

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY NOW

Politics and Metaphysics in Kant

Edited by Sorin Baiasu, Sami Pihlström and
Howard Williams

UNIVERSITY OF WALES PRESS • CARDIFF • 2011

Contents

Abbreviations and References to Kant's Works	vii
1 Metaphysics and Politics in the Wake of Kant: The Project of a Critical Practical Philosophy <i>Sorin Baiasu, Sami Pihlström and Howard Williams</i>	1
2 Kant's Moral Constructivism and Rational Justification <i>Kenneth R. Westphal</i>	28
3 Political, not Metaphysical, yet Kantian? A Defence of Rawls <i>Alyssa R. Bernstein</i>	47
4 On the Conditions of Discourse and Being: Kantian, Wittgensteinian and Levinasian Perspectives on the Relation between Metaphysics and Ethics <i>Sami Pihlström</i>	71
5 One Community or Many? From Logic to Juridical Law via Metaphysics <i>Lucas Thorpe</i>	97
6 Kant's <i>Rechtslehre</i> and Ideas of Reason <i>Tatiana Patrone</i>	115
7 Practical Agency, Teleology and System in Kant's Architectonic of Pure Reason <i>Lea Ypi</i>	134
8 What a Kantian Can Know A Priori: An Argument for Moral Cognitivism <i>Katerina Deligiorgi</i>	152

9	Metaphysics and Moral Judgement <i>Sorin Baiasu</i>	174
10	'Intelligible Facts': Toward a Constructivist Account of Action and Responsibility <i>Garrath Williams</i>	196
11	Metaphysical and not just Political <i>Howard Williams</i>	215
12	Cosmopolitan Right: State and System in Kant's Political Theory <i>Sharon Anderson-Gold</i>	235
13	The Metaphysics of International Law: Kant's 'Unjust Enemy' and the Limitation of Self-Authorization <i>Oliver Eberl</i>	250
	Index	271

1 • Metaphysics and Politics in the Wake of Kant: The Project of a Critical Practical Philosophy

Sorin Baiasu, Sami Pihlström and Howard Williams

Hence human reason, ever since it has been thinking or – rather – meditating, has never been able to dispense with a metaphysics, yet has nonetheless been unable to expound one that was sufficiently purified of everything extraneous. The idea of such a science is just as old as speculative human reason; and what reason is there that does not speculate, whether such a speculation be done in a scholastic or in a popular manner? (*KrV* A842/B870)

1. Historical contexts

The past three decades have witnessed the emergence, at the forefront of political thought, of several Kantian theories. Both the critical reaction to consequentialism inspired by Rawlsian constructivism and the universalism of more recent theories informed by Habermasian discourse ethics, for instance, trace their main sources of inspiration back to Kant's writings. Yet much of what is Kantian in contemporary theory is formulated with more or less strict caveats concerning Kant's metaphysics. These range from radical claims that theories of justice must be political, not metaphysical, to more cautious calls for replacing Kant's metaphysics with a less demanding ontology, such as one informed, for instance, by the relatively recent linguistic turn in philosophy.

What motivates such a reluctant attitude towards metaphysics among Kantian scholars? To begin with, the very meaning of metaphysics is deeply contested: depending on whether the word 'metaphysics' is used critically, approvingly or merely descriptively, and depending on what those who practise metaphysics take themselves to be doing, the word 'metaphysics' will refer to

distinct and sometimes even contradictory areas of inquiry. Apart from the more technical difficulty of finding a definition of the term that would meet with at least general agreement, philosophers and especially political philosophers seem to have a reflex reaction of rejection and alarm at the very mention of the word 'metaphysics'.

For the wary amongst us, the term evokes fundamentalist conviction, obscurantist argumentation and deep complication. It is, therefore, no surprise that metaphysics has often not had a good press in moral and political philosophy and has not received entirely favourable treatment even amongst philosophers, such as Kant and Hegel, who have ended up espousing it. Amongst its critics, the name of metaphysics has conjured visions of abstract, over-complex and remote thinking that has lost touch with everyday reality.

The idea of metaphysics invites comparison with common sense. Metaphysics evokes a notion of thinking and meditating that is out of touch with the ordinary world and irrelevant to the active concerns of human life. Metaphysics is often seen as too close to religion and, in some instances, even identical to it. Many major metaphysicians such as Aquinas, Leibniz and Spinoza have presented systems that are coextensive with theology.

Metaphysics for these philosophers is a depiction of divine truth and reality. They have encouraged a view of metaphysics that is immense in its ambitions. At the same time as projecting a view of metaphysics that is coextensive with religion, they can sometimes be read as acquiescing in the aspiration of religious thinkers, in particular those belonging to the medieval tradition, to subordinate all philosophical reflection to religious conviction. This is an undesirable state of affairs, and in so far as metaphysics is understood as comprehending religious doctrine that ultimately relies on dogmatic pronouncements, it should be resisted.

However, we do not have to accept this image of metaphysics. It is legitimate for metaphysical reflection to include thinking about religious doctrine, but it need not be defined or limited by it. The problem is that historically, religion and metaphysics have overlapped considerably, and some have thought it appropriate that they should suffer the same fate in the modern period: decline.

The connection of metaphysics with religion can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle. It is usually suggested that the term

‘metaphysics’ was coined soon after Aristotle’s death in 322 BC to describe ‘a number of treatises’ that ‘were placed “immediately after the *Physics*”’.¹ These treatises contain inquiries of a fundamental kind, including a philosophical lexicon that seeks to define such terms as ‘principle’, ‘cause’, ‘element’ and ‘nature’.

The treatises are speculative, adventurous and unfinished. They are immediately recognizable to us now as metaphysics, and they rest on a tripartite distinction which Aristotle makes between physics which ‘studies mutable objects, and for the most part deals with essence as inseparable from matter’, mathematics, as a similarly speculative science, and a speculative science, which is ‘prior to both’, deals with ‘first causes’ and ‘must be eternal’. What is notable about this third speculative inquiry or ‘the highest science’ is that Aristotle depicts it as what is ‘visible of the divine’ or theology.² In Aristotle’s description of metaphysics, then, there seems to be a marked overlap between the domain of philosophy and the domain of religion.

