

The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages



On the Unwritten History of Theory

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Introduction



Outside Modernity

ANDREW COLE AND D. VANCE SMITH

I have always been in favour of a little theory; we must have Thought; else we shall be landed back in the dark ages.—Arthur Brooke of *Middlemarch*

To abandon the past to the night of facticity is a way of depopulating the world.—Simone de Beauvoir

From Roland Barthes's *punctum* to Pierre Bourdieu's use of the scholastic concept of habitus; from Martin Heidegger's early and continued fascination with *intentio* in the work of John Duns Scotus and Thomas of Erfurt to Fredric Jameson's engagement with the fourfold model of allegorical interpretation; from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *haecceitas* (after Scotus) to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's explorations of medieval communisms in thirteenth-century Italy, it is clear that many contemporary thinkers have turned to theoretical models developed in the Middle Ages in order to diagnose European and North American modernism and postmodernism. A more general engagement with the Middle Ages can be seen in the work of Julia Kristeva, Slavoj Žižek, and the late Jacques Derrida, all of whom find ancient and medieval theologies strikingly analogous to postmodern sensibilities. Examples of this sort of critical engagement are numerous. Because none of them are aleatory, we want to explore in this volume the place and function of the Middle Ages within critical theory.¹

We view the medieval turn in critical theory as an essential component of theory's own history of self-making, a history that is itself bound up with the larger and well-known "project of modernity"—specifically, the secularization of medieval philosophical, religious, literary, and economic

modes.² We therefore gave this collection of essays a title that deliberately echoes and challenges Hans Blumenberg's important and enduring critique of the "secularization thesis," *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*.³ In this work, which is astonishing in its breadth and learning, Blumenberg defends the "modern age" by arguing against both secularization, which is "nothing but a spiritual anathema upon what has transpired in history since the Middle Ages," and the very idea that modernity must legitimize itself in the terms set by that previous epoch.⁴ Secularization, in Blumenberg's account, assumes that every level of modern political and social formation extends backward to the medieval sacralization of the world: the "modern work ethic is secularized monastic asceticism; The world revolution is secularized expectation of the end of the world; The president of the Federal Republic is a secularized monarch."⁵ We'll say more about secularization and legitimation in the next section. Suffice it to say here that the title of this collection, *The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages*, intends to compete with Blumenberg's similarly named study by asserting not only that these aforementioned medieval modes are sustained within modernity, but also that no theory of modernity can be complete or legitimate without a constant reckoning with "the medieval."⁶ We reject, in other words, Blumenberg's premise about "illegitimacy": that "the medieval" undoes the cohesion of the modern.⁷ On the contrary, as the essays here show, the intellectual and political history of the Middle Ages paradoxically gives coherence to various theories of the modern. We will extend this claim throughout this introduction to a variety of test cases: Blumenberg's meditations on the self-consistency of modernity; the problem of analogy in medieval and modern theory; the rich futural themes developed within French theoretical medievalism in the 1960s and 1970s alongside other avant-garde work; and the temporal structures of the "New Medievalism." In each case, we move closer and closer to the field of medieval studies before the essays that follow open up once again the investigation to broader theoretical questions.

SECULARIZATIONS

To describe Blumenberg's project, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, in brief is to say that he seeks to demonstrate that modernity came about neither as the inverted image of the Middle Ages nor as the illegitimate

heir of the medieval period.⁸ Modernity, for him, does not bear the repressed content of medieval forms: the Middle Ages is not the disavowed truth of modernity, which is supposedly riven with medieval “pseudomorphs,” the faint presences of the previous epoch.⁹ In fact, for him, the secularization thesis is anything but secular, since it requires a version of unitary truth—that x explains y , that the medieval explains the modern, that “ B is the secularized A ”—that, like Christian medieval theology, purports to affirm analogies and correspondences not only between the earthly and the divine but also between dissimilar entities, histories, practices, and epochs.¹⁰ Instead, for Blumenberg, a radical shift takes place between the Middle Ages, with its emphasis on sacred ontology and the divine presence infusing the intelligible world, and modernity, with its new modes of inquiry, self-reflection, and human agency via epistemology, hypothesis, new scientific cosmologies, and the processes of rationalization that render nature as inherently knowable in its laws. Indeed, this radical shift—which Blumenberg is clear to emphasize is not “a secularization (‘becoming worldly’) . . . but rather, as it were, the primary crystallization of a hitherto known reality”¹¹—is most evident in the rise of the new person, the self-determined, free subject of modernity.¹²

Blumenberg offers, in our view, the most widely recognizable, and perhaps the most theoretically sophisticated, study of periodization that nonetheless rigorously sustains the great divide between the Middle Ages and modernity. His model of historical transformation is largely one of rupture and discontinuity between historical periods.¹³ The great periodic split between the Middle Ages and modernity has been deftly addressed by scholars of the medieval period, especially on the vexed question of the “subject” or “self,”¹⁴ but our specific interest here is in the implications of Blumenberg’s work for the periodization of theory and philosophy, as well as the ways critical discourse *periodizes itself* as modern by citing, adopting, expanding, revising, and indeed even secularizing putatively medieval modes of inquiry. The urgency of our engagement with Blumenberg, then, can be stated succinctly: in seeking to explain away secularization, he does away with the Middle Ages. By extension, in failing to account for the persistence of the Middle Ages within critical philosophy after Kant, he also sustains a decidedly modern form of periodization that seeks to break from the medieval, as Kant famously did in critiquing “pure reason” and its extension in metaphysics as nothing other than a species of scholasticism

to be repudiated.¹⁵ (The genius of Kant is that he medievalizes a founding figure of modernity—Descartes!)

Blumenberg's project, we suggest, lacks coherence as a theory of the modern precisely because of its premises about the secularization thesis and the Middle Ages. In other words, without secularization, and without the Middle Ages, Blumenberg lacks a language with which to describe the various modern hermeneutics of suspicion *as modern*—those methods of critical analysis that avowedly adopt, yet conscientiously critique, the pseudomorph, the mystifying appearance behind which one must see.¹⁶ Marx's commodity and Lacan's symptom are the most recognizable examples of pseudomorphs in critical theory, though many more could be added, such as the ontically concealed obviousness of Heidegger's *dasein*, the "hidden meanings" of Gadamer's hermeneutics, the absent presences of so much poststructural writing, and so forth.¹⁷ Indeed, without the Middle Ages, and absent a language with which to speak positively of critical models premised on the distinction between "essence" and "appearance," Blumenberg can characterize modern theory only as something of a failed Renaissance—an unsuccessful revival of classical forms of theoretical inquiry in the mold of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Socrates, and neo-Gnosticism.¹⁸ Yet what remains to be explained is "the medieval" in theory. We would recognize that, in some measure, Blumenberg's study is an attempt at such an explanation, but his own project, like the very project of modernity itself, is decidedly unfinished and, in our view, raises more questions than it answers.

THE ANALOGY OF THE MEDIEVAL

We would go further to claim that it is precisely when Blumenberg tries to account for the appearance (in both senses of the word—phenomenological and originary) of such a critical hermeneutics that the *absence* of the Middle Ages becomes, paradoxically, its very ontological foundation. In discussing the end of scholasticism, Blumenberg traces both the end of the Middle Ages and the inauguration of a "pure" language of speculation, unmoored from its ontological foundations and no longer a discourse of finitude. "The end of the Middle Ages," he says, ". . . also means overcoming the naïve attitude to language that induces one to let an equivalent

reality be associated with every linguistic element and that sees in this association a closed circle of accomplishment.”¹⁹ To mark the end of the Middle Ages as the end of a certain language ultimately is to install an ontotheology at the heart of Blumenberg’s historiography. Blumenberg’s very disavowal of the secularization thesis makes this version of the history of linguistics, according to his analysis, historically implausible, revealing the deep contradiction in his identification of the Middle Ages by their ending—an ending that, he shows, is the ending of a discourse.

The examples of this termination of discourse are drawn from, of all things, the fate of Anselm’s ontological argument. For Blumenberg, Nicholas of Cusa has finally severed the adequation of sign and thing that is assumed to be the presupposition of the argument, invalidating the “act of medieval humility” that requires the intellect to be sacrificed to faith. Yet the language of modernity is precisely a language of ineffability. In what Blumenberg calls its “continually renewed testing of the boundary of transcendence” postscholastic language is precisely the language of impossibility, constituted by its own contingency and arbitrariness, and also directed toward its horizon of intelligibility. It marks, in other words, both the transcendent and its nonarrival, as well as the very structure of futurity itself, the anticipated but as yet unknown category of the possible.

Yet Blumenberg’s return to the question of transcendence, even if it is now defined as the possibility of impossibility in language, is also profoundly a return to the medieval. Indeed, almost all of what Blumenberg argues about the radical futurity in Nicholas of Cusa’s work is already present a thousand years before him in Pseudo-Dionysius and even earlier writers. Cusa’s unmooring of language from indication in his figure of God as a sphere whose circumference is nowhere and whose center is everywhere, according to Blumenberg, is a mathematical construction of an “exercise in transcendence” that allows one to experience transcendence as the very “limit of theoretical accomplishment.”²⁰ But this figure is hardly mathematically “modern,” esoteric, or avant-garde. It appears in works of conventional theology and accessible philosophy from Boethius’s *Consolation of Philosophy* to Bonaventure’s *Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum*, where it anticipates—ontically, not historically—a language emptied of reference and designation. The crucial question that Blumenberg elides here is not what role the termination of scholasticism would play in ending the Mid-

dle Ages and in announcing a new philosophy of language, but the degree to which the discourse of the medieval is, and can only be, a discourse of the analogue.

