

PARADISE LOST, PARADISE REGAINED

*The True Meaning
of Democracy*



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Introduction

The Specter of Government

*What in me is dark,
Illumine; what is low, raise and support.**

MENTION THE WORD “government” in a conversation with a friend and you will probably get a roll of the eyes, perhaps a heavy-lidded look of contempt. Most likely your friend has never given much thought to the issue and has no wish to. “Government?” he might say, “war and taxes.” He might have taken a course on government and found it incomprehensible or boring. If he were to try to focus on the concept he would have a sense of something big, overpowering, distant, potentially menacing. And there the conversation would end. It is my goal to create a different kind of conversation, one in which government as a concept, as a fundamental factor in everyone’s existence, becomes alive with possibilities.

New Eyes

We go away on vacation. We return home rested with “new eyes.” We look at a favorite painting that has been hanging on the wall for years, so long that it had become wallpaper. Now it stands out with the freshness and immediacy that initially drew us to it. It is my hope that *Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained: The True Meaning of Democracy* will provide the reader with a new perspective, that it will serve as a catalyst and will supply the energy necessary for a reexamination of what we have, for too long, taken for granted about our government.

The new insight we seek is not to be found in the daily news. We need something akin to a philosophical understanding, a level of abstraction

* John Milton (1608–1674) was an English poet best known for his epic poem “Paradise Lost.” The quotations that begin each chapter are borrowed from this masterpiece. Milton has given some of his best lines to Satan, lines that I have redirected to fit the content of my chapters. I hope Satan won’t mind.

that permits us to escape the effect of day-to-day occurrences. Once we have come to understand the purpose and function of government in general, we will be equipped to study a particular government and to measure its accomplishments against our understanding of what it is that government in general should be expected to achieve.

Government is a means for organizing ourselves into a cohesive unit with an identity. In the past the unit was the tribe. Presently it is the nation-state. But the functions have not changed. We expect our government to protect us, to provide for justice, and to make it easier for us to take care of the basic necessities in life, such as food, shelter, and some kind of useful work. Government also has another function, too frequently overlooked—that of providing us with the opportunity for participation, for an expansion of our intellect and sense of self as we partake in the process of making choices that affect our collective destiny.

Our current form of government is so much an ingrained part of our lives that we often forget there are alternatives. “The government we have is the government we should have, obviously.” I think most people feel that way about their government, regardless of where they live. Yet it is instructive to look elsewhere and to see how similar problems are being solved under different forms of government. Maybe there are different answers, better answers.

Reading history serves the same purpose. We can look into the past and see that not all government is the same and that different societies choose different solutions to the same problems. Ancient Athens and the Roman Republic were contemporary societies faced with similar problems: grain supply, land use, indebtedness. Yet they chose significantly different solutions. The Italian city-states developed as small-scale separate and independent societies with an experimental approach to governance while simultaneously, to the north, large-scale autocratic empires were in the making.

I believe all history is selective. This book is no exception. I have certain biases, and they will be reflected in the selection of materials and the way in which they are presented. I will be choosing examples that illustrate my point.

So, what are some of my biases? I am in favor of political democracy. I am opposed to war. I believe that democracy as a form of government is a powerful integrating force that respects individual differences and encourages individual self-development while winning the allegiance of all to the common good. It creates unity in diversity. I believe that war is destructive of human and natural resources, and that it disrespects the ecosystem upon which we all depend. I believe that one can have war or one can have democracy, but one cannot have both.

I am going to present democracy in a positive light. I will be searching for hints of it anywhere I can find them, for my purpose is to make democracy comprehensible as a form of government. I will be argu-

ing that, broadly speaking, government shapes character, that different governments produce different kinds of citizens, and that democracy produces a more enlightened citizenry than other forms of government.[†]

The narrative will unfold in four stages. Part I—“Paradise Lost: Democracy in Historical Context”—is a chronological investigation of democracy, starting in Athens and ending with the democratic experiments in the Italian city-states. Ancient Athens, by its example, provides us with the true meaning of the word “democracy”—government by the governed. The Italian city-states offer an unusual opportunity to study government in evolution. Though none of them were political democracies by inclusion, some of them came close. Especially instructive is the variety of formulas used to establish fairness and honesty in the selection of those who would govern. It is uplifting to see how government can have a positive effect on its citizenry and act responsibly in its attempt to provide for their needs.

In Part II—“Democracy in America: Opportunity Missed”—we will take a look at the critical years between 1776 (the signing of the Declaration of Independence) and 1788 (ratification of the Constitution). We will examine in some detail the evolution and ultimate demise of the Pennsylvania state constitution of 1776. In the course of our quest for the true meaning of the word “democracy,” we will learn that this meaning has been perverted over the centuries and that what most of us consider to be democracy is in fact oligarchy. Some of the most interesting and original thinking on the subject of democracy can be found in the writings of the Anti-Federalists, those who were opposed to the signing of the Constitution. They understood the true meaning of democracy, and they recognized the risk involved in trusting government to those who lust for power.

In Part III—“The Quest for Unbridled Power: Democracy Crushed”—we will explore the contradiction between war and democracy by visiting periods of history when violent forces have crushed emergent self-governance. Warriors such as Alexander of Macedon, Genghis Khan, and Napoleon—iconic figures in world history—each trampled upon democratic movements in their march to power.

In addition to the highly visible actions of the warriors, we will scrutinize the machinations of invisible oligarchs operating behind the scenes to gain control of government in the service of special interests and in opposition to the needs of the broader populace. Special attention will be directed at bankers and speculators who, as a group, need a strong central, anti-democratic government as a means of gaining control of the flow of money and establishing financial policy favorable to

[†] Of course, government is not the only factor in play. The distribution of wealth, social structure, and religion are other powerful shaping forces. But my focus here will be on government alone.

their interests. These forces have been operating against the interests of democratic government for the past five hundred years, going all the way back to the reigns of Charles V and his son Philip II of Spain, and perhaps even farther.

Too often we see history as some distant, impersonal force that shapes events in a way that seems mysterious and beyond human control. However, one can argue just the opposite, that the unfolding of history is the work of particular individuals who lust for power. Who are they? What is their emotional makeup? Are those who seek power and abuse it like us? Or do they form a class apart? What about us, history's bystanders—does it matter if we are in the mix or out? We think our own choice as to whether or not we participate in government is a matter of indifference to our personal well-being. We might be mistaken.