However, since Aristotle’s first science or ‘theology’, which looks at concepts and being in general, is an open-ended inquiry in which no one true answer is claimed, it is arguably different from most religions which begin from what their adherents regard to be indubitable truths or articles of faith. The connection of religion with metaphysics is not necessarily one of identity. The subject matter of metaphysics and religion may in many respects be similar, but in Aristotle’s schema religion can itself become the subject matter of metaphysics.

Aristotle opens up the possibility, on which Kant capitalizes, that metaphysics need not accord with conventional religion. Thus, although Aristotle gives an extraordinarily ambitious scope to metaphysics, inviting the most uninhibited speculation, he does not suggest that it should lead to dogmatism and zealotry: speculation must, to his mind, be guided by reason and argument. Indeed, his treatment of Plato’s theory of Forms suggests an awareness of our epistemic limitations and proposes a methodology which takes these into account.³

Whatever our fears about the idea of metaphysics, anyone concerned with Kant’s political philosophy – especially if we want to probe and understand what is most illuminating about this philosophy – has to attempt to come to grips with the idea of metaphysics and the hopes and limitations Kant associates with it.

An important point to make is that Kant himself had doubts about the desirability and feasibility of metaphysics as it was understood in his day. He does not give an indiscriminate stamp of approval to everything that is presented in the name of metaphysics. In his mature philosophical system he presents a critical metaphysics which is distinguished from a good deal of what had gone on in the name of metaphysics up to his time. Indeed, Kant regards what is innovative about his thinking as deriving from the new view of metaphysics that he has to propose.

For instance, Kant dramatically transforms Christian Wolff's account of knowledge and philosophy, an account that was quite influential in his time.⁴ By introducing the distinction between the various faculties of mind, in particular between reason and the understanding, Kant relocates in the understanding the traditional concern with the identification of categories as the ultimate constituents of what exists. Wolff's general metaphysics thus becomes Kant's transcendental analytic.

Furthermore, Wolff's three branches of special metaphysics (which deal with the soul or mind, with the world as a whole and with God) are regarded by Kant as the province of reason and form the object of study of transcendental dialectic.⁵ But Kant retains Wolff's view of the significance of practical philosophy and even regards practical reason as able to provide (moral) cognition of the soul, world and God, something which on Kant's account is impossible for theoretical philosophy.⁶

Hence Kant's new view of metaphysics is not a complete rejection of earlier systems, but derives rather from a debate and close engagement with those systems. Metaphysics he regards as necessary but complex and always potentially confusing. In undertaking the *Critique of Pure Reason* he was conscious that he had to clear away much of the rubble left by the decay of traditional metaphysics.

He depicts metaphysics in the opening pages of the work as the 'combat arena' of 'endless conflicts' aroused by the ambitions of pure reason. Reason faces its own defeat; where once metaphysics 'was called the *queen* of all the sciences', 'the tone in vogue in this era, however, has made it fashionable to treat her with total disdain' (*KrV A*: viii). Kant sees this defeat as deserved, even if for a while Locke's 'physiology of the human understanding' had seemed to provide a new confidence that her reputation might be saved.

There are two ever-present dangers that metaphysics faces: on the one hand it can transform itself into dogmatism, where one system claims to present all the answers to the problems raised by pure reason; on the other hand, it can transform itself into indifference, 'where all paths have been tried in vain' and the conclusion seems to be that there is no sure path for reason to follow. Kant regards these approaches as equally harmful. We should neither give in to sheer scepticism nor be blinded by the attractions of dogmatism. Thus at the very beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason* he presents himself as an advocate of a revived but significantly more modest metaphysics. This metaphysics is empirically bound to appearances and gives in to the more ambitious demands of reason only in practical philosophy.

Kant, of course, was not alone in criticizing the assumptions of traditional metaphysics. A radical re-evaluation and critique of metaphysics has taken place over the last two centuries. This is noticeable not only in the empiricist tradition, from Hume to recent empiricists like Bas van Fraassen; it is visible also in the less unified direction initiated by Kant and continuing with Nietzsche and the classical pragmatists, among others, culminating in the downright scorn for metaphysics in logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy in the mid-twentieth century.

The debate over the role and status of metaphysics is, however, again highly relevant in contemporary philosophy. Especially in analytic philosophy, there seems to be growing interest in metaphysics, and the positivist declarations of the death of metaphysics can no longer be taken seriously. Leading thinkers have dedicated decades of work to metaphysics understood as a fundamental realm of philosophical inquiry, a 'category theory' largely in a realist, Aristotelian spirit.⁷ These and other metaphysicians disagree, sometimes sharply, about what the basic ontological categories to be postulated *are* (for instance, whether there are universals, tropes, real modalities and so on), but they largely agree on what metaphysics is all about.

We have just said that the debate over the role and status of metaphysics is again highly relevant in contemporary philosophy. A qualification must, however, be made here. For metaphysics in this context is seen as an inquiry into the way the world is, independently of the mind of the inquirer and without any Kantian restrictions or worries about the unknowability of things in

themselves. So there are indeed debates concerning the structure of the world understood, almost in a pre-Kantian sense, as what there is independently of human consciousness.⁸ Unfortunately, however, this is usually taken to be an assumption, rather than a debatable claim in need of defence and with direct implications for the status and role of metaphysics.

The present-day 'Kantian' metaphysician, however, emphasizes our need to inquire into the ontological structure of the 'human world', of the world as it is for us, by contrast to an alleged noumenal, intelligible world of things 'in themselves'. The Kantian inquiry into the constitutive structure of the human world can, however, go beyond an account of how the world is. Thus, it is sometimes argued that when dealing with the world in any manner whatsoever (however theoretical), we always, at least implicitly, make ethical choices and engage in moral valuation.⁹ For human reality is in fact constituted categorially from standpoints always already laden with ethical ideals and assumptions. Hence our human reality is itself deeply value-laden, as Hilary Putnam, among others, has suggested in his recent work attacking the fact/value dichotomy.¹⁰

The issue may go deeper than the uncontroversial idea that different metaphysical positions may have different ethical implications. The question may even be whether metaphysics, in the Kantian 'critical' sense, might not be *grounded* in ethical considerations, based on ethical premises. Metaphysics might not, then, even be *possible* without a tight connection to ethics. Accordingly, we cannot arrive at *any* understanding of reality as we humans experience it without paying due attention to the ways in which moral valuations and commitments are constituents of that same reality.

