

# Hegel's Naturalism

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*Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life*

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OXFORD  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

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# Disenchanted Aristotelian Naturalism

## A: Hegel's Aristotelian Turn

By his own account, Hegel takes his views on Aristotle to have shaped his entire thinking about how best to conceptualize our own status as creatures with minds and how to think about the role that practical reason plays in human life.<sup>1</sup> Given what Hegel says about Aristotle's importance for his own views, a quick look at Hegel's own summary of Aristotle's practical philosophy can help us to orient ourselves in his thought.

It is a commonplace, although a highly contested one, to say both that the Greeks had no concept of the will and that the concept of the will was first introduced by the Christians (specifically, by Augustine).<sup>2</sup> Hegel obviously does not hold that view, since he notes that “the best thoughts we have . . . on the will, on freedom and on further terms such as ‘imputing responsibility,’ ‘intention,’ etc. are, all the way up to modern times, Aristotle's own thoughts on the matter.”<sup>3</sup> (Again, it is striking that he gives Aristotle, and not Kant, credit for this, even though he is quite clear that he thinks that Aristotle's views need amplification about one very key aspect of the nature of freedom and the will.)

For Aristotle, the highest good, the final end that such willing aims at is, of course, *eudaimonia*, happiness (or what may also be rendered as “flourishing” or “getting along well in life”). Hegel gives his own interpretation of this by putting it into his own terminology (and thus giving us a clue as to how his own views on this are to be taken). Happiness, *eudaimonia*, is, he says, “the energy of the (complete) life willed for its own sake, according to the (complete) virtue existing in and for itself.”<sup>4</sup> The energy of a whole life willed for its own sake involves two elements—that of reason and that of passion and inclination—and the two must exist in a unity for there to be virtue.<sup>5</sup> On Hegel's reading, Aristotle holds that the agent cannot act without such inclination: “Impulse, inclination is what drives the agent; it is the particular, which, with regards to what is practical, more precisely pushes for realization in the subject.”<sup>6</sup> Thus, all the virtues involve a balance, a “mean” between the universally rational and the particular aspects of agency, a kind of “more or less” that cannot in principle be given a “pure”—that is, a priori—specification. That implies, of course, that at least for Aristotle (on

Hegel's reading of him), there can be no "pure practical reason" that can specify the virtues.

This also suggests that Hegel both accepts Aristotle's own framing of the issue and accepts what Aristotle takes to be the problems in such a view. Indeed, it seems to be that Hegel develops his own conception of freedom as a way of "being at one with oneself" (*Beisichsein*) out of Aristotle's conception of what counts as voluntary action.

Aristotle himself conceived of the voluntariness of an action as involving three aspects: First, an action is "voluntary" when the "moving principle" is within the agent; second, when the agent himself is the origin of the action, or, as Aristotle also puts it, when it is in accord with the agent's impulses;<sup>7</sup> and, third, when the action is not the result of an "external force."<sup>8</sup> Hegel restates the Aristotelian view in his own terms so that it comes out saying that the "inner, moving principle" becomes actualized, that is, when the "inner" formation of an intention, made in light of a responsiveness to reasons, is actualized in an "outward" action in conformity with the intention.<sup>9</sup> In its most succinct version, this view would hold that an action is in conformity with the intention when the content of both is the same (when the action just is the intention fully realized), and, as Hegel gradually fleshes out this idea, it becomes the claim that the interpretation of the whole complex of "intention-action" on the part of the actor must be in conformity with the interpretation given by others, who, for whatever reason, are called on or are in a position to assess the action.<sup>10</sup> How do we reach that conclusion, and what would it mean?

We are self-conscious, self-interpreting animals, natural creatures whose "non-naturalness" is not a metaphysical difference (as that, say, between spiritual and physical "stuff") or the exercise of a special form of causality.<sup>11</sup> Rather, our status as *geistig*, as "minded" creatures is a status we "give" to ourselves in the sense that it is a practical achievement. Indeed, our continuity with the natural world (specifically, with animals) is at the center of Hegel's Aristotelian conception of mindful agency more than it could possibly be for either Augustine or Kant (or any of their voluntarist comrades). In Hegel's terms, animals also have the capacity to be "at one with themselves" and even to have both "selves" and, as we shall see, "subjectivity."<sup>12</sup> However, Hegel holds that human agents, by virtue of thinking of themselves as animals, thereby become special animals, namely, self-interpreting ones, and, as we have already noted, that makes all the difference.

Hegel's discussion of animals is of great importance in figuring out what he means by calling his own philosophy an "idealism." "Idealism" is usually taken either to be the doctrine that all supposed physical objects are really just (somehow) subjective representations in somebody's mind or to be some kind of metaphysical doctrine to the effect that all that is genuinely real is some sort of spiritual or mental substance. Hegel has long been interpreted as a monist idealist of the latter sort who holds that all of the world should be interpreted as some kind of development of a spiritual substance, *Geist*.<sup>13</sup> That picture of Hegel's thought

would have us believe that he subscribes to something like the view that everything from stars to rocks to animals to humans is an emanation from or a development of a single spiritual substance.

Yet when Hegel discusses animals, he also calls them “idealists.” The language is striking. Animals, he says, are not “metaphysical realists,” since when they encounter things, they do not take them to be merely mental in their constitution. Instead, they “take hold of them, grasp them and devour them.”<sup>14</sup> If animals demonstrate the truth of idealism by devouring things, Hegel’s own idealism cannot therefore consist in a denial of the materiality of nature. Indeed, one of the clues to Hegel’s conception of his own idealism—although he himself seemed to prefer the term “speculative philosophy” as a label for what he was doing—is the way that, as he puts it, animals deny the “self-sufficiency” of worldly things.

The specific character of the idealism that is at stake emerges in Hegel’s discussion of nature. Hegel’s conception of nature in general is that of a disenchanted Aristotelian naturalism. (The term *disenchanted* is a bit overused, but no better term suggests itself.)<sup>15</sup> This comes especially to the forefront in his “philosophy of nature” (an inexact translation of what he called his *Naturphilosophie*).<sup>16</sup> First, Hegel has no quarrel with the natural sciences. Hegel, in fact, says that “not only must philosophy be in agreement with the experience of nature, but the *origin and formation* of philosophical science has empirical physics as its presupposition and condition” (a claim that, taken out of context, might sound as if it came from some twentieth-century adherent to Quine’s naturalism).<sup>17</sup> The project of the natural sciences involves the construction of theories (which Hegel divides into mechanical, physical, chemical, and biological theories) that are to be tested against empirical observation. Nonetheless, even if the best conception of “nature” is to be considered as equivalent to whatever it is that the natural sciences determine to be the case, the issue still remains open as to whether *that* nature, as described by the results of the natural sciences, is the whole, is all there is to things. Or to put it in the other terms we have used, although mechanics may tell us all there is know about the determinations of matter in motion, do such determinations fully and without residue express the unconditioned or, to shift to the more exuberant language Hegel inherited from Schelling, the absolute?

Second, what thus distinguishes Hegel’s *Naturphilosophie*, his “philosophy of nature,” from physics itself is that the philosophy of nature aims at producing a metaphysics or, as Hegel calls it, the “diamond net” into which we make the world intelligible—a comprehension, in Wilfrid Sellars’s famous phrase, of how things (in the broadest sense of the term) hang together (in the broadest sense of the term).<sup>18</sup> Not surprisingly, Hegel even rejects the idea that the real distinction between science and philosophy is that between the empirical and the a priori. After all, mechanics uses mathematics, which is the gold standard of all a priori disciplines. Even for the most seemingly a priori of his own works—the first two volumes of his *Science of Logic*—Hegel claims that his theory “is consequently . . . a critique which considers [determinations of thought] not in terms of the abstract

form of apriority as opposed to the a posteriori, but rather considers them themselves in their particular content."<sup>19</sup> In fact, in his actual description of scientific practice, he accuses some of the natural sciences of his time of being too metaphysical and thus failing to be sufficiently empirical.<sup>20</sup>

Third, what Hegel takes from his immensely detailed study of the state of the art of the natural sciences in the early nineteenth century is that there are three different types of explanation for what is really at work (*wirklich*) in the natural world.<sup>21</sup> There are mechanical explanations, which explain the whole in terms of the causal interactions of its parts (each of which is identifiable outside of its position in the whole). However, mechanical explanations (or so he thought, basing his claim on the going physical theories of the time) cannot explain how different substances are generated. For that, one requires chemical explanations to account for how different substances have an affinity or lack of affinity for each other in various combinations (in which the chemical "whole" thus plays an explanatory role different from what it does in mechanical explanations). Finally, there are biological explanations that are teleological in a functionalist sense, where the parts (as organs) cannot be identified as organic functions outside of their place within the organic whole—that is, one cannot identify an eye as an eye without taking into account how it functions in the organism for sight. Each of these types of explanations runs into fundamental philosophical difficulty when it claims to be absolute, to be an explanation that requires no further explanation outside of itself (to be, in effect, the unconditioned). None of them runs into any a priori difficulty when they are taken to be the explanatory enterprises they are.

The philosophy of nature thus deals with the kinds of conceptual problems that arise when anything "finite" is asserted to be the "unconditioned." The philosophy of nature is an investigation of the antinomies produced by the key concepts of the natural sciences—if there are any antinomies there to be found.

A fully enchanted nature—one that is understood as the expression of some divine purpose or as the locus of unobservable potentials for perfection—is not one suitable for scientific investigation, although the reasons for this unsuitability emerged not primarily at first as the result of philosophical dissatisfaction with the concept of an enchanted nature. It was instead the success of natural science itself that showed that much of what had been considered to be an expression of the various perfections inherent in the natural order (such as the sharp distinction between movement in the sublunary and superlunary spheres) had been rendered obsolete by the construction of adequate scientific theories that were confirmed by empirical evidence.

