

The Case for Qualia

edited by Edmond Wright

**A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England**

Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction by Edmond Wright 1

I Philosophical Defenses 43

1 The Case for Indirect Realism 45

Harold I. Brown

2 Illusions and Hallucinations as Evidence for Sense Data 59

E. J. Lowe

3 Experience and Representation 73

William S. Robinson

4 Qualia Realism: Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents 89

George Graham and Terence Horgan

5 The World of Qualia 109

Matjaž Potrč

6 Subjective Physicalism 125

Robert J. Howell

II Scientific Defenses 141

7 Color Qualities and the Physical World 143

C. L. Hardin

8 Heat, Temperature, and Phenomenal Concepts 155

Isabelle Peschard and Michel Bitbol

9 A Process-oriented View of Qualia 175

Riccardo Manzotti

10 The Ontological Status of Qualia and Sensations: How They Fit into the Brain	191
John Smythies	
III Attacks	201
11 The Churchlands' War on Qualia	203
Mark Crooks	
12 Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary	223
Howard Robinson	
13 Phenomenal Knowledge without Experience	247
Torin Alter	
14 A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense	269
Barry Maund	
15 How to Believe in Qualia	285
Amy Kind	
16 Transparency and the Unity of Experience	299
John O'Dea	
17 Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience	309
Martine Nida-Rümelin	
18 From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representation- alism	325
Diana Raffman	
19 Why Transparency Is Unethical	341
Edmond Wright	
Contributors	367
Index	373

Introduction

Over ten years ago I edited a volume (Wright 1993) that put forward arguments for what was then called “new representationalism,” which in effect was a collection in support of indirect realism. Indirect realism is the view that regards qualia, sensory experiences, as the evidence for our objectivizing of the real outside us. In that volume a number of the contributors complained of the failure of opponents of qualia to address the answers to the objections that had been made, admittedly to sense-datum theory as it was then characterized. At the present time there remains a strong sense of complacency about the dismissal of that theory, a mood which is suspect, particularly because sense-datum theory was centrally presented as mired in inconsistency over its purported belief in the copying in the brain of external entities, which led to its being shelved as a myth. Michael Tye, for example, feels that he has no need to rehearse any of the old objections to the theory “for a host of familiar reasons” (Tye 2000: 45–46). Austen Clark regards the very use of the term itself now as “infamous” (Clark 2000: 3). A recent review of a book by John Hyman (Hyman 2007; Mulhall 2007) takes it for granted that no one at all these days holds to a belief in qualia.

“Complacency” is, however, not the right word here; it would be if no one had voiced any objections to the myth claim since the supposed demolition of so-called “sense-data” long ago by Ryle, Austin, Pitcher, Armstrong, and the like (Austin 1962; Ryle 1966; Armstrong 1966; Pitcher 1971). When considering opponents of the notion of qualia from the last half of the twentieth century, it is revealing to look at their indexes and their lists of references and see how many publications of the following list of philosophers and psychologists they include: Virgil C. Aldrich, Ned Block, Harold Brown, David Chalmers, Arthur W. Collins, Paul Fitzgerald, John Foster, A. Campbell Garnett, Richard Gregory, C. L. Hardin, Jonathan Harrison, John Heffner, Emmett L. Holman, Frank Jackson, O. R. Jones, James S. Kelly, Charles Landesman, Michael Lockwood, E. J. Lowe, D. L.

C. MacClachlan, J. L. Mackie, Maurice Mandelbaum, J. B. Maund, C. W. K. Mundle, Robert Oakes, Christopher Peacocke, John Pennycuick, Moreland Perkins, H. H. Price (still publishing in 1964), Howard Robinson, William Robinson, Wilfrid Sellars (loyal here to his father Roy Wood Sellars, who was himself still publishing in 1970), Sidney Shoemaker, John R. Smythies, Andrew Ward, and myself (a representative list of publications is given in the references section of this introduction). On the cover of the most recent collection of essays on perception (Gendler and Hawthorne 2006) the explanatory text speaks of the “decades of neglect” of the topic of the philosophy of perception; however, it ignores the question of “Who has neglected whom?”

Our opponents have been very selective. Block, Hardin, Peacocke, and Jackson have received attention: Block for his “population of China” and “inverted Earth” counterexamples, and his consideration of orgasm; Hardin for his work on color; Peacocke for his “scenario” concept, his queries about nonconceptual sensing, double vision, and perspective effects; Jackson for his “knowledge argument” (inevitably weakened by the apostasy of its proponent); and David Chalmers for his zombie argument. Michael Tye and Daniel Dennett have addressed a number of empirical issues (Tye 1995a,b, 2000, 2006; Dennett 1991, 2006), but in all they have relied on two assumptions, the alleged nonphysical nature of qualia, and a division into given entities, these together providing them with immediately accessible refutations. Pro-qualia views that patently did not construe qualia from the point of view of sense-datum theory were ignored; perhaps, to use the phrase in favor, they were too “freakish”—the “qualia freak” often rears her ugly head in qualiaphobe writings, but who the freak is and what characterizes the failures of her freakishness are never specified.

One of the odder symptoms of this blindness is Michael Tye’s decision to call his own theory “representationalism” (introduced in Tye 1994; specifically called “representationalism” in Tye 1995b: 45–68; some philosophers refer to it as “representationism”; see Howard Robinson’s comment on this oddity, this vol.: 227–233). The “new representationalisms” put forward in the 1993 collection all espoused qualia even if they did not include pictorial resemblance and the neural copying of entities in the brain. The term “representationalism” was kept to precisely because it was the general term of choice to name the threads of argument that had developed from sense-datum theory through to that time. Since Peter Hare had warned me (pers. comm.) that “representationalism” (and “representative theory” which was sometimes used instead) was not the best term for my own view (which rejects pictorial reproduction), I had had doubts about

continuing with it; nevertheless, it was the term widely used in the journals and current books, so to have thrown it aside might have confused the readership—the contributors were, after all, *new* representationalists.

But with an ahistoric confidence Tye decided to use the term for a theory that is wholly dismissive of the old representationalism. This might have been acceptable if he had shown himself aware of the irony of what he was doing (I have been unable to discover any awareness of it in his writings), but to make this attribution as if it were an original designation with no sense of its being a misnomer is surely a sign that he not only had not read the qualiophile arguments that continued from the Austin–Ryle days to the 1990s, but also, if he had, he considered them to be not worth mention. The effect of this sequestration of the term, which has spread rapidly in the journals, has forced me—willingly—to abandon the term entirely, as Hare advised, and other qualiophiles have done the same. It also brought me to realize that it was the unthinking commitment to the entity-as-such, the *Ding an Sich*, that was in need of analysis, particularly as, from my point of view, it is a regulative idea and not a reality, that is, an idea in which it is vital to perform a commitment *without believing in it*.

The Non-epistemic

Another such transfer has been the shift of term from “non-epistemic” to “nonconceptual.” We shall leave the question of the term “nonconceptual” aside for a while as its use needs to be explained in contrast to that of “non-epistemic.” To describe sensation as “non-epistemic” is the proposal that sensory experiences do not carry “information” about entities, but are merely evidence, “natural signs” which can be interpreted according to the motivations of the observer, human or animal (Reid 1970 [1764]: 218; Grice 1967: 39). This implies that sensations are not *symbols*, which are part of the human communication process; they are “semantically inert.” The key place given to this feature in any current theory of perception is revealed by the fact that, in the most recent collection on perception, the editors claim that “it is common ground” among all the contributors to reject the “semantic inertness” of sensations (Gendler and Hawthorne 2006: 6).

To explain this “inertness” with an illustration: one might discover by careful testing that the ceiling over my head was warmer than that over the rest of the room, but no one would say, except metaphorically, that there was “information” about me in the ceiling. Evidence, yes, but not information. Michael Tye believes that tree rings, for example, contain information in a nonmetaphorical sense: “Before any human noticed rings

inside trees, the number of rings represented the age of the tree, just as it does now" (Tye 1995b: 100). We do not ask who is selecting what parts of the "rings" to count as rings, nor what is to count as a "year," when we know that years are all different from each other in length of time. If Tye protests that such minimal differences "do not matter," he has given his argument away, for "to matter" is to have relation to human desires and fears, human intentions, and thus human selections from that real. Human observers are required to extract indications from the bare evidence, from the Heraclitean real, and those indications are endless. Just how far are we to trace the causal chain? I have just seen a ringdove take off from a birch tree branch—the branch is still swinging—does that constitute *information* about the dove, or mere *evidence* that I am at liberty to interpret? The degree of swing no doubt also relates to the force of the breeze that is blowing, so it is also evidence about the placing of other trees and the houses in the area, about the present (and past) meteorological air-pressures over East Anglia, as well as to the degree of fatigue in the fibers of the branch, the strength of the dove, what induced it to move, and so on, ad infinitum. Human interest is manifestly relevant in determining for what purposes the evidence shall be interpreted. To pick out one of these effects and say it is "representing" its cause is to believe that our words match the world in "what matters," which is, frankly, an occult belief—very reassuring, no doubt, but misguided to say the least. This applies even to synthetic measures and gauges, even to the speedometer that Fred Dretske is fond of using as illustration (Dretske 1997: 13–14), for the moving needle is also registering the degree of friction on its axle, the density of the air inside the gauge, the setting it received in the factory, and so on, ad infinitum.

It is plain that to avoid this error one must keep sensation and perception on a different level, where we can distinguish blank evidence from its interpretation, for it is dangerous to equate the two. There is a fair analogy here with keeping separate the states of the phosphor cells on a television screen or the minibulbs on a "Movitype" screen from what our current motivations induce us to perceive there (R. W. Sellars 1916: 237; J. B. Maund is the philosopher who has made a special point of making this distinction clear [see Maund 1975]). They are what I have called the "field-determinate" level (sensing/the phosphor cells) and the "object-determinate" level (the perception/the object or person taken to be recognized on the screen [Wright 1990: 71–72]). This allows for the possibility of some neurophysiologist in the future being able to give a precise description of at least a part of the neural matrix or raster, and, significantly, without any

necessary reference to what is being perceived by the subject—just as an electronics expert could give a detailed list of the states of the phosphor cells on the television screen without any reference to “what” was being shown (cartoon, recording, live show, interference, etc.). The bare evidence is thus in principle not in the least “ineffable” as some qualiaphobes have immediately assumed (anyone still chary of the television analogy must see how the metaphor can be shorn of its objectionable aspects; see Wright 2005: 96–102). There is the *evolutionary advantage* in this approach, in that it allows for learning in perception and the adaptable fine-tuning of what is learned (and perhaps for the complete replacement of the former “objectivity”). There is a particular advantage here for human beings, for one person can update another by means of language, often surprisingly, about what one “sees”—or, to phrase it differently, one can render a former “transparency” opaque by replacing it with a new one. On top of that, it may be not a new “one” entity, but a revealing of two entities, or three-and-a-half where “one” was perceived before. Fred Dretske seems to know before anyone has looked that “twenty-seven children” are to be perceived by someone; one can fairly ask “How do you know?” (Dretske 1981: 147). It is the speckled hen problem in another form, for the answer to how many speckles are seen depends on who is looking—a poultry expert or a child?—and thus on what they consider to be a speckle and what not—and even experts can disagree. It is a curious form of reification to be certain that not only does every region of the real lend itself to counting, but that in a doubtful case it has already provided a specific number of them to a favored philosopher-knower. It is as if nobody ever learned anything, as if everything were already known, and no one need tell anyone else what they have learned that was different from what other people said they knew.

