

Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

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Introduction

1 The topic

The body-soul problem is not an invention of modernity, but has a long history that can be traced back to the early age of Greek culture. The problem is also not confined to Greek culture: ever since humankind has been able to think at all it has been confronted by the question of what happens at the moment of death, when life is extinguished with the last breath. Whether the 'exhalation' of life means the end of human existence, or something remains that becomes separate from the body at the moment of death, is therefore an existential question that has received and still receives different answers in different cultures. In Greek as well as Latin the association of the word 'soul' with the breath of life is already clear from etymology: the Greek word for soul, *psychê*, just like its Latin counterpart, *anima*, originally meant 'breath/breeze' or 'wind'. The notion that this breath should have a continued existence is already present in Homer, who reserves the name of '*psychê*' for the souls of the dead. Exactly when the word 'soul' came to designate not only the principle of life in the living organism but also to apply to all psycho-physical faculties is still a matter of controversy, in view of the scarcity of sources dating from the 7th and 6th centuries BC. But even the much richer material provided by the poets of the 5th century does not present a unified picture. Because there was no orthodoxy in Greek religion, no firm set of convictions emerged over the centuries concerning the nature of the soul and its fate after death. The literary sources from the Archaic age through late antiquity therefore present a diffuse picture of belief and unbelief, of fear and hope. The artwork and other archaeological artefacts dating from these periods provide vivid testimonies to this state of affairs, as is witnessed by the image reproduced in the posters and invitations for the conference, as well as on the jacket of the volume itself: painted on a white-grounded *lekythos* by the 'Sabouroff-painter' sometime in the 5th century, this image on this grave-offering depicts the God Hermes, with his emblematic traveller's hat and staff, as he guides a dead young

woman to Charon's barge, surrounded by small winged creatures, the souls of the dead.

Given the absence of a uniform conception of the nature of the soul in the ancient Greek world, it is quite natural that it was approached and treated in quite different ways by Greek philosophers. Nor were discussions of the nature of the soul confined to questions of life and death: the philosophers were also concerned with the functions of the soul of living beings, including the relationship of the soul to the physical functions of the body, as well as to the cognitive and emotional faculties. Notwithstanding the diversity of the theories that emerged concerning the respective natures of the body and soul, there were, overall, two models of explanation of this relationship, namely a monist and a dualist one. The monist model is based on the assumption of a very close interrelation between the body and soul, so that the soul is not even identifiable as a separate entity from the body, and can be treated as a mere aspect of the living body. The dualist model, on the other hand, presupposes a much looser connection between body and soul, so that certain dualists regarded the soul as a stranger on earth, living in coerced partnership with the body for a limited time only. The two models had many different variants, so that each model comprised a wide spectrum of possibilities. Moreover, heterodoxy of this kind among the philosophers is not only witnessed from early on, it lasted through the ages to the end of antiquity. Depending on the model and its cosmological presuppositions, the soul was either conceived primarily in terms of physiological, spiritual, or intellectual functions, so that different types of 'psychology' were developed by different philosophers and expanded in their schools.

Thus, since antiquity, the soul-body problem has been conceived of in both a narrower and a wider sense. On the one hand there is the question of the nature of the relationship between the body and soul itself, where the main concerns are their similarity, dissimilarity, or even opposition; their unity and separability and their dependence and independence. On the other hand there is the broader issue of how the different perspectives on the soul-body problem have shaped, and been influenced in turn, by theories of moral and developmental psychology, epistemology, education, as well as by theology. The articles in this volume not only address topics within this wide spectrum, they are also concerned with these questions in quite different periods in the history of ancient Greek philosophy, from the Presocratics and the philosophers

of the Classical and Hellenistic ages to the theologians of early Christianity.