This is not to say that Hegel simply cedes all authority to the natural sciences in interpreting nature. Rather, on his view, it is when we properly rethink the nature of our own mindful agency, *Geist*, that we come to see nature as the "other" of *Geist*. In Hegel's more dialectical terms, "we" as natural creatures make ourselves distinct from nature. This nature, from which we have distinguished ourselves, is not anything that stands, as it were, in a friendly relationship with us or

that is an expression of the grand providential plan of the universe. Indeed, such a disenchanted nature as a whole threatens no longer to be understood as responding to human aspirations at all, and if so, nature and religion part ways. It is thus in disenchanting nature and coming to a new understanding of ourselves that we make way for a genuinely naturalist, scientific account of nature, and, in turn, the success of the natural sciences further underwrites this new conception of *Geist*.

The task of a *Naturphilosophie* thus is linking natural science with metaphysics in something like the following sense.<sup>22</sup> It has to show what nature as a whole must be like if nature is indeed the kind of object that is best studied by empirical natural science. However, that kind of study is not itself a natural scientific empirical look at nature but rather an interpretive and evaluative look at science's study of nature. It attempts to show whether, for example, the kind of law/event model of explanation that dominates post-Baconian and post-Galilean science (which supplanted the older rationalist model of explaining nature in terms of inherent properties accessible to pure reason alone) can in fact be taken to be a rational account of nature as a whole, that is, of what nature, interpreted as governed by the law/event model of explanation, must itself be like. It must also evaluate the claim as to whether the disenchanted nature investigated by the natural sciences is itself absolute. Likewise, it has to show how the metaphysical issue between those two models of explanation does not threaten the rationality of the scientific enterprise altogether. The "thing" that the law/event model studies is, after all, an independent thing, identifiable apart from all its other relations and thus the proper object of a rigorously empirical study that looks for its causal relations to other things. However, the thing as so studied is itself dependent for what it is on its causal relations to other things. The "thing" is thus both independent and dependent, but, so Hegel's thought goes, this contested metaphysical status does not threaten the rationality of empirical science.

Now, not surprisingly, developments in the natural sciences since Hegel's own time have at least thrown into question, if not entirely invalidated, a great many of his particular views on scientific issues, but the way they have done this is fully consistent with Hegel's own views about the nature of conceptual content.

One of the many places where Hegel's own *Naturphilosophie* runs into trouble has to do with Hegel's own ideas about how best to comprehend biological explanation. Hegel thinks that the only rational position to take in biology is a form of holism, a rather strong position that seems to violate his own strictures on introducing metaphysical constraints on scientific theory. Relying on his tripartite characterization of explanations in nature (mechanical, chemical, and biological), Hegel concludes that, unlike mechanical wholes, organic wholes are simply not analyzable into their parts, and thus there can be no mechanical or purely chemical explanation of life.<sup>23</sup> Now, to be sure, that restraint comes, for Hegel, from the way nature actually is and not because philosophy is imposing some kind of a priori restraints on what can count as biology. In arguing for this restraint, Hegel is claiming that this is what empirical biology has revealed about nature (that is, up

until the 1820s). A *Naturphilosophie* must base its interpretation on those findings, not on some a priori scheme devised in advance of empirical biology.

In fact, to say that in principle there could never be any mechanical explanation of life unfortunately looks just like it is putting constraints on what empirical biology can find, a view that would violate Hegel's own views on the nature of conceptual content. Nonetheless, even if Hegel's claim is relativized into the more restricted view that, given the findings of biology in the 1820s, such explanation is impossible, it runs into a specific factual difficulty. In 1828, in Berlin—while Hegel was still alive and teaching (he died in 1831)—Friedrich Wöhler accidentally synthesized urea in his laboratory, thus demonstrating (although he had no prior intention to do so) that a discipline of organic chemistry was in principle possible. Wöhler's discovery set in motion a program for explaining the nature of organic matter in terms rooted in inorganic chemical and mechanical models.

Now, Hegel's particular discussions about the state of physics, chemistry, and biology have an unmistakable antiquarian tint to them, and it is fairly easy to keep adding to the list of scientific revolutions since Hegel's death in 1831, which heightens that tint even more. Since the invention of quantum chemistry in the twentieth century has thrown into question Hegel's own rejection of so-called mechanical models of explanation in chemistry, and since evolutionary theory after Darwin has reasonably shown that there are mechanisms at work in the origin of the species (natural selection and sexual selection), it thus seems odd to continue to deny that mechanical explanations can also have a perfectly good place in biological explanations of the world. Indeed, one way of reading Darwinian theory suggests that the equation of reductionism with mechanistic explanations (an implicit belief held by both Hegel and his Romantic counterparts) is itself not true. Robert Brandon, for example, has argued that it is surely an empirical question as to whether natural selection operates at the group level or the individual level, whereas metaphysical reductionism has to hold that any such group-level mechanistic explanation must be a priori reducible to lower level mechanistic workings.<sup>24</sup> To hold a priori that it must work at the individual level would thus amount to imposing metaphysical standards on the practice of empirical natural science, thus violating one of the crucial strictures Hegel himself puts on such accounts. (Hegel's own opposition to evolutionary accounts of the distinctions among species is a special case.)<sup>25</sup>

Hegel's overall point is that the problem with nature as it is conceived on the scientific model and reconstructed in *Naturphilosophie* is that it is a disenchanting nature. On its own, nature is incapable of organizing itself into better and worse exemplifications of anything. Hegel calls this incapability the "impotence of nature."<sup>26</sup> Indeed, it is only when life appears in nature that it even makes sense to speak of better and worse since only organisms display the kind of self-directing, functional structure that makes the application of such terms meaningful. However, even at the level of organic life, the stage of natural development at which the terms *better* and *worse* begin to become meaningful, nature remains



impotent since nature on its own cannot organize itself into something like the best version of a lion, a rose, or a trout, much less organize itself as a whole into a better whole.

As a whole, nature aims at nothing, even if there are some creatures in the natural order that do aim at some things.<sup>27</sup> In fact, taken as a whole, nature does not constitute a genuine “whole” at all, at least in the sense that nature “as a whole” cannot be made fully intelligible to pure reason. The intelligibility of nature as a whole is only partial, and the true understanding of nature thus requires not merely conceptual analysis but hard empirical work—the work of the natural sciences. This is a problem with nature—it is not in league with us—but it is not a problem, as it were, for nature itself. It is only when human mindful agency arrives on the planet that the issue arises about what it means for that kind of creature to be the best it can be, and that issue can only be formulated in terms of the human form of life as self-consciousness, where we, as self-interpreting animals, have a historically developing conception of what it is to be the best exemplifications of the agents we are and thus where we are in the position of actually aiming at realizing such a conceptions in our lives. Nature “as a whole” is present only to such self-conscious creatures in thought, which is to say “nature as a whole” is “ideal.”<sup>28</sup> Nature does not deal with itself as a whole. Nature has no problems with itself. It is we who have problems with nature.

## 1: Animal Life

The philosophical problem with organic life (and animal life in particular) is that reflection on it in terms of the natural sciences and our own experience of nature seem to lead in us opposite directions. As is often the case, Kant’s formulation of the problem points the way for Hegel. On the one hand, the world as we must experience it requires a mechanical explanation. On the other hand, we cannot make sense of organic life without bringing in the conception of teleology (of what an organ is for). As with several of Kant’s other antinomies, his solution was to say that although we find it unavoidable to ascribe purposes to organisms, we nonetheless cannot make sense of that within the way we must think of the world as a causal system. Our ascription of purposes has only subjective validity, something “we” must do in studying things—which we find unavoidable—and is not a feature of the things being studied.

Against the grain of many of the views prevailing in his own time, Hegel held that animal life must be understood in terms of having a kind of subjectivity on its own, a mode of self-relation as self-maintenance, and that this is not a matter of mere subjective validity. The animal organism, that is, is to be conceived as having a kind of self-contained striving within itself and thus as having a kind of self-relation in that it regulates itself by a series of mechanisms so that it can accomplish what is appropriate for it to accomplish as the animal that it is. As Hegel puts it, this gives us the first step in understanding what his idealist thesis is all about,

and it is not the thesis that everything is mental or spiritual in its makeup. Animal life is the first step in moving to idealism since—and it is important to underline Hegel's decidedly anti-Cartesian understanding of animal life here<sup>29</sup>—we recognize that animals have subjectivity in that we must speak of them as having an “inside” and an “outside” that are not merely that of “inside the skin” and “outside the skin.”<sup>30</sup> All organisms develop what Hegel calls a center in that the mechanical and biochemical processes of the organism are oriented around the organism's preserving and reproducing itself, and this is all the more pronounced in animal organisms.

Animals have an inwardness, and the animal must also do things to stay alive. Now, this inwardness is not that of a realm of special private mental facts accessible only to the animal, but a mode of registering both itself and its environment for the sake of its own preservation. The animal registers its environment through what Hegel calls sensation, *Empfindung* (which also carries the connotations of “feeling”).<sup>31</sup> For the animal, its environment is thus something “outer” to its own purposes (where the purposes are taken as the various organic functions working together to keep the animal alive and to reproduce itself). In Hegel's terms, the environment is the negative of the animal's inwardness in that it sets the limits against which the animal's own inwardness is determined. In this context, what that means is that the subjective interiority of an animal life-form can be genuinely determined only as demarcated from what it must sense as “outer” to itself. (We should also note that although it is we, not the nonlinguistic animal, who fully articulate the “outer” of the animal's “inner,” it is not “we” who determine what counts as the animal's functioning well.)