It is instructive here to place in contrast these rival statements from the world of psychology. A psychologist of the early part of the last century who was committed to a “stimulus–response” approach, R. S. Woodworth, formulated what he called a “perceptual-reaction” theory, in which the brain reacts to given separate sensory items; the view is not far removed from that of James J. Gibson, who also conceives of “invariants” in the real as already logically discrete before perception has taken place (Gibson 1968: 320). Thus one finds Woodworth in 1947 denying that “there can ever be seeing without looking or hearing without seeing” (Woodworth 1947: 120), which one can take as an anticipation of Gilbert Harman and Michael Tye’s “transparency” proposal (Harman 1990; Tye 2000). On the other hand, someone who investigates autism, B. Hermelin, asserts the

contrary of her child-subjects: “Although they can hear and see, they cannot listen and look” (Hermelin 1976: 137). In case you might think that, since this was said of autistic subjects, it cannot be applied to normal ones, consider this not uncommon occurrence: one can be gazing fixedly out of a railway compartment window, but be lost, as we say, “in a brown study,” such that one is attending to some inward thought with such intensity that, though one’s eyes are open, as with Lady Macbeth, “their sense is shut,” taking nothing in perceptually of what was to be seen through that window. The trope in the idiom is revealing: one is “*studying* something within” to the degree that one’s visual field suffers the metaphorical equivalent of a “brown-out,” all distinction lost even though color, as sensory awareness, is still present, though out of conscious recognition. Motivation, is, as always, sovereign in perception, and can withdraw attention from current sensation even as the latter is still operating—non-epistemically. When Michael Tye discusses such a situation, he weakens his case by assuming that all before the person’s eyes has *already* been sorted in past history into familiar objects (Tye 2000: 182).

As far as I can judge, Arthur W. Collins was the first to use the term “non-epistemic,” though he wrote it without the hyphen (Collins 1967: 455). He stressed the fact that we need “auxiliary information” from the memory to interpret what arrives at our sensory organs (*ibid.*: 456), much as when hearing a joke we need clues to the rival meanings. He was far from being the first to examine the notion. One can find immediate predecessors, of whom I mention three: (1) H. H. Price described bare sensation as “ineffective,” meaning that, before anyone has attended to some portion of the field, however subliminally, that sensation can have no effect on knowledge or action (Price 1961 [1932]: 150); (2) Geoffrey Warnock is notable for a careful analysis of the process of noticing and attending, in which he was led to distinguish a level of plain sensing from those occasions on which we notice something. He confines his inquiry to seeing, and concludes: “One who sees . . . need not know anything at all. . . . there must be a sense in which seeing does not involve the acquired abilities to identify, recognize, name, describe, and so on” (Warnock 1955–56: 211, 218); and (3) A. Campbell Garnett: “the still more sophisticated usage [of the word ‘sensation’] has been developed which distinguishes between the perceptual process and the item that appears or is presented as its object or content, calling the former ‘sensing’ and the latter the sense quale, the sense-datum, and so forth, whether it is actually perceived or not” (Garnett 1965: 42). One’s only quarrel here is that Garnett should not have used the phrase “*perceptual* process” for sensing alone. It is the

picking out of an "item" that is the perceptual move; sensation is prior as it is from the sensation-fields that "items" are picked.

Garnett's use of the word "quale" for the item perceived, making it equivalent to "sense datum," provides the opportunity to clear up an ambiguity. The word "quale" (derived from Latin *qualis*, "of such a kind") is pluralized as "qualia." Garnett's use of the singular is obviously for any *entity* singled out from the field, *something* perceived, and the plural "qualia" would be for a number of such items. In such a use it is without doubt the same as "datum" for the sense-datum theorists. C. D Broad, for example, carefully pointed out that in his view a sense datum, a "sensus" as he preferred to call it, was indeed something cognized and not merely sensed: "A sensum is not something that exists in isolation; it is a differentiated part of a bigger and more enduring whole, viz., of a sense-*field* which is itself a mere cross-section of a sense-*history*" (Broad 1923: 195). As this makes clear, the "datum," as its name implies, was for Broad an *epistemic* item, something perceived in the sense of being "differentiated," that is, selected from a larger whole, the sense-field proper, in order to guide the actions of the animal or human being in the service of their needs. That larger whole could contain both (a) other items before they were cognized (which would not then be the focus of attention); and (b) regions never attended to, each of which would be being non-epistemically sensed. One must add that, even for an item attended to, there are always sensory features that are given no significance, which entails that non-epistemic sensing can remain within a supposedly certain identification as well as outside it. This must be the case; otherwise, no one could ever correct another about a percept, his or her take on some problematic region of the real. "Qualia" as used in the title of this book therefore applies generally to *all the sensory experiences across the differing sense-modalities*, that is all the "sense-fields," and *not to perceived items*. It is of these fields that it is claimed that they have a non-epistemic character.

The debate about the separation of sensing and perceiving is fraught with ethical implications, for it is widely believed that to hold to the idea that we have only evidence to go on leaves us with no firm ground for objectivity, and hence truth, a place where only unsteady relativists dare venture. All those in the Gendler and Hawthorne collection, for example, are mindful of what they consider to be the danger of, as they would say, putting the world beyond a "veil of perception." The old sense-datum theorists are generally regarded as having not only become trapped in epistemological contradictions because of this move, but also imprudently opened the door to relativism. As a result, there are and have been many

philosophers and psychologists who with determined seriousness question any attempt to detach sensation from perception, and busy themselves with avoiding being characterized as an “indirect realist,” as it is taken to be canonical that indirection can only hide or distort what is real, thus setting truth and knowledge at terrible risk.

The History of the Notion of the Non-epistemic

History, however, reveals a repeated resurfacing of this distinction, which can be traced back quite far. D. W. Hamlyn, in his history of the theories of the relation of sensation to perception, mentions Empedocles as noting that “in order to perceive things we have sometimes to concentrate and pay attention” (Hamlyn 1961: 7), which implies that something must provide a field over which that act of attention can move. Carneades claimed that “in no particular case is any sense-impression self-evidently true to the object it purports to represent” (Long 1986: 95). Hamlyn himself, however, is profoundly unhappy with the distinction, noting that Aristotle made an “uneasy compromise” between “special sensibles” which “involved no judgement,” claiming that it is “we who judge rather than the senses” (Hamlyn 1961: 26). Hamlyn also quotes Epicurus as one who considered sensing as such to be non-epistemic, *alogos*, “unconnected with reason or judgement.” The idea recurs in the work of St. Augustine, who denied that truth and falsity could be properties of sense-impressions alone (*De quantitate animae*, 23).

The sixth-century Indian Buddhist sage Dinnaga believed that the visual field was made up of infinitesimal points and that these are to be distinguished from the entities we pick out from the field (Matilal 1986: 365–367). We might fitly take as analogy the phosphor cells on a television screen mentioned above, each of which is evidence of an undefined multiplicity of causes, but which for the human subject (not the neurophysiologist), cannot be interpreted without memory-guided human selection *across* the sense-field. We do not investigate each point in turn in order to project a useful gestalt. What neither Dinnaga nor Vasabandhu, another Buddhist philosopher, inquired into was the place of human motivation in the perceptual process. Pain or pleasure enforces the placing in memory of what at first appears to be salient, and lodges it there attended with the concomitants of fear and desire. Vasabandhu did speak of a multitude of phenomenalist atoms being shaped into a “conglomerate” (ibid.: 360–362); what he did not explore was the *motivation* that drives our brain to shape these memories. The nearest he got to it was his reflecting on

Descartes's demon situation, comparable to Jonathan Harrison's "brain in a vat," for what was presupposed in that thought experiment, though few today even take it into consideration, is the threat to one's desires (Harrison 1985). Dinnaga further noted the obvious fact that one person's correction of another might be of the very singularity of "the" entity in question—that perhaps the new perceiving might reveal a number of entities with different criteria of identification where one was considered to exist before. As he puts it, against Russell, Husserl, and Tye simultaneously, "Even 'this' can be a case of mistaken identity" (Matilal 1986: 332). One can add that, since non-epistemic evidence remains uninterpreted within the epistemic, as we have just seen, all "thises," whether of object, self, or other person, retain a unmeasured measure of "mistaken identity."

Thomas Hobbes noted that when one is reading, only the immediate portion of the line one is concentrating on is perceived, even though all the page is still before one's eyes as part of one's sight, which has the obvious implication that what we here call "the rest of the page" is not only unread but not even at that moment a part of our interpretation of the visual field (Hobbes 1839: 393). It would be relatively straightforward to set up a psychological experiment on a computer screen in which the "rest of the page" was slowly transformed into French while what the eye was moving its attention over remained in the original readable English, which would be an empirical proof of non-epistemic sensing, as well as the "non-transparency" of the French text. Notice that Hobbes was not arguing that the whole field was as clear as a "snapshot," as Alva Noë seems to suggest qualia-philosophers believe (thus still holding to the ancient pictorial objection; see this vol.: 342–345), but that there is an unclear but obviously sensed peripheral region around the fovea as it moves in the eye's saccades (Noë 2006: 421; it is not that the detail is "strictly unseen," as Noë claims, but that the peripheral field is *seen* but is *not sensorily or perceptually detailed*).

Nicolas Malebranche made a distinction between *sensation*, which was "confused," having "no clear idea" of objects, a matter of *voir* alone, and *illumination*, in which, through sensation, the mind was able to perceive "the essences of things," a matter of *regarder*—which anticipates Hermelin's remark about seeing and looking (Malebranche 1992 [1674]: 69). His noticing that there are some persons for whom colors are different for the right and left eye (quoted in Yolton 1984: 46) is also an indirect admission of non-epistemicity, since the difficulty of exploring this as useful evidence would not be obvious to the persons concerned. There is no doubt that it could be: take Daniel Dennett's claim that, once the cry of the osprey has been taught to someone, then a Wittgensteinian point is reached when

teaching has been completed, so that the public word-use has been finally cleared up for the pupil and no disagreements can ensue (Dennett 1985: 39). He forgets that in a case where, say, the pupil was under age ten and could hear sound-waves up to 20KHz, there might be a circumstance (say in a heavy rainstorm) where the pupil could hear the osprey but the teacher could not. Before that moment, since neither teacher nor pupil was aware of this difference, it lay within the non-epistemic, outside the “illumination” of perception, the cry of the osprey thus being the reverse of “transparent” (on this question of fine differences between person and person, see also Block 2003: 28–29; on a case of human sensitivity to ultraviolet light, see Matthen 2005: 34–35). Similarly for Malebranche’s example: the person with a difference in response to red in his two eyes might more readily notice an oncoming red traffic-light with his right eye than with his left (though not necessarily be aware of this difference). Malebranche also acknowledged both the importance of motivation in perception and the value of a non-epistemic field in allowing for flexibility in selection from it, for he argued that, although sensations have no truth-value, revealing nothing about the objects in our environment, they do “alert us to that which is useful and dangerous” (quoted in Yolton 1984: 45, 53).