As has been remarked in the preface, the order in which the papers in this volume are presented does not follow the organizational plan of the conference, which was divided into five sections based on the following broad topics: the relation of body and soul from the physiological-scientific perspective (section 1); problems of epistemology – concerning the relation between sense-perception and the intellect (section 2); the body and soul as problems of moral psychology (section 3); the problems of freedom of the will, responsibility, and determinism (section 4); the relation between the soul and body from the theological perspective (section 5). The choice of these five topics was intended to reflect the complexity and importance of the body-soul question, and to encourage participants and audience members alike to consider the diversity of, and the interconnection between, the areas of ancient Greek thought influenced by these discussions. Questions of epistemology, for example, may require an elucidation of the physiological conditions, while the problem of free will is tied to physiology as well as to epistemology and also has consequences for moral psychology. Moreover, in virtue of the fact that in antiquity, the conception of nature was intimately connected to the belief in the gods, the subject of ancient Greek theology cannot be treated in isolation, just as it in turn cannot be kept separate from questions of moral psychology. An unavoidable result of this approach to the body-soul question was that there was considerable overlap in the subjects covered by the various presentations, as the speakers tried to do justice to the various ramifications of their individual themes.

The choice of topic was left to the speaker's discretion. Surprising though it may seem, discussion of problems in Plato and Aristotle did not predominate among the topics chosen, as the importance of these two giants of ancient philosophy might have let one expect. There are, of course, several articles dedicated to central questions concerning the soul-body problem in Plato and Aristotle; but altogether there was an even balance between the Presocratics, the philosophers of the Classical and Hellenistic ages, and those of late antiquity. The great interest of historians of philosophy in the Presocratics is of long standing; they are not just treated as the precursors of the philosophers of the Classical age, but as important witnesses of, and collaborators in the creation of Greek culture as such. In recent years these studies have been intensified, especially with regard to the school of the Pythagoreans. In addi-

tion, certain changes of interpretation of the philosophers of the Classical age have resulted in a renewed scrutiny of the philosophy of their predecessors. The turning to themes in the Hellenistic and later ages may not only be due to the fact that the 'psychology' of Plato and Aristotle has already received so much attention that experts now prefer to confine shorter articles to more specialist topics within this subject, but also to the fact that there has been a general shift of interest to the philosophers of the Hellenistic and later Graeco-Roman age, an area that had long been the domain of a few specialists only. The reception of pagan ancient philosophy by early Christian theologians has also become an area of intensive study that has been spurred at least in part by a better understanding of the philosophers of the Hellenistic age. All these developments are reflected in the present volume, which aims, therefore, not only to convey information about the diverse approaches taken to the body-soul problem by ancient Greek thinkers to all comers, but also to provide a snap-shot of the present stage of research dedicated to the problem of body and soul in ancient philosophy as a whole.

It is to be hoped that the times when scholars had to prove the 'social relevance' of their research are gone for good. Nowadays there is no reason to hide the fact that one's field of interest is history for history's sake. That statement also applies to the interest in the history of philosophy. At the same time, there is no reason not to continue to explore the relevance of the insights provided by the ancient world for the present age. In view of the complexity of the treatment of the problem of body and soul in ancient philosophy it would in fact be quite strange if ancient thinkers had nothing to contribute to the present intensive debates of this issue, despite the fact that 'body and soul' have long been superseded by 'brain and mind'. Granting that due to the enormous increase of knowledge in recent years, particularly in the area of neurophysiology, fruitful discussions of the 'body and soul/brain and mind' problem presuppose special knowledge at a high level, the treatment of this problem is nevertheless based on the same alternatives as it was in antiquity: monism and dualism are still in fundamental opposition, just as there are reductionist tendencies of all sorts that stand in need of critical and, if possible, objective appraisals of their basic presuppositions and answers to such questions as whether it is meaningful to speak of the essential nature of a person's character and of freedom of the will. Notwithstanding the great advances made by the neurosciences, the explanations of the connection between neurological and cognitive as well as emotional processes arguably remain hardly less hypothetical than

those put forward by the thinkers of antiquity. The persistence of such riddles reveals the problematic character of some of the abstruse conclusions that nowadays even respectable scientists feel entitled to draw with respect to the mutual dependence of mind and brain. The evaluation of the possibilities and limitations of the cognitive and neurosciences is, however, not the only area that might conceivably profit from a study of the thought of antiquity; it should be also mentioned that many proponents of the religious faith in the immortality of the soul still see themselves as confronted by the same mysteries that were already recognized and studied by those who held analogous views in antiquity.