Part IV—"Paradise Regained: Democracy in the Modern Age"—addresses government in its contemporary context, including consideration of the concept of change itself. I will offer some practical thoughts on how governmental institutions can be modified to make them more democratic. We will be visiting countries in Europe, Latin America, and Asia to examine some experiments in government in contemporary society. We will linger awhile in India. Though India is a constitutional oligarchy, there are democratic elements to be found in the structure and processes of its government, especially when compared with Western governments.

Our study of democracy concludes with a consideration of what it might be like to live in a true democracy. Economically, politically, ecologically, and sociologically, world society is in a state of transformation. Governments currently in place are not designed to meet emerging needs. Devising a form of government that is less highly centralized and that is more responsive to the common good is becoming imperative. If such a government is to achieve its desired ends, it will, in its formation, include all of us.

Ancient Athens and Modern India

Ancient Athens is the fullest realization of democracy known to Western civilization. We call it a democracy for two reasons. One, all elements in society, from the poorest and most humble to the wealthiest and most exalted, participated in the affairs of government on equal footing. Two, Athenians governed on their own behalf. They didn't choose others to speak for them. They spoke for themselves. Between 30,000 and 60,000 Athenian citizens charted their own course. On a given day, as many as 6,000 people would attend a meeting of the assembly. If one wants to get a sense of a how democracy functions, ancient Athens provides an excellent example.

As a collective, did Athenians always act rationally and with concern for human welfare? Not always, but most of the time. In ancient

Athens there were slaves with no political rights. Women were denied access to the political process. Obviously, these institutionalized prejudices were exclusionary and undemocratic. Yet Athens was a democracy nonetheless. It would have been a more perfect democracy had slaves and women been included.

India is ripe for democracy for two fundamental reasons: its religion and its social structure. Democracy thrives on diversity and strong local communities. Hinduism as a religion is democratic in its lack of a strong centralizing, controlling force and in its emphasis on individual forms of belief and worship. Until relatively recently, the backbone of Indian society was the small local village, a self-contained economic and social entity. Such diversity and localization are ideal conditions for the growth of democracy. Homogenization and centralization lead to totalitarianism.[‡]

Although we will be studying government in its historical context, my primary goal is to shed light on current, existing forms of government and to provide a framework for a critical analysis of their effectiveness. It is my assumption that there are many who are not completely happy with the government they have but firmly believe that any alternative is both inconceivable and undesirable. Like many a bad marriage, the relationship between the citizen and his government endures not out of love, or necessarily even respect, but out of habit. The energy necessary to envision an alternative, to believe in it, and to work toward it has been dissipated in exchange for the security and familiarity of a long-standing relationship.

The first step in changing a relationship requires examining it from a new angle, looking below the surface. This may be the hardest part of all, to see things differently, perhaps more accurately. The effects of habit—the erosion of hope and energy—undermine our intellect and independence of judgment. We learn to believe that which serves to justify our continued allegiance to a relationship that has gradually lost its meaning and legitimacy. Things have changed progressively, by accretion. But we are so accustomed to what we “see” that we don’t recognize the change. We see what used to be.

Inverted Totalitarianism

Most Americans assume that they live in a democracy. They might see some disturbing trends they consider to be anti-democratic in nature, but they regard them as temporary, as surface phenomena that do not alter the form of government at its core. In *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarian-*

[‡] By no means is India a perfect society. There is corruption and there is sectarian violence. But I will not be discussing those facets of Indian culture. They are not my subject matter and they do not affect the aspects of Indian civilization that are favorable to the emergence of democracy.

ism (2008), Sheldon S. Wolin offers a radically different perspective. He invokes the legacies of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin. These were men who used their personality and intellect to shape and dominate their countries. No aspect of life—civic, artistic, intellectual, religious, familial, or political—escaped their control. That control was total and crushing. Absolute, unquestioning submission was expected. Masses were organized and activated in support of the government. None of this is the case in the United States, of course, and yet ...

Wolin coined the term “inverted totalitarianism” to describe a form of government that in many ways achieves the goals of totalitarianism but by different, gentler means. Inverted totalitarianism is “driven by abstract totalizing powers, not by personal rule.”¹⁵ The leader is not the architect of the system. He is its product. He fulfills a pre-assigned role.

The system succeeds not by activating the masses but by doing just the opposite, “encouraging political disengagement.”² “Democracy” is encouraged, touted, both domestically and overseas. To use Wolin’s terminology, it is “managed democracy,” “a political form in which governments are legitimated by elections that they have learned to control,”³ a form of government that attempts to keep alive the appearance of democracy while simultaneously defeating democracy’s primary purpose, self-government.

In managed democracy “free politics” are encouraged. Thus the populace is placated and pacified. Believing that in fact they have the government they want, people are lulled into a state of passivity and acquiescence, leaving the controlling powers to operate as they see fit to advance their particular interests. Democratic myths persist in the absence of true democratic practice.

Therefore, rather than dismantling the preexisting political system, as the twentieth-century totalitarians did, their modern-day brothers actually defend and support the system. Their “genius lies in wielding total power without appearing to.”⁴ What was once a citizenry has become an “electorate,” the populace divided against itself in groups of competing interests whose opinions on circumscribed issues are constructed and manipulated to produce a desired outcome that is fed back into the hopper, resulting in the necessary pronouncements at election time.

Fear of violence is, for the most part (depending on race and ethnicity), absent in America’s inverted totalitarianism. Yet fear is nonetheless employed as a means of control. It is a more subtle kind of fear, more insidious and more intractable. It is a fear that lingers indefinitely, though it is never fully identified as fear itself. Currently fear has two sources, one obvious, one less so.

§ Specific literature citations for quoted material appear in the Endnotes section at the back of the book. Additional comments related to the text discussion are presented as footnotes. Full publication details for all books and other works mentioned in the text and notes are provided in the Bibliography.