If these general questions concerning the relationships between metaphysics and ethics are raised in this way, then a similar investigation of the relationship between metaphysics and politics (and political philosophy in particular) becomes even more urgent.

2. Conceptual contexts

What kind of an angle should one then adopt in an investigation of this relationship? The question is difficult, since the various issues

that the relationship between politics and metaphysics gives rise to are not easy to prioritize. As we have seen, the question of this relationship not only pertains directly to political issues of norm justification and legitimation but also raises various philosophical problems, from that concerning the very meaning of ‘metaphysics’ to that of the possibility of a metaphysics-free political philosophy.

In principle, in so far as practical – that is, ethical and political – philosophy is primarily concerned with the *justification* of normative standards of action, of rules about what we *ought* to do, philosophers are bound to rely on arguments which go beyond a mere description of what happens in the world: the focus is on (ethically and politically) *right* actions, actions which *ought* to be done, rather than on what *is* usually done or what *usually* happens. This implies that practical philosophers will have to advance arguments which are correct for all and, moreover, which go significantly beyond what we can describe on the basis of our sense experience.

While reliance on the rules of traditional logic may indeed provide validity without recourse to sense perception, the resulting arguments seem to be nothing more than formal claims, which can only clarify an issue and eliminate any implicit inconsistencies. To be sure, clarification is very important and helpful for evaluation of the rightness of the rules of action; yet such a process is not sufficient to justify the correctness of the rules concerning what we ought to do, since ethically or politically correct rules may be as semantically clear and logically consistent as those which are morally objectionable.

There seems to be nothing particularly unclear, as far as semantics is concerned, about, say, the political decisions of certain totalitarian communist regimes or of other undemocratic states. Yet at least some of these decisions are obviously wrong. Similarly, I may make sure that an accurate description of such decisions contains no logical contradiction, but this only guarantees that the description is not contradictory and can refer to some decision or action; it cannot guarantee that the action is not wrong.¹¹

It is therefore doubtful that anything morally substantive can be discovered by following this method of clarification, which is confined to the tasks of making explicit and spelling out already existing content. Since metaphysics is the discipline which claims to be able to make substantive claims independently of sense

experience, it is usually considered to be a discipline which relies on the dogmatic assertion of certain (unjustifiable) claims.

For instance, certain claims about how we ought to live our lives will be acceptable only to those who adopt the particular cultural perspective from which the claims are being made. But then, even within the same cultural tradition, the arguments concerning the validity of certain rules may seem little more than dogmatic pronouncements, at best accompanied by various ‘metaphysical’ justifications: religious, cultural-philosophical or mythological. Given the plurality of the views, perspectives and experiences that people in modern liberal democracies make manifest, the outcome will be an almost permanent conflict of normative claims. Moreover, the appeal to dogmatic adjudication through such a metaphysics cannot be a good basis for conflict resolution, for it is impossible to justify such an adjudication as *correct for all*.

We therefore face a dilemma: either we try to justify such rules as right on the basis of arguments which aim to be correct for all, or we try to explain them further by clarifying the cultural contexts in which such rules are in place. In the first case, we must go beyond simple description of how such rules have been put into practice, beyond the mere clarification of their meaning and beyond the ‘argument’ that they are the rules of tradition. Hence nothing but a dogmatic postulation of the rules seems to remain available.

In the second case, one perhaps avoids this kind of dogmatism, but one ends up instead with a description and clarification of the meaning of the rules and hence fails to explain why such clearly presented rules are right rather than wrong. This approach falls short of providing a *justification* for the rules;¹² unless a person already accepts these rules as right, there is nothing further which can decide her to accept them.¹³

It is for this reason that recent Kantian philosophers like John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas or Karl-Otto Apel have tried, each in his own distinctive way, to make explicit the relationship between practical philosophy and metaphysics. This is certainly a necessary move, which echoes Kant’s distinction between dogmatic and critical metaphysics and his warning that dogmatic metaphysics makes speculative claims which go beyond our cognitive capacities.

Kant also suggested the possibility of a *sui generis* (transcendental) logical discipline, which would be able to provide substantive arguments without relying on sense experience. Since it is not

simply the result of dogmatic adjudication, such a discipline seems able to resolve the dilemma presented above, in particular the problem of finding a standard of adjudication which would enable us to evaluate the rightness of conflicting claims; however, since Kant developed his view of a transcendental logic in his theoretical philosophy, it would also be necessary to identify a parallel approach in his practical philosophy.

The main assumption which is required to get the argument for a discipline like transcendental logic going is that not all our concepts should be completely reducible to experience; in other words, the empiricist claim that we derive all our concepts from experience by abstraction and generalization would have to be reduced in scope to allow also for some non-empirical concepts. Following Kant, general logic deals with the laws of thinking about objects in general without concern for the kind of objects to which judgements refer. The formal validity of a syllogism, for instance, will be determined irrespective of how the variables in the argument are realized (*KrV* A55/B79–A56/B80).

Take the following inference: 'All Xs are *a*; A is X; hence, A is *a*.' The validity of the argument does not vary with the content of the variables X, A and *a*. Whether we replace the set with (human beings, Socrates and mortal) or (planets, Venus and green) is not relevant for what Kant calls 'general logic' (*KrV* A52/B76). Hence, while general logic does assume a reference to objects of cognition, these objects are only specified as objects in general, their particular features being logically irrelevant.

By contrast, the idea of a transcendental logic is that of a discipline which studies the relationship between judgements in so far as these employ concepts which are not empirical (and hence derived from the experience of certain objects) but a priori and, hence, capable of referring a priori to objects of experience and capable of saying something correct about these objects. This means that transcendental logic will investigate laws which regulate relationships between our judgements, in so far as they can say something a priori about the world. These laws will be more substantive than the laws of general logic and, at the same time, have a necessary character.

The link with practical philosophy can be established, at least prima facie, relatively easily, since Kant talks about the a priori, non-empirical concepts and the object of (pure) practical reason.