2 The contents of this volume

I. Presocratics

This volume starts with an article by *Carl Huffman* on the early Pythagoreans entitled: “The Pythagorean conception of the soul from Pythagoras to Philolaus”. Huffman does not confine himself to the controversial questions of the nature of the soul and the terminology used by the Pythagoreans, but also attempts to draw a consistent picture of the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul as a whole. He does so by drawing on four sources: (1) the early testimonia on Pythagoras, (2) the oral maxims known as *akousmata*, which may go back to Pythagoras and formed the basis of the Pythagorean way of life, (3) the fragments of Philolaus, and (4) the Pythagorean Precepts of Aristoxenus, which describe a Pythagorean ethical system and date to the early fourth century. These four sources indicate that the soul was conceived of as the seat of sensation and emotion only, as distinct from the intellect. This kind of soul fits well with the doctrine of transmigration, because it could also transmigrate between human beings and animals. What passes from body to body is, then, a personality characterized by emotion and behaviour, which is fashioned by intellect, when it is born in a human body.

The contribution by *Christian Schäfer* is also dedicated to the Pythagoreans, as its title indicates: “The Pythagoras-fragment of Xenophanes and the problem of his critique of the doctrine of *metempsychōsis*”. Schäfer takes up the well-known controversy of whether fragment B 7 in fact addresses Pythagoras and whether it is meant as a mockery or as a criticism at all. In his treatment of the question, Schäfer proceeds from the minimalist interpretation that nothing whatsoever can be

said about Pythagoras' doctrine of the soul to the maximalist assumption that Pythagoras claimed that the soul was immortal. In addition Schäfer tackles the question of to what extent it is possible to identify similarities and differences between the doctrines of Pythagoras and Xenophanes. Finally, Schäfer contemplates the possibility, backed by new information derived from Neo-Platonist sources, of whether the Fragment should not be interpreted in an altogether different spirit: as a political joke.

The article by *Brad Inwood*, "Empedocles and *metempsychôsis*: The critique of Diogenes of Oenoanda", is concerned with the Empedoclean doctrine of the soul. The author starts out with the critique that Diogenes, a late Epicurean of the 2nd century AD, vents against Empedocles. Diogenes, however, refers to *psychai* whereas Empedocles deals with *daimones*, and appears to be mainly concerned with the status and nature of the souls between incarnations. In his paper Inwood raises several questions with respect to Diogenes' fragment: (1) Does Diogenes' text provide evidence on Empedocles' theory or does it represent just another episode in the history of the reception of Empedocles in antiquity? (2) What is the effect of assuming that the *daimones* are souls, and is Empedocles theory defensible if the equation is misguided? (3) To what extent is the alleged persistence of the *daimones* compatible with the Empedoclean doctrine of cosmic cycles? According to Inwood, a careful consideration of the Epicurean objections suggests that these do not seriously undermine the Empedoclean doctrine, but rather contribute to a proper assessment of its distinctive features.

The contribution by *Anthony Long*, entitled: "Heraclitus on measure and the explicit emergence of rationality", aims to show that Heraclitus' doctrine of the *logos* rather than invoking any pre-existing concept of rationality was the result of the process of discovering that very thing by reflecting on the meaning and function of key concepts of his own thought. Long shows this by analyzing various concepts that Heraclitus uses in his elucidation of *logos*, such as *metron*, *nomos*, *harmonîê*, *kosmos*, *dikê*, and *sôphrosynê*. That *metron*, in the sense of measure and proportion, plays a central role in the analysis of *logos* is shown by Long's discussion of the respective concepts in early Greek poetry on the one hand, and on the other hand, by his anticipation of the important role that *metron* in connection with *sôphrosynê* will play not only within Platonic cosmology, logic, ethics, and psychology, but also in the philosophy of the Stoa.

The physicalist aspect of Presocratic philosophy is addressed by *Georg Rechenauer's* discussion, "Democritus' model of the soul and the

principles of atomistic physics”. Rechenauer points up the particular difficulties that result from Democritus’ materialistic position for his explanation of mental and psychological processes. For example, although Democritus posited the existence of special soul-atoms, his theory does not adequately account for the qualitative distinctions among the aforementioned processes, given that the soul-atoms represent ‘dead matter’ with purely quantitative properties. Rechenauer also examines the shortcomings of the Democritean model in accounting for the interaction between mind and body, and with regard to the question of the extent to which it is possible to view mental and physical processes as identical. The author therefore carefully reviews the relevance of further assumptions that can be invoked to justify the Democritean model of the soul and opts for a relation of mutual dependence, with the soul fulfilling a leading function.