We are safe at home, we are told, but only if we succeed in protecting ourselves from the terrorists who want to take away our form of government, our lifestyle, even our lives. Terrorists are everywhere and nowhere, all the time. Because they are hidden, lacking in scruples, and tricky, we can never feel safe. We must depend on our government to protect us. We must surrender all control, even rights guaranteed by the Constitution, in the hope that our leaders will keep us safe.

In addition, there is a more deep-seated fear, a nagging fear, that is harder to combat—the fear generated by economic uncertainty—which constantly reminds us that our livelihood and everything we own could be taken from us and we could be left sleeping in tents, as many are in the state of California. Trillions of dollars were handed over to Wall Street speculators. Jobs are being outsourced to China. Unemployment is unchecked. Budgets are being cut at the Federal and local levels. What feels like a recession, perhaps even a depression, persists, and government seems to be doing very little to remedy the situation, largely because the uncertainty it creates generates the compliance the government seeks. “Unlike the Nazis,” says Wolin, “the [George W. Bush] administration has done little to allay the recession’s effects and much that exploits the accompanying insecurities.”⁵

One could argue that the sidelining of the citizenry and the assumption of power by an all-powerful central government, unaccountable to its electorate, represents a radical departure from precedent and from the intentions of the founders. A closer look, however, reveals something quite different. Prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution, there was open debate about its meaning, its benefits, and its liabilities. In the *Federalist Papers*, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton took up the cause of the Constitution. There was intense opposition to its adoption,[¶] and it never would have been ratified had it not been forced through by means of intimidation and deception.

Madison had made explicit his rejection of democracy and his wish to create a strong central government that marginalizes the citizenry. He would limit representation, create large electoral districts, and locate the government away from the local constituency.^{**} Hamilton had openly advocated monarchy and hoped to mount a standing army, with himself at its head. He planned to march through the South and then on to establish American control in Latin America. The word “empire” was invoked no fewer than three times in the *Federalist Papers*.^{††}

¶ Like the *Federalist Papers*, many of the expressions of opposition took the form of published letters and essays. *The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution* (edited by Herbert J. Storing) is an excellent collection of these writings.

** In Chapter 2, “False Friends,” Madison’s views on democracy are discussed in some detail.

†† It is also worth noting that the same financial interests that have taken control in recent years also fought for ratification of the Constitution, by which means they stood to make considerable gains on their speculative investments.

Civic Education

Americans have long looked upon their Constitution and their founders with pride and admiration. To discover that much of this is myth, to discover an alternate reality at odds with the one we have grown to accept as given, is a most disturbing experience. Yet if we are willing to take the journey we will end up on solid ground once again. We will feel empowered and optimistic about our future.

What is required is a massive reorientation of our society concerning governance. We are operating under a cloud of ambiguity, confusion, and lethargy. There is a general lack of appreciation of the degree to which government impinges upon our lives. We miss opportunities for self-governance because we don't know they exist.

We need to be reeducated and revived. This seems a daunting task. Yet several examples from the recent past demonstrate that such a large-scale reorientation is possible.

Not so long ago it was routine to go to a bar, drink too much, and drive home intoxicated, too frequently causing an accident, sometimes with loss of life. But the educational and lobbying efforts of MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving) have changed the attitude toward drinking and driving. There are legal consequences for driving while under the influence. Most of us now understand that driving while intoxicated is a bad idea. We have been educated.

The same applies to smoking. Smoking was once an integral part of social life for the vast majority of the population. No one ever thought that enjoying a cigarette could be harmful to himself or the person standing next to him. In recent years, however, the attitude toward smoking has changed radically. There are still many smokers, though their numbers are considerably reduced. Those of us who don't smoke are no longer at risk from the harmful effects of the next person's cigarette smoke. As a society we have been enlightened.

A similar process is under way concerning the food we eat. We are being educated as to the harmful effects of feeding cows corn instead of grass. We are growing worried about the effects of chemical fertilizers and chemical additives. We read labels with greater awareness and concern for the content of what we eat. There is a large-scale movement to eat food that is healthful and locally grown.

We are in the midst of addressing the most critical issue any society has yet had to face: global warming. Glaciers are melting. Temperatures are rising. Weather is becoming more severe and unpredictable. Rising sea levels could cause certain island societies to disappear altogether. Climate change will have widespread detrimental effects on animal and plant life. The entire ecosystem is in jeopardy. As recently as ten years ago, the general public knew little if anything about any of this. Now just about everyone is conversant on the subject to a greater or lesser degree.

It is now more important than ever to become educated on the subject

of government, for only government can organize and direct the collective action necessary for addressing the issues that threaten our planet.

To orient ourselves with regard to government we need to ask some very simple questions, such as the following: What kind of government do we live under—a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy? Is that government designed to serve the common good (e.g., the ecosystem)? Are there structural changes that could be made in the current government that would make it better able to fulfill its fundamental purpose? What are the different kinds of solutions to the problems of government that have been arrived at in the past and in other parts of the world?

These and other questions will be addressed as this book unfolds. If, by the end of our journey together, you find yourself thinking more critically and imaginatively about the nature of government and its purpose—perhaps even coming up with a few ideas of your own about what could be tried to create a government that better serves the common good—then I will have achieved my goal in writing *Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained: The True Meaning of Democracy*.

What Is History and Why Does It Matter?

*War wearied hath perform'd what war can do,
And to disorder'd rage let loose the reins.*

WE ARE ABOUT to begin our journey. We will be traveling across countries and continents, across centuries. Democracy has its friends, its enemies. It has false friends. We shall meet them all. We undertake this journey with the purpose of understanding democracy in its historical context, to isolate the conditions that favor its emergence and those that threaten its survival.

Our guides will be historians. Many of them are trustworthy; some of them are not. Thus, we will need to be vigilant and at times skeptical. For though we think of history as being something objective, fixed, and absolute, it is, in reality, something else.

One could say that history is everything that has ever happened, going back in time as far as one can go—every heartbeat, every ripple in every pond, every lover's sigh, every transmigration of every electron—from the Big Bang that created the universe to the economic crisis of 2008 that might undo it. In other words, history thus construed is without limit.