The existence of the animal is not that of a nonorganic thing, like a stone. Through its nervous system, the animal establishes a self-relation different from inorganic things.<sup>32</sup> Although the stone may indeed respond to its environment by, say, dissolving in humid conditions, and although it is in the nature of the stone to decompose by virtue of exposure to, say, salty water, the stone does not do anything to accomplish this.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, by virtue of having a nervous system, the animal establishes a relation to itself that gives it an “inner” that is not merely, as we mentioned, spatial in character (not merely “inside the skin”).<sup>34</sup> For Hegel, very importantly, animals may thus be said to be the subjects of their lives. Whereas the stone simply is, the animal is what it is by maintaining itself and therefore sustaining a different kind of self-relation.

This is what it means for the animal to have a teleological structure to itself—that is, that there are some things (organs) in it that can be said to work well or badly, given the animal's needs—and thus there are things that can be said to be good or bad for the animal. For this reason, with the appearance of organic life on the planet, disease also enters the picture, since for each animal or plant there is some way in which some organ or part of itself can be interfering with the plant's or the animal's achieving the goals that are built into that life-form. Because of this kind of self-relation, all animals (obviously including self-interpreting ones) can

become ill, can fail to function well, whereas the stone, as Hegel says, cannot become sick.<sup>35</sup> The way in which the concept of disease functions in our understandings of animal life shows that, first of all, we seek to explain it in purely physical terms—that the animal is in a certain state because of x, y, z factors—but its being in certain states interferes with its natural functioning when the animal is taken as a whole (as a distinct substance). To speak of diseases in plant and animal life is thus not merely a matter of subjective validity, of our having to describe things in this or that way because we have trouble doing otherwise. It is a matter of whether the plant or animal really is diseased, that is, really is in a state that interferes with its proper functioning.<sup>36</sup> If that is true, then there are functions “in” nature, although this does not imply any kind of metaphysical vitalism or require the postulation of new forces to explain the existence of such functions. Purposiveness exists in nature, even if nature as a whole is not purposive.

## 2: The Inwardness of Animal Life

The animal acts on its environment in light of its sensation, that is, its inward sensing of its outer environment. Hegel makes a terminological distinction between this meaning of *sensing* (as registering within itself the unity of itself and its environment) and *representation* (*Vorstellung*), which he reserves for self-reflective human consciousness. Hegel claims that the animal does indeed have experiential content in its sensing but that this content is not in the same shape as that which appears in human reflective consciousness (although Hegel also says that the content in an animal’s sensation may be regarded as only possible content, in that it cannot serve as a ground for further inference).<sup>37</sup>

The responsiveness an agent displays toward the world (the physical world and other agents) thus has various “moments” that can be distinguished although not separated from each other, each of which manifests a kind of self-presence. There is what Hegel calls the “soul,” the level of embodied engagement with the world and others in which a variety of animal motor skills are at work. At this level of engagement, one should expect that there will be far more at work in guiding and shaping behavior than what will be fully present to a subject in his most fully self-conscious life. However, exactly how such motor skills function (if and when they function at all) is a matter for empirical research, not for philosophical argument. (That prereflective grasp of things also means that we will not always be self-consciously responsive to reasons in our behavior, since there is more in our processing the world than appears in our conscious life. Our limited awareness of the world around us involves what Hegel calls an “infinite periphery.”)<sup>38</sup> This is again only an animal-level of normativity infused with a capacity for fully self-conscious normative behavior. In the terms of this level of speaking about agency, one cannot yet speak of there being a fully drawn distinction between the normative and the nonnormative (or the subjective and the objective) at work. More like Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the agent’s

“phenomenal body” in his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Hegel’s conception involves a prior form of self-acquaintance that, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, is that of a “subject-object,” a body perceived from the “inside” of subjective quasi animal awareness that projects outward its intention to act in the world.<sup>39</sup> Our presence to ourselves is undeveloped at this point, consisting in a set of circumstances having to do with tasks to be performed and goals to be achieved. As Hegel puts it, that kind of knowledge, even when it has to do with highly abstract matters for which a reflective capacity is a necessary condition, itself involves a fluency that “consists in having the particular knowledge or kind of activities immediately to mind in any case that occurs, even, we may say, *immediate in our very limbs*, in an activity directed outwards.”<sup>40</sup>

On Hegel’s account, the difference between animal and human mentality does not rest on the idea that the former is nonnormative (or that it is merely sentient, in Robert Brandom’s phrase) whereas human mentality is also normative (or what Brandom calls sapient).<sup>41</sup> In the Hegelian view, there is a normativity already at work in nature in the sense that for organic life, there can be goods and evils for plants and animals—and thus reasons for plants and animals to respond in one way or another. In animals, the concept of an action takes shape in that the animal (depending on the complexity of, for example, its nervous system) can form plans, take steps to satisfy those plans, in some cases reevaluate the plan in light of new information, and so forth. Hegel notes (with an explicit reference that he is following Aristotle on this point) that the difference between human mindful agency and animal action is that the animal nonetheless does not “know his purposes as purposes.”<sup>42</sup> To appropriate some terminology from John McDowell, the animal cannot respond to reasons *as* reasons since the animal lacks the capacity to make judgments that can then serve in inferences.<sup>43</sup> The animal response to normativity exists only *an sich*, in itself, because the goals at work in animal life cannot be entertained *as* goals. The animal does not entertain possibilities for living its life one way as opposed to another.<sup>44</sup> Animals may have reasons, but they do not respond to reasons “as” reasons.<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, the animal does not have the power (so far as we can tell) to figure out a way to actualize the possibility of understanding its reasons as reasons. The animal has no other goal than itself. It exists ultimately to reproduce itself, but even there, it has no conceptual awareness—no developed negativity, in Hegel’s terminology—of itself as a member of a species. The lizard, the dog, and the dolphin reproduce themselves, but (at least on all the evidence we have) none of them can entertain the question of whether, for example, it is overall a better thing that there be, say, more dolphins. The animal encountering another animal of its species for reproductive purposes is aware not of the species *per se* but only of the particular other animal as an individual, and it encounters it in terms of satisfying a goal that it has by virtue of its organic nature, although it cannot entertain that goal *as* a goal. The animal “only senses the species and does not know of it. In the animal, the soul is not yet for the soul, the universal is not yet

as such for the universal.”<sup>46</sup> In this way, the animal is literally an end in itself (a *Selbstzweck*), since the animal’s whole existence is exhausted by itself and the goals internal to its form of life.

Humans and animals both have inner lives, but the animal’s inwardness is not itself a matter of awareness *as* inwardness. The animal strives for something but is not aware of its striving as a striving.<sup>47</sup> There is a strong continuity between animal experience and human experience in that both have meaningful content within their experience, but there is also a sharp break between animal and human awareness in that only humans can take up this content in a fully conceptual way by virtue of the more complicated human form of self-relation as self-consciousness. How does Hegel think he can manage that distinction?

Hegel’s proposal is that the move from our animal life to our fully self-conscious lives should be conceived in terms of stages lying between the kind of goal-directedness characteristic of animal life and the rational character of self-conscious life, and these stages should not be interpreted as separable stages of self-conscious life (as if the later stages could exist apart from the earlier stages). They are, to be sure, distinguishable from each other, but that does not imply that each of them occurs independently of the others or that each stage succeeds the other in time. In this respect, the unity of the stages replicates what Hegel thought Kant should have said about the unity of concepts and intuitions in the critical system: They are distinguishable but not separable from each other.<sup>48</sup>

Thus, we have to think of how such human awareness incorporates within itself this kind of animal life as a series of stages that mediate each other. Now, there are several caveats that have to be entered about Hegel’s reflections on this. Given his own view about how the *Naturphilosophie* is to be carried out, much of what he has to say about this should, on Hegel’s very own terms, be out of date, since the meaning of the concepts at work in natural science—such as “mass” or “species”—cannot be established (except very abstractly) apart from the use that is made of them in the theories in which they appear. That in turn means that any *Naturphilosophie* will be intimately entangled with whatever the going theories are at the time and likewise will be entangled with whatever deeper errors were at work in them. It would be surprising even to Hegel if the sciences since his own time had not made any changes to the way key terms were put to use since the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.

## B: From Animal Subjectivity to Human Subjectivity

Hegel distinguishes, as we noted, between this kind of animal awareness (or animal soul) and that of representational (*vorstellende*) consciousness. The relation between subject and world requires a differentiation between the ways in which an animal, in pursuing its own goals, senses the world and its own states and the way it gathers this kind of sensing into an organic whole. In moving to human

consciousness, there must also be a way of distinguishing ourselves from those sensings so that they become representations (*Vorstellungen*) capable of conveying truth or falsity (in the more ordinary and not the fully inflated Hegelian sense of truth). The stage of animal awareness is only a content “in itself” in the sense that the animal—depending on how developed its neuromotor system is—can use such awareness to form beliefs (or some kind of analogue of belief, depending on how one wishes to restrict the term *belief*) about its world (such as “the prey is now in striking distance”) and then, as factors in its environment or itself change, adjust its behavior in light of those goals.<sup>49</sup> To go back to Hegelian language, the animal cannot actualize this set of contents “in itself” into full fodder for inference—it cannot separate the belief from the ground of the belief. Or to put it another way while remaining within Hegelian terms, the animal cannot relate the abstract meaning to the concrete meaning.<sup>50</sup> For the animal, the world is a unity of the subjective and the objective, and thus animals do not have an objective world confronting them since they cannot distinguish the objective from the subjective as such—even if some animals can perhaps make something like that distinction when, for example, they hunt for food or flee from predators.