II. Plato

That the treatment of the problematic of body and soul in Plato, of all philosophers, is discussed in only four contributions is partly the consequence of the general shift of interest mentioned above, but partly also due to happenstance, since two of the participants at the conference had made previous commitments for the publication of their articles.

The discussion of Plato’s concern with the problem of body and soul is opened by *David Sedley’s* contribution, “Three kinds of Platonic immortality”. He intends to show that Plato with his resourceful arguments for the soul’s immortality saw himself less as an innovator than as an exegete, clarifying the scientific or rational foundations of certain religious traditions about the soul’s long-term destiny. Now Plato’s dialogues themselves display a certain kind of heterodoxy. While in the *Phaedo*, Plato’s Socrates is intent to prove the immortality of the soul in a transcendent sense – i.e. on the basis of logical and metaphysical considerations, in the *Timaeus* he lets the title figure propose the conception of a kind of ‘conferred’ immortality, and in the *Symposium*, the priestess Diotima seems to advocate a kind of ‘earned’ immortality. It must remain an open question, therefore, what kind of ‘apotheosis’ of the soul is most akin to Plato’s own position.

The *Phaedo* is also at the center of the other two contributions that are primarily concerned with Plato. *Michael Erler’s* article, “‘For we speak with humans, not with gods’. A comparison of the Platonic and

the Epicurean *epimeleia tês psychês*”, starts out by contrasting the virtually unaffected and therefore anti-tragic personality of Socrates with that of his pupil Phaedo, who despite his subjection to strong emotions in view of the imminent death of his beloved master and teacher Socrates, nevertheless manages to keep his feelings under control. Erler not only treats Phaedo’s personality as a model of the kind of control of the *pathê* demanded by Plato in his critique of poetry in Book X of the *Republic*, but also discovers a convergence between these Platonic moral standards and corresponding postulates in Epicurus. Erler also adds the observation that Plato’s depiction of the personalities of Socrates and that of Phaedo, when taken as the varying embodiments of the personality of a ‘decent’ (*epieikês*) human being, anticipate the ideal of humankind of the Stoics on the one hand and that of the Epicureans on the other.

The anti-tragic figure of Socrates is also the topic of the article by *Gyburg Radke-Uhlmann* entitled “The *energeia* of the philosopher – on the unity of literary dialogue and philosophical argumentation in Plato’s *Phaedo*”. The author is concerned to show that this dialogue represents the synthesis of tragedy and comedy that Socrates had demanded in the *Symposium*. Just as pleasure and pain are presented as inextricably intertwined early in the *Phaedo*, so the depiction of Socrates’ death unfolds as a ‘story with a happy end’. This happy end is constituted, on the one hand, by the stringent arguments concerning the relation between soul and body, culminating in the proof of the immortality of the soul on the basis of the theory of forms, and, on the other hand, on the dramatic staging of the discussion itself. According to the author these two elements in a way represent the dialogue’s soul and body and thereby illustrate Plato’s notion of the activity (*energeia*) that is characteristic of the philosopher.

A relatively neglected topic is the concern of the discussion by *Jan Szaif*: “The *aretê* of the body: The position of health in Plato’s doctrine of goods”. Plato is usually taken to attribute to health the function of an instrumental good with respect to human happiness. Szaif not only collects and compares conflicting evidence concerning the happiness-related effects of health and the detracting effects of ill-health, but subsequently also investigates the question in how far health is treated as an intrinsic and as a final good. That health is an intrinsic good is shown chiefly on the basis of Plato’s conception of harmony, which always represents a good state, regardless of any further effect. That health is also a final good is justified by the constitutive role it plays in the indi-

vidual's own conception of his or her happiness. In what sense health fulfils that condition is the object of an intricate scrutiny that purports to show that utility is not to be confined to instrumental goods, but – as in the case of the virtues – includes their active contribution to happiness. In the case of health this contribution consists in the fact that the harmonious interaction of the parts of the soul presupposes the integration of the body's appetites and desires. Thus health as an aspect of the well-conditioned self turns out to be both a constitutive and a final good, at least in a weak sense.