It becomes immediately obvious that conceiving of history in these terms is meaningless and ungraspable. We can't relive it. We can't learn anything from it. It is just there. If we are to make sense of this infinite stream of facts and events, we need to shape it. This is where the historian comes in. What a historian does is to cut a slice in time somewhere, pick a certain subject or theme, and then use the facts to paint a picture. There are many more facts than he can ever use. He must select what he includes. If we say that it is the job of the historian to both delight and instruct, then the ultimate rendering must be shaped in such a way that it will be of interest and have meaning and value to the reader.

We go to history to learn and understand. We want to learn where

we came from so we can better understand where we might be heading. We want to learn how cultures and civilizations function so we can better understand what works and what doesn't work in our own society. Was democracy a good thing? Where did it succeed? Where did it fail? What were the strengths and weaknesses of a particular culture, and how did democracy fit into the picture? We read history to find out.*

What we learn is determined in part by the values we espouse and by the values and prejudices of the historian. What we learn will determine our ability to plot the future. Our reading of history will leave us feeling empowered or disempowered.

One or two things become clear: (1) Though the facts and events that make up the historical narrative exist independently of and prior to the writing of history, history itself—the narrative the historian creates—does not exist in any a priori sense. It does not predate the moment of its writing. (2) History is what historians say it is, and what they say it is will always be biased, by definition. That is, the way in which historians select and reject certain facts and events, the way in which this material is organized, affects how we perceive and respond to the narrative. Adjectives that are applied here and not there create a certain impression, favorable or unfavorable. In other words, history is a creative enterprise.†

History has a rhetorical function. It is trying to win us to a certain position. It reflects the values, beliefs, and prejudices of the historian. Is war a good thing or not? Is individual life a sacred matter? Was Alexander Hamilton a gentleman or a scoundrel? Was Socrates an innocent victim of Athenian “mobocracy,” or was he a threat to the survival of Athenian democracy?‡ Are warriors noble, or are they self-serving egotists? We read history to find the answers to these questions. The answers we get will inevitably be shaped by the world outlook of those who provide them.

Modern “objective” history—history as a “scientific” academic discipline—is a relatively recent invention. The first Departments of History were established at the University of Berlin in 1810 and at the Sorbonne in 1812. The third quarter of the nineteenth century gave birth to academic journals in Germany, France, Italy, and England. And it is the academic imprimatur, the claim to scientific objectivity, that cows us into unthinkingly believing what we read without taking into account the message that is being delivered.

The academic historian seeks to achieve a position of apparent neutrality with regard to the material he is discussing. He avoids discussion

* The Swiss historian J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi said that history should be “explored ... for instructions in the government of mankind.” Quoted in Daniel Waley, *The Italian City-Republics*, p. 174.

† According to Friedrich Hegel, “It is incumbent upon him [the historian] to bring before our imaginative vision this motley content of events and characters, to create anew and to make vivid the same to our intelligence with his own genius.” Quoted in Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe*, p. 107.

‡ See I. F. Stone, *The Trial of Socrates*.

of cause and effect, because that would entail taking sides. He has a tendency to depersonalize the historical narrative by taking individual human action out of the formula. He is more comfortable with abstractions and concepts. As a consequence, events just seem to happen, by themselves, in a manner that defies analysis and understanding.

Alexis de Tocqueville made the point that the way in which history is construed by the historian affects how we readers of history feel about our collective destiny. History founded in abstraction makes us feel powerless. History that identifies human action as its wellspring leaves us with a feeling of empowerment. “Historians who live in democratic ages [read U.S. oligarchy in the 1830s] then, not only deny that the few have any power of acting upon the destiny of a people, but deprive the people themselves of the power of modifying their own condition, and they subject them either to an inflexible Providence or to some blind necessity.” He adds, “In perusing the historical volumes [of our age] ... it would seem that man is utterly powerless over himself and all around him. The historians of antiquity taught how to command; those of our time teach how to obey.”¹

Today we hear that globalization is the source of our misery. We are led to believe that concepts can act. We are made to feel powerless. Sentences like the following, found in just about all histories, have the same effect:

In the early 1700s, the Russian Empire took the offensive against Poland using military force and bribery.
France’s invasion of Russia in 1812 was a turning point in the Napoleonic Wars.

Taken literally, such statements are mystifying. They create a white haze of ambiguity and mental distance. The statements are incomprehensible because they are nonrational. After all, what is the Russian Empire? Is it an amorphous form outlined on a map? Is it a certain physical land mass? Is it the people taken collectively? A form on a map cannot invade another country, nor can a land mass, nor could the entirety of the Russian population. If we substitute Peter the Great for “the Russian Empire” and Napoleon for “France,” we enter the realm of rational discourse. Once our attention is directed to a particular individual and the actions he took, we can start thinking rationally about these events and their meaning for society. We can wonder what Peter was up to. Was he acting for personal reasons of power and glory, or did he have the best interests of his country at heart? Was violence the only solution? Should one man be given so much power?

Thus, in reading history, often we need to clear away the haze of ambiguity by translating abstractions into concrete realities, remembering that only live human beings can act and bring about change, for better or for worse.

Historians can go to the other extreme as well—hero worship. Rather than eliminate the human element from the equation, they may exalt a par-

ticular individual in a manner that is biased and misleading, while simultaneously claiming their own neutrality and objectivity. The effect on us readers is the same as depersonalization. We feel powerless when faced with these larger-than-life figures who have destroyed civilizations and taken millions of lives.[§] We are led to believe that the actions taken by these men were glorious and hence desirable, that the good they achieved by their violence outweighs the harm. Thus, there is nothing to be done to stop such excesses, nor should we want to stop them. These men are to be admired and accepted on their own terms. They should not be judged. Once again we are disempowered in our attempts to make sense out of history by applying our own judgment to the subject matter as a means of sorting things out and drawing conclusions about what is desirable and possible.

Ultimately, in reading history, we are searching for answers to some very basic questions. Is there a plan? Is it all inevitable? Is there a meaning? Is it possible for us to take charge of our collective destiny and set it in a particular direction? But before we can begin to address these fundamental questions, we must consider a question about the very enterprise of reporting history: Is there a way of organizing history as written that will help us grasp its deeper meaning?

