp. 62–64.

8. "The only *practically* possible emancipation of Germany is the emancipation based on the unique theory which holds that man is the supreme being for man. In Germany emancipation from the *Middle Ages* is possible only as the simultaneous emancipation from the *partial* victories over the Middle Ages. In Germany no form of bondage can be broken unless *every* form of bondage is broken. Germany, *enamored of fundamentals*, can have nothing less than a *fundamental* revolution. The *emancipation of Germany* is the *emancipation of man*. The *head* of this emancipation is *philosophy*, its *heart* is the *proletariat*. Philosophy cannot be actualized without the abolition of the proletariat; the proletariat cannot be abolished without the actualization of philosophy." K. Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung" [1844], in *MEGA*, vol. I,2, pp. 182–183; English: *MEPW*, p. 70.

9. J. G. Fichte (1762–1814), *GgW*; English: *SK*.

only one who did not read Hegel as a “dead dog.” (This is a phrase stemming from Lessing, who opined that we should not treat Spinoza as a dead dog, as many had in the eighteenth century.)¹⁰ By virtue of his willingness to take Hegel seriously, Marx was able to write *Das Kapital*.

Third, existentialism is the product of the collapse of idealism, and it is impossible to understand any basic doctrine of Kierkegaard without knowing both Hegel and Fichte. One can even say that existentialism and Marxism are complementary outcomes of the collapse of Hegel’s system. Kierkegaard’s existentialism is the philosophy of mind isolated from the philosophy of nature and history. Marxism is the philosophy of history and society isolated from the Hegelian and Fichtean philosophy of mind. So the universal claim of the Hegelian system is that it integrated at least aspects of theories that became equally influential, and continuously so, after its collapse. Therefore, understanding Hegel’s system is a precondition for understanding what happened afterward.

There is a second reason for interpreting this period of philosophy that follows partly from the historical one I have just given. We can understand this interpretation as an introduction to Continental philosophy. Philosophy has a single origin in Greece (if one distinguishes from the logic of Hinduism and Buddhism). It also enjoyed a single tradition from its origin up to the end of the eighteenth century. This means in part that the philosophers whom we could call “great” were connected with each other, irrespective of political borders or the boundaries of language. It also means that philosophy had one language. At first this language was Greek; then, with the rise to dominance of the Roman Empire, the language of philosophy became Latin, which endured until the eighteenth century. This situation changed entirely at the end of the eighteenth century with the appearance of Fichte. At that time a split took place that has since separated two worlds of philosophy: the Anglo-Saxon, which is basically empirically oriented, and what is called Continental philosophy, which understands itself as somehow in a tradition that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. Of course, there were exchanges between the two traditions, and “emergency entrances,” so to speak, remained open for “refugees” from the other side. But there was no real cooperation, except for two decades be-

10. F. H. Jacobi (1743–1819), “Jacobi an M. Mendelssohn,” Pempelfort, 4 November 1783, in *Bw*, p. 235; English: *CDS*¹, p. 193.

fore World War I. For more than a century, both sides exhibited a deep inability to understand each other.

This split, which originated with Fichte, was then reinforced during World War I, when for the first time philosophers tried to define their work politically. Anglo-Saxon philosophers defended reason and humanity against what they construed as an aggressive systematic spirit. They interpreted this spirit as an attempt to reorganize all of life primarily by force instead of insight. For their part, Continental philosophers resisted what they deemed to be superficiality. They opposed the naïve integration of the deep experiences human beings have into shallow economic and social perspectives.

These arguments, in turn, are connected with different experiences, not only of philosophers, but also of the peoples on the Continent and in the Anglo-Saxon countries. On the Continent, a feeling of crisis grew out of the ruin wrought by the war, a crisis so profound that philosophers found themselves ineluctably drawn to the task of shaping a new form of life. Such was the experience, for instance, from which Heidegger started. On the other side of the channel, a certain feeling of nostalgia emerged—a longing for a return to the eternal and unchanging foundations of all experience that had survived the war unshaken. From this nostalgia, an attitude developed in England and the United States that was critical of any speculative approach to philosophy. This criticism felled English Hegelianism, which was already tottering under the impact of the arguments Russell and Moore had lodged.