To draw the distinction between the subjective and the objective and to have the distinction itself be present to oneself as a matter of avowal, one requires self-consciousness. Or to put the same point differently, self-consciousness precisely is having that distinction present to oneself. If Hegel would have had to contend with something like a Darwinian evolutionary theory instead of the pre-Darwinian theories he in fact rejected, he would no doubt have been pressed by the empirical evidence to note that in the evolution of animal subjectivity—in life’s establishing a practical relationship to itself that qualifies as “innerness”—the perceptual system would have to have developed a kind of accuracy or correctness built into it such that animals could track their environments in a way that would fit their goals, and, with the development of self-conscious animals, that earlier form of accuracy in, for example, stalking prey or avoiding predators would develop into a full-fledged conception of truth and falsity. That much would be consistent with Hegel’s views, although by no means identical with the ones he actually espoused.

Thus, Hegel thinks that at least three distinctions have to be drawn when one speaks of animal subjectivity. One must distinguish the specific ways in which the animal registers the world—as we have seen, Hegel calls this “sensing” and not “representing”—from the way the animal organizes its feeling of itself and its environment in light of these various sensings.<sup>51</sup> (Hegel calls the latter “feeling,” even while noting that ordinary German does not itself draw such a sharp distinction between “sensation,” *Empfindung*, and “feeling,” *Gefühl*.)<sup>52</sup> The first has to do with the way in which the organism registers the world and is attracted to some things while being repelled by others. The second distinction has to do with the way in which animal life learns to put its “sensings” into order and, in the cases of the so-called higher animals, forgo certain attractions to better satisfy its inherent goals.

The third distinction has to do with what it would mean to speak of the actualization of the “soul.” The soul, our animal existence, is, in Hegel’s own terms, the “ideal simple being-for-itself (or self-relation) of the bodily *as bodily*,” whereas in self-conscious life there is the practical distinction established between one’s self and one’s body.<sup>53</sup> A self-conscious agent both is his body (since the person is an animal) and is not his body since the agent establishes a practical distinction between himself and his body.<sup>54</sup> (This “is and is not” marks a fundamental tension in human experience, which as both Kant and Hegel diagnose the matter, can mislead us into thinking that mind and body must therefore be two separate “things” or separate “substances.”)<sup>55</sup>

What animals and agents have in common is not some form of “givenness” of sensation, as one might imagine (that is, the idea that in our seeing something blue, we are having the same qualitative sensation that the color-sighted animal is having).<sup>56</sup> Both humans and animals are characterized in terms of the type of self-relation they maintain, and what is different between them is the kind of self-relation that marks the distinction between the animal soul and human agency. For the human agent, experience is that of a world of objects that exist independently of us and that appear to us from our different perspectives. That difference—the object as it is apart from us and our perspective on the object—is a distinction that is present to a self-conscious agent, even if the distinction itself is not always explicitly made. Moreover, at the level of the soul (that of animal awareness), such a distinction can in principle be practically put to use—although it is an empirical issue as to which animals, if any, actually do put it to use—even though the distinction as such cannot be drawn solely from within the sphere of animal awareness itself.

Once again, we see Hegel’s background reworking of Aristotle being put to Hegel’s own use—that is, being rendered into his own “sublation” of Aristotelian thought.<sup>57</sup> The “actual soul” (the realized soul) has to do with a form of life—human life—that can have that distinction between its experience of the object and the object itself exist as an explicit distinction. As Hegel notes, this difference is marked by the fact that the soul can acquire habits, and for human agency as such, “the soul brings into its bodily activities a universal mode of action, a *rule*, to be transmitted to other activities.”<sup>58</sup> In doing so, our animal awareness moves from its animal normativity to something more full-bloodedly normative in its orientation instead of only having the sheer normativity of goal-directed behavior. The soul thus becomes present to itself *as* soul, that is, *as* an inwardness of animal consciousness that now takes its inwardness *as* inwardness.<sup>59</sup> This inwardness is constituted by the animal organism’s assuming a relation to itself mediated by its nervous system that puts it into a different kind of relation to itself and its environment than is the case with nonanimals and especially with nonorganic things.<sup>60</sup> (Hegel also holds that fully submitting ourselves to such rules also requires a recognition by other such agents and ultimately a kind of locating ourselves in

social space constituted by norms, but introducing that point here would be jumping ahead in the story.)

The actual soul is thus not a correlation between two independent realms (the inner and the outer). It is “this identity of the inner with the outer, where the latter is subjected to the former.”<sup>61</sup> The behavior of the animal is to be explained as an expression of its various “inner” states, but the animal remains at one with itself in these expressions. As such an actualized soul—as a human animal life that assumes a normative stance to itself and entertains not only its goals as possibilities but also its own stance to itself as yet another possibility—the actual soul is no longer really a soul at all but a feature of self-conscious agency. With that, a different kind of practical establishment of a self-relation thus comes to be at work in the organism. The human animal now distinguishes itself (as leading a life) from its perspectives on the world it inhabits, and in doing so, it subjects itself to norms that constitute what it is for such a act of making distinctions to take place at all. The freedom it embodies is, as Hegel puts it, both a “freedom from and a freedom in” the natural world, not a dualist account of freedom as involving nonnatural powers.<sup>62</sup>

Hegel's account of the actual soul is thus a nondualist account that stresses the element of inwardness in subjectivity by seeing it as emerging in animal life as having to sustain itself by directing itself to the achievement of goals. Human subjectivity emerges as a kind of reflexive complication of this kind of organic, animal self-relation, not as something radically other than animal life.

Hegel's commitment to this kind of disenchanting Aristotelian naturalism is strong enough for him that, as he puts it, if our theoretical choices really were indeed restricted to either a purely naturalist-materialist account of mindful agency or a dualist account, we would have to opt for the naturalist-materialist account. In his lectures on the subject, he put it this way: The “point of view of materialism” is a view we should in fact “honor” as a way of articulating the unity of mind and nature and overcoming all the dualisms associated with it.<sup>63</sup> Likewise, if we thought that our only alternatives were subjective idealism—the view that nature is somehow only a construct out of our own subjective experience—or non-Aristotelian naturalism, then we would have to choose naturalism (or, for that matter, even dualism) over the “belief in miracles” that subjective idealism seems to force on us. Indeed, as Hegel wryly puts it, it would be “in order to avoid [such] miracles . . . to avoid the dissolution of the steady course of nature's laws, that we would prefer to stick with either materialism or with inconsistent dualism.”<sup>64</sup>

## C: Animal Life and the Will

In his own notes for his popular lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel states his own views about the will in a way that both replicate and extend his own statements about Aristotle's views in other contexts:



Laws and principles have no immediate life or validity in themselves. The activity which puts them into operation and endows them with real existence has its source in the needs, impulses, inclinations, and passions of man. If I put something into practice and give it a real existence, I must have some personal interest in doing so; I must be personally involved in it, and hope to obtain satisfaction through its accomplishment.<sup>65</sup>

In putting his point this way, Hegel is transforming Aristotle's own system—with its substantialist and essentialist metaphysics of potentialities and actualities—into a theory of how “the concept” realizes itself. Thought and the will, Hegel says, are “not two separate faculties; on the contrary, the will is a particular way of thinking—thinking translating itself into existence, thinking as the drive to give itself existence.”<sup>66</sup> That is, the activity of willing something is a mode in which the conceptual is shown to be already at work in reality—in which it is, in Hegel's updating of Aristotelian terminology, *wirklich*, actual, effective.<sup>67</sup> Saying that the will is “thinking translating itself into existence” is Hegel's way of saying that the conceptual is actualized in bodily doings. Moreover, for the will to actualize thought, there must be a mediation between principle and passion: For general principles to have any grip on an agent, they must appeal to the singularity of the agent's life, be reasons for him or her as a singular entity to act.

Hegel contrasts this view of the will—as the capacity of thought to give itself existence and thereby actualize itself—with what he takes to be the more received and therefore ordinary view of willing. That view sees the will as a special faculty on its own, a separate part of the mind, the lever one pulls to put deliberative judgment into practice.<sup>68</sup> On Hegel's diagnosis, this conception arises naturally out of the ordinary ways in which we reflect on our lives. Our very language itself suggests to us that the difference between the “inner” (thought) and “outer” (bodily movement) is a difference between two separate “things”—mental states and bodily movements—and since there is often and obviously a discrepancy between what we thought we were doing and what somebody (others or even ourselves) took to be what we actually did, we are very naturally led to the view that the two realms “must be” distinct from each other.

The natural tendency of that view, when philosophically articulated, develops into the more Augustinian, non-Aristotelian voluntarist conception of freedom as the result of an “inner” act of will producing an action through some type of non-standard causality in that the will (seen as one “thing”) causes another “thing” to occur (the bodily movement). However, in the terms of Hegel's more Aristotelian conception, the relation between intention and will should not be seen as a relation between two “things” at all but in the relation of the contents—the meanings—of the “inner” intention with the contents (the meaning) of the “outer” bodily movements. This is why Hegel prefers the metaphor of “translation” in speaking of the relation between the “inner” and the “outer” to other

metaphors of, say, pushing or pulling. The “inner” content is “translated” into “outer” content. The metaphor of “translation” is better suited to bring out the different ways in which intentions-actions as a whole can be reinterpreted in various ways. (An intention-action complex is like a text in that it is as capable of reinterpretation as any other text; sometimes the meaning is rather clear, and at other times it is more up for grabs. The metaphor of the text dovetails nicely with Hegel’s own metaphor of translation: Sometimes, translations are perfect in that the original and its translated expression match up, but very often, the translation changes the original.)