For an answer to this final question, we can turn to writers like Hegel and Marx. And to enhance our understanding of these writers, let us first briefly consider the thoughts of Hayden White, a historian who has examined the writing of history from a literary standpoint. In *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (1973), White organized historical writing by the shape and tone of its narrative. According to White's schema, the historian can retreat into cynicism (the satirical mode). He can ally himself with the hero who rises above the fray (the romantic mode). He can step back in philosophic detachment and analyze the forces at play (the comic mode). Or he can experience the tragedy and try to elucidate a means of understanding it that will lead us to a brighter day (the tragic mode).

The Comic Mode

Friedrich Hegel[¶] was a philosopher of history, rather than a historian. He was perhaps the first, in the Western world, to think about universal history—the development of civilization around the world and across time.** Hegel studied, analyzed, and critiqued the writings of historians. His struggle to come to terms with the misery that man has wrought is enlight-

§ In chapters that follow, I will discuss Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Napoleon.
¶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) was one of the major German philosophers of the nineteenth century. He was one of the first to attempt to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of change, and he had a profound influence on Karl Marx. With Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Hegel was one of the creators of German idealism.

**For an earlier and equally impressive study of universal history, see Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun's (1332–1406) *Prolegomena*.

ening, as are his insights into what history is and how it redeems itself.

In the course of his writings, Hegel seems to have passed through all four modes mentioned by White and ended up in the comic mode. He shifted from irony and defeat to romantic optimism via Christianity and the triumph of good over evil. Seeing the tragic in the rise and decline of each individual civilization, he then found comic resolution by taking universal cultural history—as opposed to history in its discrete parts—as his subject matter. At this level of abstraction, he was able to find progress.

History, as Hegel saw it, was “made” by individual men, some of whom were heroes, some of whom were ordinary men, some of whom were criminals. The great men or heroes are those who show themselves to be “in cooperation with the common end which underlies the ideal notion of the conditions which confront them” but are in conflict with the existing social order.^{††} The ordinary men are those “who fail to rise in stature to the demands made on their energy.” The criminals, the depraved, are those who are content “to give free rein to an individual force which is ... foreign to all such common ends.”²

Hegel was deeply saddened by the moral decay he saw across the various civilizations he studied, but was heartened by the fact that in declining and disappearing, these civilizations could be seen as a totality whose meaning for history could be gleaned only once they had completed their historical trajectory. Looking at ancient civilizations—Rome, Greece, Persia, India—that had run through their cycle of existence, he could see the formal whole as having passed through four phases: (1) birth and early growth, (2) maturity, (3) old age, and (4) dissolution and death.

These earlier civilizations were doomed to dissolve because in each civilization there was an internal contradiction that prevented it from living out the ideal of the notion that was the premise of its existence. The demise of the civilization resolves the contradiction by creating a synthesis, which is the basis for the next civilization.

The progress that Hegel found was not in the concrete world of “sin and suffering”³ but in the abstract world of intellect. One can see that there is intellectual progress in the degree to which a given civilization gains cognizance of itself as a collective whole with a purpose. This self-awareness is expressed in the writings of its poets, playwrights, and philosophers, but most especially in the writings of its historians. It is the historians who, in their writing of history, convey or fail to convey a self-conscious awareness of historical occurrence as part of some meaningful whole.

Using this criterion, Hegel organized and ordered civilizations from less to more self-conscious. Where there is savagery, there is no sense of

^{††} For example, Caesar, in his efforts to fulfill his own image of his importance in the world, and in conflict with the existing social forces, completely reconstituted Roman society, leading it in a direction that Hegel would have characterized as the ideal notion of Roman civilization, that is, its imperial destiny.

history. There is endless present. There is no sense that the culture taken as a whole is any different from nature. The Orient, which Hegel saw as exemplifying the “childhood” of history, represents progress over savagery. Man has differentiated himself from nature but has instead, in ancient China (a theocratic despotism), merged with the sovereign. There is still no real sense of history. Individuals have no self-consciousness of personality or of rights. Cultures operate in a cyclical process.

India, a theocratic aristocracy, represents progress over China. The political body, no longer monolithic, is broken up into parts, leading to political tension and awareness of difference. Persia represents progress over India in that, while still allowing for differences, the culture supplies an overarching spiritual unity. In Egypt there is a separation of spirit and matter, leading the way to the emergence of the individual in Greece. Thus, each civilization prepares the way for a higher level of development in the next.

The ethical life of the Greek polis allows for expression of personal individuality. However, the relationship of the individual to the state is not self-conscious. It is unreflective and based on obedience to custom and tradition, according to Hegel. This is the period of “adolescence.” In ancient Rome, individual personality is recognized in the granting of formal rights, leading to a degree of personal self-awareness on the part of the individual, who feels separate and endowed. But freedom is limited. The state becomes an abstraction whose demands must be met by individual Romans. There is a tension between the principles of individuality and universality (the state), leading to political despotism and insurgency against it. This stage (ancient Rome) in the history of civilization gives expression to “manhood.”^{‡‡}

The Germanic realm was composed of Germany and the Nordic peoples, the major European nations (France, Italy, and Spain), and England. Here the principle of subjective freedom comes to the fore. This involves a gradual development that begins with the rise of Christianity and its spiritual reconciliation of inner and outer life and culminates in the appearance of the modern nation-state. Civilization has reached “old age.”

For Hegel, the modern nation-state can be said to manifest a “personality” with self-consciousness of its inherent nature and goals. It is able to act rationally in accordance with its self-awareness. The modern nation-state is a “spiritual individual,” the true historical individual, because of the level of realization of self-consciousness that it actualizes. The development of the perfected nation-state is the end or goal of history because it provides an optimal level of realization of self-consciousness, a more comprehensive level of realization of freedom than mere natural individuals, or other forms of human organization, can produce.

The history of civilization in the broad sense can be seen as a spiral that starts from a low point in the infancy of civilization, rising as it passes through

‡‡ These sketches in no way do justice to Hegel’s thinking. The goal here is to understand his outlook in the most general way and to see how it might have merit.

each new stage of maturity, ever growing and assimilating as it moves to each higher level of advancement, and then sinking into death. Exactly where is all this leading? Is there a final resting point? Hegel might argue there will be a resting point when and if there is a universal perception of the ideal notion of civilization, which is then realized in actual living. There are no internal contradictions. Universal civilization is conceived as being at one with itself. There is a unity of consciousness and being. History is over.