III. Aristotle

The contribution by *Günther Patzig* "Body and mind in Aristotle", was originally delivered as the opening presentation of the conference. After providing a brief overview of the development regarding the relation between body and mind in early Greek thought up to Plato, Patzig explains in what way the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the 'first actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it' differs from all previous models. He points out that it not only has the advantage of overcoming the dualism of soul and body, but also constitutes a hierarchical order of physiological and psychological functions that applies to all living things, including plants. A key role is assigned to sense-perception as a psycho-physical process, where the physical event and the activity of consciousness turn out to be just two aspects of one and the same process. Such a differentiation, according to Patzig, could serve as the model in the present-day controversy on the relation between brain and mind, since it neither requires a reduction of the mind to the brain nor an incurable dualism, but instead treats mental phenomena as a special class of physical events. The author does not pretend that this interpretation of the problem removes all difficulties in defining the relationship between brain and mind, but recommends the Aristotelian model at least as a suitable basis for future solutions.

In his article "The priority of soul in Aristotle's *De anima*: Mistaking categories?" *Christopher Shields* starts out by first putting into question the unity of body and soul, which is often regarded as a non-question, because Aristotle seems to reject it as superfluous in a prominent passage of *De anima*. As an explanation of this rejection, experts often refer to the basic conception of Aristotle's hylomorphism, according to which a living thing is nothing but an ensouled body. Against this view, Shields

objects that Aristotle does not regard the question of the unity of body and soul as superfluous, but rather assumes that his conception of the soul as the *entelecheia* of a natural organic body already represents an answer – and one, moreover, that turns out to be far more complex than is commonly assumed. For a proper understanding of Aristotle’s conception of the relation between the soul and other aspects to the organization of living bodies requires not only explications of both the nature of the priority that the soul has over the body, and of the nature of their unity; in addition, it calls for an explanation of how the soul can be the principle or cause of the live body. The author’s further discussion not only works out with precision the kinds of tensions for the unity of body and soul that result from the priority of the latter over the former, but also the kind of solution that Aristotle’s conception of the relationship allows for.

In “Aristotle on desire and action”, *David Charles* addresses the question of whether the Aristotelian explanation of how the soul moves the body is not disappointingly simplistic, because it does not even address the fundamental question of how desire, a psychological phenomenon, can cause motion, a physical process. On the basis of central passages on this issue, *De anima* I 1 and *De motu animalium* 7–10, Charles shows that Aristotle presupposes the inseparability of the psychological and physiological aspects in affective behaviour in cases of anger and fear. The author then proceeds to make the plausible claim that Aristotle’s explanation for the interconnection between ‘the passions of the soul’ (such as desire) with the state of the body, are both based on the aforementioned presupposition. This approach represents an interesting alternative to the post-Cartesian positions of dualism, materialism, and functionalism; given that such emotions as anger, fear or desire are psycho-physical states, the question of how psychological forces can have physical effects does therefore not arise in the sense presupposed by post-Cartesians.

The ‘anatomy’ of the connection between soul and body is the topic of the contribution by *Friedemann Buddensiek*, “Aristotle’s pineal gland? Concerning the relation between soul and *pneuma* in Aristotle’s theory of animal locomotion”. Aristotle’s views on the function of the *pneuma* invite comparison with the function attributed by Descartes to the pineal gland: whereas the innate *pneuma* is described in *De motu animalium* 10 as serving a crucial role in the self-initiated movement of animals, Descartes believed that the pineal gland was playing an analogous role. Aristotle’s *pneuma* has, on the one hand, been treated as the material coun-

terpart of the striving that is responsible for the transformation of sense-perception into the movements of the body; on the other hand it has also been regarded as the instrument through which the soul sets the body in motion. The crucial question that Buddensiek sets out to answer is, then, which of the following alternatives is more in conformity with the hylomorphic conception of the unity of body and soul. Is the soul the form of the *pneuma*? Or is the *pneuma* a separate entity that serves as the instrument of the soul? Or does the soul stand in some other kind of relation to the *pneuma*?