In Hegel’s metaphor of translation, the inner intention and the outer action are two sides of the same coin, and in Hegelian language, each is said to be a moment of the other. For something to be a “moment” in the Hegelian sense is for it to be a distinguishable but nonseparable component of what is supposed to be conceived as a whole. The intention is thus not a separate “thing” from the action. Rather, an intention (the “inner”) is an “action on the way to being realized,” and an action (the “outer”) is a “realized intention.” In keeping with Hegel’s language, one could put it this way: The intention is the action in its inner “moment,” and the action is the intention in its outer “moment.”<sup>69</sup> It probably goes without saying that intentions can fail to be realized in actions, and sometimes for the most obvious reasons: One changes one’s mind, one forgets, one is prevented from acting, and so forth. However, if one sees the intention as an “action on the way to being realized,” one is not tempted to think of the intention as some separable, determinate mental state that is merely to be correlated with an action.

To have a will, therefore, is to have a conceptual capacity that has as a “moment” of itself an embodied agent located in a natural and social world, and that element of embodiment in both the physical world and the social world is a component of the spontaneity of thought-as-willing.<sup>70</sup> Since the will is a “form of thought,” what distinguishes having a will from what one might describe as a merely animal response to any perceived good or evil is, in Hegel’s language, to grasp the goal as a goal (or the reason *as* a reason) and to grasp the reason *an sich*—in itself, or “as such”—something that does not automatically specify what it would mean to realize that reason.

When an agent successfully unites the affective and the cognitive, she achieves a kind of practical truth, that is, not only a grasp of some isolated propositional truth (which would only be “abstract” in Hegel’s sense) but also an affective relation to that truth. The free agent manifests this practical truth by knowing what she must do and doing it.<sup>71</sup> Without the relation to “needs, impulses, inclinations, and passions,” no action will take place, and the agent will have shown that, however sophisticated her grasp of the propositions at stake, she is not in possession of practical truth.

In doing that, one gives shape to one’s will in resolving to do this and not that, that is, in putting limits on one’s willing, in moving oneself to do one thing and not another.<sup>72</sup> For self-conscious creatures, the “moving principle” at work is not

that merely of animal motion—which basically has to do with the preservation of itself as an individual and with the preservation of the species—but the series of social reasons “out there in the social world,” which themselves go beyond the merely natural goods of self-preservation and propagation (for example, the various ways one might think, say, of honoring a friendship or of choosing a career), however much these social reasons might have some basis in those principles of animal motion.<sup>73</sup> Animals may have reasons for action (such as fleeing from a predator, going after something for food, taking this as a mate, etc.), but only self-conscious agents have the capacity to understand these goals as goals, reasons *as* reasons.

### Notes

1. For example, Hegel himself notes: “The books of Aristotle on the soul, along with his discussions of its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of speculative interest on this topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce the conception as such into the cognition of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books.” Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §378; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the “Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences”* (1830), p. 3. This is not to claim that Aristotle is the only philosopher who influenced Hegel; the point here is not the historical issue of who and what influenced Hegel at what time—an issue that is both fascinating in its own right and always vexatious with Hegel, since he seems to have been influenced by everybody. Hegel's systemic and philological relation to Aristotle's work has been admirably explored by Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle* (Modern European Philosophy; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xxii, 442 pp. Hegel's praise of Aristotle's theory of the mind as the touchstone for much of his own thought is not something that has gone unnoticed. See, for example, Michael Wolff, *Das Körper-Seele Problem: Kommentar Zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie* (1830), §389 (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1992); Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel's Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xi, 308 pp. G. R. G. Mure had already some time ago put the relation to Aristotle front and center in his work on Hegel: G. R. G. Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1950), viii, 375 pp. In his celebrated study of Hegel's ethical theory, Allen Wood drew attention to the very Aristotelian character of many of Hegel's claims; see Allen W. Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), xxi, 293 pp.
2. For a summary of the debate, see T. H. Irwin, “Who Discovered the Will?” *Philosophical Perspectives*, 6 (1992), 453–73. Irwin claims that the Greeks did in fact have all the elements of a concept of the will. What they did not have, he argues, is the more specifically Augustinian “voluntarist” conception of it.
3. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. (Theorie-Werkausgabe, 19; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), p. 221: “The best that we have on psychology, all the way up to the most recent times, is what we have from Aristotle—likewise with what he thought about the will, freedom and the further determinations of imputation, intention, etc.” Whereas although in Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §482; and Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the “Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences”* (1830), p. 239, he does say that “the Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, did not have it [the Idea of freedom]” in its “actuality,” he also clearly does not deny that Aristotle had a concept of the will, only that he failed to attain the full “Idea” of freedom, since he also endorsed slavery.
4. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II*, p. 222.

5. Ibid., pp. 222–23: “From a practical consideration [Aristotle] distinguishes a rational and an irrational part in the soul; in the latter, *νοῦς* [spirit] is only *δυνάμει* [potentiality], and what befits it are sensations, inclinations, passions, and affects. In the rational side of the soul, there is intellect (*Verstand*), wisdom, level-headedness, knowledge—all of which have their place. However, they do not yet constitute the virtues. The virtues first exist in the unity of rational with the irrational side. We call those things virtues when the passions (inclinations) comport themselves to reason in such a way that they do what reason commands. If insight (*λόγος*) is bad or not even present but passion (inclination, the heart) acquires itself well, then good-heartedness can very well be at work, but there is no virtue because the ground (*λόγος*, reason) is lacking, [that is,] the *νοῦς*, that is necessary for virtue.”
6. Ibid., p. 223: “What is impelling is impulse and inclination. That is, the particular, with a view to the practical, is closer to the subject that is on the way to actualization. The subject is particularized in his activity and it is necessary that he be identical therein with the universal.”
7. “The voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action.” Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Urnson, J. O. Ross, and J. L. Ackrill (The World’s Classics; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), xxxvi, 283 pp., p. 52.
8. See Susan Sauvé Meyer, “Aristotle on the Voluntary,” in Richard Kraut, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2006), 137–58.
9. “But actions and states of character are not voluntary in the same way; for we are masters of our actions from the beginning right to the end, if we know the particular facts, but though we control the beginning of our states of character the gradual progress is not obvious any more than it is in illnesses; because it was in our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way, therefore the states are voluntary.” Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 63.
10. This reconceived Aristotelian conception is thus in the same family as what Charles Taylor calls an “expressivist” conception of action, although it is not identical with it; Hegel certainly does not conceive of action as merely the expression of an already determinate meaning; the action as a whole—intention and action—realize a meaning. It also fits with much of both Allen Wood’s and Robert Pippin’s characterization of Hegel’s conception of action. See Wood, *Hegel’s Ethical Thought*, and Pippin, *Hegel’s Practical Philosophy*.
11. On Hegel’s understanding of freedom as not requiring any special form of causality, see also Paul Redding, *Hegel’s Hermeneutics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), xvi, 262 pp.; and Pippin, *Hegel’s Practical Philosophy*.
12. There are numerous passages where Hegel speaks of animals as having “selves.” Here are two representative ones. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §371 Zusatz; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler’s Edition (1959), and from the Zusätze in Michelet’s Text (1847)*, p. 429: “The organism exists then in the opposed forms of being and of the self, and the self (just as what is for itself) is the negative of itself.” Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*; Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §351, Zusatz: “With animals, the self is for the self, and the reason is the following: the universal of subjectivity, the determination of sensation (*Empfindung*), which is the *differentia specifica*, is the absolutely distinguishing feature of the animal. . . . This ideality, which constitutes sensation, is in nature the highest wealth of existence, because everything is compacted therein.”
13. The most thoroughgoing contemporary “spiritual monist” interpretation is that offered by Frederick Beiser in *Hegel* (Routledge Philosophers; New York: Routledge, 2005), xx, 353 pp. In contrast to a “spiritual” monism, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, *Die Grenzen Der Vernunft: Eine Untersuchung Zu Zielen Und Motiven Des Deutschen Idealismus* (Frankfurt a.M.: Anton Hain, 1991), sees Hegel as offering a “monism of reason,” a view that the entire world is produced by a kind of cosmic rationality working its way out.
14. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §246; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*,

Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text* (1847), 9: "There is a metaphysics which is all the rage in our time, which holds that we cannot know things because they are completely closed off to us. One could put it this way: Not even the animals are as stupid as these metaphysicians, for they go directly to the things, seize them, grasp them and consume them." See also Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. (Theorie-Werkausgabe, 7; Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1969), 20 v., §44; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. Hugh Barr Nisbet (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), lii, 514 pp., p. 76: "The free will is consequently the idealism which does not consider things as they are to be existing in and for themselves, whereas realism declares those things to be absolute, even if they are found only in the form of finitude. Even the animal does not subscribe to this realist philosophy, for it consumes things and thereby proves that they are not absolutely self-sufficient." Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Phenomenology of Spirit" (trans. Terry Pinkard), at [http://web.me.com/titpaul/Site/Phenomenology\\_of\\_Spirit\\_page.html](http://web.me.com/titpaul/Site/Phenomenology_of_Spirit_page.html) (¶109): "Nor are the animals excluded from this wisdom. To an even greater degree, they prove themselves to be the most deeply initiated in such wisdom, for they do not stand still in the face of sensuous things, as if those things existed in themselves. Despairing of the reality of those things and in the total certainty of the nullity of those things, they, without any further ado, simply help themselves to them and devour them. Just like the animals, all of nature celebrates these revealed mysteries which teach the truth about sensuous things."