Robert Boyle can be said to refer indirectly to the non-epistemic. When he was considering the fact that people often have mistaken notions about the world around them, he said that it was much “fitter” to think of words as being constantly altered to things, rather than believing words to be wholly successful in matching what is outside us, and added that we too often accommodate ourselves to “forms of words” when our understanding is limited—as he put it, “when the things themselves were not known, or well understood, *if at all thought on*” (Boyle 1979 [1666]: 58; my emphasis). This is an admission that not only can the familiar object be doubtfully identified, but that experience *within a percept* can still be outside knowledge. Boyle is, of course, well known for denying that color bears no resemblance to what causes it, and he was the first to cite the experience of phosphenes: he observed that coughing in the dark produced the sight of “very vivid, but immediately disappearing flames”—it would be hard for the ordinary person to attribute any meaning whatever to such undoubtedly real sensations (Boyle 1964 [1664]: 13). He was also intrigued by Aristotle’s remark that the eye sees both light and darkness, that the brain produces a “positive” sensation when the eye is deprived of light altogether (Boyle 1979 [1666]: 229). To an infant, darkness could hardly be more non-epistemic; hence, perhaps, in some cases, the intensifying of the fear of it.

At a first superficial reading of his *Essay on Human Understanding* John Locke might be said to be one who held to the theory of the semantic inertness of sensation because he seemed to place such an emphasis on the separation of “sensation” and “reflection,” the latter being the mind’s operations upon the “ideas” it received through the senses. However, a close look at his description of the process reveals an early blurring of the two, which could fairly be described as an inconsistency. He begins with the mind as a blank sheet, a “white paper,” but what comes to be written on it removes that blankness entirely: notice that he speaks of the “ideas” of “yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet” as if they were indeed *semantically* recognized at this initial stage (*Essay*, II, i, 3; his emphasis). But no infant (“without speech”) has such words or “ideas” even though it senses perfectly well. Further Locke refers to “material things” as the “objects of sensation,” and assures us that “*External objects furnish the minds with the ideas of sensible qualities*” without inquiring into how the mind comes to select such portions of its fields as “material things” (*ibid.*, II, 1, 4, 5; his emphasis on the word “ideas”). If he had said, instead, “the external real furnishes the mind with sensible qualities,” it would have been acceptable, for the infant can have the sensation of yellow without having any knowledge of it; we would say “without any idea of it,” not employing Locke’s own dubious meaning for the term. This might be said to be an early example of the suspect attempt to smuggle epistemic elements into the notion of sensing. Another way the inconsistency shows itself can perhaps be found in his use of “I know not what” for the real: if the real is outside knowledge, it is no surprise that the “involuntary” sensory fields are “white paper” to start with, as they are just as much “I know not what,” being as real as what causes them. One can add that, since they are “involuntary,” they are outside motivation—something that motivation, the will, works on, quite distinct from itself.

One odd absence in the eighteenth century of a consideration of the non-epistemic is that in the works of the would-be arch-skeptic David Hume. His discussion of sense-impressions, as he calls sensory experience, never touches the question, except indirectly. He was much taken up with the fragmentariness of our perception of objects (as some philosophers today still are; see Noë 2006) and is led to regard their continuance out of sight as a product of imagination, which does contain an valuable insight. Nonetheless, he did not make the move to consider the possibility that more than one individual’s imagination was in *play* in a mutual projection. This, ironically, was probably because, as he said himself, he could not resist breaking away from his abstruse inquiries and seeking human

company: "I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any farther" (*Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, section 7). It is not without significance that mutuality, especially when heightened by play, wit, and humor, should reconcile him to everyday existence in the world. His skeptical mask was difficult to wear when intersubjectivity forced itself on him. A pity that he never stood back and inquired as to why and how this came about, and whether the structure of play, wit, and humor could have anything to do with it.

Bishop George Berkeley and Cardinal Giacinto Gerdil, unsurprisingly perhaps given their clerical profession, were both aware of the danger of leaving perception without epistemic support (Berkeley 1972 [1713]; Gerdil 1748). One might say (mistakenly) that, although they were nearer to the qualia camp in that they considered sensation to be a spiritual matter, part of the "mind," they veered toward modern transparency theory in asserting a given objectivity for all external entities, the only difference being that God supplied that objectivity without any need for materiality. I have argued elsewhere that this lodging of an ideal objectivity in God is an understandable acknowledgment—though through a mythical misrepresentation—of the needful faith on which all language is based (Wright 2005: 111–120, 194–195). We can now connect Berkeley and Gerdil with David Chalmers's entertaining of the notion of an "Edenic perception," which is also an indirect acknowledgment of that real faith, although Chalmers does not see it as such (Chalmers 2006: 75–125). Chalmers, believing that he has found a way to escape relativism, cannot resist introducing the notion of "complete endorsement" of an identification (*ibid.*: 120), but without seeing that *to endorse* is to enter upon a pact of faith with others, and faith must include the acceptance of inevitable risk. As regards the non-epistemic, Berkeley did concede that sensing was "altogether passive" in the sense of being outside one's volition (Berkeley 1972 [1713]: 228). It could be argued that there was also an indirect acknowledgment that sensing is not mental in Philonous's curious remark that sensations, because of their "passivity," could be called "*external objects*" (*ibid.*: 229).

John Yolton, who is outstanding in his historical investigations into the philosophy of perception in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, introduces us to Zachary Mayne, who wrote a book on sense and the imagination in 1728, which Yolton describes as "a sophisticated analysis,"

“one of the more important essays on ideas and awareness” in that century (Yolton 1984: 109–113). Mayne is worth mentioning here for two observations that he made. First, he describes sensation as “a bare Representation of some corporeal Phenomenon or external appearance as *Colour, Sound, Taste, Odeur, etc.*” (Mayne 1728: 9), from which the mind has to get at the meaning or significance, which clearly places sensing as “semantically inert,” with understanding being what contributes the knowing through an interpretation of the evidence. The word “representation” cannot therefore imply that there exists some given copying of external entities or properties. Indeed, he strongly disapproved of Locke’s equation of the sensory “phantasm” with the “idea” (in the sense of some rational understanding): as he puts it, “to have an *Idea* [i.e., sense impression] cannot be the same thing with an Act of *Understanding*” (ibid.: 70). Second, he noted the tendency of common sense to accept habitual interpretations, so that an apparently objective identification is likely to be the product of what “people fancy they understand” (ibid.: 14). In view of the fact that all human beings have to behave *as if* they are identifying some “entity” in the same way (they could not get a rough overlap of their understandings otherwise), his use of the word “fancy” is not out of place. They turn a necessary act, which has the character of a regulative idea, something imagined for the nonce, into an actual delusion—nothing is easier than *to believe* what you should only be *assuming* when the “entity” is apparently before you in the form that you understand it! What such a blinkered approach neglects, of course, is the sensory and perceptual perspectives of others. Mayne is firmly an indirect realist for he insists that, whether one is observing something external or entertaining a mental image, one is still confronting an “appearance” (ibid.: 146).

Condillac is noteworthy for his elaborate thought experiment of a “statue” (for which we might currently read “robot”) which was given elements of mind in stages until it reached the human one. The imaginary chronological advance can readily be translated into what is prior in the act of knowing. Condillac places sensing first, but denies it any epistemological value until pain and pleasure have enforced selections from the fields. For him non-epistemic sensing is the first requirement; the implication is that no learning and no adaptation of that learning could take place unless there was the flexibility to move the selections about on those fields at the behest of motivation. Not even the “I” is given, but in time the self–world division gets established: “From the moment I realise this it seems my modes of being cease to belong to me. I make then into collections outside me. I form them into objects of which I am aware”

(Condillac 1930 [1754]: 231). Of that within the sense-fields which gives neither pleasure nor pain, “they are part of a confused mass of which it has no knowledge”; there would be no *attention* on any portion (ibid.: 220, 61). He is unusual in giving motivation a dominant initial place in the course of a being’s learning to cope in the world: “Thus it is that pleasure and pain are the sole principle[s] which, determining all the operations of its soul, will gradually raise it to all the knowledge of which it is capable” (ibid.: ch. II, sect. 4).

Thomas Reid is interesting because of his determined attempts to deny the implications of his own argument. Having admitted the profound difference of sensation from what causes it (he even entertained the thought of tasting with our fingers, smelling with our ears, and hearing with the nose; see Reid 1970 [1764]: 216–217), he is content to say that “Sensation, taken by itself, implies neither the conception nor belief of any external object. It supposes a sentient being, and a certain manner in which that being is effected; but it supposes no more. Perception implies an immediate conviction and belief of something external—something different both from the mind that perceives and from the act of perception” (Reid 1941 [1785]: 155), which would plainly appear to be a Lockean separation of “sensation” and “reflection,” non-epistemic and epistemic. He was fearful, however, of the skeptic’s attack (as are many in the Gendler and Hawthorne volume), defending his belief in an external world of objects. He admitted that nature presents us only with natural signs, whereas humans can employ “artificial” signs like “articulate sounds” or “writing” (here anticipating Grice 1967: 39), but he is sure that we can interpret nature’s signs as correctly as our own. We pass safely from the “appearance” to the “conception” in three ways: “by original principles of our constitution, by custom, and by reasoning” (Reid 1970 [1764]: 218). The first rests on the experiences of pain and pleasure, and the interests which spring from them, which makes us guide our actions by “prudence” (ibid.: 208–209); the second confirms them by repeated success, resulting in “common sense”; and the third works by inquiry into and dependence on the first two. He could not see, of course, how, with such a firmly Cartesian commitment to the singularity of the self, he might be tripped by Descartes’s demon or “brain-in-a-vat” arguments, but he does indirectly betray a sense of how people together maintain their differing sensings and perceivings in harness, how they manage to update each other, for he alludes to “taking” belief “on *trust* and without suspicion” (ibid.: 207). He also cannot help using the metaphor of “a kind of drama,” where “nature is the actor” and “we are the spectators.” It does not occur to him that

the structure of drama might contain a clue as to how agents beset by otherness from each other might overcome it (and all threats of relativism and solipsism) by the *performance* of a *perfect* perception that enables them, ideally, to facilitate the updating of each other's *imperfect* ones.

Kant, of course, made an outright statement of the non-epistemic-epistemic distinction: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A51/B75). In saying that "intuitions" (Kant's term for sensory impressions) are "blind," Kant is using a hyperbolic metaphor: he does not mean that they cease to be experienced, only that no knowledge can be derived from them if no perception is active. One has to bear in mind Boyle and Warnock's point, that it is not the case that someone's identification of and observation of some region of the real can take in "all" the significance of all the evidence available, as if there were a quantifiable amount to be discovered. A most vivid "intuition" may be "blind" in an endless number of respects. What to Dr. Watson is just a depression in the ground is for Sherlock Holmes an indication that a lame woman of nine stone or so, wearing shoes purchased at Harrod's within the last three months, has just passed by. And Dr. Watson may have keener eyesight than Holmes, and a more vivid sense of color—though these availed him not. A short-sighted entomologist may be able to pick out confidently the camouflaged moth on the bark of a tree that is "invisible" to his sharp-eyed student. Frank Jackson's Mary, just out of the black-and-white room, may be having her first experience of red and *not know it* because the red was on a small Dretskean cuff-link in an open drawer, and, though she was looking into that drawer, she was so amazed at the *greenness* of a tie next to the cuff-link, that she had not noticed the red of the latter (this is where the knowledge argument falls apart—for to sense is not to know).