In her article “*Aporiae* in the Aristotelian conceptions of the self-controlled and the bad person”, Ursula Wolf addresses important problems of moral psychology that arise in Aristotle because of the interdependence, in his view, between the acquired character-dispositions (*hexeis*) and practical reason (*phronêsis*), in the explanation of self-control (*enkrateia*) on the one hand and of badness (*kakia*) on the other. Thus, it is hard to see why Aristotle regards the bad person as internally torn and full of remorse, given that he presupposes that the vicious person is convinced of the correctness of his universal maxims, which conform to his evil inclinations. Again, Aristotle’s view that the self-controlled person is dispositionally prone to strong desires turns out to be rather hard to reconcile with the alleged possession of *phronêsis*, given that latter is supposedly to be in conformity with the proper moral dispositions. In view of these problems, the phenomenon of *enkrateia* should present a graver problem for Aristotle’s moral psychology than the much debated question of *akrasia*.

IV. The Academy

The question of what gaps there are in Plato’s account of the relation between soul and body, as seen from the perspective of the Platonists of the Old Academy is discussed in *John Dillon’s* contribution “How does the soul direct the body, after all? Traces of a dispute on mind-body relations in the Old Academy”. Specifically, Dillon addresses a question concerning the Platonic dualism of body and soul that was already a concern to Plato’s immediate followers Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus: namely, how can Plato treat the soul like an incorporeal substance without giving any explanation, as his own dualistic perspective pointedly requires, of how the soul nevertheless exerts control over the body and its behaviour? In search of an answer, Dillon first looks

at the Platonic dialogues that are central for this question, and then turns to the solution proposed by Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus that the soul employs a certain substance, either fiery or aetherial in nature, that comes between body and soul and that the soul employs as a 'vehicle' when controlling the body. Dillon finally speculates, as an explanation for Plato's failure to recognize the aforementioned difficulty, that Plato may not have believed in the real existence of the body, and therefore may not have viewed questions concerning the relationship between the soul and body as particularly problematic.

V. Hellenistic philosophy

As a matter of coincidence, all four contributions that are dedicated to this epoch are concerned with the philosophy of the Stoa. That the topics discussed may, at first glance, look somewhat marginal is due to the fact that the Stoic conviction of the inseparability of soul and body and its effect on questions of epistemology, psychology, and ethics has long been at the center of scholarly discussions, while other aspects of Stoic doctrine have received far less attention.

This certainly applies to the topic that is addressed by *Tad Brennan*: "Stoic souls in Stoic corpses". Different from what one might expect, Brennan is not concerned with the relation of living persons to their prospective physical remains after death, but with the question of whether the Stoics, given their concentration on reason as the overall active principle, are even able to do justice to the fact that humans are composites of soul and body. If human beings are identified with their soul, and the body is treated as a burden, it is easy to see why Epictetus, a late adherent to the Stoa, would see fit to call the body a corpse (*nekros*). The reproach that the Stoics neglected the body, already raised by Cicero, has prompted Brennan to subject this question to further inquiry. Since there are no reliable sources on this issue, Brennan approaches the question by attempting to reconstruct the ethical consequences that are to be drawn within the Stoic system from their alleged 'indifference' to the body. This investigation leads Brennan to conclude that while the Stoics identified the self with the soul, they regarded human beings as a '*systasis*' of soul and body. The fact that the composite needs to be taken care of explains why, according to Brennan's reconstruction, the Stoics viewed physical well-being as one of the 'preferred indifferents' but not as a good as such. If we accept that for the Stoics the

body does not count as a good, it is intelligible that from their perspective, the body could be regarded as a mere ‘corpse’, which the individual is forced to carry with him or her like so many other burdens through life.