It is at this point that we are reminded of Michel Foucault. The first chapter of his book *The Order of Things* closes with the assertion that with Velázquez representation is “freed finally from the relation that was impeding it” and now offers “itself as representation in its pure form.”²¹ What Foucault means by this relation that impedes representation is precisely the deep analogy that structures the language of the Middle Ages, the adequation of sign and thing that ontically guarantees the grammaticality of the world. Foucault’s second chapter opens with the assertion that “up to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a constructive role in the knowledge of Western culture,”²² a claim that comes to seem surprisingly modest in the light of the taxonomy of resemblances that follows. This taxonomy is divided into four classes of similitude: *convenientia*, *emulatio*, analogy, and sympathy. But the heterogeneity and distinction suggested by this very classification is, as Foucault suggests, merely heuristic, not least because the presence of analogy dissolves these very distinctions. Analogy has, he says, “a universal field of application” through which “all the figures of the universe can be drawn together.”²³ If representation is at stake for the formulation of modernity, then its field of knowledge can be neither structured by nor founded on analogical repetitions of formal relations, *nor can it suffer the analogy of the medieval*. It is here that Blumenberg’s argument against the secularization thesis converges with Foucault’s notion of an austere and pure modern representationality. For Blumenberg, to preserve the vestige of medieval sacral relations would be not only to permit the horizon of modernity to be bounded by the medieval, marked as its logical consequence, but also to demand that it be structured by the historically and noumenologically inaccessible medieval experience of transcendence. Indeed, modernity’s horizon of intelligibility would be the transcendent, at least to the degree that the traces of medieval power relations remain the inescapable analogue of the Middle Ages, a structuration that appeals to the persistent analogy between the human and the divine.

The question of analogy is deeply related to the question of transcendence, at least for the medieval philosophies of language that proved to be most influential in the installation of a philosophical modernity. Heideg-

ger, whose work itself could be said to mark the break between a medieval ontotheology and a critical modernist phenomenology, depends largely on modistic grammar (at least in his early work) for his version of medieval scholasticism, a crucial and, we will argue, *destructive* choice. For the philosophy of language that underpins modistic grammar insists not only upon the usefulness of analogy as a way to transcendence, but upon its reality. We understand how things are because of the deep analogical structure of being in the world: the modes of understanding, signifying, and being operate in concert because each is structurally analogous to the others. As Thomas of Erfurt, whose treatise on grammar is the subject of the second half of Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift*, famously put it, "every mode of signifying radically originates from some property of the thing."²⁴ Likeness establishes the anterior *identity* of discourses, and any separation between them will only be heuristic, a way of organizing knowledge that in no way changes the apperception of reality. A certain philosophical realism underlies this theory of language. William Crathorn, in the generation after Ockham at Oxford, argued that the mind forms concepts by replicating or simulating the qualities of the external world—that is, by working on their *species*, their likenesses.²⁵ And Thomas of Erfurt himself shores up the analogy of understanding and world by arguing that the understanding must initially be passive, or there could be no analogy, no likening possible: it is the very potential of the mind to be determined by something outside it that allows analogies to be made.

In Heidegger's early work, his philosophy of language is arguably as deeply ontotheological as that of Thomas of Erfurt, and for the same reasons. The relation between the human and the divine (what Heidegger refers to as the transcendental) is, for Heidegger in his *Habilitationsschrift*, one of *communicabilitas*, that is, the possibility of an analogical structuring, even, and especially, when what we encounter is heterogeneity.²⁶ Our purpose here is to argue not that Heidegger has always been medieval, but that the pervasive recourse to the pre-ontic *lesein* in his later work, masked as a primordial "gathering" that initiates the work of philosophy in world-historical terms, is both a repudiation of the role of the analogy in his version of medieval language philosophy and a continuing indebtedness to it.

Heidegger's rigorous and massive attempt to anchor the *lesein* of thinking and of signifying in the mode of being itself was founded not just on the assumption that language is the way to transcendence, but also on the

implementation of a continuing work of analogization. Even when we are constrained to the *Existenzialien* that constitute our phenomenal world, we are bound to recognize them as relating to us precisely because of their *gleichursprünglichkeit*.²⁷ Because the mode of being conforms to rules that are like the rules of logic, both the understanding (*modus intelligendi*) and the act of saying something about something were considered to be like—to be equivalent to—being itself, yet not identical to it. In this sense transcendence and analogy are themselves equivalences, metaphysical and rhetorical conditions that give their fields of inquiry their warrant precisely by making them permeable, not only open to interrogation by other means but also articulable in other terms. Indeed, the possibility of articulation is not merely a supplement of what it means to designate analogy or transcendence, but their constitutive feature: to say precisely what they are not is to say what they are like and therefore fail to become. To designate something involves us in a play of loss and enjoyment: the recognition that designation itself is necessary because the object is absent and the expectation that designation will no longer be needed once we arrive in the presence of the object. Yet this loss and enjoyment is never the thing itself. If we were fully to experience either of these, both designation and object would disappear: loss tells us what we do not have—that is, what an object is—and enjoyment tells us we no longer know what it is—that is, how to say anything about it. But this play of play is merely a phenomenological way of stating how signs work, and we are usually conscious neither of the loss nor of the possession, nor are we aware of the impossible demand of being and having that designation makes.²⁸

But both analogy and transcendence insist on the very impossibility of designation. Without the thinking of a *parousia*, a present and a presence in which all things are possible, likeness and supersession can be only figures of the impossibility of their own discursive boundaries. Unless it can be called into question, conceived as bounded, terminated, a discourse cannot have the *possibility* of the figures of analogy or transcendence. And it is this possibility, not its necessity, that allows the thinking, in turn, of analogy and transcendence. In one sense, they are founded on negations that precede the possibility of thinking them: unless a discourse can be conceived of as unlike any other, its putative likenesses will be subsumed into its attributes, into what defines it constitutively or essentially. Only what stands against it, what opposes it, what cannot be ren-

dered in its terms, can become its likeness.²⁹ Knowledge, as Pseudo-Dionysius says, comes only through the denial of all being; by this he means not merely the cancellation of positive terms of knowing, the Freudian disavowal that is also a determination of libidinal attachment, but something more like the Heideggerian clearing that allows gathering to happen, to appear.³⁰ A likeness first has to be impossible for it to become possible. The limits of analogy and transcendence are not their terminations, but rather the grounds of their possibility.

But is this critique of an analogical Middle Ages what Blumenberg means? What is most salutary about Blumenberg's critique of the secularization argument is not its installment of a periodization that itself remains prior to any hypothesis of periodization, for it remains deeply implicated in its own critique. Indeed, much of the usefulness of Blumenberg's work lies in its insistence on what Edmund Husserl would have called the transcendental reduction: not so much the removal of everything that encumbers the potentiality of the self, but the disclosure of what initiatives, within the horizon of its intention, remain possible for it. In discovering the medieval as the object of our contemplation, we discover that it exists in a world that does not fully contain us; yet it remains a world that presupposes our awareness of it. The moments that stand against us are the relics of our intentionality, of our own desire to discover how it is that we can organize a world that excludes us and by doing so define the boundaries by which we experience our world.

The difficulty of doing this—the impossibility of defining a world not our own precisely because in so doing we engage in the “worlding of world”—is the subject of Heidegger's late essay “The Age of the World Picture.” By attempting to configure a “world view,” a “world image,” or a “world picture” of the Middle Ages, we necessarily define our own initiatives in terms of the very modes of figuration, of representation, that define and configure our own moment. Indeed, the drive to reduce the medieval to a representation in the first place is what separates us from the medieval and from ourselves by virtue of thematizing this or that mode of being: being-as-past, being-for-the past, being medieval, being modern, and so forth.³¹ The “conquest of the world as picture,” Heidegger argues, is the “fundamental event of the modern age,” the *Neuzeit* whose legitimacy derives from the technics of representation.³² Much of Heidegger's essay is, surprisingly, an argument for interdisciplinarity in the modern university.

The methodologies of representation have become the central question of knowledge formation in both the sciences and humanities because they are the subject of the “institutionalizations” that define areas of research and knowledge. The methodology of the “historical sciences,” much like the methodology of the natural sciences, aims at “representing what is fixed and stable and at making history an object.”³³ That Heidegger here means “object” in the phenomenological sense is clear in his equation throughout the essay of “representing” and “explaining,” both of which depend upon a “reduction to the intelligible” and an objectification of the past as an “explicable and surveyable nexus of actions and consequences.”³⁴ This phenomenological orientation to history is both a symptom and the cause of modernity. It demands that we free ourselves, in Heidegger’s blunt phrase, “from the bonds of the Middle Ages” in order to free ourselves to ourselves—that is, in order to conceive of a “world picture.”³⁵ The inability to form this *Weltbild* (which could also mean a conception of the condition of the world) is what Heidegger designates as the failure of the Middle Ages, which is a failure of representation precisely because of the primordial ordering of the medieval by correspondence and analogy. “The art work of the Middle Ages,” Heidegger writes, “and the absence of a world picture in that age belong together.”³⁶ The animating analogical quality of a medieval artwork, in other words, stands in for and disrupts the more comprehensive and copious view of the world as a system that is capable of analysis and that *must* be analyzed, researched, institutionalized, in order to be understood. In the Middle Ages, by contrast, everything stands in relation to a single cause: “to be in being means to belong within a specific rank of the order of what has been created—a rank appointed from the beginning—and as thus caused, to correspond to the cause of creation (*analogia entis*).”³⁷

