

From Caliphate to Secular State

Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic

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Preface

Working on a critical study on the early Turkish Republic poses a particular challenge for someone like me, who grew up and was oriented in the same political discourse as the subject of this study. The challenge is more visible when one realizes that my subject—the formative years of the Republic of Turkey—has always been regarded as “sacred” for an academic work. Being a product of such an intellectual and political environment had long prevented me from questioning the validity of information about the emergence of my own country, information that I was exposed to during my elementary, middle school, high school, and college education. I remember being upset with those who tried to do what I did in this book: simply read Turkish republican history under a more critical light. I regarded those individuals as people who harbored hatred toward my country. The irony is that there may be some people today who would regard this study as such and accuse me of having some ulterior motives. Let me begin by firmly stating that my only aim is to produce an academic study that would stand firm under the highest degree of scholarly scrutiny. Although I am aware that this study can be exploited by different and even diametrically contradictory political discourses, I know that I did not write it with any political purpose in mind. I am not naive to assert that my study is free of biases. However, I can safely state that they are unintentional, and I hope that the reader will judge it fairly.

In addition to overcoming mental blocks, in the process of working on this study, I had to cope with other, less painful obstacles, namely, finding and reaching reliable information. The reader should be informed up front that much information is still not fully available to

researchers, and my research is not immune from these limitations. However, there is sufficient direct and indirect information to support my conclusions in this book. Another challenge was to maintain a critical eye on every piece of information obtained from all my sources, both primary and secondary. I hope this study will add another layer of scholarly brick on top of previous reputable works in the reconstruction of the early Turkish republican history.

This work from its conception to its production has taken over a decade. As new information became available, I tried to incorporate it into the text. The manuscript was read by several scholars who are specialists in their fields. They made very valuable comments. Although I benefited from their criticism and revised my text accordingly, I must accept full responsibility for the shortcomings of this work. Therefore, I must recognize the valuable input of the following scholars. I am deeply indebted to Professors Mete Tunçay, Şükrü Hanioglu, Hamit Bozarslan, and Reşat Kasaba for their time in reading and commenting on the text. I am also grateful to Carole Gonzalez for proofreading it and to Eyüp Türker for his help in İstanbul during my research. I am most thankful for the grants provided by the University of Central Florida and the Pauley Endowment.

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION

Except for terms common in English, regardless of origin, all words used in the Ottoman context are spelled according to Modern Turkish orthography. Therefore, all Turkish proper names are rendered in Modern Turkish forms. Particular challenge emerged, however, for the names that end with soft/voiced consonants. Since there is a tendency in Modern Turkish to end words with hard/voiceless consonants, proper names such as Cavid, Receb, and Mehmed were spelled as Cavit, Recep, and Mehmet unless they are part of a direct quotation. Therefore, the reader might see both ways of spelling for some proper names that end with voiceless consonants. To provide a degree of uniformity, I omitted some diacritics for names and terms that were taken from Ottoman texts.

The Turkish system of alphabetization is also utilized for place-names in Turkey, such as Ankara and İstanbul, not Angora and Istanbul. Common Ottoman/Turkish and Islamic titles were spelled in English, such as sheikh, sayyid, qadi, and pasha. For uncommon titles, I utilized the Turkish transliteration, such as *mutasarrıf* and *kaymakam*.

Introduction

It is a known fact that after every successful revolution, an inevitable power struggle emerges. The Republic of Turkey was no exception to this proposition. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the political map of the Middle East changed significantly. Since many newly formed Middle Eastern states were still under the mandate of Great Britain and France, their internal power struggles were delayed until after the departure of the Western Powers. A notable exception was the Republic of Turkey, which almost immediately locked in an internal strife for the vision and the leadership of the state. An examination of this struggle is significant for it reveals clues about the radical transition from an empire, which housed the seat of the Islamic caliphate for over four centuries, to a secular state in which religion was confined to a private sphere.

As a secular nation, Turkey has often been cited as an example of a successful modern state in the Islamic world, which made serious commitments to the Western mode of government. However, circumstances that allowed such a drastic transition were not satisfactorily documented, examined, and explained. How did Turkey make such a radical transformation? Was there any internal opposition to the leadership and vision of the new regime? What were the methods employed to circumvent the opposition? These significant questions fall in the subject of the current study. This book aims primarily at explaining the process in which the opposition in the new republic was silenced. However, it also invites readers to rethink the early republican history in the context of a power struggle that helped shape the Turkish political identity. I hope that this line of thinking lends itself to the larger issue of the Kemalist vision in general. I propose that the nature of the new Turkish state was not a result of a predetermined

vision but a pragmatic synthesis of political realities and opportunities to silence the opposition.