Keimpe Algra's contribution is concerned with a question that forms a central part of Greek popular religion, but whose treatment by the Stoics is likely to be unknown even to most experts: “Stoics on souls and demons: Reconstructing Stoic demonology”. As Algra notes, the sources on this theme are few and scattered far and wide, so that a reconstruction of the original theory, or theories, is not easy. In addition, demons seem not to have played an important role in Stoic cosmology so that one is tempted to regard them as marginal and slightly embarrassing *Fremdkörper* in the Stoic system. The aim of Algra's paper is therefore to reconstruct the conception of demons that was endorsed by various Stoics and the philosophical contexts in which this conception was used. Special attention is given to the Stoic concern to demonstrate the compatibility of their rationalist theology with popular religious beliefs. Thus, the *daimones* are identified on the one hand with the spirit of deceased heroes, and on the other hand as offshoots of the divine *pneuma* where non-human demons are concerned. In addition, Algra points up the changes of doctrine that occurred within the long history of the Stoic school and discusses the extent to which the conception of *daimones* is compatible with their psychology and anthropology, as well as with their theology.

As is indicated by its title, the article by *Christopher Gill*, “Galen and the Stoics: what each could learn from the other about embodied psychology”, raises a ‘What if...?’ question, regarding what the Stoics and Galen could have learned from each other about the relation between body and soul. For Galen, in his attempt to make the Platonic tripartition of the soul compatible with his own localization of it in the brain could have profited from the Stoic postulate of a ‘*hégemonikon*’, just as Galen's brain-centered picture would have provided the Stoics with a better foundation for their unified psychological theory than their own location of that center in the heart. Gill concludes that together with Galen's anatomical studies, such a combination of Platonic and Stoic elements could have in fact led to the development of the most powerful and convincing account provided by ancient thinking on embodied psychology. Galen's massive attacks against the Stoics in *On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* can therefore be considered as a missed

out *Sternstunde* for science in antiquity, and shows how prejudice can stand in the way of progress.

Stoic ethics is the main concern of *Martha Nussbaum's* comparison of two Roman statesmen in "Philosophical norms and political attachments: Cicero and Seneca". Nussbaum investigates the question how the strong emotions both men appear to have had towards Rome are compatible with the Stoic injunction against emotions. Though Cicero was no orthodox Stoic, in ethical matters he professed to share their basic convictions. That there are tensions between Cicero's moral convictions and his passionate feelings about Rome's destiny – between hope and despair – is witnessed most of all in his letters. The case of Seneca is more complex, since his philosophical texts, including his philosophical letters, paint, by and large, a consistent picture concerning emotions towards one's country. But the satire attributed to Seneca on the *Pumpkinification of the Emperor Caudius (Apocolocyntosis)* reveals a wider range of emotional attitudes not easy to reconcile with the Stoic ideal of freedom from all emotions. Nussbaum argues that although the emotions expressed in that text, such as disgust, are not compatible with the Stoic injunction against strong emotions, they may represent transitional attitudes, corresponding to an intermediate stage between the excessive immersion in emotions characteristic of most people, and the complete detachment befitting the sage.

VI. The philosophers of early christianity

Jonathan Barnes' contribution, "*Anima Christiana*", discusses the first extant work on psychology by a Christian author. This work rests on two pillars: Christian doctrine and pagan theory. Thus, Tertullian explains death as the punishment for the Fall, i. e. as the unnatural separation of the substance of body and soul, and Resurrection as their natural reunification. As Barnes is intent to show, Tertullian's doctrine does not just rely on revelation; it also employs theories of pagan philosophers, partly for polemical, but partly also for constructive purposes. This applies especially to Tertullian's rejection of the Platonic conception of a disembodied soul on the one hand, and his acceptance – within limits – of the Stoic doctrine of *pneuma* on the other. It is highly amusing to read how Tertullian, with more or less refinement, founds his doctrine of the soul's substance partly on rational arguments and partly on revelation, and thereby comes to sometimes absurd, sometimes insightful results.

When Tertullian rejects ‘parts of the soul’ on the ground that they are not instruments, but ‘powers’, Barnes agrees with him. But when Tertullian finally treats the soul in its entirety as an instrument, Barnes sees this as the fatal philosophical flaw that this new Christian psychology shares with many other theories on the soul. According to Barnes, the postulate that the soul is an entity of its own, and the treatment of the soul as an entity in contrast with the body are fundamental philosophical misconstructions. Here as elsewhere an agnostic often turns out to be good at diagnostics.