Prima facie, the insistence that the Middle Ages lacks a world picture is another way of saying that medieval theologians thematized both being and time—their past, their present, their future, their “being.” In that light, Heidegger is not necessarily identifying a specifically medieval problem, because in his view philosophers from Thales to Kant and Hegel and beyond have offered thematic metaphysics of one kind or another—while all along persons in the fourteenth century, as in any other century, went about their business of comporting themselves within equipmental totalities without a thought about the essential “thisness” of, say, a rake (unless

of course the rake breaks).³⁸ Perhaps because Heidegger's project is split between the ontological and the pragmatic, Heidegger himself could not, like Blumenberg, periodize the Middle Ages in predictably "modern" ways (securing the exclusion of the medieval) only to turn around and conceive of secularization simply as "an attempt to answer a medieval question with the means available to a postmedieval age."³⁹ Yet when it comes to the repudiation of scholasticism, Heidegger and Blumenberg are of like minds. In fact, Heidegger's assertion that the Middle Ages lacks a world picture depends on his rejection of scholasticism *above all other ontotheologies*, and in particular the analogical ontology of modistic grammar and the Thomistic figure of the *analogia entis*. But he also repudiates the very way out of configuring being only as analogy that he had explored in the *Habilitationsschrift*. There he attempts to demonstrate that Thomas of Erfurt's *Modi Significandi* points toward a Husserlian symbolic, formal logic emptied of particularity and content—in other words, toward his later thinking of history as the reduction to the intelligible, calculable, and repeatable.⁴⁰ In some ways, it seems that the only distinction between the discarded analogies of the medieval and the institutional convergence of modern knowledges lies in the genealogy of their legitimacies. Emergent institutions themselves legitimate research in the *Neuzeit*, but in the age of scholastic language the *modi significandi*, which are "like the nerve of the complex of meaning," legitimate the correspondences of language and world; they "prescribe the structure and constitute a domain for its lawfulness."⁴¹ We will put aside the question of what relation there is between the "nerve" that animates complexes of meaning and the nexus of institutions in the *Neuzeit* that determines the field of knowledge, although it seems to us that the relation between them is more than merely analogical. What we would like to do instead is to turn to an examination of this double work of analogy in a postmedieval historiography.

MAGICAL NARRATIVES

One of the most complex and productive articles written on the romance, at least from the perspective of a medievalist, is Fredric Jameson's "Magical Narratives: Romance as a Genre."⁴² Apart from the philosophical richness of its approach to medieval forms and modes, a richness not cashed in by most work on medieval romance, it asks the slightly embarrassing ques-

tion of what to do with the forms of another age. Especially for Middle English studies, in which the vocabulary of literary form is strikingly impoverished, Jameson's account of romance as a pseudomorph is a compelling and, it seems to us, highly plausible thesis. Yet it raises the question of whether to think about the relation between periodization and formal change is to reinstall the very analogues at the heart of our inquiry that modernity tells us are no longer plausible ways of signifying the world to ourselves. Jameson is interested in, among other things, what remnants of the "worlding of the world" are still visible in the romance and its genealogy. In his account (which loosely follows Erich Auerbach's chapter in *Mimesis* on Chrétien de Troyes) the epic, which stages crucial moments of absolute moral determination—the choice, already made, of whether to oppose evil—gives way in a purely phenomenological reduction to the romance; that is, it no longer reflects the material conditions of its production as clearly as did the epic. The romance reflects the conditions of an ethics that no longer works directly on the world. It uses the form of narration—or chivalric value—to present to itself a consciousness that is unbound and unrestricted, although it remains free of the very sense of the utilities and determinations that make its world possible. What the romance does, Jameson argues, is perform a Husserlian reduction of history. He not only uses the epic and the romance as analogies for a politics of appearance and its unconscious; he also uses the very structure of analogy to do so, or rather the analogy of two structures of likeness. What we initially discover is the purposive form of each, the ethical ends that emerge within the horizon of their form, the conditions under which they present choice or withdraw it: what Jameson describes as the disclosure of the "worlding" of world. The conditions under which this happens—that is, the conditions under which, say, the romance is written—are themselves "historical in character," he argues. And they are historical in a specific instance, an instance that at first has the structure of analogy: "there must," he writes, "as in medieval times, be something like a nature left as a mysterious and alien border around the still precarious and minute human activities of the village and field."⁴³ The determination of the "preconditions" that make up a historical determination of worlding is structurally analogical: a temporality *as if* medieval, a state "like a nature." Jameson's point here is that we need to observe these conditions in order

to undo the mystifications that give us this illusion of an immanent and pressing nature outside of time that purportedly conditions our activities. The remnant of this work is what appears as nature, the “mysterious and alien border” around purposive, human activity—what is not assimilable as work.

But what does it mean to invoke the analogy of *medieval* labor, in its “still precarious and minute” state? The Whiggish, teleological assumption would be that medieval labor serves as an analogy for the preconditions of the historicizing (worlding) of world because it also serves as the precondition for a history of labor and for a conception of historicity as the conditioned forms that labor takes. This project is certainly valid and legitimate, but what legitimates it is the delegitimizing figure of medieval labor as nascent, original, and primitive. That is, it is useful as analogy precisely because it fails, because that alien border is so proximate and demanding. That is also what work does, and to admit its failure is to admit also what we do not understand about its very purposiveness. But what if the work in hand takes on the very border that defines its historicity and artifactuality? Jameson’s analogy here is more than the thorp or vill or unit of labor: it is the romance itself, for which an account of labor *serves as an analogy*. The work here is not the transformation of the earth’s “original larder” (Marx) into the stuff that sustains the body, but the work of romance itself—and this work is precisely engaged with undoing the unassimilable alien border that marks off the world for us.

Romance gives us, if we read Auerbach’s version as strictly as possible, the primal moment at which the preconditions of the world are set forth: the moment of choice, the abdication of freedom by the necessity to make determinations. It is precisely because the “feudal ethos” of romance “serves no political function” or “practical reality” that the moment of decision is, in Auerbach’s term, “absolute.”⁴⁴ Yet the ostensible argument of *both* Auerbach’s chapter and Jameson’s article is that romance ultimately stages the lack of a determination of choice: it obscures the binding of the subject by increasingly intolerable intrusions of massification, status anxiety, and the emergence of a global market. The purposive form of romance, then, becomes the surprise of its own survival, its emergence above life itself, in which its world remains determinative, a condition that allows thinking to persist. It is a world that, in its very persistence, its belated

nature, is made possible by a transcendental reduction, an organizing of and by the romance form of a subject that is under threat by the manifold but able to narrate its escape from determinations of all kinds.

The fact that Jameson frames the question in terms of genre is what allows the romance to survive its contingency, to remain determinative for the worlding of world. His dismissal of both Northrop Frye's and Vladimir Propp's alignment of the romance in terms of a hero or a central series of functions suggests, rightly, that the romance offers a contemplation of "states of being" rather than a record of acts and deeds.⁴⁵ But to frame the disappearance of the hero in romance as a crisis of, and in, generic limitation is to relegate the romance to the status of survival, to reinscribe the analogy as the genesis of medieval romance. The crucial question of romance is the conditions under which it survives, the question of how the belated historical conditions of the romance—the conditions that we *now* read into the romance, as its immediate audience—become an adequate substitute for the impossibly credulous conditions from which the romance emerges. Jameson calls these originary conditions "those older magical categories for which some adequate substitute must be invented."⁴⁶ But the substitute is there at the genesis of the formal problem of the romance, or those magical categories would be continuous with the categories that now determine the romance in the form that we recognize it. The formal problem, in other words, is that magic must be forgotten in order to make the romance a form determined by its originary repetition: the analogy for a condition that appears only in the obviated forms that adequation and analogy demand.

At a more general level, the mutual determination of romance and analogy is more than simply the result of framing history in generic terms, or of the assumption that the finitude of history is equivalent to the finitude of generic boundaries. It results from the demand for legitimacy, and, as we have argued, the correlative belief that the medieval simply cannot *remain* legitimate in the era of modernity. The crucial questions in Jameson's article are how to account for the trace of a world determined by magical relations, and how to identify the analogies that legitimate a form unmoored from its cause. Romance, in other words, is itself an analogy for the medieval, for the persistence of demands for forms of credulity and knowledge that we no longer believe to be absolutely legitimate.

For Jameson, romance is also an ever-persistent form that posits a unique temporal problem in its medieval and postmedieval deployments: “Romance . . . expresses a transitional moment, yet one of a very special type: its contemporaries must feel their society torn between past and future.”⁴⁷ In medieval and modern societies alike, romance produces the past in a particular way—through nostalgia for traditional social arrangements, practices, and beliefs—but it also summons a future by dint of its “formal possibility,” romance’s own “process of secularization and renewal.”⁴⁸ Clearly, Jameson’s reflections on the persistence of romance, which trace the genre’s eventual emptying out of medieval content in modernism only to be filled up again in postmodern fantasy fiction, mirror Blumenberg’s attempt to perform a kind of phenomenological reduction on medieval historiography in order to strive toward a “pure” modernity freed of relations of mere analogy and medieval power relations.⁴⁹ But whereas Jameson (especially in his recent work) leaves us with the future of romance—a future of a medieval literary content and form—Blumenberg offers us a future that is far more predictive and pathologically modern. For him, the future is borne out in the “repeatable” and “imitable” paradigm of the modern, the tendency to “go beyond” established bounds and posit not only breaks from the past but also breaks from the present—“to anticipate what is possible for man, which is the future.”⁵⁰ In this light, Blumenberg’s *Legitimacy* can be seen as a history of postulated futures in modernity—the new domains in which human *curiositas* is extended, the manner in which classical and medieval *theoria* falls into modern *hypotheoria* in the quest for new possibles, new unknowns, new news.⁵¹ It is the last problem—the future as it is conceived in the modern disciplines and especially “postmodern medievalism”—to which we must now turn, lest it seem that the persistence of romance succeeds as a screen for the persistence of “the medieval” and its future.