15. As is well known, the term *disenchanted* stems from Max Weber. For the history of Weber's own use of the term, see Hartmut Lehmann, *Die Entzauberung Der Welt: Studien Zu Themen Von Max Weber* (Bausteine Zu Einer Europäischen Religionsgeschichte Im Zeitalter Der Säkularisierung Bd. 11; Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009), 149 pp.
16. The term *Naturphilosophie* is probably better translated as "nature-philosophy" rather than as philosophy of nature. On this sense of *Naturphilosophie*, see Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), x, 382 pp.
17. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §246; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text* (1847), 6.
18. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §246; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text* (1847), 11. Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method; New York: Humanities Press, 1963), 366 pp., p. 35.
19. Hegel, *Wissenschaft Der Logik I*, p. 62; Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 64: "The objective logic is consequently the genuine critique of those determinations—a critique which considers them not in accordance with the abstract form of apriority as opposed to the a posteriori, but rather considers them themselves in their particular content."
20. On this topic, see especially Sebastian Rand, "The Importance and Relevance of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature," *Review of Metaphysics*, 61/2 (December 2007), 379–400. One of the examples of this type of criticism on Hegel's part is that of the a priori, nonempirical idea that there must be some kind of nonobservable caloric "stuff" that explains heat. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §305; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text* (1847), 153: "Specific heat-capacity, associated with the category of matter and material (*Stoff*), has led to the representation of latent, undetectable, fixed heat-material. As something not perceivable, such a determination does not have the warrant of observation and experience, and as

disclosed, it rests on the presupposition of a material self-sufficiency of heat (cf. Remark to §286). This assumption serves in its way to make the self-sufficiency of heat as that of matter empirically irrefutable, precisely because the assumption is not empirical. If the disappearance of heat, or its appearance is shown to be in a place where it previously was not present, then the disappearance is explained as the concealment or *fixation* of heat, and the appearance is explained as the emergence from indetectability. The metaphysics of self-sufficiency is *opposed* to that experience. Indeed, it is presupposed a priori."

21. See Rand, "The Importance and Relevance of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature." See also Wolfgang Neuser's helpful discussion in his contribution to Herbert Schnädelbach, Ludwig Siep, and Hermann Drüe, *Hegels Philosophie: Kommentare zu den Hauptwerken*, 3 vols. (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 139–205; Wolfgang Bonsiepen, *Die Begründung einer Naturphilosophie bei Kant, Schelling, Fries und Hegel: Mathematische versus spekulative Naturphilosophie* (Philosophische Abhandlungen Bd. 70; Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1997), 651 pp.; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, ed. Michael John Petry (Muirhead Library of Philosophy; London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1970).
22. One of the more troublesome issues in interpreting Hegel has been how to interpret the move from his *Science of Logic* (or the first book of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which more or less recapitulates it in abbreviated form) to the philosophy of nature and then to the philosophy of *Geist*. At least in the terms sketched out here, that transition should be understood in terms of Hegel's own statement that the transition is no real transition at all. ("This determination is not a 'having-been' and a transition [*Übergang*] . . . in this freedom, no transition takes place." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. [Theorie-Werkausgabe, 6; Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1969], 573; Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 843.) That is, if it is true that Hegel has no a priori method to apply to the content, and if sublation involves the act of moving to a different context that tames the oppositions of a prior context involving the assertion of the unconditioned (the absolute), then there can be no logical transition (in the narrower sense of Hegel's use of "logic") between the *Science of Logic* and the philosophy of nature. The problem for Hegel is analogous to the problem Kant faced in creating the "transcendental deduction of the categories" in his first *Critique*: Would it be possible for experience to present us with something that did not conform to the categories? At least one way of taking Kant's answer is: No, since we, or at least the structure of human mentality, shaped all experience in terms of the categories, nothing could appear there that was not in conformity with them. Hegel takes up the issue of nature and our experience of nature in the same way—could the philosophy of nature itself confront us with something that contradicted the categories of the *Logic*?—but he clearly could not rely on the idea that we shaped our experience to make nature conform to them. We thus had to investigate the experience of nature and the theories of nature neither with an a priori assurance that everything found there would be in conformity with the more rarified categories of the *Logic*, nor with any advance assurance that the dilemmas would arrange themselves in the same way. This approach to the *Logic* is criticized by Stephen Houlgate, who takes more of a conceptual realist stance toward the book. Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity* (Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy; West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2006), xix, 456 pp. Other similar conceptual realist stances are given in Robert Stern, "Hegel's Idealism," in Frederick C. Beiser, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and in Kenneth R. Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 2003), xvi, 146 pp.
23. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §337 *Zusatz*; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text (1847)*, 274: "Life is the unification of opposites in general, not merely that of concept and reality. Life is where the inner and the outer, cause and effect, end and means, subjectivity

and objectivity are one and the same. The genuine determination of life is that, with the unity of concept and reality, this reality does not any longer exist in an immediate way, not in the manner of self-sufficiency as a plurality of properties existing alongside one another. Rather, the concept is the utter ideality of indifferent durable existence. Since here the ideality that we had in chemical processes is posited, so too individuality is posited in its freedom. The subjective, infinite form exists now also in its objectivity, which it was not yet in its shape [as chemical process], because in that shape the determinations of infinite form still have a fixed existence as matters. The abstract concept of the organism, on the contrary, is that the existence of particularities (since they are posited as transient moments of one subject) are adequate to the unity of the concept, whereas in the system of the heavenly bodies, all the particular moments of the concept are freely existing, self-sufficient bodies which have not yet returned into the unity of the concept. The solar system was the first organism, but it was only in itself organic, not yet an organic existence. . . . What is there is only a mechanical organism. . . . The individuality of the chemical body can be overpowered by an alien power, but life has its other within itself, is in its own self one rounded-out totality—that is, it is own end (*Selbstzweck*).”

24. See Robert N. Brandon, *Concepts and Methods in Evolutionary Biology* (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xiv, 221 pp.
25. It was not, of course, Darwin’s theory that Hegel opposed. Hegel died in 1831, and Darwin’s book appeared in 1859. He opposed the view that there had to be an externally teleological explanation of the origin of the species as “completing the series.” This was, he thought, empirically vacuous. His own views were influenced by those advanced by his French contemporary, Georges Cuvier, who argued that each organism is an internally structured whole that exists in such a close harmony with its environment that changing any small part of it would damage its ability to survive in that environment. Although Hegel accepted the fact that the earth had a rather violent history of several million years, that there was once a time when there was no life on earth, and that many species of plant and animal life had become extinct, he also believed that empirical biology and comparative anatomy—as practiced by Cuvier—had ruled out evolution as a satisfactory explanation of the origin of the different species. See Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §339; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler’s Edition (1959), and from the Zusätze in Michelet’s Text (1847)*, 283–84. In keeping with his own views, Hegel had no theory of his own about the origin of the species except for the general idea that the various species had to precipitate out of some kind of “life process,” and he thought that it made more sense to think of each species, more or less, arriving on the scene as fully formed. Thus, in Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 141 (¶171), he says, “Within the universal fluid medium, life in its *motionless* elaboration of itself into various shapes becomes the movement of those shapes, that is, life becomes life as a *process*. . . . As such, it is life as *living things*. . . . The simple substance of life is thus the estrangement of itself into shapes and is at the same time the dissolution of these durably existing distinctions. The dissolution of this estrangement is to the same extent itself an estrangement, that is, a division of itself into groupings.” On evolution, he says, in Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §249, Zusatz; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler’s Edition (1959), and from the Zusätze in Michelet’s Text (1847)*, 21: “The way of evolution, which starts from the imperfect and formless, is as follows: at first there was the liquid element and aqueous structures, and from the water there evolved plants, polyps, mollusks, and finally fishes; then from the fishes were evolved the land animals, and finally from the land animals came man. This gradual alteration is called an explanation and understanding. It comes from the philosophy of nature, and it still flourishes. However, although this quantitative difference is of all theories the easiest to understand, it does not really explain anything at all.” It is thus not completely implausible that this part of the Hegelian system could be excised without doing much harm to the rest, and if it were, the apparent opposition between

- Hegelian idealism and Darwinian evolutionary theory would itself dissolve, leaving the field open for a reconsideration of the links between the two. See James Kreines's speculations on the issue: James Kreines, "Hegel's Metaphysics: Changing the Debate," *Philosophy Compass*, 1/5 (September 2006), 466–80; James Kreines, "Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, 57–58 (2008), 48–70; James Kreines, "The Logic of Life: Hegel's Philosophical Defense of Teleological Explanation of Living Beings," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
26. "...die Ohnmacht der Natur," in Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §250; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text (1847)*, 23.
  27. As Hegel sums this up: Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text (1847)*, 418 (§370): "The forms of nature are thus not to be brought into an absolute system, and the species of animals are exposed to contingency."
  28. The very nature of idealism has to do with Kant's claim that the world as a whole cannot be apprehended in sensuous intuition and is thus only available to thinking creatures, who must therefore construct concepts and theories of what nature as a whole must be like. "Nature as a whole" is thus an "ideality," a "concept," not an individual existing "thing" available to any kind of perceptual intuition. It is in fact a philosophical (and therefore idealist) issue as to whether nature as a whole should be conceived as simply the set of all natural things, as something more than the set of all natural things, or even as something very different from that set. Idealism is thus the stance that a purposive creature would take to individual natural things, namely, to locate them within a purposive whole. In Hegel's admittedly playful language, animals are idealists in that they locate their food sources as playing a role in their own reproduction—and thus display an orientation to a greater whole than their immediate perceptions—but animals are, as it were, failed idealists in that they cannot have a conceptual sense of any greater whole than that of themselves as individual organisms experiencing various drives. Indeed, the very idea of animal's good is itself vague. It is not developed at this level, and it cannot be better developed, since what is good for the animal cannot be separated from what is good for its species. The goal of idealist philosophy is thus to have a true concept of nature as a whole—a concept that obviously outstrips the immediate empirical evidence on which such concepts are based. Hegel's version of idealism thus does not hold that natural, material objects are (to use an admittedly slippery term) reducible in any kind of way to mental or spiritual objects.
  29. It is impossible not to notice the slightly scornful dismissal Hegel gives to Descartes' conception of animal life in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. (Theorie-Werkausgabe, 20; Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1969), 155: "There are a few particular assertions which need to be mentioned, which have in particular contributed to Descartes's fame—particular forms which were otherwise noted in metaphysics, also by Wolff. One emphasizes: *a*) that Descartes saw the organic, animals as machines, that they are set in motion by an other and do not have the self-active principle of thought within themselves—a mechanical physiology, a determinate thought of 'the understanding,' which is of no real importance. With the sharp distinction between thought and extension, thought is not regarded as sensation, in the way that sensation can isolate itself. The organic, as the body, must be reduced to extension. What follows is thus a dependency on the first determinations."
  30. Hegel's stance would thus seem to be at odds with McDowell's view that animals do not have subjectivity but only protosubjectivity and thus have no inner or outer experience, only sentience. John Henry McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994) x, 191 pp. (It's of course also not entirely clear whether these might not be