Hence, the idea of a discipline which investigates the relationships between judgements which employ non-empirical practical concepts is precisely that of a transcendental logic in the practical domain, and the result should be more substantive than that of general logic while at the same time presenting the necessary character of the laws of general logic.

In fact, in the Preface to the *Groundwork*, Kant draws two distinctions that may help to illuminate our argument. The first is the distinction between universal practical philosophy and metaphysics of morals, and the second between general logic and transcendental philosophy. Kant claims that, just as general logic investigates the laws of thinking as such, universal practical philosophy explores the laws of willing as such. By contrast, just as transcendental philosophy investigates the laws of pure thinking or of the thinking whereby objects are known a priori, metaphysics of morals examines the laws of a will determined by a priori, non-empirical principles (*GMS* 4: 390–1). We can in this way draw an analogy between transcendental logic and metaphysics of morals. The former has the role of identifying the a priori laws which constitute experience and, hence, through which objects of experience can be known a priori. Analogically the latter can be seen as playing the role of a practical transcendental logic, which investigates those laws of a will which have a constitutive role in practical judgement and, hence, make practical cognition possible.

To be sure, more needs to be done to spell out this idea of a metaphysics of morals as a practical transcendental logic, but despite the ongoing nature of the endeavour, the analogy points clearly to a possible solution to the dilemma presented above. Recall the dilemma: either we try to justify rules as right on the basis of arguments which aim to be correct for all or we try to explain them further by clarifying the cultural contexts in which such rules are in place; the first alternative requires us to do more than the second allows and suggests that we need to have recourse to a dogmatic assertion of rules; the second alternative avoids such dogmatism, but falls short of providing a justification of the rules. Hence, the question is that of providing a substantive and necessary standard of action which is non-dogmatic. For recall the assumption which was needed for the notion of a transcendental logic to be possible: that the empiricist claim that all concepts are reducible to experience (together with activities of abstraction and generalization) be

weakened in order to admit some concepts which are of a non-empirical origin.

Now, even if the plausibility of this assumption is not considered sufficient, and even if the objection that the notion of an a priori concept is dogmatic is again raised, one can still advance the following argument. Given the difference between theoretical and practical philosophy and, hence, given the normative character of practical rules, the notion of an a priori concept in practical philosophy is easier to justify than that of an a priori concept in theoretical philosophy, since justification in practical philosophy must go beyond what we can describe merely on the basis of sense experience or of the rules of general logic.

But can such a justification be genuinely non-dogmatic? Such a question points to a potentially rich area of further investigation. To be sure, transcendental idealism is metaphysical for Kant and the task is to identify the type of metaphysics it incorporates and the extent to which this is legitimate. In the context of current debates, the more problematic aspect is not simply the a priori, non-empirical character of the concepts of practical reason; rather, it is their constitutive character in the determination of the object of practical reason which must be defended as legitimate. Nonetheless, we think the discussion above offers at least some ammunition for the defender of the non-dogmatic character of such a transcendental or critical practical philosophy.

We regard the project of a critical philosophy as one concerned with transcendental idealism. The transcendental idealist character of critical philosophy refers to the attempt this project makes to steer a path between (and hence to avoid the traditional problems of) realism and idealism, as well as rationalism and empiricism. There are, of course, various accounts of transcendental idealism.¹⁴ Distinguishing between those which are, in some sense, accurate (or correct or convincing) and those which are not would not be an easy task. One test should perhaps be accepted here, namely that an account which regards transcendental idealism as dogmatic cannot be seen as accurate (or correct or convincing) without further qualification and discussion, especially given the importance, for Kant, of justification as opposed to uncritical acceptance of existing norms and authorities.

3. Texts

The conceptual and philosophical character of the problems presented in the previous section in relation to Kant's project of a critical philosophy goes some way towards explaining the relevance of Kant's thought for current debates. Another important consideration has to do with the concrete political problems with which such an account of justification has the potential to deal. In the current context of pluralism and diversity, the main advantage of such a Kantian project is that, if successful, it can offer an account of moral objectivity and a corresponding strategy of adjudication on moral conflicts without a commitment to moral realism.¹⁵

Moreover, such an account would not simply reduce moral objectivity to intersubjectivity. As a result, apart from sidestepping problems of demandingness created by most versions of moral realism, this account would also avoid difficulties which are usually associated with conceptions of justification based on *modus vivendi*, status quo or other versions of agonal politics. At the same time, this account offers a view of justification which is also distinct from many current contractarian, constructivist and discourse ethics conceptions.

The discussion in the previous two sections foreshadows some of the arguments and debates that have to be explored in relation to the question of the relationship between metaphysics and politics in Kant. The essays in this volume focus precisely on these arguments and debates, and make in this way an important contribution to the literature in the area.¹⁶ In fact, given that only very few studies have addressed this issue so far, this volume opens up an area of research which is not only philosophically intriguing, but which also has implications for highly concrete and urgent contemporary political issues.¹⁷ Moreover, taken together, the papers in this volume can be seen as offering the sketch of a research programme on the nature of critical practical philosophy.

To begin with, on Kenneth Westphal's account, Kant adopts a constructivist philosophical method, which is based on core principles of rational justification. Such principles do not rely on the assumptions of transcendental idealism, and yet are able to fulfil their function: that of justifying practical (moral and political) claims. Thus, according to Westphal, Kant's justificatory strategy

needs only to make appeal to a notion of justification, which requires that sufficient reasons be provided in order for all parties consistently to be able to adopt or follow the same principle in thought or action.

Such a notion of justification relies only on a view of reason as autonomous, a view which avoids naturalism (and hence is properly normative) and at the same time does not involve an appeal to transcendent or even transcendental authorities. While Kant's systematic approach may suggest that metaphysics is a necessary assumption for practical philosophy on Westphal's view, contemporary Kantians like Onora O'Neill can defend and implement constructivism without appeal to transcendental idealism.