Kant did not escape inconsistency, however, and for the same reason as many another philosopher, the same antiskeptical desire to retain epistemic contact with the singular external object, for elsewhere he did tie intuition to it: "In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it is in immediate relation to them" (*CPR*, A19/B33). Here we find again a claim to a real perfect perception, when all that is required is a mutual postulate that there is such a thing. He even clung to the notion of given discrete singularities in the *noumenon* where things resided in absolutely pure ontological singularity, the *Dinge an Sich*—he could not refrain from the addition of that "*an Sich*," forgetting that they can only be "as such" to someone. It matches John McDowell's "thus-and-so" and "that shade"

exactly, as he himself agrees (McDowell 1994: 9, 56–57). Both are *believing* in the real existence of a singularity that is really only the product of a mutually *hypothesized* regulative idea; none of this casts any doubt over the existence of what each person's "singularity" *is being selected from* (see this vol.: 352). To develop Dinnaga's dictum: even "that shade" can be a case of mistaken identity.

Ludwig Feuerbach had a more perspicuous metaphor for our sensings: "The senses give us riddles, but they do not give us the solution, understanding" (Feuerbach 1903–11: II, 144). A riddle has at its core a non-epistemic element, not necessarily singular (for puns and riddles permit of an accommodating degree of fudging the notion of "one"), over which rival epistemic interpretations strive for motivational supremacy according to the salience of the rival contextual clues that the joker has placed in the context (see Wright 2005: ch. 1). This can be regarded not as an analogy for learning, but as an actual example of its structure, although the outcome is usually taken as irrelevant to any immediate conscious concerns (though not perhaps to deep-seated unconscious ones). The whole point of a joke is in its rivalry of motivations, for in a good joke the contrast between the motivational associations of the two meanings involved points to the key pressures of desire and fear on our perceptions. What a joke brings to uncomfortable or consoling notice is how non-epistemic the most familiar of perceptions can become.

George Henry Lewes has a claim upon our attention not merely because he was George Eliot's husband. It might have interested Richard Rorty to learn that he was an empiricist opposed to the idea of the mind producing a "mirroring of things"; Lewes says that wants to "discredit the old idea that the Senses directly apprehend—or mirror—external things" (Rorty 1980: 390; Lewes 1874: I, 122). He sees "sensation proper" as "a passive affection of the organism, whereas "Mind is the secondary and completing stage of Reaction" (Lewes 1874: I, 74–75). He attributes this "completion" to the operation of motivation, through what he terms "the Law of Interest": "It has long been observed that we only *see* what interests us, only know what is sufficiently like former experiences to become, so to speak, incorporated with them—assimilated by them. The satisfaction of desire is that which both impels and quiets mental movement" (ibid.: I, 121; his emphasis). This does not imply, *pace* Noë (2006), that we cease to sense what we do not perceive, only that the unperceived remains within the non-epistemic, whether that non-epistemic is a background to what is attended to or is inside it. Another way of saying this is that a percept cannot be wholly defined by the agent's own view of her intention.

Notice that Lewes differs from the contributors to the Gendler and Hawthorne volume in not neglecting the part played by motivation in the impulse to perceive. They are too bemused by the *noun* “mind” to see that semantically its more important use is as a *verb*—“Mind the two steps down as you go out!” In fact, if you look at their extremely detailed index (for a book of 530 pages on perception) you will find only two references to “motivation” (and neither of those has anything to say about its relation to perception), six to “pain” (again with no account of its embedding memories that are attended with fear), two to “desire” (again merely passing allusions), none to “fear,” and none to “pleasure.” Another recent example is Mohan Matthen’s (2005) book *Seeing, Doing, and Knowing*, which has no references at all to any of them, nor to “intention.” The determination of most qualiphobes to avoid relativism leads them to steer clear of the examination of the place in “perceptual experience” of pain and pleasure, fear and desire, because “common sense” is taken to have already sorted out those troublesome “subjective” *matters* and consigned them to impersonal, third-person “objectivity.” They forget what “to matter” means. It is not only their tendency to rigidify tradition and to further scholastic intricacy that makes them remind one of monks (see Howard Robinson’s remarks on their treatment of Ned Block’s argument concerning orgasm, this vol.: 232–233; Block 2003: 11–13).

The great psychologist Hermann von Helmholtz is remarkable in the keenness of his investigation of visual optics. In his discussion of “the facts of perception” he makes a clear distinction between the non-epistemic and the epistemic: “The assumption of every nativist theory—that ready-made representations of objects are elicited through our organic mechanism—appears much more audacious and doubtful than the assumption of the empiricist theory, which is that only the non-understood material of sensations originates from external influences, while all representations are formed from it in accordance with the laws of thought” (Helmholtz 1868: 175–176). As a good empiricist he gives several examples of how the non-epistemic can invade our mundane take on the real. He says that we are “not in the habit of observing our sensations accurately” for we are “wont to disregard all those parts of sensations that are of no importance so far as external objects are concerned” (*ibid.*):

(1) The vitreous humor of most people’s eyes contain floating wisps of semitransparent tissue, called “floaters” or *mouches volantes* (I have indeed myself occasionally mistaken them for flies). These can be noticed when the eyes move rapidly as they shift suddenly across the field of vision, but

many people do not notice them at all. (A friend of mine who became ill and somewhat depressed noticed them for the first time and attributed them to her illness, having never observed them before although they had been present throughout her life.)

(2) When the fixation point of the two eyes rests upon an object, a great deal of the background is taken up with double images (test it for yourself now with a finger close to your eyes). So for most of the time your vision consists of a confused overlay which you never normally notice (cf. Lowe, this vol.: 61–65).

(3) Double images are not the same, as a careful comparison, say, of the two images of a finger observed in a squint. One sees farther round the right-hand side with the right eye and the left-hand side with the left eye. (Gilbert Ryle and George Pitcher both assume that the images are identical; see Ryle 1966: 207; Pitcher 1971: 41.) The truth is that the two fields as wholes are different *at every point*, and it is this which enables the brain to create the sensory phenomenon of stereoscopic shape and depth.

(4) Normally, says Helmholtz, we are “unskilled” in separating our sensing from our perceiving. However, if, while standing, you bend your head down and look behind you at a landscape, you will discover that the prospect, upside-down, provides an impression profoundly different from the normal. As Helmholtz says, “the colours lose their associations with near and far objects, and confront us now purely in their own peculiar differences.” The non-epistemic temporarily becomes detached from the epistemic (a fact denied by Harman [1990]).

(5) Afterimages of what you last looked at briefly continue, so that whatever you are looking at still contains a faint record of the previous look. This can have definite effects, as when a butcher places green paper under his meat, for the afterimage of green being red makes the meat look redder; the customer, of course, is not aware of this (Helmholtz 1868: 176–180).

It is therefore no surprise to find Helmholtz, like R. L. Gregory (Gregory 1993), treating objects as hypothetical choices from the sense-fields, “unconscious conclusions” as he called them, though he did not inquire into the intersubjective parameter of such hypotheses.

To make mutual sense out of this “confusion” of nature, Helmholtz says that we must “start with the *assumption* of her intelligibility, and draw consequences in conformity with this assumption, until irrefutable facts show the limitations of this method” (quoted in James 1977: 115). Like Helmholtz, James preferred to see the “flux of sensations” as blank evidence for this assumption to work upon, as not in itself containing any given “information”:

Sensations are forced upon us, coming we know not whence. Over their nature, order and quantity we have as good as no control. *They* are neither true nor false; they simply *are*. It is only what we say about them, only the names we give them, our theories of their source and nature and remote relations, that may be true or not. . . . What we say about reality thus depends on the perspective into which we throw it. The *that* of it is its own; but the *what* depends on the *which*; and the *which* depends on us. Both the sensational and the relational parts of reality are dumb; they say absolutely nothing about themselves. We it is who have to speak for them. (James 1977: 451, 452)

The “Thing” he regards as a “conceptual instrument” which we by a process of “triangulation” are forever adjusting (ibid.: 423, 60). There is a risk in entering such a triangulation, for the evidence may be misinterpreted, and the person we trust may have had a different interpretation from the start. This is the kind of risk that those who pride themselves on refuting the skeptic are not facing up to, namely, that trust has to be faith, reaching beyond such painful discoveries of cross-purposes to retain, perhaps through some sacrifice, one’s commitment to the other. James quotes Helmholtz again: “Hier gilt nur der eine Rath: vertraue und handle!” (“There is only one worthwhile piece of advice: have faith and act!”)

Roy Wood Sellars was much taken with the need to adjust our perceptions, seeing our perceptual traffic with the sensory as a continual “from-to” of adjustment by feedback of the flux’s responses to our tentative selections from it. Even so, Sellars professes himself unhappy with the notion that, before the “configurational wholes” are selected, the field itself is in an “anoetic” state (Sellars 1932: 88), his term for the “non-epistemic.” Yet he still wants to maintain an intuition–judgment distinction (1965: 236), with the intuition “simpler” than the perception. It is because of this that “artists are able to disturb inferential elements” (1916: 18) since they are more responsive to unnoticed sensory features. Two years earlier he had defined his point more exactly in saying that he did not believe that there was a “chaos” of sensations but a “patterned field” controlled by “the stimuli coming to the organism” (1930: 268). However, the patterned field does not contain any given information. If he is to allow for shifts in attention over the field to improve reference, as he insists, he cannot in the same breath believe that there is already a set of given singular selections awaiting choice.

It is not that, as he puts it, “it is *as though* we were directly aware of a thing” (Sellars 1965: 237, his emphasis); but the part of our body that is our sensings is certainly part of *existence*. It is true that it is only “as though” we are aware of a *singular* thing, but mutually negotiated, ten-

tative choice is from something that undoubtedly exists, the sense-field (quite apart from our would-be objective percepts), and what that sense-field as a whole is caused by undoubtedly exists, as a portion of the real continuum. To put it another way, we are all making our *differing* choices from real existence, but the supposed singularity that lies across all those choices is a convenient, even pragmatically necessary, but nevertheless unreal hypothesis. There is no veil of perception, because the “veil” is part of the real. To use James’s words, both sensing and what it is caused by “simply *are*,” regardless of what we are perceiving and regardless of whether the cause is external to the body or internal (as is the case with phosphenes, afterimages, dreams, hallucinations, migraine “fortification” patterns, and the like). Perception remains merely viable—until the next item of feedback, or someone else’s correction of our choice, which, right or wrong, will still prove that another can invade our supposedly private world and suggest to us that what we perceived from what we sensed was incorrect. Since that can include the self as a major choice, redirecting our motivation, solipsism is an impossibility. Perception is a *choice*, because motivation energizes the whole perceptual process.