In order to guide the reader, the narrative must begin with an overview of the political situation in Turkey after World War I. As it is known, the Ottoman Empire lost the war and, in the period between 1918 and 1920, was waiting for its fate, which was to be determined by the victorious Allied Powers. Following the occupation of İstanbul¹ by the Allies and İzmir by Greece² after World War I, there were many competing visions for the future of the state within the empire. The dominant view among the Ottoman government officers, high-level bureaucrats, politicians, and the sultan was that the only way for political survival of the empire was to cooperate with the victors. This attitude was challenged by a group of nationalists who created the Anatolian Resistance Movement. This group, consisting mainly of individuals who believed that the empire could not survive by surrender, set its base in Ankara, a small town in central Anatolia. Led by able Ottoman military commanders and statesmen such as Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), and Rauf (Orbay), this new movement soon found itself locked in a power struggle with the İstanbul government for the future of the state.

In this context, the years between 1920 and 1924 were crucial in determining the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the direction of the emerging Turkish regime in Ankara. Despite many claims to the contrary, it should not be a forgone conclusion that the empire was destined to collapse after World War I, at least until the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. Many high-level bureaucrats and politicians, as well as the dynasty, were clinging to a desperate hope that the empire could survive, albeit with a substantial territorial loss. The members of the İstanbul Circle (the monarchists and associates)³ were trying their best to spare the empire with a minimum loss of territory. Since they lacked the necessary military force to ensure the empire's security, the imperial government in İstanbul was hoping that cooperation with the Allied Powers would perhaps soften the blow to the very existence of the state. This tactic to protect the empire, however, was proven to be disastrous and played into the hands of the Nationalists (the Ankara Circle) since the Allies had no desire to allow the empire to survive in a meaningful way.

It must be remembered that in the pre-Treaty of Sevres period, the nationalist movement was not entirely outside the realm of the İstanbul government. The Anatolian resistance began in 1919 with the manifest goal of protecting the empire and the sultan. In other words, until after

the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), the two sides, İstanbul and Ankara, differed on the method of saving the empire, not on the purpose. The opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in Ankara on April 23, 1920, expressly challenged the authority of the İstanbul government but registered its purpose as saving the empire and the caliph. This move was, nevertheless, a major challenge to the İstanbul government, as it attracted some İstanbul parliamentarians to Ankara. The final blow to the strained Ankara–İstanbul relations came after the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which later proved to be the death sentence of the Ottoman Empire.

It is worth mentioning that during the War of Independence (1919–1922), the İstanbul government's reaction to Ankara was not monolithic. Some cabinet members in the post–Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)⁴ governments sympathized with the resistance movement in Anatolia. However, as soon as Ankara rejected the authority of İstanbul, there emerged more of a unified tone against the nationalists, championed by Damat Ferit Pasha,⁵ and many of his cabinet members. İstanbul governments under Damat Ferit Pasha's premiership accused the nationalist movement in Anatolia of harming the interest of the state and its citizens by provoking the Allies. The imperial government in İstanbul believed that World War I was lost and that any military action against the Allies was doomed for failure. These actions would provoke the superior military powers to harm the interest of the empire and adversely affect the upcoming peace negotiations.

However, there was another not well-articulated reason for the hostility of İstanbul toward Ankara. This reason fundamentally colored the perception and affected the attitude of the İstanbul Circle against Ankara. It was the alleged connection of the nationalists to their political nemesis, the CUP. Memoirs of the members of the İstanbul Circle reveal that the Damat Ferit Pasha cabinets and many members of the anti-CUP coalition sincerely believed that the nationalist movement in Anatolia was another deception by the CUP to replace their government of the Liberal Entente.⁶ In their minds, there existed sufficient evidence to connect the Ankara Circle to the CUP, a fear that was justified by the CUP backgrounds of many nationalists, including Mustafa Kemal. Even more significant was that, at its inception, the Ankara movement did not have a clearly manifested political identity that separated it from the CUP. Many foreign observers also considered this movement first as an arm of and then as the custodian for the CUP.⁷ This perception is significant in understanding the rivalry between İstanbul and Ankara and, later, Ankara's purges of İstanbul.