merely semantic differences between the McDowellian and the Hegelian stances.) For Hegel, animals have an “inner,” and they are subjects of a life. However, they do not (because apparently they cannot, given the states of their organic neuronal systems) develop their subjectivity into a fully actualized, *verwirklichte* subjectivity.

31. Thus, Hegel says, in Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §381 Zusatz; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 10: “Sensation is just this omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all of its members, which communicate each impression to the whole, which in animals is a whole that begins to be for itself. It lies in this subjective inwardness that the animal determines itself through itself, from the inner outwards, and is not merely determined from the outside, i.e., the animal has both impulse and instinct.”
32. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §352 Zusatz; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text (1847)*, 356: “Since the animal organism is the process of subjectivity, relating itself in externality to itself, here the rest of nature is present as external nature, because the animal preserves itself in this relationship to the external.”
33. Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), xxv, 741 pp. See Redding's critique of Brandom's conception of reliably differential responsive dispositions: Paul Redding, *Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought* (Modern European Philosophy; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), x, 252 pp. Pippin also argues against Brandom's view in Robert B. Pippin, “Brandom's Hegel,” *European Journal of Philosophy*, 13/3 (December 2005), 381–408.
34. See Sebastian Rand's important discussion of this in Sebastian Rand, “Animal Subjectivity and the Nervous System in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature,” *Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos*, 11 (2010).
35. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §371; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text (1847)*, 429: “The stone cannot become diseased, because it comes to an end in the negative of itself, is chemically dissolved, does not endure in its form, and is not the negative of itself which expands over its opposite (as in illness and self-feeling). Desire, the feeling of lack, is also, to itself, the negative. Desire relates itself to itself as the negative—it is itself and is, to itself, that which is lacking.”
36. Not all things that interfere with its functioning are diseases. The concept of disease, like that of most such hybrids of the empirical and the normative, is elastic. Moreover, the environment can change on the animal and interfere with its functioning, even though this is not a disease on the part of the environment or the animal. Likewise, the animal can suffer injury and thus fail to function well, but this is not a disease. The possibility of disease or injury as the intrusion into the animal's functioning well already takes it as a fact that the animal as a whole has a way of functioning, and that is the key idea.
37. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §381 Zusatz; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 10: “That which senses (*das Empfindene*) is determined, has a content, and thereby a distinction within itself. This distinction is at first a still wholly ideal, simple distinction that is sublated in the unity of sensation. The sublated distinction enduring in the unity is a contradiction, which is thereby sublated in such a way that the distinction is posited as distinction. The animal thus will be impelled from out of its simple relation to itself and into the opposition towards external nature.” However, in Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §402; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 90, he says: “In this totality, or ideality, in the timeless indifferent inner of the soul, however, the sensations which are displacing each other vanish but not without leaving a trace. Rather, they remain therein as sublated, and

- the content therein acquires its enduring existence as, at first, a merely possible content, which then first achieves its passage from possibility to actuality in that it comes to be for the soul, that is, within the content, this sensation comes to be for itself." Likewise, he notes that there are ways in which the content of animal awareness and human awareness are the same, except that human awareness actualizes the potential of normativity within itself. See Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §400; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 74: "Although the characteristically human content belonging to free spirit takes on the form of sensation, yet this form as such is still the form that is common to animal and human souls and is consequently not adequate to that content. What is contradictory between spiritual content and sensation consists in the former being in and for itself a universal, something necessary, objective—sensation, on the other hand, is something singularized, contingent, one-sidedly subjective."
38. See Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §402 Zusatz; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 90.
  39. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (Routledge Classics; London: Routledge, 2002), xxiv, 544 pp.
  40. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I*, §66; Hegel et al., *The Encyclopaedia Logic, with the Zusätze: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*, 115. In the passage cited, Hegel goes on to add, "In all these cases, immediacy of knowledge not only does not exclude mediation, but the two are so bound together that immediate knowledge is even the product and result of mediated knowledge."
  41. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*.
  42. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §360; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959), and from the Zusätze in Michelet's Text (1847)*, 389: "Since the impulse can only be fulfilled through wholly determinate actions, this appears as instinct, since it seems to be a choice in accordance with a determination of an end. However, because the impulse is not a known purpose, the animal does not yet know its purpose as a purpose. Aristotle calls this unconscious acting in terms of purposes *φύσις*."
  43. John Henry McDowell, *Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), ix, 285 pp. See particularly the discussion on pp. 128–46 ("Conceptual Capacities in Perception"). Hegel's point is that the ability to see reasons as reasons grows out of the self-conscious animal's ability to entertain his goals as possibilities. Hegel himself seems to note this same point when in his lectures on Aristotle, he renders the Greek, "*Logos*," as both "*Grund*" and "*Vernunft*." This does not prejudge whether the capacity to see reasons as reasons is not itself something that might exist on more of a continuum with ordinary animal life than has been previously recognized. Perhaps there are some animals that can exhibit a bit of reflexivity about their reasons, such as entertaining in some primitive way something like the thought, "Must we really flee these predators, or are there enough of us to resist them?"
  44. This distinction finds voice in two very different contemporary accounts of goods in nature. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (Paul Carus Lecture Series; Chicago: Open Court, 1999), xiii, 172 pp.; Michael Thompson, "The Representation of Life," in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn, eds., *Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Thompson explicitly puts Hegel to work for some of his ideas on life, although he and Hegel part ways on several key points.
  45. Hegel's nice metaphor for the way full-blown human normativity develops out of our animal normativity is that, as he says, *Geist* can be viewed as "asleep" in nature. The particular skills necessary for human normativity have not been developed yet and will not be developed except in the conditions in which humans put their natural makeup to work in social settings and institute normative statuses. "The Idea, or spirit existing in itself, sleeping in

- nature, thus sublates externality, singularization and the immediacy of nature. It produces in its own eyes an existence adequate to its inwardness and universality, and it comes to be spirit reflected within itself, spirit existing for itself, the self-conscious, awake spirit, that is, spirit as such." Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §384, *Zusatz*; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 19.
46. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §381; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 10: "This animal senses merely the species and does not know it. In the animal, the soul does not yet exist for the soul, the universal does not exist as such for the universal."
  47. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §401; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 82: "Already we have seen in the observation of this relation that what is inner in the sensing being is not entirely empty, not completely indeterminate, but rather is to a greater degree something determinate in and for itself. This counts already for the animal soul and to an incomparably greater degree for human inwardness. Thus, what therein turns up is a content that is, on its own, (*für sich*) not an external but rather an inward content."
  48. Hegel took one of Kant's mistakes to be the suggestion that since the distinction between concepts and intuitions was crucial, that meant that they were separable items. See Robert B. Pippin, "Concept and Intuition: On Distinguishability and Separability," *Hegel-Studien*, 40 (2005). To be sure, in claiming a "speculative identity" for the two—that is, that each was an inseparable moment of a whole—Hegel practically invited those unfamiliar with his arcane although nonetheless precise terminology to construe him as denying the difference between concepts and intuitions and thus setting himself up for the criticism that he was something like a holist gone mad who no longer had any way of conceiving of objects in the world as offering standards for the judgments about them. However, even before John McDowell had made the phrase "frictionless spinning in the void" a suitable metaphor for all such views that deny the way in which experience can provide genuine reasons for belief, Hegel himself scornfully employed a similar metaphor to speak of those who deny the existence of independent standards of judgment: See Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 293 (§396), where Hegel speaks of a deficient conception of mentality as having "the appearance of the movement of a circle, which, within a void, freely moves itself within itself, and which, unimpeded, now enlarges and now contracts, and is fully satisfied in playing a game within itself and with itself."
  49. On the role of animal awareness and emotions in German idealism in general and Hegel in particular, see the important work by Paul Redding, *The Logic of Affect* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), x, 204 pp.
  50. Thus, in Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §400; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 74, Hegel goes into one of his usual warnings about the danger of thinking that the kind of animal immediacy of sensation could be used to justify anything. "However, that feeling (*Empfindung*) and the heart are not the form by which something is justified as religious, ethical, true, righteous, etc. The appeal to the heart and to feeling is either merely saying nothing—or is to an even greater degree saying something bad. This is not at all something about which we need to be reminded."
  51. Although most twenty-first-century writers on animal awareness are far more likely to use the term *representation* to refer to the animal's sensing its environment, they would by and large agree that animals do not "represent" in Hegel's use of the term.
  52. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §402; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 88: "For sensation (*Empfindung*) and feeling (*Fühlen*) there is no ordinary linguistic usage that makes a thoroughgoing distinction between them. Yet one still does not speak of a sensation for law, a sensation of oneself, etc. but rather of a feel for the law, or a "self-feeling." Sensation and sensitiveness belong together. One can therefore take the position that

sensation emphasizes more the aspect of the passivity of finding that one feels, i.e., the immediacy of determinateness in feeling, whereas feeling at the same time has more to do with the self-hood (*Selbstichkeit*) that is therein."