By envisioning history in broad global terms, across time, Hegel enables us to grasp civilization in its entirety as a first step in understanding its evolution. If civilization is to remedy itself, it must first become cognizant of itself as an object of thought and analysis. This is what Hegel has done. I think he is mistaken, however, in making universal self-consciousness his final destination. He has escaped into a world of subjectivity. In so doing he has left the world of living beings. He has marginalized issues of the common good and social justice, as well as issues of war and peace. His celebrating the nation-state—especially the German nation-state—is an expression of a personal preference. This belief in the nation-state is neither a universal truth nor a universally shared value. The subjection of the individual to, and the individual's absorption by, the nation-state is the formula for fascism. Individual existence disappears as a value.

But, in addition and perhaps more importantly, I think Hegel failed to properly apply his own theory. If he had applied it consistently, he might have come up with a different end point. This becomes clear in his treatment of ancient Athens in comparison with ancient Rome. Many would argue, by making reference to Athenian culture—its historians, philosophers, playwrights, orators, and statesmen (such as Pericles)—that Athens was many times ahead of Rome in its consciousness of itself. How can one possibly argue that Rome, having produced very little in the way of theatre, literature, philosophy, or history, is more mature than Athens? I believe one cannot, yet Hegel must if he is to reach his end point of the modern nation-state as the goal of historical development. He must ignore the possibility that it was democracy in Athens—a citizen-state—that produced such a high level of self-awareness, a degree of historical self-consciousness that probably has not been achieved since. To accurately appraise Athens would entail, as well, consideration of the notion that it is government itself that is a chief factor in determining societal development.

The Romantic Mode

Hegel took culture and its evolution as his subject matter and ended up in the clouds. Karl Marx^{§§} did just the opposite. With both feet planted

§§Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–1883), German philosopher, political economist, historian, and political theorist, is the author of *The Communist Manifesto* (with Friedrich Engels, 1848) and *Das Kapital* (1867).

firmly on solid ground he attempted, like Hegel, to come up with a broad understanding of universal history. As his subject matter, he chose the mode of production that characterizes a particular society.

Marx saw civilization as having passed through four phases: (1) primitive communist, (2) slave, (3) feudal, and (4) capitalist. He hypothesized an early civilization (primitive communist) in which man is at one with nature and cooperates with his fellow man in producing what he needs to live. All of this changes when division of labor appears, an occurrence Marx attributed to physical differences between men and women, between the strong and the weak. With this division there is alienation of man from nature, from his fellow man, and from himself.

Once labor is divided, “each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and he must remain so if he does not want to lose his livelihood.”⁴ People are torn between being whole men and the necessity of functioning as specialized instruments of production. The social force that produces this schism is perceived as natural and hence ineluctable, generating a feeling of powerlessness and quiet despair.

The division of labor results in a class conflict that endures over time and produces the events we call history. This is what Marx meant when he spoke of “the materialist conception of history,” history being determined by the modes of production, which in turn generate class conflict. From the serfs of the Middle Ages come the burghers of the earliest towns, and from the burghers come the earliest elements of the bourgeoisie. As population expands, needs grow. The feudal system is replaced by a system of manufacturing. Division of labor among guilds is replaced by division of labor within the guild.

The relationships of production—slave–master, nobleman–serf, bourgeoisie–proletariat—are the foundation or base of society. Everything else is superstructure: religion, government, law, ideology, art, literature, history, social consciousness. The superstructure is determined by the base. Our government, our religion, our self-expression as a culture, and our social consciousness are all consequences of the mode of production.

The relationship between base and superstructure is a one-way relationship. The base determines the superstructure and never the other way round. When the mode of production changes, there will be a change in the superstructure. Changes in the mode of production occur when there is a change in material conditions. Soil erosion, the introduction of a new form of technology, increase or decrease in population—these are all material conditions that bring about a change in the mode of production and hence the relationships of production, which in turn affect the superstructure.

In the South of the early United States, conditions were favorable for the growth of cotton and tobacco. Wealthy landowners imported slaves to do the work. In New England, the land was difficult. There developed a mercantile class devoted to trade and banking. In each case arose a super-

structure—religion, government, and a level of social consciousness—that corresponded to and was determined by the mode of production.

Marx did his writing as capitalism was developing into the dominant form of production, pitting the captains of industry against the working class. He believed that the proletariat—including disaffected members of the bourgeoisie—would ultimately prevail and set up a new society based on a new mode of production in which the proletariat would rule. But this could not occur until the proletariat had become conscious of itself as a class, a class with a destiny and the will to realize it. Here Marx borrowed from Hegel the concept of consciousness and its dialectical evolution.

Marx introduced cause-effect analysis into the study of universal history. A change in the material conditions of production causes a change in the mode of production, which causes a change in the relations of production, which causes a change in social consciousness, and so forth. Although this is a mechanistic, deterministic outlook on how society evolves, Marx nonetheless believed that by understanding the mechanics of social existence one would be in a position to take action and bring about change. Hegel, who showed little concern for the material conditions of human existence, was unable to explain what creates the change in consciousness that he described. Marx saw the evolving social consciousness as an instrument in man's liberation from the conditions of his oppression.

Marx's description of capitalism, its evolution, and its effects on those who live through it is as valid today as when it was written 150 years ago: the profit motive, the need for new markets, the need for cheap labor, the movement toward monopoly, the psychological alienation and physical isolation of one man from the next, and the alienation of man from nature. Marx's wish to understand the source of man's suffering and to remedy it was a noble one. By applying cause-effect analysis to universal history, Marx held out the possibility of fundamental change. And he saw the importance of development in consciousness as a prelude to that change. Yet, as with Hegel, there are some internal contradictions.

Marx's chief concept is the division of labor, leading to exploitation and class struggle. Division of labor comes about because of biological differences between man and woman: one is stronger than the other. This kind of argument poses a problem, however. Marx has framed his general theory of history in terms of society. His concepts are sociological or societal. To have his primary causal factor rooted in biology is reductionistic. He is employing one conceptual framework, biology, to explain phenomena in another more abstract conceptual framework, that of sociology or economics. For his theory to be valid he would have to explain division of labor in sociological or economic terms.