The Nonconceptual

“Nonconceptual” is a term that Gareth Evans introduced to characterize the “information” that he believes awaits the observer in the world, whether or not that observer has recognized its presence (Evans 1982: 156, 226–229). He was convinced that “informational states” existed within sensory presentations, regarding it as a given that there must be some access to the external world if reference was to be confirmable. Of late this idea has been seized upon by many philosophers of perception (see the representative collection edited by York H. Gunther: Gunther 2003), and it is easy to see why it has been so popular since, in building on information that was waiting to be picked up and conceptualized, it provided a firm bridge to the external across the mire of subjectivity, thus escaping in one move the threat of skepticism. It is obvious, then, that *it cannot be equated with the non-epistemic*. Evans showed himself sensitive to the danger of adopting a pro-quality approach that would seem to place the external out of reach, using the familiar antipictorial argument: “inner states cannot intelligibly be regarded as objects of an internal gaze” (Evans 1982.: 231. This is similar to John McDowell’s “mysterious” ploy [see McDowell 1994: 139]).

What is central to Evans’s definition of the nonconceptual is the ability of an observer (and animal observers can here be included) to

discern discrete objects, already singular, that await the selection process. Discrimination of the object is taken to be the vital element, so that we can in future recognize it, be able to provide some description of it, and so on. The representation of that information he defines as follows: "We can speak of a certain bit of information being of, or perhaps from, an object, in a sense resembling the way in which we speak of a photograph being of an object" (Evans 1982: 124). What is occluded here is how and why "an object" is discriminated in the first place. Again there is no whisper of the place of motivation, nor how it is known beforehand that the real does consist of discretely singular entities that are the same for all observers. Nor does he ask whether that "discrimination" serves any purposes, nor whose purposes. The whole book takes for granted that *singular* entities preexist their sorting from the real apart from human choice. He actually uses the phrase "take to be" when speaking of "information": "We *take* ourselves *to be* informed, in whatever way, of the existence of such-and-such an object" (Evans 1982: 121, my emphases). But "to take to be" is *to assume, to accept something as if it were something else*, which is a clue to what actually happens, namely, that each of us "takes an object" to exist in a perfect singularity apart from us just in order to bring, via this strictly fictive mutual act, our *differing* "referents" into some kind of rough convergence, and why?—so that a speaker can update a hearer and adjust the boundaries of his or her "referent" closer to those of the speaker.

Thus whenever Evans speaks of "nonconceptual content" it is always in terms of discrete singular entities awaiting perception. "Information" about entities is already there in the sensations. Instead of evidence to be interpreted à la Sherlock Holmes, we have semantically defined regions that already carry the knowledge waiting to be absorbed. Even in the version Christopher Peacocke presents, entities may have disappeared but identifiable parts of space still linger; he produces the notion of a "scenario" content, in which, before any perception has taken place, there are already marked out, point by point, spatial features of the world (Peacocke 1992: 67–84). Thus he is able to claim that there is "content" in the visual array and that it is representational before anyone has interpreted it. But spatial features of the world are knowledge, not evidence. One has to *learn* how the distribution of features in one's sense-fields matches external space; it is not a given (the same can be said of Austen Clark's notion of "feature-placing," which exists when learning has gone on but not before; his term "sensory reference" is paradoxical in the absence of learning, and even with it is only viable; see Clark 2000: 74–80). Peacocke does commit himself now to what he calls the "autonomy thesis" being realizable, that

is, “nonconceptual states could exist in the absence of conceptual states” (Peacocke 2003: 320). He is thinking here of animals that are able to act in the world, but lack the ability human beings have of being aware of self and being able to recombine concepts (such as recombining “That’s green,” “That’s square,” and “That’s in the dark” into “That’s a green square in the dark”; *ibid.*: 321). However, such a state, even in an animal, is well on the way up the path of learning. The reasons for this are that the content has already been acquired; motivation has embedded sensory features in the memory and marked them with fear or desire, so a measure of representation has been achieved. It was certainly not there before the learning, and the learning has not erased what the “fine-grain” of the sensory might yet yield up, for there is no end to learning—for there is no end to what we purpose (only death brings desire to an end). The conclusion is clear; the nonconceptual is not the non-epistemic, for the latter is wholly without content. Indeed, the term “nonconceptual content” does not avail anything to those who want to load the sensory with meaning. It is a perfectly harmless term if one merely wants to characterize what perceptual state a rat is in and one wants to deny it an egocentric node and the ability to recombine concepts; however, if one wants to hang confirmatory news of the external on it, something to which truth conditions are applicable, something that will save one from the relativist pit, then, unfortunately, “nonconceptual content” becomes an oxymoron.

Incidentally, it is worth pointing out that what was true of the Gendler and Hawthorne collection is even more applicable to the Gunther one, for not a single reference can be found in the index to “motivation,” “pleasure,” “desire,” or “fear”—there are five references to pain, but they are all concerned with its representational properties, none with its power to embed perceptions and suffuse them with fear. This is a clue to the entity’s being a notion believed in, not, sensibly, merely “taken for granted”; and to the failure to keep in mind “mind” as a verb. As Lewes said, “we only see what interests us” (Lewes 1874: I, 121), though one has to unpack that “we” and that “us.”

The Essays

Qualiaphiles, of course, are just as concerned to find a satisfactory account of knowledge. If their opponents are to be credited with anything, it must be that, as far as the debate has gone on over the last fifty years, they are faced with the especial difficulty of establishing philosophical contact with the real when they hold that our access to it appears to be second-

hand—and, worse, hidden behind a screen of sensations that contain no information. They are the ones, it is confidently claimed, who are in an ethical dilemma, seemingly purveying a view that slides easily into relativism and solipsism.

So several supporters of qualia have undertaken defenses of the indirect realist position, as is evidenced by a goodly proportion of the contributions in this volume. For that reason, they have been grouped under the title of “defenses.”

It will become plain at once that supporters of qualia do not agree about the nature of them. The reader may find it useful to employ the criterion of belief in non-epistemicity as a way of distinguishing the various positions taken by the contributors. Harold Brown, for example, takes it as generally agreed that “normal perception” is caused by “physical items” (45). However, were the reader to take the word “items” to mean countable entities perceivable by the human eye (whether assisted or not by instruments such as microscopes, etc.), then non-epistemicity would be ruled out; but Brown acknowledges that our objectifying is not a matter of a given response to entities, even if the whole field is traceable to some overall external cause (48). On the one hand, Jonathan Lowe holds to the qualia experiences being of “private objects,” but his discussion of illusion makes it plain that he does not hold to an automatic registration of external things; on the other, William Robinson regards the tying of sensory experiences to identifiable properties as an acceptable premise. I suggest that the reader use this criterion as a guide through the arguments that follow, for it will be a direct sign of whether or not the writer makes a sharp distinction between sensation and perception, on which distinction hangs a great deal, both epistemologically and metaphysically.

Harold Brown argues that an indirect causal link is no bar to knowledge. He makes an analogy with science, in which many examples can be found of well-founded theories being based on evidence that is far from direct. He points out that direct arguments make appeal to analyses of everyday concepts, which “everyone can happily concede embody direct realism,” but adds: “But we should no more expect a correct account of perception from conceptual analysis than expect to establish relativity theory or the principles of statistics in this manner” (this vol.: 45). He supports his case with a new argument from illusion, one resistant to the familiar objections, such as those proposed by J. L. Austin (1962). He leaves aside the ontological questions concerned with what constitutes the “items” observed in “normal perception,” but stresses the fact that what we sense and perceive is numerically distinct from what the causes may be. He is in

search of an argument to the best explanation, given the insights afforded by science. Following C. L. Hardin (1988), he gives a detailed account of the transmission of sensory and neural impulses, and concludes that the resulting experience, though bearing similarities to the input, is far from being numerically identical with it. He instances the fact that many different combinations of wavelengths can result in the same color (see Hardin in this vol.: 143). Furthermore, indirect realism can attribute a credible ontological status to the appearance *per se*.

E. J. Lowe unabashedly describes his theory as a sense-datum theory, as he has a right to, having published a book making a thoroughgoing statement of his position (Lowe 1996), even though opponents have assumed that no one holds to such a theory nowadays because of “all the familiar reasons.” In that book he carefully distinguishes between accounts of what we perceive and accounts of the way in which we refer to our sensations, an “oblique” form of reference, which a sophisticated observer can use. So in 1996 he had already produced an argument that questions the claim that we are always faced with an immediate relation to the items perceived. He also then insisted that any causal relation between the external and the inner presentation could only be via “sensuous features” and *not* between external object and perceived item (1996: 115). In his essay here he mentions that there is a tendency to turn one’s back on sense-datum theory because one “doesn’t like the questions that it raises” (this vol.: 70). Like Brown, his central concern is the question of illusion, as presented in the typical cases of double vision and hallucination.

William S. Robinson is openly a dualist, entirely opposed to a physicalist explanation of the sensory. In his recent book (W. S. Robinson 2004) he defends a form of qualia realism, the belief that phenomenal experiences have an ontological existence that no form of materialism is able to explain. He there presents many convincing examples of stubborn facts in sensory experience that the physicalist must account for if she is to sustain her metaphysical beliefs. As he puts it, there is a “basic question” that she must answer, namely, how, for example, “does color come into a full accounting of what normally happens when a person sees a red apple?” (ibid.: 8). A full explanation, he believes, must accept that qualia as events are real but nonmaterial, a view he calls “qualia event realism.” He is prepared to claim that a full account of qualia will largely decide the issue of consciousness itself (ibid.: 33), that directing research on the “explanatory gap” will reduce the “puzzlement” about the relation between our experiences and our brains. To ignore the existence of that gap, as some materialists do, is to reduce materialism to an empty shell “whose only virtue is

that it cannot be shown to be self-contradictory" (ibid.: 250). In his essay here he sets out to refute the claim that sensory experiences can be equated with judgments (thus following in the non-epistemic tradition), and therefore denies that qualitative events are representational. He uses a thought experiment to establish the fact that a physicalist version of representationalism is unable to explain the intrinsicity of qualitative events.

Terence Horgan and George Graham are qualia realists, in the sense that they consider the character of "what it is like" for a human being to be essential to consciousness. In the first part of their essay they define the term "qualia," taking it beyond the use as confined to direct sensory experience. They borrow Ned Block's distinction between "access-consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness" (Block 1995): A state is A-conscious if it is ready to be used for the direct rational control of thought and action, so it is plain that it can make use of phenomenal consciousness. The non-epistemic view, of course, allows for the separation of the two, that is, for sensing to go on apart from cognitive engagement (notice that this is not illustrated by the situation in which one becomes aware that a dog has been barking for a while unnoticed, but one in which a *novel and unrecognized* noise has been going on unnoticed). Horgan and Graham, on the other hand, take phenomenal consciousness to be "inseparably intentional or representational"; that is, qualitative experiences possess intentionality (they allow that there might be counterexamples, but feel sure that such would not disturb their argument). Their definition, however, contrasts with that of the modern representationalist, for she sees the phenomenal as "exhaustively, non-intrinsically, intentional," whereas they see it as "intrinsically intentional," constituting a "phenomenal intentionality." They conceive of qualia as "multidimensional," for they include within their definition the phenomenology of agency, the what-it-is-likeness of apparently voluntarily controlling one's apparent body, that of conative and cognitive phenomenology, that of "attitude content" (e.g., hoping or fearing that something is or might be the case), and that of "self-modification or self-attribution" (when one experiences a thought or sensation as one's own). These inclusions mark out an interesting extension of the term qualia. The second part of the essay is taken up with three other considerations in favor of qualia realism.