Even though it represents one of the most distinctive and significant conceptions of justification in contemporary literature, Onora O'Neill's position is clearly influenced by John Rawls's. Yet, as Alyssa Bernstein argues in her contribution to the volume, while Rawls explicitly made claims for the exclusion of metaphysics from political theory, he only referred to a narrow sense of 'metaphysics'. Hence, while the Rawlsian constructivist method may well reject certain types of metaphysical claim, it does not reject metaphysics altogether and may even rely on some assumptions of a metaphysical nature. Thus Rawls's Kantian constructivism may be one way of sustaining an explicitly Kantian metaphysics in practical philosophy.

In his contribution, Sami Pihlström defends the thesis that ethics and (possibly) political philosophy are entangled with transcendental idealism, in a relationship which needs further elaboration but which cannot be ignored. Interestingly, the context of his discussion complements that of the previous papers. Thus, rather than focusing on debates sparked by the work of philosophers such as Rawls and O'Neill, he starts from the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Emmanuel Levinas. He reads them as Kantian philosophers and explores the ways in which Kant's view on the metaphysical status of practical reason paved the way for the views of these two important twentieth-century philosophers.

It seems evident, given the nature of Kant's critical philosophy, that he thinks that his theoretical philosophy is linked in important respects to his moral or practical (ethical and political) philosophy. He sometimes elaborates at fair length on the differences between his theoretical and his practical philosophy (for instance, *KrV*

A795/B823–A831/B859; *KpV* 5:119–21 or 5:134–41). Yet many questions remain unanswered and unclear in this respect. In particular, it is unclear how his critical metaphysics will function in the context of ethics and political philosophy.

Perhaps the best way to develop this aspect of Kant's philosophy further is by trying to identify areas in his practical philosophy where significant similarities with theoretical philosophy can be identified. By examining how his critical philosophy is deployed in the theoretical context, an appropriate starting point for a similar practical account can be provided. Several chapters in this volume adopt this strategy.

According to Lucas Thorpe, for example, there is at least one strong connection we can draw between Kant's theoretical philosophy, ethics and political philosophy. Thus, he argues that Kant's ethical ideal of the kingdom of ends is essentially the same as both his political ideal of a community of individuals governed by juridical laws and his theoretical ideal of an intelligible world. Here Thorpe draws on the normative character of the ideals, which move beyond the simple description of the world towards the prescription of states of affairs to be realized.

Tatiana Patrone's chapter focuses more specifically on several similarities between Kant's key concepts of political theory and his ideas of reason in the theoretical philosophy, starting with their function as representations of the unconditional. The claim she defends is that a regulative function is performed not only by Kant's ideas of reason in the theoretical domain, but also by fundamental concepts of political philosophy in the practical domain. Specifically, she argues that just as ideas of theoretical reason unify cognitions formed through the contribution of the concepts of the understanding, concepts of the unconditional public right bring into systematic unity concepts of private right, thus making possible their coherent application to the world.

In her contribution, Lea Ypi also starts from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*; not, however, from the Dialectic chapter, but from the Methodology section, more precisely the 'Architectonic of Pure Reason'. This part of the first *Critique* deserves much more attention than Kantian scholars usually pay it, and Ypi tries to address this concern at least in part. Her assumption is that in the attempt to link the systematic unity in science with the imperative of promoting the complete good, as presented in the second

Critique, Kant relies on teleological principles. The way in which these principles are deduced in the first *Critique* leads to tensions in their use in the theoretical and practical domains, and the aim of the paper is to illuminate these tensions and, thus, reconstruct the background which made possible Kant's discussion of teleology in the third *Critique*.

Yet equally pertinently, Katerina Deligiorgi emphasizes the role of moral experience in practical philosophy, in particular in the application of practical principles. Her contribution to the volume explores the role of moral experience in Kant's ethics and practical philosophy more generally. This brings into discussion the analogy between practical philosophy and theoretical philosophy with particular reference to an aspect of the latter which seems to have no place in a practical theory, namely sensibility. Deligiorgi agrees that an appropriate account of the justification of practical principles along the Kantian lines will have to explain the link to moral law. But, once justified, these principles can be applied if some reference to specific, concrete circumstances is possible. Here, then, at least an analogy with experience in theoretical philosophy would be useful.

An identification of the nature and structure of Kant's practical philosophy will have to go beyond an exploration of the analogy with theoretical philosophy and focus also on what is specific to Kant's practical philosophy. Three of the chapters of this volume do precisely this. Thus, in his article, Sorin Baiasu focuses on the unconditional character of practical principles. He explores the way in which we can hope to be able to justify in a Kantian manner particular principles of action as unconditional. More exactly, the question he raises is how to justify these principles on the basis of the supreme principle of practical reason, the moral law.

On Baiasu's account, ethicists and political philosophers who would like to account for the unconditional character of practical principles would do well to acknowledge the ultimate irreducibility of these principles to principles of logic or empirical science, although, of course, such principles of logic and science have an important role to play in practical philosophy. An appropriate account, he claims, will have to devise a justification which preserves the specific, fundamentally practical nature of Kant's practical philosophy. Yet, he goes on to claim, there are sufficient resources in Kant for a reconstruction of such an account of practical justification, and he offers an outline of such an account.

Garrath Williams's argument centres on the issue of accounting for the specific normativity of practical philosophy and, in particular, philosophy of responsibility. More exactly, given that this type of normativity makes necessary arguments which go beyond a mere description based on sense perception, he calls normative practical principles 'intelligible facts'. He explores the nature of these facts, firstly by making explicit their conventional, constructed character, and secondly by examining their necessary, unconditional nature. This suggests that a distinction must be drawn between the conditional elements of moral or political principles and their unconditional aspects. Garrath Williams anchors the latter in the mutual critique that arises when we are regarded as authors of, and hence as responsible for, our thoughts and actions.

In his contribution, Howard Williams examines the specifically practical character of Kant's political philosophy by dint of a direct investigation of concrete and specific issues, such as property, the state and war. Williams's starting-point is still an analogy with Kant's theoretical philosophy; he focuses not only on the ideas of pure theoretical reason (whether or not mediated by principles of the faculty of judgement), but also on synthetic a priori propositions of practical reason. From this analogy, he moves on to an examination of the nature of the principles of Kant's political thought which regulate interpersonal relationships involved in issues of property, political statehood and war. He also aims to identify the type of metaphysics these principles presuppose, and he examines the extent to which this use of metaphysics can be justified and sustained in the current philosophical and political context.