Further, is it always the case that where there is division of labor, there is dominance and exploitation? If so, why? These are questions for which Marx has no answer. It is Marx's position that the proletariat will be the savior of mankind. Once this class becomes conscious of

itself as an instrument of change and accumulates the necessary foresight and will to act, it will take charge, rule in its own name, and transform the base of society from a capitalist to a communist mode of production. Pre-history will come to an end. History will begin.

However, Marx believed that there is one-way causality between base and superstructure. This, it seems to me, would preclude the superstructure (i.e., social consciousness) from being a causal agent in bringing about change at the base. If he were to allow social consciousness to have this kind of effectiveness, then he would open up the possibility that other elements in the superstructure might affect the base as well.

It is Marx's position that the mode of production (the base) determines the form of the superstructure (i.e., government). Is it conceivable that the opposite is true—that the form of government determines the mode of production?

One could argue that monarchy/tyranny, where all of the power is concentrated in one person, produces a slave/serf economy and that oligarchy, where there are several potentially conflicting sources of power, produces capitalism. What kind of economy might a democracy produce? One can imagine certain general characteristics. If national government were directed by a multitude of local councils, power would be dispersed, in all likelihood favoring the development of small businesses, small farms, and small-scale industry that would be responsive to local demands. Oligarchy, by virtue of its centralized power, favors the ever-increasing concentration of wealth. In a democracy, where power is dispersed, there would be a more equal distribution of wealth, a greater degree of social justice, and more attention to the common good.

Marx offers some guidance in understanding universal history, but I believe he falls victim to a certain kind of reasoning that serves to mystify and confuse, rather than enlighten. He speaks of capitalism as being the source of man's misery. He speaks of class conflict as being the material cause behind the unfolding of history. "Capitalism" and "class conflict" are concepts, abstractions. Concepts can't act. They can't cause things to happen. Only people can. The fog is lifted once one begins to understand history as being composed of the acts of consequence undertaken by specific human beings.

In contrasting the writings of Hegel and Marx, one gets the sense that deciding on the content of history determines a great deal about one's understanding of the course of societal development. Hegel decided that a society's consciousness of itself is the content of history, leading him to draw certain conclusions about the overall meaning and direction of history. Marx chose the mode of production as his content and was led in a radically different direction. What then should one choose as one's content if the goal is to stay rooted in concrete reality and arrive at an understanding of history that is empowering to those of us who read history with the goal of bringing about change for the better?

Tolstoy's Battlefield

Leo Tolstoy^{¶¶} was a member of the Russian aristocracy. Leading a rather aimless existence in his early adulthood, in 1857 he left Russia and had his first encounter with European culture and politics. During his 1857 visit to Paris, Tolstoy witnessed a public execution, a traumatic experience that would mark the rest of his life. He expressed feelings of revulsion toward the state for its acts of violence and exploitation, and became an ardent advocate of social progress based in simple human values, the enemy of violent solutions of any kind.

Tolstoy's *War and Peace* is thought to be one of the greatest novels ever written, but the author saw his book more as a work of history than a work of fiction. One of his primary interests was to investigate the causes of the Decembrist revolt,^{***} and the result was a massive novel with 580 characters, many historical, others fictional. *War and Peace* tells the story of five aristocratic families and the entanglements of their personal lives with the history of 1805–1813, principally Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. The story moves from family life to the headquarters of Napoleon, from the court of Alexander I of Russia to the battlefields of Austerlitz and Borodino.

Count Pyotr Kirillovich Bezukhov, Pierre, is the central character and often a voice for Tolstoy's own beliefs and struggles. Pierre decides to leave Moscow and go to watch the Battle of Borodino from a vantage point next to a Russian artillery crew. There he experiences firsthand the death and destruction of war. The battle becomes a hideous slaughter for both armies and ends in a standoff. This is Tolstoy's commentary on the gratuitous viciousness of war.

Tolstoy wrote two epilogues to the novel in which he discussed his theory of history. He began the second epilogue as follows: "The subject of history is the life of peoples and of humanity."⁵ The fundamental question to answer is "What force moves nations?"⁶ The modern historian might respond "powerful men," like Napoleon. But, for Tolstoy, that was not good enough, because by what means could it occur that vast numbers of people would do Napoleon's bidding? What is the causal connection between Napoleon's issuing a command and the movements of an army of half a million men? In the past, one could make the connection via the guiding hand of the Deity. In the absence of such an overarching force, historians are at a loss to explain cause and effect. Tolstoy went on to get

¶¶ Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) was a Russian writer and novelist, and his *Anna Karenina* (1877) and *War and Peace* (1869) are considered to be among the great pieces of fiction in any era.

*** When Czar Alexander died in November 1825, it was assumed that his brother Constantine would succeed him. However, Constantine removed himself from the line of succession and his younger brother Nicholas assumed the throne. On December 14, 1825, in an action that came to be known as the Decembrist revolt, Russian army officers leading about 3,000 soldiers refused to declare allegiance to the new czar. Their goal, instead, was to establish a form of constitutional monarchy, along European lines. With the support of 9,000 troops who remained loyal to him, Nicholas I quickly suppressed the revolt.

involved in a tangle of abstract questions and answers, along the way dismissing, without argument, the possibility that power can “be that direct power of the physical ascendancy of a strong creature over a weak one.”⁷

I believe that Tolstoy, like Hegel and Marx, has been led astray by his definition of the content of history. In Tolstoy’s case, the definition is much too vast and abstract. To say that history is the “life of peoples and of humanity” is to say a great deal while saying not much at all. It is not much different from saying that history is everything that has ever happened. Such a definition of the content of history can take one down a path of reasoning leading to abstract final causes and divine intervention.

Yet I think Tolstoy has something important to teach us on the subject of history. One simply has to consider the title of his novel: *War and Peace*. Is that not, indeed, what history is about—war and peace—mostly war, very little in the way of peace? Is history anything other than a vast battlefield, after the battle is over—a mountain of corpses watered with oceans of blood, made up of men, women, and children from around the world and across time who were slaughtered to satisfy the warrior in his quest for blood and glory?^{††}

There are the ancient bones, reduced to piles of dust, commingled with the earth. There are bones and skulls, still recognizable shapes. There are the mangled bodies, crushed skulls, spilled guts, and pools of blood, the putrefying odor of the more recently dead. There are the silent gasps, the desperate waiting, the whimpers, groans, and cries of agony of those expiring as these words are being written. This, I believe, is history. It is the history excised from the books and broadcasts. It is the history we don’t want to know about.^{†††} But it is history nonetheless. And it will determine our destiny, if we allow it.