Like Horgan and Graham, Matjaž Potrč sees qualia both as real and as "intertwined with intentional content." He regards qualia as "what holds the experiential world together," using the metaphor of cement for the purpose. Here he can be said to be close to Horgan and Graham in regarding qualia as omnipresent in conscious states, and not only in the form of

sensory experience. He draws attention to what he calls the “sharpening up” of intentional content that qualia enable us to perform. Here he pays tribute to the part qualia play in learning, as he puts it, in the “dynamic” aspects of cognition, but he is concerned to retain the “preliminary existence” of what that cognition is in search of. Here we see the determination to avoid the “veil-of-sensation” accusation, coupled with the conviction that real existence is what the dynamic process wrestles with. He concludes by stressing the importance of context as contributing to the process, in that a holistic awareness must underlie it, since interpretation cannot gain a hold without placing an experience against such a context. Here he is bearing witness to the richness of memory in the performance of our actual perceiving.

Robert J. Howell, like myself, is someone for whom the existence of qualia does not imply the falsity of materialism. Indeed, his article sets out to reconcile subjective experiences such as qualia with a physicalist ontology. He calls his approach “subjective physicalism.” His version of physicalism is one in which it is asserted that all things, properties, and facts are physical, but within which “no objective theory, including physics, can completely describe the world” (this vol.: 126). He claims that his argument shows that dualism is not the only outcome of such an approach and that it does not therefore lead to the problem of nomological danglers such as epiphenomenalism implies. The key assertion with regard to the subjective is that these states “must be undergone in order to be fully grasped” (cf. Edelman and Tononi 2000: 12–13; and in this volume, W. S. Robinson: 78, and Wright: 347). This does not imply that they are not physical, only that they are “not identical with any property mentioned in a completed physics.” The bulk of his argument is taken up with rendering that position credible and avoiding the dualist conclusion.

The second group of articles really falls under a subheading of the first, since they are, in various ways, scientific defenses of the existence of qualia. C. L. Hardin is well known for his clear and painstaking exploration of the scientific evidence for the characterization of colors as qualia. His book *Color for Philosophers* is a classic of its kind; it won the 1986 Johnsonian Prize for Philosophy. His essay is an argument that sets out to show that colors are not properties of physical objects, but are “two removes from the occurrent bases of the dispositions to see them” (this vol.: 143), and central to the proof of this is not only the fact that the causes of color are many and varied, but the degree to which individuals vary in their sensory responses. Different spectral power distributions (SPDs) can produce the same color (the phenomenon of metamerism) and

the mode of illumination is a key factor. The contrast between one region and another will produce anomalous effects if surroundings are changed; “even black is a contrast color.” He mentions an interesting situation in which an increase of light will actually make black blacker. This recalls Locke’s observation that black was a “positive” state of sensation, one produced by the entire absence of input (one wonders what those for whom qualia are “transparent,” allowing access through to what causes them, have made of this; Locke, *Essay*, II, viii, 2). He cites many more interesting examples that challenge the mundane view. He also carefully considers the objections that have been made to the apparent qualia-favoring consequences of these facts, noting that often an appeal is made to the experiences of a “normal” observer when it is questionable whether there is such a person. What undermines the commonsense view are the well-documented differences between persons, of which he gives a scientific account (in the present writer’s view this is a conclusive proof of the non-epistemic, since no propositional agreement can capture these hidden differences in advance of test). He concludes that “phenomenology must be the arbiter of adequacy” in the investigation of these matters, and does not rule out the hope that much more will become clear “with plenty of time and good science.”

Isabelle Peschard and Michel Bitbol’s essay can fitly be linked with that of Hardin’s, for what they say of heat, temperature, and phenomenal concepts allies itself firmly with his investigation of color. Just as he resists the reduction of color to spectral power distributions, they resist the reduction of the sensory experiences of heat (and cold) to molecular kinetic energy. To take the latter as key cause, of course, facilitates the attempt to turn discourse about sensations into a scientific description of neural activity. The possibility of such a reduction is what they set about to refute, endeavoring to show that the phenomenal cannot be removed from science by such means. There is no straightforward relation between temperature and heat sensation. It is worth, they believe, going back to Locke’s citing of the experiment in which the two hands are placed in cold and hot water respectively and then moved to a bowl of lukewarm water (Locke, *Essay*, II, viii, 21); it establishes the “perspectival” nature of our sensing without losing contact with the world. They claim, against my own argument (Wright 2005: 84), that even the experience of peripheral vision is not without some representational element; this, then, constitutes a rejection of the possibility of the non-epistemic, and they believe that it gives them access to the external across the veil of perception. They go on to argue that heat sensations are recognitional and not functional, so that they can

claim that they have not yielded up a qualia-realist stance. It is in this last section that they are nearest to Hardin's position, and it is interesting to compare the facts that establish a similar philosophical contention.

Riccardo Manzotti's way of countering the relativist attack is to assert that qualia are to be defended by a thoroughgoing rejection of the traditional dichotomy between phenomenalism and representationalism. He presents a realist view of qualia that is capable of explaining illusions, dreams, afterimages, phosphenes, and so on without yielding up their intentional aspect. He is determined to link the external object, which he takes as given, with the internal presentation. He notes that his fellow-countryman, Galileo, was among the first scientists to make the sharp distinction between the internal sensation and the outer cause, but acknowledges the apparent challenge to the materialist scientist posed by this hypothesis, since it regarded as real something that appears obstinately beyond scientific description. Manzotti takes the view that the explanatory gap only exists because of a refusal to see perception as a Whiteheadian process in which sensation and cause cannot be detached from each other. The color of, say, a red ball, is not to be lodged either on the surface of the ball nor in the neural structures in the brain that are the end-point of the process, but in the process as a whole. The process is "partially outside the brain and partially inside it," thus collapsing the distinction between sensation and perception. By this device he claims to have escaped both dualism and naive realism, as well as Daniel Dennett's dismissal of what he takes to be generally accepted criteria of qualia (that they are ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly apprehensible). He concludes with an examination of difficult cases, such as hallucination, by tracing their causal histories to past experiences.

John R. Smythies, the psychologist, has been a stalwart of the belief in qualia, from his first endeavor in the field, *Analysis of Perception*, published (astonishingly) in 1956. He has not become an apostate to the cause, as did his colleague Lord Brain, and like our contemporary Frank Jackson, but has held to the notion of qualia over all these years, arguing tenaciously for their inclusion in a materialist science. His latest contribution here is a robust attack on direct realism (dealing, for example, with one of the "familiar objections," the vicious regress of homunculi). He also presents the notion of perception not being a reproduction of what is "out there" as perfectly plausible from a scientific point of view. He also has a section on the "binding problem," that is, how the brain unifies the deliverances of the different sense modalities (see O'Dea, this vol.), and provides significant evidence from the recovery of brain-damaged patients.

But, since attack proverbially is the best form of defense, there are also numerous detailed criticisms of opposing views, both representationalist and tough-minded-physicalist, and these have been grouped under the heading of “attacks.”

The first, that of Mark Crooks, is an attack on eliminativism, the thesis that there are no qualia whatsoever. This is a summary way of dealing with the imaginary danger that adhering to the notion of qualia inescapably leads to either dualism or relativism. Instead of interpreting perception as wholly definitive of qualia, as the transparency thesis has it (as we shall see in a moment), the supporters of this view, notably Daniel C. Dennett, Paul M. Churchland, and Patricia S. Churchland, hold that sensing, in being reducible to neural architecture, neither has nor requires any phenomenological aspect. Qualia do not exist within this theory, being only the outcome of a folk interpretation of the actual case. The whole problem of how Locke’s “sensation” and “reflection” are to be related is thus rendered unreal in a theory that, by definition, is materialistic, so one need not concern oneself with issues such as how a visual field registers the nature of external or internal entities, which are, of course, believed in without question. The metaphysical dilemma thus evaporates. Were it a cogent argument, all defenses of qualia could be regarded as ingenious scholastic constructions devoid of any purchase on the world. It is important, then that a refutation of this “neurophilosophy,” as Patricia Churchland calls it, is carried through, and this is what Mark Crooks has undertaken here. The core of his argument relies on showing how the eliminativists surreptitiously retain a commitment to qualia while apparently rejecting the notion. In defining the perception of a distinct sensation (such as the tartness of lemon juice), Paul Churchland, for example, in a covert operation that he is not aware he is performing, “confounds a percept with its cause.” This can be seen to be the result of providing a premise that is actually no more than a convenient act of legislation that identifies “object” with “percept,” which, naturally, escapes the problem of having to explain how something that uses an indirect path to external existence can have as its product reliable knowledge. Crooks presents a number of other examples of what he calls “misleading fallacies of equivocation” (this vol.: 206). Patricia Churchland is accused of relying on a questionable philosophy of science to support her claims of intertheoretic identification that would allow her desired reductions to go through. He claims to show, for example, that “The Churchlands have inconsistently retained logical empiricism’s claim of identification of cross-theoretic properties while concurrently rejecting the premises on which those claims are based” (this vol.: 211–212).

Crooks concludes that few, if any, intertheoretic identities (of percepts with neural architecture) are admitted by the eliminativists, and those that are are no more than “misidentified psychophysical correspondences.”

There is a particular target for attack that qualiaphiles have come to prefer: the currently popular claim that qualia can be fully accounted for by the “transparency thesis.” This is specifically described by those attacking it, as will be seen, but, in brief, it is the theory that phenomenal experience is fully explicable in terms of what human beings detect by its means. For example, if one looks at the superb greenness of a lagoon beside the holiday atoll, there is no way one can detach that greenness from the reality of the lagoon. The “intentionality,” as its proponents are fond of saying, wholly explicates the sensory experience, exhausting all that can be said of it: hence, there is no way in which the sensory can be separated from its import. If it fully accounted for this, then there are no qualia, no “sense-data,” no awkward dangles that smack of the occult that can tempt the unwise into dualism, relativism, and the rest. It is another attempt to bridge the imaginary space between our perceptions and the knowledge we impute to them. What could be plainer than the fact that we “look through” our sensations to unmistakable singular entities to the point in the argument where sensations can drop out of consideration altogether as supposed screens between us and the things and persons around us, which are all visibly “thus-and-so”?

Howard Robinson, a dualist like his namesake, roundly turns on Frank Jackson for his abandonment of the qualia cause, taking up the knowledge argument where Jackson left off. Jackson declared his apostasy precisely because he saw the transparency argument as providing a ready confirmation of direct access to knowledge of external things. Robinson argues that representationalism fails as an account of experience as a whole, particularly because it is unable to provide a satisfying explanation of hallucination. He mentions phosphenes, which, being the result of a direct stimulus to the brain, do not of themselves “represent” anything. I might add here that in childhood, I was mystified by the strange patterns I saw in the dark when I was coughing (see Boyle 1964 [1664]: 12) and then could gain no knowledge of them whatever. In addition, the experience of hallucinations remains stubbornly real, with the result that tough-minded physicalists cannot dismiss them as imaginary. He regards it as implausible that one should attempt to deny that hallucinations resemble veridical experiences in their phenomenology. It is worth appending the note here that M. J. M. Martin, who is one of Robinson’s targets, leaves out of his account altogether the fact that hallucinations can be so chaotic as to be

unobjectifiable, and thus nonrepresentational (as in hypnagogic visions). Robinson also considers Michael Tye's discussion of Ned Block's argument about orgasm (Block 1995; Tye 1995b) and concludes that it commits him to a "radically reductive account if the experience itself."