Futural thinking is historically determined, needless to say. Efforts to postulate a future for medieval studies, for instance, have been made for the past twenty-five years or so, from institutional reflections⁵² to more theoretical ones.⁵³ This sort of disciplinary self-consciousness has also led to scholarly work on the medieval sense of the future.⁵⁴ Yet not all futural

projects within the field of medieval studies are relevant only to medievalists. In support of this claim, we turn to some of the earlier, formative enterprises in futural thinking, especially in French theory, where we find the work of the medievalist Paul Zumthor emerging alongside that of the more widely known expositors writing at the time. Our presentation of Zumthor is purposeful in that it helps us to discover the unique difference the medieval makes to futural projects.

Zumthor's *Essai de poétique médiévale* (1972; published in English as *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, 1992) is the first book in medieval studies to deploy structuralism and poststructuralism at a transitional moment—the late 1960s and early 1970s. Peter Haidu once characterized Zumthor's *Essai* as “a structuralism on the verge of semiotics.”⁵⁵ The same has been said of, say, Roland Barthes's master work of exegesis, *S/Z*, which is, as Jonathan Culler put it, “an extreme example of both structuralism and post-structuralism.”⁵⁶ Zumthor, who wrote the book between 1969 and 1971, was very much in conversation with those in that French scene—Barthes, Michel de Certeau, Pierre Macherey, Foucault, Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous.⁵⁷ But in what ways? Zumthor's work stands out, among all these thinkers, on account of its temporal fascinations and, above all, its particular brand of futurism. For instance, Zumthor writes:

The relationships set up within the text belong to a succession, but operate reversibly in time. A feature occurs at line ten that only then valorizes a posteriori an element found in line one or three. In this way a multiplicity of crosscurrents is created within the text's temporal dimension, as a result of which the present gives way equally to the past and the future. Textual time aspires to be pure form in which past, present, and future occur in patterns similar to the movements of stars, as an all-embracing present that simultaneously remembers, contemplates, and anticipates.⁵⁸

Here there are some of the expected reflections on the relation between time and language, expectation and narrative, that are as old as Augustine and were, in Zumthor's time, developed in narrative analysis, such as Macherey's idea that the ideological work of the novel is disclosed, in the first instance, retrospectively.⁵⁹ Yet Zumthor references the linear, formalist, and chronological models of linguistic temporality in order to expand them and speak of the “multiplicity of crosscurrents,” the multiple temporalities, within medieval texts.⁶⁰ It not just that Zumthor sees multiple

times within medieval texts, even before scholars in his own field, such as Jacques Le Goff, began to exposit on the topic of time in the Middle Ages and point out that various (and often conflicting) cultures of time comprise medieval experience.⁶¹ Rather, Zumthor situates the temporality of texts within phenomenological time, within “an all-embracing present that simultaneously remembers, contemplates, and anticipates.”⁶² Mental states (remembering, contemplating, and anticipating) are temporal modes (past, present, future) within the present; therefore any reading of medieval texts (above all) is an experience of being in time: “The time in which the reception of the text takes place is an extension of a past in which all truth has its roots, yet it produces an accumulation of knowledge, generating science and a sense of right that belong as a whole to the future. At one and the same time the mind valorizes both memory and prediction, resulting in the collapse of the sense of time, the integration of the past into the present.”⁶³

In these reflections, Zumthor signals which contemporary temporal themes he wishes to engage, particularly those espoused by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Blanchot, and Emmanuel Levinas. When, for instance, Zumthor writes in his characteristically phenomenological manner that “medievalists are constantly brought face-to-face with a long past lying hidden behind the surviving texts,”⁶⁴ and when one remembers that the French scene in the late 1960s and early 1970s was rife with philosophical and phenomenological discussions about “face-to-face” encounters with Otherness and alterity,⁶⁵ it appears that he is in dialogue with, say, Levinas. In *Time and the Other*, for example, Levinas posits that futural thinking arises from a face-to-face encounter with the Other: “Relationship with the future, the presence of the future in the present, seems all the same accomplished in the face-to-face with the Other. The situation of the face-to-face would be the very accomplishment of time; the encroachment of the present on the future is not the feat of the subject alone, but the intersubjective relationship. The condition of time lies in the relationship between humans, or in history.”⁶⁶ The “intersubjective relationship” of which Levinas speaks is staged in Zumthor, but with some variations on the themes of Otherness and futurity. Zumthor, for instance, would understand the “condition of time” to lie in something like the second of Levinas’s suppositions—“in history,” in a relationship between self and texts, or self and a postulated past (more on this below).

Zumthor writes: “What I needed was to be able to recognize myself in the Other—the texts—without making myself a mere learned catalog and without renouncing my taste for literature and my need to enjoy the text for its own sake; I needed to see my equal in the Other, to enter into dialogue with it, and, at moments of intense emotion, to experience the by no means innocent pleasure of a love capable of providing the motive for critical study.”⁶⁷ This is a packed and personal passage by Zumthor, and explicating it would flatten it. Suffice it to say that the modes of self-recognition, desire, and Otherness exhibited here distinguish this passage as indelibly post-Hegelian and quintessentially intersubjective. It would be reductive, we believe, simply to relegate his reflections to a nonphenomenological form of Otherness of a piece with North American versions, in which the questions of “hard-edged alterity” instantly posit a distance between past and present in the effort to render the Middle Ages absolutely unique, an identity in its own difference.⁶⁸ To do so would be to confuse critical histories and evacuate desire from the scholarly enterprise and from the past.⁶⁹

Yet to the extent that Zumthor proffers a phenomenology of medieval texts, he does so with some telling differences from contemporary models, and, we believe, with certain advantages. To begin with, his encounter with Otherness is a “relationship” with *the past*, and in this emphasis he differs from Levinas, among others, who speaks of the “exceptional place” that is the “relationship with alterity, with mystery—that is to say, with the future, with what . . . is never there, with what cannot be there.”⁷⁰ Levinas takes up a model of futural thinking that is close to that of Sartre,⁷¹ Beauvoir,⁷² Louis Althusser,⁷³ Georges Bataille,⁷⁴ and Blanchot.⁷⁵ His is a “pure future,” a “future purified of all content,” and as such open to possibility.⁷⁶ Zumthor, however, finds a *place* for the future—“the texts,” medieval texts—and grounds possibility itself in the Middle Ages:

The twelfth century is akin to a turntable [*une plaque tournante*, a train hub]. It is both a point of departure and a goal, an exemplary sector, in which traits and tensions proper to medieval civilization take on the intensity of a revelation. . . . The fate and future of literature in French was largely settled in the twelfth century. I feel it is most helpful to consider what went before, as well as what came after, which already seems much closer to modern poetry, in the light of forms created in that century.⁷⁷

The twelfth century, as a point of departure and return, transmits the future and brings it back again. It is no accident that Zumthor selects this circular, turning-and-returning image, for it resonates tellingly in the context of Blanchot's well-known adoption of the Nietzschean "eternal return,"⁷⁸ which for Blanchot can never fully be a "return" or closed circle, since the future always arrives in the present in dissymmetrical ways, bringing something back that is alien (and hence, purely futural and initially indifferent) to the present from which it departed.⁷⁹ In other words, Blanchot imputes alterity to the future, just like Levinas. (The prevailing image for the Blanchot would be a spiral or lopsided wheel moving across a terrain). Yet Zumthor has a different agenda for this theme of "returns" and its place in the past and present. He believes that a symmetrical return is possible—that a future can be generated from the past. On how this temporality works, on how a future is projected from the past, from medieval texts, Zumthor writes:

The inventors of the first clocks in the second half of the fourteenth century were less concerned with counting the hours of the day than with reproducing the *eternal circular* motion of the stars [le mouvement éternel et circulaire des astres]. History was only a more profound form of memory that added substance to the present and projected it into the future as a more intense form of being [un accroissement d'être]. It was conceived both as the milieu in which the social group existed and as one of the ways in which *the group perceived and knew itself*. Although closed and finite, it was felt as progress toward a goal and *the hope of future perfection* [espoir d'une perfection].⁸⁰

Self-recognition, then, transpires not only between the present and the past, between medievalist and medieval remainders, but also between the Middle Ages and the future that lies ahead of it. Being medieval, being in the *modus* now, adds historical substance—memory—to the present, a substance that is "projected . . . into the future." To be medieval is to posit a future in the very act of self-recognition, to offer a memory or memorial to a future that will be recognized at a time and place not yet known. In modern theoretical terms, to grasp this temporal project is not to modernize the Middle Ages or to thematize medieval being,⁸¹ nor is it to project nostalgia onto the past. Rather, it is to assign the productive category of impossibility to medieval language itself and loosen the restrictive bonds that analogy places on language, being, and time that would discipline and

contain the Middle Ages both to its own time (or “age”) and presumed mode of temporality. Medieval memory and modern recognition are, for Zumthor, consanguine temporal modes that defy the strictures and thematizations of their own epochs.