The final two contributions examine even more applied issues in Kant's political philosophy with a view to illuminating the nature of Kant's practical philosophy more generally. According to Sharon Anderson-Gold, a Kantian framework for the rightfulness of national law requires a cosmopolitan framework of rights. Her contribution therefore explores the fundamental role played by a universal and unconditional set of rules in the grounding of more contingent and constructed legal frameworks, like that specific to a nation. Of course, the assumption here is not simply that such a universal and unconditional set of rules, which would constitute a cosmopolitan framework of rights, can be taken for granted and directly applied whenever it seems to be denied by national laws.

Oliver Eberl's contribution focuses precisely on this issue and on the currently dominant interpretations of Kant's response. He shows that these interpretations make a case for a right to regime change in rogue states by assuming the existence of a rightful order of international relations which is threatened by such states. In fact, Eberl argues, Kant only allows for a right to regime change as a preventive, collective self-defence measure under conditions of a state of nature. This right is a provisional one, part of a decentralized system of collective security similar to that stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations. Hence, Kant cannot be regarded as justifying a unilaterally performed regime change in a rogue state with the argument that it would serve universal and unconditional interests.

4. Further questions

This overview of the next twelve chapters of this volume brings into relief the significance of four sets of issues which are relevant for the project of a Kantian, critical practical philosophy. The first set of issues concerns the very nature of transcendental idealism, a position with epistemological and (even if only negatively) metaphysical implications, which may be required for an appropriate account of justification in conditions of pluralism and diversity.

The second set of issues centres on the relationship between Kant's theoretical and practical philosophies and, more generally, between an account of what happens in the world and an account of what ought to happen. Although Kant asserts a certain priority of practical over theoretical reason, in fact the idea of a critical metaphysics is developed by Kant in his theoretical philosophy; indeed, its development in the practical domain sometimes gives the impression that what Kant is doing is merely drawing the implications for the practical domain of the theory already formulated in the theoretical domain.

The third set of issues concerns more specifically a critical practical philosophy, in particular those aspects which refer to the justification of moral and political unconditional standards. While there are important parallels to be drawn between a Kantian theoretical and a Kantian practical critical philosophy, unless a distinct character is presented for each of these an appropriate

account of the justification of *practical* standards cannot be articulated.

Finally, once such an account is formulated or at least once an approach to the issue of practical justification is identified, the question is how this account of approach can be applied – not only for the actual identification of specific justified standards, but for the application of justified standards to concrete circumstances.

In the context of the arguments of this volume, these sets of issues suggest several specific questions and areas of inquiry. As we have seen, Westphal's claim that Kant adopts a constructivist method of justification which can be defended without appeal to transcendental idealism seems to conflict strongly with Pihlström's claim that ethics and political philosophy are strongly connected with transcendental idealism. Yet any such conflict will depend on how we understand transcendental idealism, and also on how the relationship between moral (ethical and political) philosophy on the one hand and constructivism on the other is drawn.¹⁸

Moreover, Westphal's view seems to be in tension with Bernstein's claim that Rawlsian constructivism need not reject metaphysics altogether and may even rely on certain metaphysical aspects. This again raises questions about the nature of transcendental idealism and its relationship to metaphysics; but it also raises questions about what exactly we should take 'metaphysics' to refer to and mean. Furthermore, a distinction seems useful here between Kant's view of justification in moral philosophy and the constructivist account of justification.

An examination of the relationship between Kant's theoretical and practical philosophies therefore seems useful not only in order to determine the extent to which transcendental idealism, so important for Kant's theoretical philosophy, is to be found also in his practical philosophy, but also to determine the extent to which Kant's moral theory is in fact ultimately constructivist. As we have seen, the papers by Thorpe, Patrone and Ypi establish links between Kant's theoretical and practical philosophies with regard to the ideas of reason. Deligiorgi draws parallels more generally between sense experience and moral experience, and explores the role of moral 'experience' in the application of justified moral principles.

Such investigations of the links between the theoretical and practical domain suggest issues for research, issues which might, for instance, focus on the extent to which important elements of

theoretical philosophy have a similarly important role in practical philosophy and vice versa. Examples here would concern the constitutive function of certain elements of mind (or reason, in the general sense), the condition of universality and universalizability, the normative force of theoretical and practical claims, the very status of the elements of the a priori structure of mind or of the self as the transcendental condition of these elements. In short, the general question which can be explored further in this respect refers to the aspects of Kant's theoretical philosophy which are relevant for his practical (moral and political) philosophy.

Another important question, which can be associated with the third set of issues mentioned above, refers to the specifically practical character of Kant's practical philosophy and to an appropriate account of practical justification. The papers by Baiasu, Garrath Williams and Howard Williams place themselves more directly in the practical domain and try to offer answers to aspects of this general question. To be sure, in this way, these papers will also point to significant differences between Kant's theoretical and practical philosophies, but they go beyond this point and try to present accounts respectively of practical justification, normativity and apriority. These connect with the previous two sets of issues mentioned above, but they represent a series of distinct questions focused more precisely on the nature of Kant's practical philosophy. One important question would be whether, apart from the standard of truthfulness discussed in Baiasu's text, there are other standards which function as a priori structures of practical reason and are constitutive of practical judgement.

A further topic is suggested by Garrath Williams's study of authorship and responsibility, which is a rich source of questions and issues for further exploration, including the nature of 'the intelligible' and the prospects for Kantian constructivism. Furthermore, the question of synthetic a priori practical propositions raised by Howard Williams in relation to very concrete political issues, such as property, the state or war, can be pursued further along two directions of inquiry. Thus, one may explore other similar concrete issues, or one may investigate more deeply the nature of the practical synthetic a priori.

Finally, the question of the application of Kant's practical philosophy to specific political issues such as those explored by Anderson-Gold and Eberl in their contributions to this volume

suggests, first of all, further research into the very idea of application and the extent to which it is even appropriate to talk in this way in the context of Kant's critical philosophy. Moreover, here, issues of 'application' are interrelated with questions concerning judgement, and a discussion of this aspect of Kant's practical philosophy in connection with his third *Critique* would be another fruitful topic for the project of a critical practical philosophy. One can, of course, also fruitfully explore other specific political issues discussed by Kant and then draw the implications for current circumstances and situations.