Torin Alter is also concerned to defend the knowledge argument from its recent attackers. The most recent form of attack has been to claim that there are cases in which acquaintance with the nature of the phenomenal has been achieved without actual experience of that phenomenon. They opponents bring forward as evidence Hume's "missing shade of blue" and various thought experiments in which "RoboMarys" and "Swamp Marys" have knowledge of the phenomenal without actually having had the experience. Alter examines with patient care these various claims, and produces counterarguments to show that it is not a priori deducibility of phenomena that is arrived at but dispositional states. These, in effect, amount to a smuggling of the existence of qualia as a concealed premise into an account that was ostensibly meant to be free of them. The proponents of this view already know what it is like to see color before they make their deduction. Alter actually accuses Dennett's "RoboMary" of "cheating."

Barry Maund sets about an attack on the "strong intentionalists," who argue that there is no need for a strong account of qualia since all their character can be explained in terms of their intentional content. If he is right, then the intentionalism–transparency route to external knowledge can be shown not to achieve the breakthrough it is in search of, that what they have won has not the reliability they claim, and that they will be forced to accept that, in attacking a straw man, they have been blindly avoiding more intractable problems. Maund is careful at the outset to define qualia and show that, although the sensory phenomena and the subjective awareness of them are the most obvious candidates, there are also more subtle "feels" that are undoubtedly a part of our consciousness, such as those that accompany our ordinary understanding (even of something as mundane as one's response to the query "Would you like a cup of tea?"), which ought not to be omitted from consideration. Maund takes a firm line on the non-epistemicity of sensations, emphasizing their "intrinsic, non-intentional features." The supporters of the transparency theory (Harman, Tye, Byrne, Crane) discount the possibility of the non-epistemic entirely, confining the phenomenal, that is, sensation, completely within intentional bounds. Maund points out that the transparency theorists operate with altogether too narrow a definition of qualia, ignoring empirical facts that appear to demonstrate non-intentional characteristics (such as the blind regaining sight; and hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery).

However, the central weakness of the notion of transparency is that it is forced to try to explain the phenomenal in terms of the “physical qualities of physical bodies.” The theorists of transparency, aware of this, do attempt such a reduction, for example, in the reduction of surface color to spectral reflectance, but as Hardin, Thompson, Maund, and others have pointed out, such a reduction has been shown to be flawed. They have tried to refute this objection, but their response rests overmuch on an idealized view of a “normal” observer (see Hardin, in this vol.: 145–148). Maund concludes with a refutation of Tim Crane’s version of transparency, which, he believes, ignores obvious features of phenomenal experience.

A similar criticism is that of Amy Kind, for she too regards the case for transparency as employing an insufficiently broad definition of qualia. A closer investigation of the phenomenology of our sensory experience reveals aspects that cannot be explained merely by detailing the recognizable, intentional features of everyday things and persons. She examines first what she calls some “exotic” cases, but then shows how the deliverances of that inquiry are just as applicable to the entities of mundane perception. There are two camps of opponents to qualia, those physicalists who are convinced that qualia cannot exist since they are not explicable in any current neurophysiological science, and the representationalists for whom all sensory experience can be lodged within conscious perception. The state of the argument appears to be that the latter believe that their case is plausible, even proven, and thus the ball is in the qualiophile court to provide an answer to these strong objections. Kind sees the phenomenological data as proving the contrary, that qualia do exist, and not only in the exotic cases (that of blurry images and phosphenes, which are obviously not “transparent” in any direct way). A mundane example is that of attending to a pain, which (as Maund also points out) cannot be reduced to the idea that it specifies its location (one can add here what V. S. Ramachandran and Sandra Blakeslee have documented, that it is not uncommon in injured patients for pains to be felt in a different part of the body from the actual damage; Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1999: ch. 2). The thesis also is revealed as inadequate to explain the phenomenology of emotions and moods. She concludes by denying outright the claim that we can never be aware of the sensory features of our experience apart from what we are been taught is “objectively” before us. One wonders, indeed, how any teaching and learning could go on if everything were “transparent” in the manner described.

John O’Dea takes up an unusual contention of Michael Tye, that the binding problem (i.e., the means by which the mind fits together the

inputs from the different sense modalities), results in it being correct to deny that there is a specifically visual experience as distinct from a tactile or auditory or gustatory one. Watching a TV advertisement, for example, you are subjected to a succession of sounds (words, music, noises of various kinds) which are deliberately, more often than not, synesthetically bound together with the changes in the images with which you are presented, with the result that you cannot help but link them (think of Walt Disney's *Fantasia*). Tye asks how an explanation of the unity of consciousness is to be achieved if, as qualiphiles maintain, there is a stubborn uniqueness about each modality that marks it off from all the others. He proposes instead an "experienced togetherness" in which there are no such sense-specific experiences. O'Dea, using an example from H. P. Grice, argues that this view leaves out the fact that the intentional contents are differently presented in different sense-modalities. He cites experiments that show that the projected unities can often be mistaken: a notable instance is that of the ventriloquist's performance, where the puppet's jaw movements and its "body-language" induce us to attribute the source of sound to the puppet and not the ventriloquist. One can also instance those psychological experiments in which a subject is fooled into thinking a false hand within her visual range that is being touched is her own hand. O'Dea also notes that the form of binding varies: in the case of a blue pebble, the blue invests the whole shape of the pebble (an "intermodal" blending, a binding of sensory elements to each other) whereas in the case of us dropping the pebble and hearing a click as it hits another, there is a mere coinciding of sight and sound (an "intramodal" blending, a binding of modalities to one object). These bindings are "psychological facts" about the act of perception rather than facts about the object perceived, which implies the falsity of transparency.

Martine Nida-Rümelin argues that the transparency thesis fails in different ways for our experiences of color and shape. In her view, "phenomenal character" (the term she prefers to "qualia") is "an intrinsic property of the experiencing subject" (this vol.: 309). She concedes that there is an intimate relation between phenomenal character and content. In order to refer to sensory experiences we often use the content as a convenient mode of reference (on this point, see Maund 1976: 62), but this does not imply that there are not "cases of misrepresentation" (which must be the case if learning is to be possible), nor does it exclude the possibility that "there are experiences with phenomenal character but without representational content," the existence of latter being enough to overturn representationalism (see the discussion on the non-epistemic above). Colors may

appear to be properties of objects, “but it is doubtful that they also appear to be *objective* in any more substantial sense” (this vol.: 314). It is plain that a judgment about the color of something can be *both* a judgment about the object *and* a judgment about one’s visual experience. Neither the concept of being blue nor the concept of a blueness experience is more fundamental than the other. To use the term “introspection”—or Block’s term, “mental paint” (though the latter is probably just a mischievous challenge)—skews a proper understanding of the process. Nida-Rümelin argues that a transparency statement cannot avoid a reference to phenomenal character, however much it would prefer to conceal the fact. Finally, she claims that it is impossible to carry through a direct reduction of phenomenal character to a material base without begging the question of the subject of experience, and this is noticeably absent from the transparency thesis.

Diana Raffman has a similar aim to that of Nida-Rümelin, that is, to show how proponents of the transparency thesis cannot escape covert reliance on the phenomenal quality of sensory experiences when they try to equate “outer” qualities with “inner,” with the result that inner qualities disappear into outer ones. They believe that this support of what is supposed to be naive common sense (though many a layperson has doubts about the directness of his or her sensory experiences) would banish at one go the problem of the reliability of what passes for knowledge, as well as getting rid of the troublesome apparent resistance of the phenomenal to scientific explanation. She begins with the concession that awareness of content can infuse phenomenal experience, but denies that definition of the content “exhausts that awareness.” It is vital that the would-be materialist does justice to our intuitions about the sensory, in particular, by explaining how one could be aware of content without having access through the sensory fields: “*How content gets fixed, and how one gains awareness of that content, are two different questions*” (this vol.: 326). One answer that is given is that experiencing external color, say, red, consists in tokening a mental predicate “RED.” Raffman believes that one cannot equate a conceptual representation with a perceptual one, though one can, if one chooses, talk of the first as a “representation,” but that would not capture the sensory feature, only classify it. She draws attention to what is missing in this account by having the reader imagine she presents an actual example of red within her text. What this makes clear is that the tokening of a word cannot “constitute a *look*.” This makes plain that the representationalist’s argument includes a covert stipulation about “a (hitherto unknown) kind of mental representational vehicle that has all and

only the properties that his theory requires" (this vol.: 330). She traces this stipulation in the arguments of both Michael Tye and Gilbert Harman. She concludes with a section in which she deals with some possible objections to her case. The problem of how a "word-picture" could be effective without awareness of intrinsic phenomenal properties has not been solved.

In the final essay, my own attack on the transparency thesis comes from another quarter, providing an ethical criticism of its beliefs (for an extended treatment, see Wright 2005). I regard the discovery and constant adjustment of objectivity as an endless intersubjective process, in which the sensory fields provide evidence that is fundamentally corrigible, though they themselves are brute at the level of registration of input. The fields covary with the inputs at the sensory organs in a "structurally isomorphic" manner. Just as the laser beams moving over the surface of the disc inside a DVD-player can covary in subtle ways with the states of the phosphor cells on the TV screen and the vibrations that issue from the stereo loudspeakers and yet bear no direct similarity to them, so too our sensory experience covaries, not necessarily exactly, with the inputs, but *bears no direct resemblance to them*. This implies, for example, that there is no "pictorial" similarity between our experience of color and the causes that affect our eye, and that, by the same token, external surfaces are not colored with the phenomenal colors that we sense—although there is a principled covariance. These fields provide evidential access to the real—in particular, to the features that affect our creaturely life, and these, initially as a result of pain and pleasure, become embedded in memory as unitary gestalts. They are honed to greater success there by subsequent encounters, remaining able to track change in those encounters, and, most importantly, are tabbed in memory with fear and desire. This is why I call in philosophy for the word "mind" to be seen first as a *verb*—as in "Mind the thorns on the rose-bush by the door!," and not as a noun, as in "the philosophy of mind." This emphasis on its meaning as a verb makes motivation a key issue in the philosophy of consciousness. Such a process, with which evolution has provided our animal ancestors, has, by further evolution, received an enhancement as a result of the development of language, which essentially enables updatings of percepts to be proposed among species members. Such updatings necessarily involve trust between agents about what is to be considered "an" object, for the hypothesis of there being a "common," singular entity is a necessary mutual ploy to get a rough coordination of understandings. Consequently, the nature of that trust becomes critical, since it is attended with unavoidable risk. To imagine

that the *singularity* of a current objectification, mutual by the very mode of its creation and maintenance, already exists as a given in the real is thus an act of undue complacency. Indeed, since it ignores the risk inherent in a proper faith between agents, it can thus be said that such complacency partakes of superstition. However, this is what is implied in any philosophy of perception that assumes a singularity of entities without realizing the ethical responsibility of that strictly false assumption, and transparency theory, in *believing* the assumption, even though that assumption is still a practically necessary, mutual, regulative idea, is thus open to that criticism.