Yet Zumthor is equally concerned with recovering the philosophical category of *presence* and asserting the phenomenal significances of the medieval remainders that surround us, be they genres, manuscripts, or buildings. Indeed, for him, the future inheres strictly in the material presence of the past in our own time—manuscripts, ruins, languages, texts⁸²—“works” whose own palpable “intensities” and “tensions” are met by our mutually “intense emotion, . . . the by no means innocent pleasure of a love capable of providing the motive for critical study.” The theme may now seem familiar. For instance, Blanchot once wrote that “what was written in the past will be read in the future, without any relation of presence being able to establish itself *between* writing and reading.”⁸³ Yet it seems clear that *presence*, for Zumthor, matters as a dialectical relation of desire, recognition, and memory, an intersubjective relation between past and present. Lest this idea again seem like mere romanticism beyond the ambit of “theory,” we can bear in mind that this version of presence contains something of an ethical demand that itself was clarified by Beauvoir. In her *Ethics of Ambiguity*, she offers a formulation of futural thinking that seems coincident with Zumthor’s effort to enter into intersubjective relationships with the past and is worth quoting in full, as the passage is itself beautiful and shows in notional form the difference even the slightest bit of medievalism makes in a quasi-existentialist, post-Hegelian scene:

All that a stubborn optimism can claim is that the past does not concern us in this particular and fixed form and that we have sacrificed nothing in sacrificing it; thus, many revolutionaries consider it healthy to refuse any attachment to the past and to profess to scorn monuments and traditions. A left-wing journalist who was fuming impatiently in a street of Pompeii said, “What are we doing here? We’re wasting our time.” This attitude is self-confirming; let us turn away from the past, and there no longer remains any trace of it in the present, or for the future; the people of the Middle Ages had so well forgotten antiquity that there was no longer anyone who even had a desire to know something about it. One can live without Greek, without Latin, without cathedrals, and without history. Yes, but there are many other things that one can live without; the tendency of man is not

to reduce himself but to increase his power. To abandon the past to the night of facticity is a way of depopulating the world. I would distrust a humanism which was too indifferent to the efforts of the men of former times; *if the disclosure of being achieved by our ancestors does not at all move us, why be so interested in that which is taking place today; why wish so ardently for future realizations?* To assert the reign of the human is to acknowledge man in the past as well in the future.⁸⁴

What Beauvoir says here, Zumthor says throughout his *Toward a Medieval Poetics*. For her part, Beauvoir is rejecting Futurism in its modernist, destructive and, by her time, tired rejection of the past. Could the past be done away with? Can one live “without cathedrals” and “without history”? These questions are related to humanism and also to phenomenology, and indeed to the intersection of both in the matter of ethics and the substance of memory. These are issues fundamental to the “disclosure of being achieved by our ancestors,” which, if forgotten or misrecognized by us, becomes primarily a foreclosing of our own future. There can never be an “empty future” or self-forgetting, in other words, if the medieval is taken into account. The Middle Ages are or can be, in a very real way, the grounds of possibility and intelligibility for a human and humane future. To think otherwise would be, *pace* that journalist in Pompeii, a waste of time.

THE NEW FUTURISM

Zumthor did not downplay the theoretical innovation of his own work.⁸⁵ In fact, we believe that, in literary theoretical terms, Zumthor’s *Toward a Medieval Poetics* stands alongside important titles such as Macherey’s *Theory of Literary Production* (1966), Barthes’s *S/Z* (1970), and Kristeva’s *Revolution in Poetic Language* (1974).⁸⁶ We do not want to overstate Zumthor’s influence on Romance and English studies.⁸⁷ His immediate audience seemed to be in some ways thrilled, in other ways shocked, by this book, translating (often wrongly) its emphasis on futurity into a form of modernization.⁸⁸ While one may question whether Zumthor’s ideas, as expounded in his theoretical section (part 1), were evenly deployed in his practical section (part 2), we submit that he offers one of the most historically grounded and generically rich futural projects among those *au courant* in the French theory of the 1960s and 1970s.

Our brief critical history may well offer points for discussion in an

already ongoing conversation about time and the future in the field of medieval studies.⁸⁹ Zumthor was among the first to posit a futural Middle Ages (or a futural past, in more general terms) in the context of temporal discussions ranging from Sartre to Blanchot and Levinas, all of whom worked within (and against) precedent temporal projects of Henri Bergson and Heidegger, among others.⁹⁰ We want this critical history to remain in sight for subsequent work in this area and discourage any tendency to elide these theoretical precedents, or worse, to suggest that thinking within multiple temporal frames is a particularly new project, or only a queer one.⁹¹

Much recent work in critical temporal studies has transpired in the wake of Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe*—a book that declares its productively Heideggerean investments rather boldly and that draws from Heidegger's own refusal to "thematize" time or periodize the past (or for that matter, Being).⁹² As Heidegger writes, "We must hold ourselves aloof from all those significations of 'future,' 'past,' and 'Present' which thrust themselves upon us from the ordinary conception of time."⁹³ Yet scholars in the field have yet to indicate whether a Heideggerean project conforms to more recent postmodern inquiry, or whether ideas within the Hegelian and Marxist traditions are really so simple in their temporal schemes (they are not and never were).⁹⁴ No critico-temporal project, nor any form of postmodern medievalism, would be worthwhile if it disavowed or occluded the texts and traditions that go into the making of modernity—or, for that matter, of modernism—in order to affirm the novelty of this or that new methodology. Indeed, the field of medieval studies has already witnessed several forms of futural medievalism that are problematic in this respect. The most prominent version is perhaps the "New Medievalism," which repeats the error of a Blumenbergian futurism that extols the very paradigm of the modern, the tendency to "go beyond" and posit breaks from the past and present.

The "New Medievalism," as delineated by Stephen G. Nichols, chiefly endeavors to undo "the putative modernity" of the Middle Ages by postulating a future for medieval studies.⁹⁵ Nichols writes that "modernism sought to make the Middle Ages in its own image, as recent studies have argued. New medievalism has on the whole tried to avoid reading the Middle Ages onto the modern world except as a gesture of postmodernist inquiry."⁹⁶ Nichols goes on to cite work by Umberto Eco, Lee Patterson,

Brian Stock, and Brigitte Cazelle as examples of “New Medievalism,” which affirms “the desire to draw the line more sharply between Modernity and its successor,” postmodernism. What follows is a statement full of implications for periodization: “In a real sense, Modernity has become the ‘middle ages’ of that successor program and we are free to pursue the historical identities of our own period, however we choose to identify the era from the fifth to the fifteenth century. We may, at last, leave the agenda of Modernity behind.”⁹⁷ This program makes a great amount of sense in its refusal to reduplicate destructive nationalisms and colonial ambitions, but it in fact sustains the very modern temporal structures that have always, in the most superficial of terms, made modernity notorious in the tendencies toward rupture, and the aspirations for “the new”—that “desire to draw the line more sharply.” What’s odd is that “New Medievalism,” in its emphasis on the *coupure épistémologique* of the “new,” deems prior models to be “medieval.” The “New Medievalism” is therefore an example of what Peter Osborne describes in *The Politics of Time*: “Once the ‘modern’ becomes ‘tradition,’ the ‘postmodern’ can play the modern, and the temporal structure of the orthodox sociological concept of modernity can be redeployed across the new field.”⁹⁸ Indeed, any “successor program” in medieval studies, or any other field, that seeks to look ahead and be free “to pursue the historical identities of our own period” will find this project difficult in temporal terms.

It seems paradoxical to declare that the Middle Ages will be periodized on their own terms (so to speak) but then turn around and accept the very periodizing terms of modernity that have troubled medievalists for so long, and that have put the field in its auto-legitimizing position in the first place. Arguably, however, the main difficulty in the “New Medievalism”—and the reason it must hastily designate a futural medievalism that will break with scholarly practices deemed to be “past”—lies (perhaps by now not surprisingly) in its seemingly wholesale acceptance of Blumenberg. Nichols writes:

New medievalism tries to contextualize the concept of modernity as a process of cultural change, and thus to profit from the decline of modernism’s hegemony both as the dominant period and the arbiter of methodological orthodoxy. In anxiously asserting its own legitimacy in its early phases, Modernity defined itself away from the Middle Ages. As Hans Blumenberg has argued, “[The Middle

Ages] were lowered to the rank of a provisional phase of human self-realization, one that was bound to be left behind, and were finally disqualified as a mere interruption between antiquity and modern times, as a 'dark age.' Now at the other end of the process, Modernity has had to come to grips with its own historical identity. Its pastness is being surveyed, limits assigned.⁹⁹

It's easy to accept that "Modernity defined itself away from the Middle Ages," but in settling on that idea, one risks following Blumenberg too far (as Nichols does) in rationalizing the legitimacy of modernity as an age in which the medieval is absolutely purged. As we suggested in the previous sections, that process of modern self-definition in relation to medieval modes has yet to be fully described, and Blumenberg himself endeavors to *explain away* (not explain) the inherence of "the medieval" within modernity. Our project is, in essence, to challenge Blumenberg's ideas and re-write Nichols's formulation above as something like, "Modernity and post-modernity have defined themselves *toward* the Middle Ages and they will never let it go."

LEGITIMATIONS

If recent thinking about the so-called project of modernity can claim, as does the title of an important book by Bruno Latour, that "We Have Never Been Modern," the essays here collectively assert that "We Have Always Been Medieval."¹⁰⁰ We have collected a range of essays by scholars working in modernism or medieval studies, as well as those specializing in eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century comparative literatures. While, as we have already noted, there is work within the field of medieval studies that trenchantly challenges the suppositions of modernity and even modernism, we strive to reach an audience beyond the field of medieval studies—an audience that, regardless of its scholarly emphases, may easily recognize that the periodic distinctions between "the medieval" and "the modern" are far more interesting, generative, contested, and genuinely dialectical than those between periods where the lines are ubiquitously accepted as blurry (such as—to take an example from English literary studies—late Romantic and early Victorian). By exploring how "the medieval" and "the premodern" appear as necessary anachronisms in modernist and postmodern frameworks, the authors here seek to offer a new history of

critical theory and, in so doing, attempt to answer the following questions: What does it mean that the Middle Ages offer the conceptual equipment to analyze—or even produce—modernity? How, and why, are the temporalities of postmodern critical writing structured against medieval temporality? Why is the premodern deployed in the interests of globalization and capital? Why is it simultaneously used to demystify those very interests?