“Well, that is a really bleak picture,” you might say. “What about advances in medicine and technology, for instance?” Granted, there is the history of medicine, the history of technology, and many other “histories of” one could cite—the history of photography, the history of art, the history of farming, the history of golf, to mention a few. There are many more. And in each of these areas one could quite convincingly make the case for progress. Yet none of these is history, per se, the history that fills textbooks, the history that was taught by my high school teacher.

History, per se, has as its domain everything that is left after all the “histories of” have been accounted for. It describes the war and pillage and leaves the historian with the challenge of making sense of this “panorama of sin and suffering,” in Hegel’s words.

††† The numbers add up to something like 390 million. See “Selected Death Tolls for Wars, Massacres and Atrocities before the 20th Century” (<http://necrometrics.com/pre1700a.htm>) for some of the details. Of course, this does not account for the wounded and maimed, whose number is easily twice as large, nor the destructive impact on the economy, civic life, and psychic existence of those who survive “intact.”

†††† Said C. Wright Mills, “We study history ... to rid ourselves of it.” *The Power Elite*, p. 274.

It is no mere coincidence that the first two histories written in the Western world are about war: Herodotus' story of the fifth-century B.C. Greco-Persian Wars and Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, which occurred later in the same century.^{§§§} These important works simply document the fact that the subject matter of history is war.

As we acknowledge war and its aftermath as the ultimate subject of history, we can begin to understand that warriors have ruled the world for the past five thousand years. And consequently, though true democracy has made a few relatively brief appearances, for the most part it has repeatedly dissolved into a cloud of empty rhetoric. Warriors don't want to have to ask for permission to make war.^{¶¶¶}

Considered in this light, one might argue that democracy is a bulwark against war. Where democracy and democratic values prevail, where power is widely dispersed, there is no opportunity for warriors to take charge of government. Further, one can argue that democracy offers a twofold benefit: (1) individual and culture reach their highest level of development,^{****} and (2) the worth of each human life is at a premium; state-organized killing is at a minimum.

Continuing this line of reasoning, one is led to conclude that war is neither incidental nor accidental, but rather that it is a direct consequence of the form of government,^{†††} an integral and sustaining element in the oligarchic governing process, "the inseparable ally of political institution."⁸ According to libertarian Sheldon Richman, "War is a government program." Why? "Because power-seekers and privilege-seekers [seek] outlets for their ambitions." In the 1950s, C. Wright Mills put it even more simply: "Warfare is the only reality." Early in the twentieth century, sociologist Max Weber declared that the modern state is "that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical violence* within a certain territory" (italics added).⁹

Randolph Bourne (1886–1918) was a progressive writer and public intellectual best known for his unfinished work "The State," which was discovered after his death. Bourne was steadfastly opposed to America's entering into World War I. According to Bourne, "The State is inti-

§§§ See M. I. Finley's *The Portable Greek Historians: The Essence of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius*, for excerpts from both works.

¶¶¶ It is interesting to contemplate what would happen if we simply changed the vocabulary. Suppose instead of declaring "war" on a country, we declared "death" on a country. Suppose we called the "Department of Defense" the "Department of Death and Devastation." Would it still be as easy to mobilize the citizenry?

**** John Dewey (1859–1952), American philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer, said, "The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed ... as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in the formation of values that regulate the living of men together; which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as individuals." Quoted in Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy*, p. 139.

††† Said Thomas Paine, "to establish any mode to abolish war ... would be to take from such government the most lucrative of its branches." *The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine*, p. 343.

mately connected with war, for it is the organization of the collective community when it acts in a political manner, and to act in a political manner towards a rival group has meant, throughout all history—war.” Thus, war is the basic organizing principle of oligarchic government. “War is the health of the State,” said Bourne. “Only when the State is at war does the modern society function with that unity of sentiment, simple uncritical patriotic devotion, cooperation of services, which have always been the ideal of the State lover.”^{10†††} War brings us all together, as we seek shelter and protection under the same umbrella.

In his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness*, written at the end of the eighteenth century, English political philosopher William Godwin made this impassioned statement on the subject of war:

Man is of all other beings the most formidable enemy to man. Among the most various schemes that he has formed to destroy and plague his kind, war is the most terrible. Satiated with petty mischief and retail of insulated crimes, he rises in this instance to a project that lays nation waste, and thins the population of the world. Man directs the murderous engine against the life of his brother; he invents with indefatigable care refinements in destruction; he proceeds in the midst of gaiety and pomp to the execution of his horrid purpose; whole ranks of sensitive beings, endowed with the most admirable faculties, are mowed down in an instant; they perish by inches in the midst of agony and neglect, lacerated with every variety of method that can give torture to the frame.^{11§§§§}

Where power is concentrated and centralized, it is easy for a single individual or relative handful to mobilize the engines of war.^{¶¶¶¶} Where power is dispersed throughout the citizen population and the citizen population itself is directly involved in making life and death decisions, war is a less likely outcome. Thus, the goal is to bring an abrupt halt to history by creating a form of government in which the lust for violence is contained. In the words of Anaïs Nin, “Our real objective is to create a human being who will not go to war.”¹²

†††† See Christopher Hedges, *War Is a Force that Gives Us Meaning*.

§§§§ See also Major General Smedley D. Butler, USMC Retired, “War Is a Racket,” available at <http://lexrex.com>, which begins, “WAR is a racket. It always has been. It is possibly the oldest, easily the most profitable, surely the most vicious. It is the only one international in scope. It is the only one in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives.”

¶¶¶¶ Hermann Goering, founder of the Gestapo, explains: “Why of course the people don’t want war. Why should some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece? Naturally the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia, nor in England, nor in America, nor in Germany. That is understood. But after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.” Quoted in G. M. Gilbert, *Nuremberg Diary*, from an interview with Goering conducted April 18, 1946.