As I noted at the beginning of this introduction, the existence of qualia has for many years been regarded as an eccentric notion, a relic of early Enlightenment “natural philosophy,” a Galilean misconception that unfortunately led to “infamous” relativistic, even occult, conclusions. Notoriously, this notion has been presented as comical, half-baked fantasy by Daniel Dennett (2006: 77–102). It is no surprise that such defenses of qualia that appeared were automatically ignored for it was taken as read that no professional philosopher would so imperil his reputation—or career—by espousing a belief in them. That some psychologists and neurophysiologists (John Smythies, Lord Brain, R. L. Gregory) still showed signs of tinkering with the idea only betrayed their philosophical amateurishness. The older philosophers who favored qualia, like Wilfrid Sellars, Jonathan Harrison, Virgil C. Aldrich, and J. L. Mackie, were given respectful but unenthusiastic hearings (see, as representative, the response to Sellars’s Carus Lectures, in the *Monist* of January 1981). The earlier volume I edited (Wright 1993) met with the same indifference: I do not know of a single philosophical journal that ran a review of it in spite of the fact that it contained essays by reputable philosophers and psychologists.

From my own point of view the motivation for this neglect is traceable to an irrational source, from which spring the accusations of solipsism and relativism that are deemed to provide powerful refutation of a qualia-based theory. I also regard the belief that to countenance the existence of qualia is reactionary and unscientific, tempting one too easy to fall in with Dennett’s mockery, as equally insecure. However, it may come to be argued that this is an unfair ad hominem attack, one ignoring in its turn the positions taken up by the other side. But mine is not the only novel objection in this volume. Whether or not the counterarguments here are cogent, there does seem to have been a hubris-like overconfidence among the qualiaphobes, together, one might claim, with a certain professional

insularity, as evidenced in the refusal to encounter the qualiophile objections, except in those limited cases mentioned at the outset. It is to be hoped that, from this time forth, the philosophical conversation about sensation and perception can be conducted in a less myopic, less dismissive manner, with the objections here presented not thoughtlessly overlooked; otherwise, the qualiaphobe could fitly be likened to the cartoon cat who has run off the edge of a cliff but hasn't yet fallen, *because it hasn't looked down*.

References

- Aldrich, Virgil C. 1980. Mirrors, pictures, words, perceptions. *Philosophy* 55: 39–56.
- Armstrong, D. M. 1966. *Perception and the Physical World*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Austin, J. L. 1962. *Sense and Sensibilia*. London and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berkeley, G. 1972 [1713]. *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*. In *A New Theory of Vision and Other Writings*, ed. G. J. Warnock, 197–303. London: Collins Fontana.
- Block, N. 1980. Are absent qualia impossible? *Philosophical Review* 89, 2: 257–274.
- Block, N. 1995. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 18: 227–247.
- Block, N. 2003. Mental paint. In *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*, ed. Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A Bradford Book. Available at <http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/mentalpaint.pdf/>.
- Boyle, R. 1964 [1664]. *Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours*. Facsimile edition. Ed. M. B. Hall. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation.
- Boyle, R. 1979 [1666]. *Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Brain, W. R. 1951. *Mind, Perception, and Science*. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.
- Broad, C. D. 1923. *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
- Brown, H. 1987. *Observation and Objectivity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, D. 2006. Perception and the Fall from Eden. In *Perceptual Experience*, ed. T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 49–125. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Clark, A. 2000. *A Theory of Sentience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Collins, A. W. 1967. The epistemological status of the concept of perception. *Philosophical Review* 76: 436–459.
- Condillac, E. B. de 1930 [1754]. *Condillac's Treatise on the Sensations*. London: Favil Press.
- Dennett, D. C. 1985. *Quining qualia*. Medford, Mass.: Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University.
- Dennett, D. C. 1991. *Consciousness Explained*. London: Penguin Books.
- Dennett, D. C. 2006. *Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A Bradford Book.
- Dretske, F. 1981. *Knowledge and the Flow of Information*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Dretske, Fred. 1997. *Naturalizing the Mind*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A Bradford Book.
- Edelman, G. M., and G. Tononi. 2000. *Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination*. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press.
- Evans, G. 1982. *The Varieties of Reference*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Feuerbach, L. 1903–11. *Sämtliche Werke*, 13 vols. Ed. W. Bolin and F. Jodl. Stuttgart: Fromann Verlag.
- Fitzgerald, P. 1979. Review of F. Jackson, *Perception*. *International Philosophical Quarterly* 19, 1: 103–113.
- Foster, J. 1982. *The Case for Idealism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Gadamer, H.-G. 1975. *Truth and Method*. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Garnett, A. C. 1965. *The Perceptual Process*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Gendler, T. S., and J. Hawthorne, eds. 2006. *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Gerdil, G. S. 1748. *Défense du Sentiment du P. Malebranche sur la nature et l'origine des idées, contre l'examen de M. Locke*. Turin: L'Imprimerie Royale.
- Gibson, J. J. 1968. *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Gregory, R. L. 1993. Hypothesis and illusion: Explorations in perception and science. In *New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception*, ed. E. L. Wright, 232–262. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Grice, H. P. 1967. Meaning. In *Philosophical Logic*, ed. P. F. Strawson, 39–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Gunther, Y. H., ed. 2003. *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A Bradford Book.
- Hamlyn, D. W. 1961. *Sensation and Perception*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Hardin, C. L. 1988. *Color for Philosophers*. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett.
- Harman, G. 1990. The intrinsic quality of experience. In *Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. J. Tomberlin, 31–52. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview.
- Harrison, J. 1976. Direct perception and the sense-datum theory. In *Contemporary British Philosophy: 4th Series, Personal Statements*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Harrison, J. 1985. *A Philosopher's Nightmare*. Nottingham: Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham.
- Heffner, J. 1981. The causal theory of visual perception: Its scientific basis and philosophical implications. *International Philosophical Quarterly* 21, 3: 303–332.
- Helmholtz, H. von. 1868. *Helmholtz on Perception: Its Physiology and Development*. Ed. R. M. Warren and R. P. Warren. New York: John Wiley.
- Helmholtz, H. von. 1962. *Treatise on Physiological Optics*, 3 vols. Trans. J. P. C. Southall. New York: Dover.
- Hermelin, B. 1976. Coding and the sense modalities. In *Early Childhood Autism*, ed. L. Wing, 135–168. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Hobbes, T. 1839. *Elements of Philosophy, The First Section: Concerning Body*. Trans. Sir Bart W. Molesworth. London: John Bohn.
- Holman, E. L. 1979. The problem of theory-laden perception. *Philosophical Studies* 35: 91–99.
- Hyman, J. 2007. *The Objective Eye: Form and Reality in the Theory of Art*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Jackson, F. 1977. *Perception*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jones, O. R. 1972. After-images. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 9: 150–158.
- James, W. 1977. *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition*. Ed. J. J. McDermott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kelly, J. S. 1989. On neutralizing introspection: The data of sensuous awareness. *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27, 1: 29–53.
- Landesman, C. 1989. *Color and Consciousness: An Essay in Metaphysics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Lewes, G. H. 1874. *Problems of Life and Mind*, 4 vols. London: Trübner.

- Long, A. A. 1986. *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*. London: Duckworth.
- Lockwood, M. 1989. *Mind, Brain, and the Quantum: The Compound "I."* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Lowe, E. J. 1996. *Subjects of Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- MacClachlan, D. L. C. 1989. *Philosophy of Perception*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Mackie, J. L. 1976. *Problems from Locke*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Malebranche, N. 1992 [1674]. *Philosophical Reflections*. Ed. S. Nadler. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett.
- Mandelbaum, M. 1966. *Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception: Historical and Critical Studies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Matilal, B. 1986. *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Matthen, M. 2005. *Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Maund, J. B. 1975. The Representative Theory of Perception. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 5: 41–55.
- Maund, J. B. 1976. The non-sensuous epistemic account of perception. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13, 1: 57–62.
- Maund, J. B. 1995. *Colours: Their Nature and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mayne, Z. 1728. *Two Dissertations Concerning Sense and the Imagination*. London: J. Tonson.
- McDowell, J. 1994. *Mind and World*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Mulhall, S. 2007. Because it's pink. *London Review of Books* 29, 2: 26–27.
- Mundle, C. W. K. 1971. *Perception: Facts and Theories*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Noë, A. 2006. Experience without the head. In *Perceptual Experience*, ed. T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 411–433. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Oakes, R. 1982. Seeing our own faces: a paradigm for indirect realism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 42, 3: 442–449.
- Peacocke, C. 1983. *Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Peacocke, C. 1992. *A Study of Concepts*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A Bradford Book.
- Peacocke, C. 2003. Nonconceptual content: kinds, rationales, relations. In *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*, ed. Y. H. Gunther, 309–322. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A Bradford Book.
- Pennycuik, J. 1971. *In Contact with the Physical World*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Perkins, M. 1983. *Sensing the World*. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett.
- Pitcher, G. 1971. *A Theory of Perception*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Price, H. H. 1961 [1932]. *Perception*. London: Methuen.
- Price, H. H. 1964. Appearing and appearances. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 1, 1: 3–19.
- Ramachandran, V. S., and S. Blakeslee. 1999. *Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the Architecture of Mind*. London: Fourth Estate.
- Reid, T. 1970 [1764]. *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*. Ed. T. Duggan. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Reid, T. 1941 [1785]. *Essays in the Intellectual Powers of Man*. Ed. A. D. Woozley. London: Macmillan.
- Robinson, H. 1994. *Perception*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Robinson, W. S. 2004. *Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rorty, R. 1980. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Ryle, G. 1966. *The Concept of Mind*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Sellars, R. W. 1916. *Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Sellars, R. W. 1930. Realism, naturalism, and humanism. In *Contemporary American Philosophy*, vol. 2, ed. G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague, 261–285. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Sellars, R. W. 1932. *The Philosophy of Physical Realism*. New York: Macmillan.
- Sellars, R. W. 1965. The aim of critical realism. In *Perception and the Physical World*, ed. R. J. Hirst, 235–244. New York: Macmillan.
- Sellars, W. 1981. The lever of Archimedes; Naturalism and process; Is consciousness physical? The Carus Lectures. *Monist* 64, 1: 3–90.

- Shoemaker, S. 1994. Phenomenal character. *Noûs* 28, 1: 21–38.
- Smythies, J. R. 1956. *Analysis of Perception*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Tye, M. 1994. Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. *Noûs* 38, 2: 159–183.
- Tye, M. 1995a. Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap. *Behavioural and Brain Sciences* 18: 268–269.
- Tye, M. 1995b. *Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A Bradford Book.
- Tye, M. 2000. *Consciousness, Color, and Content*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/A Bradford Book.
- Tye, M. 2006. Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grain. In *Perceptual Experience*, ed. T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 504–530. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Ward, A. 1976. Direct and indirect realism. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13, 4: 287–294.
- Warnock, G. J. 1955–56. Seeing. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 55: 201–218.
- Woodworth, R. S. 1947. Reinforcement of perception. *American Journal of Psychology* 60: 119–224.
- Wright, E. L. 1990. New representationalism. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 20, 1: 65–92.
- Wright, E. L., ed. 1993. *New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Wright, E. L. 2005. *Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Yolton, J. 1984. *Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.