The difference between these two experiences echoes the divergence of opinion between Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Edmund Burke. Early in his philosophical career, Fichte wanted to develop an apology for Jacobinism in politics, which in this context meant the attempt to build a new life in much the same way as an architect builds new houses. Just as the architect provides a blueprint from which to build the house, so also the political philosopher, or at least the theoretician of politics, provides a design from which to erect a new society. Burke, on the other hand, taught that this “architectural” attitude toward political life rested on a fundamental mistake—the aggressive imposition of a design for life on a people—that every sound philosophy had to target for criticism.¹¹

11. Edmund Burke emphasized the necessity of taking into account the historical circumstances peculiar to a situation before proposing the establishment of laws and government.

These two attitudes continued to predominate in both Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy until the early 1960s. Then the lingering effects of World War I began to dissipate, and the gap between the two traditions became narrower. On the Continent, the Heidegger wave was over. It had been very strong, but philosophers finally realized that, despite his promise, Heidegger was unable to accomplish the revision of the conceptual framework within which philosophy had been undertaken. Instead, Wittgenstein and his successors who pursued a similar project attracted attention.¹² Meanwhile, within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of philosophy, the need for a comprehensive analysis of modern life and society began to make itself felt again.

Traditional expectations for philosophy then began to reemerge. Among these, for instance, was the conviction that philosophy should not be just the kind of theoretically important but otherwise irrelevant activity whose motivation is demonstrating brilliant and analytical abilities. Instead, philosophical interpretation of human life in general should be consonant with the way in which life already understands itself before it turns to philosophy. Incidentally, this expectation makes it important for us to understand the implicit standard toward which a philosophy orients itself. The philosophy of idealism, as well as what we are calling Continental philosophy, has standards of a kind that, as far as I can see, became relevant within analytical philosophy during the late 1960s.¹³

People should continually work out ethical imperatives with reference to particular contexts rather than abstracting them from reason in an ahistorical manner. See Edmund Burke (1729–1797), “Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol,” 3 April 1777, ed. W. M. Elofson and John A. Woods, in *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke*, vol. III, ed. Paul Langford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 288–330; and idem., *Reflections on the Revolution in France* [1791], ed. L. G. Mitchell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also Dieter Henrich, introduction to *Betrachtungen über die Französische Revolution*, by Edmund Burke, trans. Friedrich Gentz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967), pp. 7–22.

12. The basic shift in philosophy from ontology to language—in other words, from invoking “Being” as the domain in which we live to construing “language” as this domain—occurred with the quickening interest in Wittgenstein and his linguistic turn. See L. Wittgenstein (1889–1951), *PU*; English: *PI*. Principal among Wittgenstein’s successors are G. Elizabeth M. Anscombe, Peter T. Geach, and Norman Malcolm. See G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, *3 Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967); P. T. Geach, *God and the Soul: Studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: Schocken Books, 1969); and N. Malcolm, *Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein* (London: Allen and Unwin Press, 1971).

13. Among the analytic philosophers of this period who were receptive to such standards are Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969);

One of these—that philosophy should not alienate itself from understanding life—I have just mentioned. Another standard is that philosophy should offer a universal theoretical project applicable to various fields in basically the same way. This implies that the philosopher should not be a specialist. We can also understand this difference by saying that Continental philosophy takes the relationship between the transcendental constitution of the person and the concept of philosophy as constitutive of the definition of philosophy, whereas empiricist philosophy tends to emphasize scientific and critical standards primarily, and even, at times, exclusively. But there are reasons to agree with Plato that there is no necessary incompatibility between these two endeavors. One need only be circumspect about what one can accomplish at any given time. So, we can connect the first and second standards. In order to probe the primordial experience of life, a philosophy has to employ a universal framework. Just as a person has to have an integrated approach to all kinds of problems that present themselves in life, so also must a philosophical framework permit this kind of integrated approach. If philosophy does not offer this universality, it will not be able to coincide with what the person experiences.

A third standard bears on a philosophy's capacity to interpret itself. To do so with depth, a philosophy must be able to appraise its context, which includes history and the development of society, as well as the development of art. This is why the Continental philosophers are always in an implicit competition with the artist. A philosophy that is unable to say something about the unarticulated intentions of artists of its time does not fulfill this important standard.