5. Critical practical philosophy: a project

This chapter has introduced the idea of a critical practical philosophy, which would be able to offer an appropriate account of justification of unconditional ethical and political standards in conditions of pluralism and diversity, but without the strong metaphysical commitments of moral realism.¹⁹ The idea of such a critical practical philosophy is the main result of the attempt in this volume to approach the question of metaphysics and politics in Kant in a way which would be relevant for various urgent issues we are facing today.

We began this chapter with an overview of some aspects of the history of metaphysics and its relationship to the issue of ethical and political justification. The main aim there was to illuminate the motivations behind the reluctant attitude seen in the way current moral philosophers relate to metaphysics. While metaphysics has sometimes been associated with theology and with a dogmatic argumentative style, we have seen that this association was brought into question very early on and was systematically undermined by Kant and post-Kantians.

In the second section, we have seen that this dominant attitude of reluctance towards metaphysics makes it difficult for moral philosophers to offer an appropriate account of ethical and political justification in the current context of pluralism and diversity. In fact, it turns out that an indiscriminate rejection of metaphysics is as detrimental as an indiscriminate acceptance.

To be sure, a reluctant attitude towards metaphysics may still be motivated by its traditional identification with theology. This

attitude is, of course, compatible with the current revival of some traditional forms of metaphysics, which is usually associated with a commitment to knowledge through sciences or even to scientism. In general, as Kant says in the epigraph to this chapter, additional reasons for such a reluctant attitude can be found in our constant tendency to overstep the limits of our epistemic capacities and to make speculative claims, claims which, as such, cannot be justified. This applies equally well to a metaphysics related to theology or scientism.

However, the implication is a critical attitude towards metaphysics, not one of complete rejection. Hence, the project of a critical practical philosophy is that of an account of ethical and political justification and normativity which proceeds precisely from the attempt to identify the limits of our epistemic practical capacities, and thus to draw a line between what can be known and justified about morality – as well as what can be known or justified morally – and what cannot. Hence, this will also be a line dividing what is morally permissible from what is morally impermissible.

We regard this project as distinctive in the current philosophical landscape. So another potentially fruitful area for research would centre on the relationships between this project and other similar contemporary projects, such as discourse ethics, constructivism, contractarianism or pragmatist moral and political philosophy. It may not be immediately clear to what extent this project does anything more than develop an account of justification and normativity already present in Kant. However, our aim is not to formulate, come what may, a *new* project; we are rather interested in an account which is able to tackle some important ethical and political issues that confront us today. Whether this project turns out to be more or less Kantian is a secondary issue. What is clear so far is that Kant's texts offer an important source of inspiration for the project and an important starting point for the formulation and development of those elements that Kant was not able to discuss. We share his view that metaphysics – as a study 'after physics' which is not reducible to empirical claims and conceptual analysis – has a limited yet significant role to play in moral and political philosophy. This limited role has an objectivating function that offers us knowledge of some of the basic preconditions for effective social and political action.²⁰

Notes

- 1 John Warrington, 'Editor's Introduction', in Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, ed. and trans. J. Warrington (London: Dent, 1961), viii.
- 2 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 154.
- 3 See, for instance, the Kantian interpretation of Aristotle's method in epistemology in Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, rev. edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 240–63.
- 4 For instance, in Christian Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt (Deutsche Metaphysik)*, ed. C. Corr, in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. J. École, H. W. Arndt, C. Corr, J. E. Hoffmann and M. Thomann, vol. 2. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965).
- 5 See Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, second edn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952).
- 6 Of course, Kant's practical philosophy is quite distinct from Wolff's universal practical philosophy, as Kant himself points out (*GMS* 4: 390–1).
- 7 E. J. Lowe, *The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); David Lewis, *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Michael Loux, *Metaphysics: a Contemporary Introduction*, rev. edn (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); David Armstrong, *Truth and Truthmakers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- 8 From a Kantian perspective, this view is a form of transcendental realism, a view that Kant systematically challenges in his critical works.
- 9 A contemporary Kantian might even echo William James's pragmatism, arguing that in *every* genuinely metaphysical dispute, some practical issue is, however remotely, involved: see James, *Pragmatism: a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, ed. F. H. Burkhardt, F. Bowers and I. K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), chs 2–3. In some situations of metaphysical reflection, the ethical aspects are, of course, less relevant than in others. For example, it is easier to make the case for the ethical value-ladeness of the metaphysics of personhood (e.g. personal identity) than of the issue of universals vs. tropes. Piecemeal analysis and careful attention to specific issues in relation to such controversies is needed. The main point here is that we may not be able categorically to disconnect metaphysical disputes from ethical considerations.
- 10 Hilary Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); *Ethics without Ontology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

- ¹¹ Of course, here we refer to formal logic and to contradictions of the type A and non-A. For Kantians claim that morally impermissible principles and actions are contradictory in some sense, and some even claim in a 'logical' sense. Yet, most often, this does not mean a contradiction in formal logic. See, for instance, the distinction between logical, practical and teleological contradictions in Christine Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of the Universal Law', in *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also the recent discussion of universalizability in Kant and of the various types of contradiction used in the literature in Mark Timmons, 'The categorical imperative and universalizability', in C. Horn and D. Schoenecker (eds), *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: New Interpretations* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006).
- ¹² The assumption here is that providing a justification for rules is a possible and worthwhile enterprise. This may, however, be contested. From the perspective of Richard Rorty's 'ethnocentrism', for instance, justification assumes at least one starting point on which parties in dispute should agree on, and one rule that they should accept and on the basis of which implications can then be formulated. Yet on Rorty's account, there is no such starting point and no such rule. Even the principle of non-contradiction is regarded as culturally specific and in principle revisable. Hence, on this account, the task is to persuade others of the practical value of such a rule and of the acceptability of such a starting point, rather than to try to justify them: see Rorty, *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin, 1999); *Philosophy as Cultural Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). On the meta-philosophical and epistemological underpinnings of Rorty's position, see for instance James Tartaglia, *Rorty and the Mirror of Nature* (London: Routledge, 2007). Two things are worth mentioning here. First, Rorty's account does not presuppose that any means by which others can be persuaded are to be used; so he wants to maintain a distinction between violent force and persuasion, but he does not think that this can be achieved by reference to some idea of rational justification. Secondly, however, it is unclear whether his account is able to offer such a distinction between persuasion and violent force.
- ¹³ The exception here seems to be the situation where a person disagrees with a certain rule and agrees after the rule is clarified. But, in fact, this is not at all an exception. The reason why the rule is now accepted is that the agent realizes that it is the same as a rule she already considered as right. The process of clarification does not add anything to the rule; it only helps the agent understand it.
- ¹⁴ On this, see the discussion in Section 4 below, as well as n. 14.