The unification of soul and body at the moment of resurrection is also the topic of *Therese Fuhrer’s* contribution: “The spirit in a perfect body. A thought-experiment in Augustine’s *De civitate dei* 22.” In principle, Augustine, under the influence of Plato, assigns a higher status to the mental than to the corporeal. But given that the incorporeal form of the soul’s future existence is incompatible with the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh, Augustine establishes the conception of a ‘spiritual body’ (*corpus spiritualis*). Such a body has organs that are free from any blemishes; moreover, the spiritual body is neither subject to desires nor to illnesses, nor to any other kinds of disturbance, so that it is possible for humans to live the paradisiacal life of a *vir perfectus*. In her treatment of this thought-experiment, Fuhrer concentrates chiefly on the premises and the logical form of Augustine’s arguments. Addressing the question of whether those arguments are able to withstand strict philosophical scrutiny, Fuhrer replies that to subject the work to such scrutiny would miss Augustine’s real intentions. The main purposes of the work, she argues, are catechetical and apologetic, and philosophical arguments are employed only to the extent that they serve its supreme religious purposes.

In more than one sense the contribution by *Theo Kobusch*, “Resurrection of the body”, brings this volume to its conclusion: The author’s intention is to show that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body was understood by its adherents to represent the legitimate successor of ancient conceptions of immortality. The Christian apologists were forced, however, to defend by philosophical means their belief in immortality against the Gnostics, and also to meet the objections of pagan philosophers, which focused on the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh and on the Christian conception of the identity of human existence. Moreover, later Christian works belonging to the genre ‘*De resurrectione*’ are still to be understood as reactions to this type of criticism. The character of the Christian replies to their oppo-

nents varies, depending on the philosophical convictions of the Christian authors, as well as those of their opponents. And, as was the case with Tertullian's *Anima Christiana*, other Christian authors engaged themselves with the theories of non-Christian philosophers not only for polemical purposes, but also for the constructive purpose of advancing the development of Christian doctrine itself. Thus certain Christian authors rehabilitated the corporeal existence of the whole human being in opposition to the conception, *Platonico more*, of the body as a mere receptacle, instrument, or vehicle of the soul. There were exceptions to that rule: Gregory of Nyssa in his dialogue *De anima et resurrectione* defends the Platonic point of view and thereby represents the Christian completion of the Platonic belief in the immortality of the soul; this work was therefore dubbed 'a Christian *Phaedo*'.

The foregoing survey of the twenty-two contributions to this volume is meant to provide an overall impression of the complexity and variety of the philosophical debates on the body and soul in antiquity, debates that lasted over a period of a thousand years. That there are important gaps in the treatment of the philosophical tradition cannot be denied. For example, this volume contains no discussion of the conception of body and soul in the Epicurean school and also none on the Sceptics' reaction to the *dogmata* of the philosophers of the different schools. There are also many aspects in the psychology of the great philosophers that are not touched on here at all, as are some important developments in late ancient philosophy. There is, for instance, no discussion of the differentiated theories of the nature of the soul in Plotinus or in the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*. However, to render an exhaustive treatment of the variety of theories on the nature of body and soul in antiquity could realistically neither be the aim of the conference nor of the present volume, which contains its results. To convey a comprehensive picture of the entire spectrum of the conceptions of the soul and its relation to the body would have required an expansion of the discussion beyond the borders of philosophy and an inclusion of corresponding developments in literature and in the history of religion. There is no better witness to the dimensions of such an enterprise than the still classical *Urschrift* on this most complex of themes, Erwin Rohde's *Psyche* of 1893.

The articles presented here thus confine themselves to the philosophical treatment of the body-soul problem. The major objective of this collection of papers, then, is to encourage students of philosophy

and, for that matter, of all other disciplines that are concerned with the body-soul problem to further engage themselves with the questions raised here and to provide some incentives for further study. As this introduction, as well as various contributions to this volume together attempt to show, the relevance of the thoughts of these philosophers is not confined to antiquity; they are also worthy of careful study because they paved the way for the further discussion of the body-soul question – or as most philosophers now to prefer to call it, the mind-body problem – in the Middle Ages and in the modern age. In sum, this volume tries to make intelligible why this discussion of the relation of body and soul has not come to a conclusion to the present day.

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