In my view, there is a feeling developing among some analytical philosophers that these standards should be accepted. Embracing these standards might well justify the hope that the narrowing gap between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophical traditions will eventually close. We find evidence for this joining of the traditions in the development of Kant

Roderick Chisholm, *Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study* (London: Allen and Unwin Press, 1976); Arthur Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Thomas Nagel, *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Richard Rorty, ed., *The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956); Peter F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (New York: Anchor Books, 1959); and J. O. Urmson, "The History of Analysis," in *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 294–301.

discussions in analytic philosophy that Peter F. Strawson's books has initiated.¹⁴

These two motivations—the perduring historical influence of two decades in the late eighteenth century and an introduction to Continental philosophy—stand behind my desire to develop this specific philosophical interpretation. On the problems that were the most important for the successors of Kant, I shall speak at a later point. But I would like to mention now two problems—one historical and one systematic—to which I shall give special attention.

Let me begin with the historical problem. The shortness of the period poses three questions for the interpreter. The first is the question of the relationship between Kant's philosophical system and the idealism that succeeded it. Fichte and Hegel considered themselves to be the true successors of Kant. Each claimed that only *his* philosophical program ultimately could defend Kant's position, making it coherent and superior to all alternatives. Kant (who lived until Hegel's position was finally elaborated) did not agree at all with either claim. He flatly denied that Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* had anything to do with the position he defended in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. So one problem of the history of philosophy of this period is to make intelligible how this development from Kant to Hegel, which took place during Kant's life, was possible. What unity, if any, keeps Kantian and Hegelian thinking together as positions inside one period of philosophy? Hegel, of course, had an explanation. He claimed that the development from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to himself was a necessary development from a beginning (when it was not yet possible to understand the basic implications of Kant's position) toward the end in which idealistic philosophy became coherent and universal. But this Hegelian interpretation, although widely accepted, is indefensible. The historian who deals with this period has to give another account of its unity.

The second historical question for interpreting this period is how to delineate the relationships among the idealists themselves. We can portray the entire period in terms of the major controversies that occurred between students and their teachers. These include the disputes between Fichte and the Kantians, between Fichte and Schelling, and between Hegel

14. Peter F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*; *id.*, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"* (London: Methuen, Ltd., 1966). In *The Bounds of Sense*, Strawson takes traditional Kantian themes and raises them from the perspective of the analytic tradition. See, for example, "Two Faces of the *Critique*," pp. 15–24.

and Schelling. Early on, it was the students who mounted these controversies with attacks on their teachers. Fichte, for example, considered himself to be the successor of Kant, but Kant vehemently dismissed this claim. Similarly, a tension developed between Fichte and Schelling. Initially a student of Fichte, Schelling purported to advance the case for his teacher's idealistic system. But later he distanced himself from Fichte's position, describing it as only an insufficient predecessor to his own "true" idealism. Fichte hotly contested this, and a rancorous debate over their disagreement ensued. With the appearance of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, yet another of these rifts erupted—this time between Hegel and Schelling.

At a later point, those who had been the teachers retaliated, mounting attacks on their former students. After his controversy with Schelling, Fichte developed a "new" philosophy, which to a certain extent can be seen as a reaction to what Schelling had criticized in his earlier system. Fichte and Schelling fell into quarreling over the authorial origin of this "new" philosophy. Schelling, too, developed a late philosophy that he claimed to be a corrective to the misuses to which Hegel had subjected his own philosophy.

We might describe the entire period in terms of these and other minor controversies. In this way, we could develop an image of the relationships among the philosophers that differs entirely from the one Hegel presented and that still dominates the literature today. This is the view that each philosophical position from Kant through Hegel is like a step in a staircase that we ascend as we leave previous steps behind. By way of contrast, in the image I am proposing there are three comparable and competing positions that cannot be reduced to each other. To see the period in *this way*, we have to understand the late philosophy of Fichte *and* Hegel's system *and* the late philosophy of Schelling. Here, I propose to concentrate on the late Fichte and Hegel in particular, because I consider them the most important.

The third question has to do with the continuity of the entire period as it is related to its collapse. We would want to find out what happened when idealistic philosophy suddenly broke down and existentialism and Marxism emerged in the wake of its demise. These are the historical questions I want to attempt to answer.