We have structured this collection to move from a survey of modern historiographical theory to the identification of a nominalist turn in historiography and aesthetics, whereby “the medieval” stands not only as the site of negation but also as the very figure for the negative in modernity. In between those essays are papers on Hegel, Marx, medieval and modern empire, and Heidegger’s time and the *tempus* of medieval linguistic theory, and each of these falls within one of two thematic clusters, to which Michael Hardt and Jed Rasula respond.

The first cluster, “Theological Modernities,” traces the determining presence of medieval, theological modes within the work of thinkers who define their own modernity as a historical present that has fully transitioned out of a previous phase, be it feudalism or imperialism. In the cluster’s opening essay, Kathleen Davis examines periodization in the theory of sovereignty and “political theology” developed in the writings of Karl Löwith, Carl Schmitt, and Blumenberg, and its extension to a theory of history in the work of Reinhart Koselleck. She demonstrates how the narrative of the transition from medieval to modern is made to absorb the slippage between law and religion and to legitimize a particular brand of “secular” politics. Focusing primarily on the “secularization thesis,” Davis’s essay delineates the structural and historical relation of periodization to the “sovereign exception,” which makes but suspends law and thereby mimics the historiographic processes of periodization itself in the naming of a historical moment from the outside. The second essay in this cluster, by Andrew Cole, assesses Marx’s own fascination with the transubstantiation of raw materials into commodities and shows that Marx draws from unappreciated Hegelian sources in formulating his theory of commodity fetishism. Hegel, both in his early theological writings and in his later lectures on the philosophy of history, posits fetishism as a cultural, religious, and institutional mandate to produce, praise, value, and consume that one Thing that obsesses medieval culture especially—the Eucharist. Cole argues that Marx translates this Hegelian Eucharist into the commodity

and makes possible his famous idea that “[the commodity-form] is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things.” The third essay in “Theological Modernities” is by Bruce Holsinger, who examines the relationship between Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* and the events of September 11, 2001. Holsinger suggests that while Hardt and Negri themselves sought to frame the book’s project as a utopian revival of a premodern barbarism filtered through the lens of a utopian neo-Augustinianism, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, conservative critics perceived the book as a virtual script for al Qaeda. Holsinger considers *Empire* as a contemporary contribution to the genre of apocalypse and suggests that the book’s apocalyptic medievalism resonates tellingly within the milieu of the “9/11 premodern”—especially the numerous medievalisms that served as a primary rhetorical weapon in the Bush administration’s war on terror.

The second cluster, “Scholastic Modernities,” pursues some of the afterlives of medieval philosophy within modern critical theory: psychoanalysis, Heidegger’s engagement with Christian Aristotelianism, and Theodor Adorno’s deployment of medieval nominalism, broadly construed as a theory of the particular. In the first essay of this cluster, Erin Labbie and Michael Uebel examine the psychohistory of modern and medieval paranoid by grounding them in an approach to the scholastic and aesthetic dimensions of Daniel Paul Schreber’s famous autobiography, *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (1903). Schreber’s paranoid system, while reflecting the scientific methods that attempted to contain it, dramatizes the conflict and coexistence of the medieval and the modern. By contributing to broader discussions (such as those put forth by Latour, Louis Dupré, Alexandre Leupin, François Lyotard, and others) of the premodern, the modern, and the postmodern as epistemes that present the subject as a being in time, Labbie and Uebel open up a set of possibilities for paranoid subjectivity within both the modern science of psychoanalysis and everyday life. In the following essay, Ethan Knapp situates the development of Heidegger’s early phenomenology within the context of early twentieth-century medieval studies. Heidegger’s early study of Thomas of Erfurt, Knapp argues, demonstrates the extent to which this philosopher’s first encounters with scholasticism were shaped by the specific Catholic antimodernism that grew in the wake of the *Pascendi* encyclical of 1907. Despite the irresolution of this early study, Heidegger here developed a crucial diagnosis of medieval scho-

lasticism as a philosophical moment too much in thrall to the object(s) of its analysis. In escape from the deadening overdetermination of the historical object within both medieval scholasticism and the historical methodologies that grew up around the study of specifically medieval materials, Heidegger developed a hermeneutics of facticity through a critical rereading of Augustine and Martin Luther. Knapp concludes by arguing for the relevance of Heidegger's solutions to the world of contemporary medieval studies. In the third essay of this cluster, C. D. Blanton tracks the history of one of the central historical and metaphysical concepts in Adorno's account of the modern work of art: nominalism. In Adorno's elliptical explanation, nominalism marks the ontological separation of the particular from the universal, a gap that inheres in the possibility of philosophy. But it also names a discrete episode in the history of thought, mapping the turn from a system of medieval correspondences to a modern structure of noncorrespondence. Accordingly, the problem of nominalism underlies and informs the entire history of development or transition, concretizing the constitutive incompleteness of modernity in two crucial ways: first by formalizing the metaphysical failure of the universal or totality, but also by encrypting modernity itself as distinctly medieval. Drawing on accounts of both the historical transition into capital and the recurrence of nominalism as a philosophical problematic, Blanton suggests that Adorno ultimately locates the paradoxical metaphysical contour of modernism in this buried medieval identity, grounding his account of the modern work of art in the capacity of the aesthetic to incorporate a persistent state of historical unevenness as form.

The collection aptly concludes with an afterword by Fredric Jameson, who has engaged with the Middle Ages over the entirety of his career—from his book *The Political Unconscious*, in which he outlines a set of critical procedures that borrows from the medieval exegetical protocols discussed by Henri de Lubac in *Exégèse médiévale: Les quatre sens de l'écriture*, to *Postmodernism*, which (following Adorno) names “nominalism” as the impulse to particularize and the concomitant refusal to conceptualize late capitalism as a social whole, a totality. Indeed, Jameson's engagement with “the medieval” appears in his more recent book, *Archaeologies of the Future*, in which he finds that the figural capacities of medieval theology are analogous to the very effort of utopian thinking from Thomas More to Ursula Le Guin. In this recent work, he writes:

Theology thus constitutes a repository of figuration and figural speculation whose dynamics were not recovered until modern times, with psychoanalysis and *Ideologiekritik*. But it is important not to confuse this remarkable language experiment with religion as such, and better to focus on its fundamental mechanisms, rather than on any alleged subjective content. Those mechanisms are summed up by the word *allegory*, which, as enigmatic as it may be, must always offer the central challenge of any attempt to go to the heart of the medieval.¹⁰¹

Jameson revisits precisely this issue in the afterword. Suffice it to say here, in closing, that we propose that allegory is not the *only* figure that poses the challenge of “the medieval” to contemporary critical practice. The essays in this book attempt to open a window onto how a range of thinkers have taken up this challenge. Indeed, as we hope to show, the very concept of “the medieval” offers to modern and postmodern philosophy and criticism the necessary antithetical term in the dialectic of modernity’s own making. All that is designated by “the medieval” is never overcome and rarely superseded but rather continuously posited as that necessary anachronism that paradoxically generates “the modern” as we know it. To forget “the medieval” is to conjure a modernity that can never be known.

NOTES

- 1 Bruce Holsinger, a contributor to the present volume, has made an important beginning in this regard in his assessment of Bataille and his students in *Tel Quel*. See Holsinger, *Premodern Condition*, 97–113 (on Bourdieu) and 152–94 (on Barthes).
- 2 This is Jürgen Habermas’s phrase; see “Modernity—An Incomplete Project.”
- 3 Blumenberg is replying, in part, to Karl Löwith’s *Meaning in History*.
- 4 Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, 5.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 6 A 1988 special issue of *Romanic Review*, edited by Stephen G. Nichols, bears a title identical to ours, “The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages,” but is surprisingly not intended to echo Blumenberg’s study. Nichols’s introduction (1–3) never mentions Blumenberg’s work, and only one essay (in the collection of thirteen papers) cites this thinker: Giuseppe Mazzotta’s “Antiquity and the New Arts in Petrarch” (23). Our title signals both our interest in extending the work of Nichols (as indicated below in our discussion of “New Medievalism”) and our sense that Blumenberg’s work continues to be a deep provocation for medievalists, even if it is not widely read.