- ¹⁵ Moral realism is understood here by analogy with contemporary metaphysical realism, as discussed in Section 2 above. Moral realism would thus imply a metaphysical claim concerning the existence, independently from the mind, of some moral standards. Moreover, it would imply an epistemological claim concerning the possibility for us of discovering or acquiring knowledge of these standards as they are independently from us. There are, however, versions of moral realism which put emphasis on the epistemological, rather than the metaphysical, claim. It remains an open question whether they are appropriately considered as versions of moral realism, rather than of, say, moral cognitivism. The general question of what moral realism refers to also remains open. We would also like to point out that our intention here is not to deny the persuasiveness of an interpretation of Kant as a moral realist. Our claim is only that such an interpretation would deprive Kant's theory of most of what makes it philosophically interesting and challenging.
- ¹⁶ The papers in the next twelve chapters were invited for a Section on 'Political and Metaphysics in Kant', organized as part of the 2007 European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, which took place in Pisa in September. Howard Williams and Sorin Baiasu organized the Section.
- ¹⁷ For some texts dealing more directly with this issue, see John Rawls, 'Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 14/3 (1985), 223–51; Jean Hampton, 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', *Ethics*, 99/4 (1989), 791–814; Katrin Flikschuh, *Kant and Modern Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also Sorin Baiasu, 'Kantian metaphysics and the normative force of practical principles', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 3/1 (2007), 37–56.
- ¹⁸ Sami Pihlström, for instance, defends a pragmatic form of transcendental idealism in *Pragmatist Metaphysics: an Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology* (London: Continuum, 2009). More generally, 'transcendental idealism' can be understood in various ways. Kant first formulated his critical philosophy and the theory of transcendental idealism in the context of what he called 'theoretical philosophy', more exactly in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Recent commentators have attempted to clarify the relationship between Kant's theoretical philosophy and transcendental idealism, and perhaps the most influential interpretive lines to date are the works of Graham Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: an Outline of One Central Argument in the Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962); and Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983). But see

also Robert Pippin, *Kant's Theory of Form: an Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Richard Aquila, *Representational Mind: a Study of Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). In spite of important differences, both Bird and Allison emphasise the relationship between Kant's theoretical philosophy and transcendental idealism, and both regard transcendental idealism as a non-dogmatic, legitimate form of philosophizing. Both agree that, with regard to the much-debated topic of the reality of things in themselves, all we can say epistemologically is that we cannot know them. Yet whereas Allison thinks the only conclusions which transcendental idealism can legitimately offer on this are epistemological – conclusions which, moreover, have only a negative character – Graham Bird seems to accept that transcendental idealism also affords us ontological considerations; these, to be sure, make no specific epistemological claims beyond the negative ones already mentioned, but they nevertheless tell us something about the world's reality structure. For other ways of distinguishing between transcendental idealisms, see Mark Sacks, *Objectivity and Insight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also Adrian Moore's discussion of this issue in 'Transcendental constraints, transcendental features and transcendental idealism' (paper presented to the Mark Sacks Memorial Conference, 2009).

¹⁹ See, however, n. 11 above, where the possibility of metaphysically weaker forms of moral realism is introduced.

²⁰ Stephen Engstrom seems to back up this line of argument in his recent *The Form of Practical Knowledge: a Study of the Categorical Imperative* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), vii–xv.

References

- Allison, H., *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).
 Aquila, R., *Representational Mind: a Study of Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).
 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, ed. and trans. J. Warrington (London: Dent, 1961).
 Armstrong, D., *Truth and Truthmakers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
 Baiasu, S., 'Kantian metaphysics and the normative force of practical principles', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 3/1 (2007), 37–56.

- Bird, G., *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: an Outline of One Central Argument in the Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).
- Engstrom, S., *The Form of Practical Knowledge: a Study of the Categorical Imperative* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
- Flikschuh, K., *Kant and Modern Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- Gilson, E., *Being and Some Philosophers*, second edn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952).
- Guyer, P., *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
- Hampton, J., 'Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics?', *Ethics*, 99/4 (1989), 791–814.
- James, W., *Pragmatism: a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, ed. F. H. Burkhardt, F. Bowers and I. K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
- Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996).
- , 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals', in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. and trans. M. J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- , *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002).
- Korsgaard, C., 'Kant's formula of the Universal Law', in *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Lewis, D., *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Loux, M., *Metaphysics: a Contemporary Introduction*, rev. edn (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
- Lowe, E. J., *The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
- Moore, A. W., 'Transcendental constraints, transcendental features and transcendental idealism' (paper presented to the Mark Sacks Memorial Conference, 2009).
- Nussbaum, M., *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, rev. edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2001).
- Pihlström, S., *Pragmatist Metaphysics: an Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology* (London: Continuum, 2009).
- Pippin, R., *Kant's Theory of Form: an Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
- Putnam, H., *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

- , *Ethics without Ontology*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
- Rawls, J., 'Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 14/3 (1985), 223–51.
- Rorty, R., *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin, 1999).
- , *Philosophy as Cultural Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- Sacks, M., *Objectivity and Insight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Tartaglia, J., *Rorty and the Mirror of Nature* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- Timmons, M., 'The categorical imperative and universalizability', in C. Horn and D. Schoenecker (eds), *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: New Interpretations* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006).
- Warrington, J., 'Editor's Introduction', in Aristotle, *Metaphysics*.
- Wolff, C., *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt (Deutsche Metaphysik)*, ed. C. Corr, in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. J. École, H. W. Arndt, C. Corr, J. E. Hoffmann and M. Thomann, vol. 2. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965).