The systematic problem I earlier mentioned is that during this period, new types of philosophy also appeared without accounts either of what they were or of how to describe their systematic form. In order to write an account of the systematic form of Kant's philosophy, for example, we have

to collect many occasional remarks that he made, and draw from them in the absence of any complete statement from Kant. We encounter a similar situation with Fichte's contributions to the philosophy of mind. He incorporated into his system very interesting ideas and arguments for a new theory of consciousness and the concept of the self. We have to develop a way to assess the value of these contributions that does not depend on his success in system building. This means trying to bring into view the rudiments of a systematic structure that Fichte was never able to complete satisfactorily. I believe this is true of Hegel's *Logic*, as well. I want to try to discuss those parts of its structure that Hegel had not fully worked out. We know that the concept of negation has a fundamental role in his *Logic*. We could say that Hegel bases his concept of negation on a typology of various kinds of double negations. In the course of my interpretation of this period of philosophy, I propose to integrate a new reading of the *Logic* in terms of this underlying typology.

This book consists of five parts. The first will consider the systematic structure of Kant's philosophy.¹⁵ Second, I will discuss the early critics of Kant, whose arguments—especially the influential ones of Karl Leonhard Reinhold that introduced the systematic form of a possible philosophy—led to the development of the *Science of Knowledge*.¹⁶ Actually, there are three main lines that led from the Kantian position into the idealist philosophy. We can understand how these lines connect, but we also need to separate them. First, of course, is the foundation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; second, the controversy over Kant's ethics and the relationship between duty and inclination; and third, the development of Kant's philosophy of religion, in which the concept of God is subordinated to the concept of freedom and is actually developed in terms of concepts of freedom, of reason, and of moral law. These lines, which led from Kant to Hegel, met in Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*. Accordingly, in the third part of my interpretation, I shall consider two of the numerous versions of the *Science of*

15. For more on the systematic structure of Kant's philosophy, Henrich recommended the "First Introduction" to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. This is the only publication in which Kant wrote explicitly about the systematic form of his entire work. I. Kant, "Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft" [1790], in *HN*, pp. 195–251; English: "First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment," in *CJ*, pp. 1–51.

16. Many of these critics' writings remain available only in old German editions, although current scholarship is increasingly devoted to making them more accessible.

Knowledge: the early one, which was influential, and the second one, which Fichte never published and so was without any influence.¹⁷ It is, nonetheless, a deep and interesting theory. I shall turn, fourth, to the arguments of the friends of the young Hegel against the systems of both Kant and Fichte, as well as to the process that led to the formation of Hegel's system. Finally, in the fifth part, I shall develop an interpretation of the underlying structure of Hegel's *Logic*.¹⁸

17. J. G. Fichte, *GgW*; English: *SK*. The second version to which Henrich refers is *Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre* [1797], ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Gliwitzky, in *GA*, vol. I,4 (1970), pp. 183–281; English: *ANPW*. In 1796 Fichte became a co-editor of the *Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrten* [1795–1800] alongside his colleague, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (1766–1848), who founded the journal. The essay (*Versuch einer neuen Darstellung*) appeared over four installments in the journal. The first installment (which actually appeared twice, due to an initial defective printing in February 1797) was published in vol. 5, no. 1 (March 1797) and included both the “Vorerinnerung” and the “[Erste] Einleitung.” The second installment appeared in vol. 5, no. 4 (August 1797) and consisted of the first six sections of the “Zweite Einleitung.” The remaining half of the “Zweite Einleitung” was printed in vol. 6, no. 1 (November 1797). The final installment in vol. 7, no. 1 (March 1798) consisted of the “Erstes Capitel.”

18. Henrich considers Hegel's four most important works to be (1) *Wissenschaft der Logik* [1812–1816], ed. Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke, in *GW*, vol. XI–XII (1978–1981); English: *SL*. (2) *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* [1821], in *Sämtliche Werke. Neue kritische Ausgabe*, vol. XVII, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955); English: *PR*. (3) *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* [1830], ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Hans-Christian Lucas, in *GW*, vol. XIX–XX (1989–1992); English: *Hegel's Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); *Philosophy of Nature: Part Two of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); (4) *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, in *GW*, vol. IX (1980); English: *PS*.