- 7 Joel Kovel's *History and Spirit* offers an interesting riposte to the secularization thesis by critiquing the "de-spiritualization" of the West. Among the spiritual figures Kovel discusses is Meister Eckhart, but he also notably includes non-Christian persons.
- 8 Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, 72.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 18.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 4; see 74. See also his claim that "secularization has been accepted as a category for the interpretation of historical circumstances and connections even by people who could not be prepared to conform to theological premises" (5); "The illegitimacy of the result of secularization resides in the fact that the result is not allowed to secularize the process itself from which it resulted" (18). See also 49–49, 74.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 47; see also 48.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 126, 137.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 116.
- 14 See Patterson, *Chaucer and the Subject of History*; Aers, "A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists."
- 15 See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 569, 117–19.
- 16 "Secularization," writes Blumenberg, "does not transform; it only conceals that which the world cannot tolerate and to be unable to tolerate which is its essential character" (*Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, 40).
- 17 On the "pre-ontological," see Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 12. On other pseudo-morphs, see Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, 4, 17, 19, 27.
- 18 On this problem of naming, see Brient, *Immanence of the Infinite*, 50–60. This excellent book, written by a medievalist, is one of the few on Blumenberg in English.
- 19 Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, 492. The hero of Blumenberg's account is Nicholas of Cusa, whose deployment of the linguistic skepticism of negative theology "makes logical antitheses into marks of world-bound language, which lead outward beyond world-boundness precisely by negating their perceptual contents. In this process, language [takes] itself as provisional and tending continually toward the point of its self-suspension" (490).
- 20 Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, 491.
- 21 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 18.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 19.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 24.
- 24 Bursill-Hall, *Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages*, 3.
- 25 "The word 'cognition' stands for the idea of the thing known, and that idea is the quality existing subjectively in the mind or in some part of the brain" (Crathorn, "On the Possibility of Infallible Knowledge," 261).
- 26 For more on this, see McGrath, *Early Heidegger*, 116–19.
- 27 This observation taken from *ibid.*, 117.
- 28 On signs and "indicating," see Heidegger's discussion of the idea that "a sign is

- not a Thing which stands in relation to another Thing in the relationship of indicating" (*Being and Time*, 110; see also 110–14).
- 29 Cf. Merleau-Ponty's statement about the transcendental reduction: "The positing of the object, therefore makes us go beyond the limits of our actual experience which is brought up against and halted by an alien being, with the result that finally experience believes that it extracts all its own teaching from the object. It is this ek-stase of experience which causes all perception to be perception of something" (*Phenomenology of Perception*, 70).
- 30 Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Mystical Theology*, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, 2.
- 31 See Heidegger's well-known critique of "ontological difference" in "The four theses about being and the basic problems of phenomenology," in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 15–19, as well as *Being and Time*, 414, on scientific thematization ("Thematizing objectifies"). On the history of being as metaphysics (and themes about being), see Heidegger's *End of Philosophy*.
- 32 Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," 134.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 123.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 *Ibid.*, 143.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 130.
- 38 See Heidegger, *End of Philosophy*, 89: "The completion of metaphysics begins with Hegel's metaphysics of absolute knowledge as the Spirit of will."
- 39 Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, 48–49.
- 40 See Kusch, *Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium*.
- 41 Heidegger, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, 269.
- 42 Jameson, "Magical Narratives"; expanded as the second chapter in *Political Unconscious*. We focus on the former version because it has a few more productively knotty provocations that are not so much smoothed out as moved aside in the book version.
- 43 Jameson, "Magical Narratives," 142 (emphasis added).
- 44 Auerbach, *Mimesis*, 134.
- 45 Jameson, "Magical Narratives," 139.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 143.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 158.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 142 and 143; see also 144–45. In other words, romance is, in medieval society, a medieval form, but in modern society it is a modern form in its redeployments in new fictions.
- 49 Jameson, "Magical Narratives," 145, and *Archaeologies of the Future*, 58–64.
- 50 Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, 440 and 442. We note here that for Hegel, the opposite is the case: in various works, he traces the ways in which humanity gathers in and humanizes the beyond, rendering it proximate, recognizable, and reasonable (or subjective).

- 51 Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, especially part 3.
- 52 On the future of the discipline in view of a surge in new institutes in medieval studies, see Shook, "University Centers and Institutes of Medieval Studies," especially 486, and this striking (albeit lofty) conclusion: "The future of medieval studies lies in bringing what is valid and helpful in the scholarly tradition which I have dwelt upon in selected vignettes into the consciousness of man living out his accumulated experience in the eternal present" (492). See also Ladner, "The Future of Medieval Studies," for whom the future of the discipline is in prosopography, demography, and the history of mentalités. See also Gentry and Kleinhen, *Medieval Studies in North America*.
- 53 Indeed, medievalists are now used to articles, books, panel presentations at the Modern Language Association convention, and whole conferences with familiar themes about the future. See Bloch, "The Once and Future Middle Ages," and Paden, *The Future of the Middle Ages*. The latter draws from a colloquium, "The Future of the Middle Ages: Medieval French Literature in the 1990s," held March 9–10, 1990 at the Newberry Library. This volume is also in part a response to a special issue of *Speculum*, "The New Philology," edited by Stephen G. Nichols. There are also several relevant essays by Mark D. Jordan, E. Ann Matter, and Michael Camille in Van Engen, *The Past and Future of Medieval Studies*, which is the proceedings of a 1992 conference at Notre Dame. Van Engen's "Agenda Paper: The Future of Medieval Studies" (1–5; esp. 4–5) succinctly describes the topics for reflection about the discipline. There was also a panel, "A Future for Medieval Studies," at the Modern Language Association Convention in New Orleans in December 2001, on which many of the authors in this collection participated.
- 54 Conferences and colloquia on the medieval sense of the future have included the 1997 conference "Medieval Futures" at the University of Bristol, the 2003 conference "Perceptions of the Past / Visions of the Future" in Toronto, and the colloquia "Anglo-Saxon Futures" at King's College London, which took place in 2006 and 2008. Burrow and Wei, *Medieval Futures*, stems from the 1997 conference of the same name. See also Murphy, "The Discourse of the Future."
- 55 Haidu, "Making It (New) in the Middle Ages," 5; Haidu identifies Zumthor's chapter on romance as an example; see 9.
- 56 Culler, *Roland Barthes*, 88–90.
- 57 See "Author's Introduction to the Translation," in Zumthor, *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, xi. See also Vance, "The Modernity of the Middle Ages in the Future," 141–42; 143.
- 58 Zumthor, *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, 11.
- 59 See Macherey, *A Theory of Literary Production*, 189–92. As Macherey indicates in an interview, the French title *Pour une théorie de la production littéraire* should have been translated as *Towards A Theory of Literary Production*; see Kavanagh and Lewis, "Interview," 49.
- 60 On linguistic temporality, see Jakobson, *Verbal Art, Verbal Sign, Verbal Time*.

- 61 See Le Goff, *Pour un autre Moyen Age*.
- 62 See also Zumthor's notion of "periods," which are coeval, in *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, 38.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 63.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 35.
- 65 We have in mind works from Sartre (*Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, 84–96; first published as *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* in 1939) to Deleuze and Guattari's "faciality" (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 167–91; on Chrétien de Troyes in this context, see 174, 184), but also the post-Sartrean work of Levinas, as discussed in the present essay and in Levinas, *Totality and Infinity* (first published as *Totalité et infini: Essai sur l'extériorité* in 1961): "The way in which the other presents himself, *exceeding the idea of the other in me*, we here name face" (50; for a more general discussion, see 50–51). On the face-to-face encounter, Levinas writes: "Even when I shall have linked the Other to myself with the conjunction 'and' the Other continues to face me, to reveal himself in his face. Religion subtends this formal totality" (80–81). See also Blanchot, *The Step Not Beyond* (first published as *Le pas au-delà* in 1973), 35.
- 66 Levinas, *Time and the Other*, 79.
- 67 Zumthor, *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, xii; see also 375.
- 68 Nichols, "The New Medievalism," 12. Of this form of alterity, Kathleen Biddick writes, "The repetitious invocation . . . of images of the 'hard-edged alterity' of the Middle Ages is suspect. These images mark a desire rigidly to separate past and present, history and theory, medieval studies and medievalism. They foreclose exploration of how critical theories might historicize medieval studies" (*Shock of Medievalism*, 4). One may find an earlier reflection on this issue in Gadamer's reflections on Hegel's dissolving of the "hard edge of positivity": "it is of central importance that the hermeneutical problem come to grips with Hegel. For Hegel's whole philosophy of mind claims to achieve the total fusion of history with the present. It is concerned not with a reflective formalism but with the same thing as we are. Hegel has thought through the historical dimension in which the problem of hermeneutics is rooted" (*Truth and Method*, 345–46).
- 69 In this vein, and epigraphically, L. O. Aranye Fradenburg writes: "Past times do not know themselves, or their pasts or their futures, in fullness, free of desire" (*Sacrifice Your Love*, 64).
- 70 Levinas, *Time and the Other*, 88.
- 71 By way of contrast, Sartre's historical sense is exhibited in his remark that the "past is not nothing; neither is it the present; but at its very source it is bound to a certain present and to a certain future, to both of which it belongs" (*Being and Nothingness*, 163). For Sartre, the present and the future are the fundamental dialectic of Being-for-itself. While one may fairly say that Sartre's notion of the past is an empty one (see *ibid.*, 164), can the same be said of his idea of the future? According to Thomas Martin, Sartre's "futural dialectic," as we would call it, might not be empty after all but is bounded by identity and facticity—by, in

- short, race, class, gender, and so forth; see Martin, *Oppression and the Human Condition*, 17–19. We would agree, citing Sartre’s *Existentialism is a Humanism*: “man is, before all else, something that projects itself into a future and is conscious of doing so. Man is indeed a project which has a subjective existence, rather unlike that of a patch of moss, or a fungus, or a cauliflower” (23). See also Simone de Beauvoir: “When I envisage my future, I consider that movement which, prolonging my existence of today, will fulfill my present projects and will surpass them toward new ends: the future is the definite direction of a particular transcendence and it is so closely bound up with the present that it composes with it a single temporal form; this is the future which Heidegger considered as a reality which is given at each moment” (*Ethics of Ambiguity*, 115–16). On the relation between the “practico-inert” in Sartre’s *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and the future, see Flynn, *Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason*, 196–97.
- 72 See Beauvoir on the “Future-Thing”; she argues that positing of a future is an act in the present (117). On Beauvoir, festivals, and the future in postwar France, see Hollywood, *Sensible Ecstasy*, 25–27.
- 73 In speaking about Carlo Bertolazzi’s *El Nost Milan*, Althusser writes of “empty time,” a time that “tends towards silence and immobility,” a “future that is hardly groped for” (*For Marx*, 135).
- 74 Bataille finds that “speculation on the future subordinates the present to the past. I relate my activity to the being to come, but the limit of this being is wholly determined in the past. The being I am talking about is closed off, intends to be unchangeable—its limits, its interests” (*On Nietzsche*, 144). Foucault, in “On Transgression,” seeks to read a future out of Bataille; see *Language, Counter-memory, Practice*, 33.
- 75 For Blanchot, there is not only an “empty future” but an “empty past”; see *Step Not Beyond*, 12–13, 15, 22, 29–30, 40, 42, 55–56, 90, 107, 110.
- 76 Levinas, *Time and the Other*, 89 and 90.
- 77 Zumthor, *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, 39; *Essai*, 62–63.
- 78 For a succinct statement about various propositions on the “eternal return”—from Kant to Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Deleuze—see Ansell-Pearson, *Viroid Life*, 57–84.
- 79 Blanchot, *Step Not Beyond*, 41–42, and similarly, 16; see also his discussion of writing as effacement, 50.
- 80 Zumthor, *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, 16 (emphasis added); *Essai*, 35.
- 81 Granted, Zumthor’s wilder, albeit intermittent claims—such as “medieval poetry is thus closer to the modern mass media” (*Toward a Medieval Poetics*, 19)—stand out among his more nuanced attempts to discuss the seeming “modernity” of medieval texts; see *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, 28, 39, 43, 53–54, 71.
- 82 See especially Zumthor’s reflections on the “empirical” levels of meaning from the “work’s material (physical) aspect” to its “motifs and themes” (*ibid.*, 111).
- 83 Blanchot, *Step Not Beyond*, 30. On Nietzsche, see also 22, whence this formulation comes.