53. In Hegel's usage, unlike the usage to which Jean-Paul Sartre later put the terms, "being-for-itself" is not the simple opposite or counterpart of "being-in-itself." Translated fairly literally, *being-for-itself* is what something is "on its own," whereas the *being-in-itself* of anything is, in its Hegelian usage, what it is in its concept, which itself must then be articulated and developed in practice. Thus, its most abstract sense, *being-for-itself* means that which is "on its own," independent in the sense that it seemingly can in principle be characterized without having to contrast it with anything else or without having to refer it to something else. In the dialectic of mastery and servitude, for example, the master seeks a being-for-itself in his attempts to live the life of an agent who, as it were, entitles himself and others but is entitled to do so by nobody else. In the normative sphere in which agents live, this attempt at self-entitlement cannot simply come about passively. An agent's being-for-itself can only come about through his own activity, his own relating-to-himself. However, Hegel does not restrict, as Sartre does, being-for-itself to self-consciousness; the object of perception, for example, is said by him to be something we at first take to be something existing "on its own" without our having to relate such a thing to other things that form its limit, a task that proves to be impossible. (The object of perception turns out to be something supposedly independent from other things, but its very existence is dependent on its relations to other things, a dependency that becomes apparent only in reflection on the nature of the otherwise independent perceptual object.)
54. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik II*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. (Theorie-Werkausgabe 14; Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1969): "Spirit and soul are essentially to be distinguished. The soul is only this ideal, simple being-for-itself of the bodily as *bodily*, but spirit is the being-for-itself of conscious and *self-conscious* life with all the sensations, representations and purposes of this self-conscious existence."
55. Hegel's diagnosis of this failed inference is a topic in Wolff, *Das Körper-Seele Problem: Kommentar Zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1830)*, §389.
56. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §411 Zusatz; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 148: "At the conclusion of the main section of the 'Anthropology' in §401, what was under consideration was the involuntary corporealization of inner sensations, and this is something that people have in common with animals. On the other hand, what is now to be discussed are the corporealizations that happen freely. These impart a characteristically spiritual stamp on the human body so that this stamp distinguishes the human from the animals much more than any natural determinateness could do. In accordance with his purely bodily aspect, the person is not that distinct from an ape."
57. See Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*, trans. William Oggle, 645b 14–20. "As every instrument and every bodily member subserves some partial end, that is to say, some special action, so the whole body must be destined to minister to some plenary sphere of action. . . . Similarly, the body too must somehow or other be made for the soul, and each part of it for some subordinate function, to which it is adapted." Aristotle and Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), xxxix, 1487 pp., p. 658.
58. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §410, Zusatz; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 146.
59. See Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §409; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 140: "But this abstract being-for-itself of the soul in its embodiment is not yet the I, not the existence of the universal existing for itself. It is embodiment brought back to its pure ideality, which is appropriate to the soul as such . . . in that way, that pure being, which, since the particularity of embodiment, i.e., immediate embodiment, is sublated within it, is

- being-for-itself, a wholly pure, unaware act of intuiting, which is, however, the foundation of consciousness into which it inwardly turns (*in sich geht*). It does this since it has sublated into itself that embodiment, whose subjective substance it is and which is for it a barrier. In that way, it is posited as a subject for itself.”
60. On this point, see especially Rand, “Animal Subjectivity and the Nervous System in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature.”
  61. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §411; Hegel et al., *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the “Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences”* (1830), p. 147.
  62. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel et al., *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes: Berlin 1827/1828* (Vorlesungen / Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1994), xxxviii, 321 pp., p. 19: “We have said that *freedom* is to be asserted as the basic essence of spirit, the freedom *from* and *in* the natural, which, however, must not be taken as arbitrary choice (*Willkür*) but rather as law-like freedom”
  63. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
  64. *Ibid.*, p. 20; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Robert R. Williams, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827–8* (Hegel Lectures Series; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), vi, 287 pp., p. 70. (This alters for emphasis Williams’s translation.)
  65. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, Reason in History*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), xxxviii, 252 pp., p. 70; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte: Berlin 1822/1823*, ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting, Hoo Nam Seelmann, and Karl Brehmer (Vorlesungen / Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1996), x, 626 pp., p. 82.
  66. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §4, *Zusatz*; Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 35.
  67. The term *actuality* is the accepted translation for the German *Wirklichkeit*, even though it means “reality” in ordinary German. However, Hegel has a term *Realität* that he contrasts with *Wirklichkeit*, so translators have on the whole shied away from rendering *Wirklichkeit* as “reality.” In addition to that difficulty, there are some more systematic reasons for using “actuality” as an accepted translation. The term is a technical term in Hegel’s system, and it is the preferred term for rendering Aristotle’s concept of *energeia* (actuality) into German. Hegel himself notes in several places the link between the concept of *Wirklichkeit* (“actuality”) and *Wirken* (to have an effect). The clearest statement of this is in the *Science of Logic*: “What is actual is what is efficacious. The most *wirklich ist, kann wirken*.” A. V. Miller translates the relevant phrase as “what is actual can act.” Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, p. 208; Hegel, *Hegel’s Science of Logic*, 546. In his early works, Hegel also defined *Wirklichkeit* as the “possibility of efficaciousness.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften*, ed. Gerd Irrlitz (Philosophische Studententexte; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1972), liii, 526 pp., p. 185; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805–6) with Commentary*, ed. Leo Rauch (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), 183 pp. The phrase used is “*Möglichkeit des Wirkens*.” Another instance occurs in Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §82; Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 116: “For actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) is that which has an effect (*was wirkt*) and preserves itself in its otherness, whereas what is immediate is receptive for negation.” The French have a better solution for the problem of translating the term, having chosen “*l’effectif*” and “*effectivité*” as the translation of “*Wirklichkeit*.”
  68. Thus, in Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §12; Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 46, Hegel speaks of resolving (*beschließen*) to do something, which he identifies with bringing the “inner” into the sphere of the “outer.” In §8, he makes it clear that the dialectical conception of the will only applies to that account that tries to combine the commitment to an objective world with an equal commitment to subjectivity. Not everything that has to do with willing is “dialectical” or “speculative” (his other term for the same thing). Ordinary practical reasoning is thus not “dialectical.” As he puts it in Hegel,

- Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §8; Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 43: "The consideration of the will's determinacy is the task of the understanding [*des Verstandes*, the intellect] and is not primarily speculative."
69. The two taken together, intention and action, stand in what Hegel calls a relation of "speculative identity"; in fact, the "intention/action" complex is almost a paradigm case of what Hegel means by a "speculative identity," namely, a whole with distinguishable but nonseparable components, which leads to various conceptual dilemmas when the components are each treated as parts possessing their own determinate identity.
  70. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §11; Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 45: "The will which is free as yet only *in itself* is the *immediate* or *natural* will. The determinations of the difference which is posited within the will by the self-determining concept appear within the immediate will as an *immediately* present content: These are the *drives*, *desires*, and *inclinations* by which the will finds itself naturally determined." See also Hegel's notes for his lectures on the philosophy of history: "The first thing we have to notice is this: that we have hitherto called the principle, or ultimate end, or destiny, of the nature and concept of the spirit in itself, is purely universal and abstract. A principle, fundamental rule, or law is something universal and implicit, and as such, it has not attained complete reality, however true it may be in itself. Aims, principles, and the like are present at first in our thoughts and inner intentions, or even in books, but not yet in reality itself. In other words, that which exists only in itself is a possibility or potentiality which has not yet emerged into existence. A second moment is necessary before it can attain reality—that of actuation or realization; and its principle is the will, the activity of mankind in the world at large. It is only by means of this activity that the original concepts or implicit determinations are realized and actualized." *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction*, 69–70.
  71. See the discussion of Aristotle's conception of practical truth in Gabriel Richardson Lear, *Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), viii, 238 pp., p. 106.
  72. Hegel divides animals from people not on the religious ground that animals do not have souls—on Hegel's account, they do have souls—but on the ground that they cannot *think*, that is, cannot entertain reasons as reasons in the sense mentioned previously. To illustrate this, here are three among many examples that could be cited: Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §4, *Zusatz*; Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 35: "Spirit is thought itself, and the person distinguishes himself from animals through thought." Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §42, *Zusatz*; Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 74: "The animal can intuit (*anschauen*), but the soul of the animal does not have the soul as an object in its own eyes. It is rather something external." Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §468; Hegel et al., *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*, 468: "However, in truth as we have just seen, thought determines itself into will and remains the substance of the latter, so that without thought there can be no will, and even the uneducated person wills only insofar as he has thought. On the other hand, because the animal does not think, it is also incapable of possessing a will."
  73. In its subjectivity, the animal thus does not distinguish itself from the species, whereas we do. See Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*, §322; Hegel and Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, *Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's Edition (1959)*, and from the *Zusätze in Michelet's Text (1847)*, 220: "In the organic, it is the genus, the inner universal, which brings about the loss of the individual." In Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 143 (¶173), Hegel notes: "But this other life for which the *genus* as such exists and which is the genus for itself, namely, *self-consciousness*, initially exists in its own eyes merely as this simple essence and, in its own eyes, is an object as the *pure I*."