- 84 Beauvoir, *Ethics of Ambiguity*, 92 (emphasis added).
- 85 For an alternative view, see Holsinger, *Premodern Condition*, 16.
- 86 In *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, Zumthor exhibits a hybrid poststructuralism involving, in the first instance, symptomology—focusing on disrupted linguistic structures and modes of “interference” (8), “tension” (21), and “intensity” (4, 35, 39) in language that point to historico-textual conditions that are nowhere directly represented or “imaged” in any given work. He finds the same to be true of authorial identity, and in fact he proposes his own version of the “death of the author” (à la Barthes) and the “author function” (à la Foucault) in his pronouncements about “author functionaries”: “The author has disappeared; what remains is the subject of the enunciation, a communicating psyche, integrated in the text and indissoluble from the way it functions: a talking id” (43, 44). Additionally, Zumthor takes up formalism in his use of preset terms to describe authorial, literary, and textual properties (“mouvance,” 45–46; “work,” 47–48)—all of which doubtless draws from his early adoption, as he puts it, of “the traditional English critical technique of close reading” (xi), which in turn informs symptomatic readings: “A certain type of critical formalism has to be opened up to the perception of history’s silent presence” (4).
- 87 Vance, however, stated that with the publication of Zumthor’s book in 1972, “a giant step has at least been taken” in the field, “a corner has been irreversibly turned” (“The Modernity of the Middle Ages in the Future,” 145). Bloch and Nichols regard Zumthor’s other work (particularly *Speaking of the Middle Ages*) as equally paradigm-shifting, “the first attempt, certainly in recent years, to propose the memoir as a legitimate exemplum within the domain of the ‘objective’ history of medieval studies” (introduction to Bloch and Nichols, *Medievalism and the Modernist Temper*, 6); see also Bloch, “Once and Future Middle Ages,” 71. For Zumthor’s influence on “studies . . . of English medieval literature,” see the translator’s preface by Philip Bennett in Zumthor, *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, vii.
- 88 Zumthor’s methods appeared to scholars as some strange new technology from the future to describe texts in their own futural terms. For example, Vance, in his review article entitled “The Modernity of the Middle Ages in the Future,” suggests that Zumthor renders medieval texts as hypermodern, more modern than our own moment: “Zumthor, like his forbears in medieval studies, is portraying in the ‘medieval’ poet a modern in disguise. What is surprising is that the medieval poet turns out to be more modern than anyone writing nowadays at Editions du Seuil ever dreamed of being” (“Modernity of the Middle Ages,” 146). Vance interprets Zumthor’s futural tendencies as straightforwardly *modernizing* ones and not (as they should be seen) as philosophical contributions about questions of futurity in the French scene. (Zumthor understands “modernization” to be, simply, “change” or the introduction of novelty to tradition; see *Toward a Medieval Poetics*, 27 and 36.) In arguing against Zumthor’s purported modernization of medieval literature, Vance drives a wedge between past and

present, a certain *hard-edged* (if you will) technological difference between medieval and modern forms of textual reproduction: modern culture has “the technological achievement that is Xerox” and thus satisfies the “compulsion to preserve as perfectly as possible the mark of the text as Original, to freeze it for futurity” (“Modernity of the Middle Ages,” 147). As a result of this reception, Zumthor’s own work appears out of time, such that any final judgement about its importance will have to wait for the future to which it speaks: “Zumthor’s book does not demand, at present, to be judged, for it will assuredly stand or fall with the collective efforts of a whole generation” (Vance, “Modernity of the Middle Ages,” 151). Haidu concludes similarly in saying that Zumthor’s book “is guaranteed not to induce universal agreement—fortunately!—but it is likely to prove, especially for the coming generation, the most insightful and inciting voice speaking about that curious body of texts that is medieval literature” (Haidu, “Making It [New] in the Middle Ages,” 11b).

- 89 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen supplies an overview of what he calls “critical temporal studies”; see the chapter “Time’s Machines” in *Medieval Identity Machines* (1–34, especially 8). For other explorations of temporality in medieval studies or the “temporal folds” between medieval and modern, see Carolyn Dinshaw’s contributions to the roundtable in Dinshaw et al., “Theorizing Queer Temporalities,” 177–78, 185–86, 190; and the “Further Reading” at the end of Dinshaw, “Temporalities,” 122–23.
- 90 For the critique of Bergsonian duration and an analysis of temporal interruption, see Bachelard, *The Dialectic of Duration* (first published as *Dialectique de la durée* in 1950).
- 91 We agree with a point Annamarie Jagose made in the *GLQ* roundtable cited above: “Rather than invoke as our straight guy a version of time that is always linear, teleological, reproductive, future oriented, what difference might it make to acknowledge the intellectual traditions in which time has also been influentially thought and experienced as cyclical, interrupted, multilayered, reversible, stalled—and not always in contexts easily recuperated as queer?” (Dinshaw et al., “Theorizing Queer Temporalities,” 186–87).
- 92 Chakrabarty’s *Provincializing Europe* has an avowed Heideggerian intention (18), with the “second part of the book . . . organized under the sign of Heidegger” (19; see also 21).
- 93 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 374 [326].
- 94 For instance, Dinshaw argues for affective identifications with the past that in turn produce an ever-expanding now. In light of the foregoing, this is not necessarily a new project. She contrasts, for instance, Foucault’s “ontology of the present” with Jameson’s imperative in *The Political Unconscious* to “always historicize!” (Dinshaw, “Temporalities,” 111). In this respect, she follows Chakrabarty’s critique of Jameson—particularly “the assumption of a continuous, homogeneous, infinitely stretched out time” (Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 111). However, Dinshaw simplifies Marxist theory after Chakrabarty as a body of

thought invested in singular temporalities, linear history, and progress. Any student of Marxism knows that the opposite has always been the case—from Marx’s theorization of labor time and his observations about the anachronism of any given historical situation; from the Brechtian multiple, dramatic time (as fully realized by Althusser); to Lukács’s prerevolutionary time; to Benjamin’s retrospective “angel of history”; to modes of production as historical and temporal locators, often out of linear time; to the famous stalled history of the “dialectic at a standstill”; to Jameson’s own *A Singular Modernity: Essays on the Ontology of the Present*, whose fitting subtitle matches Foucault’s phrase and brings the questions of affect and temporality to historical reflection. One might well, then, regard Dinshaw’s reflections on the ever-expanding now as an essential feature of modernity’s own presentism, itself a marker of its own periodizing limits. For a statement that presentism is also periodization, see Kathleen Davis’s opening paragraphs in this volume, 39–40. For a critique of presentism in medieval studies, as well as a grounded feminist polemic on historical method, see Bennett, *History Matters*. Last but not least, for some powerful essays that look at issues of temporality in various thinkers, see Nolan, “Making the Aesthetic Turn,” and Uebel, “Opening Time.”

- 95 See Nichols, “The New Medievalism,” 8. On that entity related to “New Medievalism,” the “new philology,” see Kay, “Analytic Survey 3,” and Warren, “Post-Philology,” 24.
- 96 We are aware that one may now designate the former “new philology” in the German humanistic disciplines as an “old philology” centered around journals such as *Neophilologische Mitteilungen*, *Neophilologus*, and *Studia Neophilologica*; on this point, see Warren, “Post-Philology,” 23–24 and 40n22. But none of the program statements posit a new future for the discipline. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, however, does find analogues between the New Philologists and early twentieth-century Spanish philologists who sought to bring “the otherness of the tradition into contact with the culture of their own present and its future” (“A Philological Invention of Modernism,” 42).
- 97 Nichols, “The New Medievalism,” 9.
- 98 Osborne, *Politics of Time*, 3–4. Osborne suggests that “the failure to recognize the logic of these determinants underlies naive concepts of ‘postmodernity’ as a new historical epoch which succeeds modernity in historical time in the same way that modernity itself might be thought to have succeeded the ‘Middle’ Ages” (9). Not surprisingly, Zumthor himself affirms this idea in his review of this volume: “Attempts to revitalize the Middle Ages have been numerous in many countries in the last twenty years. At present the context of such attempts is the epistemological opposition between modernity and postmodernism” (“Review of *The New Medievalism*,” 112).
- 99 Nichols, “The New Medievalism,” 8.
- 100 Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*.
- 101 Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, 61.