No doubt, by 1920, Ankara was resolute to break ranks with and to replace the government in İstanbul; however, one should be cautious to blindly accept the proposition that Ankara was determined to get rid of the monarchy and that the nationalists aimed at creating a new secular republic. Accepting such a proposition would mean reading the history only retrospectively. The Ankara movement could have stayed loyal to the sultan if he recognized the TGNA as the legitimate government of the Ottoman Empire. The turning point in Ankara's break with the sultan came with the realization that such recognition would never materialize. Consequently, the nationalists abolished the sultanate on November 1, 1922, forcing Vahdettin to flee from the empire on November 17, 1922. Although the deposed sultan claimed that he was leaving İstanbul only temporarily,⁸ this was a great opening for the Ankara Circle to initiate a process in which the authority of the imperial government would be completely destroyed. Was the departure of the sultan from İstanbul devised and instigated by Ankara to get rid of the sultanate? This question cannot be answered definitively; however, one should not discount the possibility that Ankara was acting pragmatically and improvising its moves against the sultanate and the İstanbul government. A strong possibility exists that one of the main reasons for the abolition of the sultanate in 1922 was to replace the İstanbul government, for it was clear that the sultan would never recognize Ankara over İstanbul. Therefore, the office of the sultanate needed to be abolished, a decision that garnered overwhelming support in the TGNA.⁹

One can convincingly make the case that Ankara originally intended to get rid of the "office" of sultanate, not necessarily the sultan in person.¹⁰ In other words, the main target for the abolition of the sultanate was the İstanbul government, not Sultan Vahdettin or the Ottoman dynasty. It is telling that Vahdettin was still the caliph until his escape on November 17, 1922. Vahdettin became the main target of many pointed attacks from Ankara as a traitor to the nation after his departure but not necessarily because of it.¹¹ Ankara accused the last sultan of treason only *after* his escape for his activities that took place prior to his escape. If Vahdettin in person were the main target for Ankara's historic move to abolish the sultanate, he could have been deposed as the caliph also on the date of the abolition of the sultanate. Conversely, if he did not leave the country, the possibility remains that he could have continued to be the caliph, and this could have changed the entire course of Turkish and Islamic history. This nuanced action demonstrates that Ankara did not have a clear plan

as to how to deal with the dynasty as yet and was responding to the developments only pragmatically. The escape of the last Ottoman sultan provided Ankara with an opportunity to devastate the sultan's legitimacy and to build its own. As a result, Ankara felt increasingly confident to claim the sole authority to govern.

However, nationalists in Ankara knew that there were still able contenders for power. By 1923, until the republic was proclaimed, Mustafa Kemal alienated some of his close friends and respected figures in the Ankara Circle, such as Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Kazım Karabekir. In İstanbul, there were still the remnants of the old regime: the İstanbul Press, Ottoman politicians, the newly appointed caliph Abdülmecit Efendi (TGNA voted for his appointment on November 19, 1922) and the members of the Ottoman dynasty, many of whom were antagonistic toward Ankara and any of whom would pose danger to Ankara's bid to govern. These groups were required to be subdued. Mustafa Kemal judged that as long as the Ottoman dynasty resided in Turkey, the opponents of Ankara would be encouraged. Nationalists were keenly aware that the office of the caliphate still carried high esteem among the Muslim population of the empire and beyond.

After the departure of Vahdettin, Ankara hoped to have a "tamed" dynasty headed by Abdülmecit. However, soon it became evident that even this move was too risky for the well-being of the new regime. Unlike the abolition of the sultanate, the abolition of the caliphate targeted the entire Ottoman dynasty and sought their removal from Turkey. Ankara probably did not feel confident enough to make this move in 1922.¹² With a degree of reasonable confidence, one can state that the office of the caliphate was abolished mainly to eliminate the threat of the dynasty, not just the caliph, for Ankara's legitimacy. In other words, the office of the sultanate was abolished to eliminate the imperial government, not the Ottoman dynasty. On the other hand, the main target for the abolition of the caliphate was the Ottoman dynasty, not necessarily the caliphate itself.

A U.S. archival document¹³ supports the claim that in fact one of the main reasons for the abolishment of the caliphate was to remove the dynasty, not necessarily to abolish the office of the caliphate as an Islamic institution. In this document, the U.S. source informs Washington that Kemalists were promising to support Seyyid Ahmet Sanussi for his bid for the caliph as long as he promised to support the Ankara government and reside outside Turkey. Seyyid Sanussi's private secretary, Osman Fahreldine (Fahrettin) Bey, reported to the U.S. embassy in İstanbul the following information:

Shortly before the abolition of the Caliphate and the expulsion of Abdul Medjid last March, Moustapha Kemal Pasha in an interview with Sheik Senoussi offered him Turkey's support in Caliph on the condition that the seat of the Caliphate be outside of Turkey. This offer the sheik refused. He made it plain that he favored the retention of Abdul Medjid as Caliph with spiritual powers at Constantinople; . . . as a result, Ankara cancelled his allowance.¹⁴

If this is true, it shows that Ankara was more interested in uprooting the Ottoman dynasty than in abolishing the caliphate.¹⁵ Having a caliph who would be responsive to Turkish demands and—unlike the Ottoman dynasty—could not claim legitimacy to challenge the Ankara government would have been the best-case scenario for Mustafa Kemal.

In any case, the caliphate was abolished on March 3, 1924, and the caliph was hurriedly removed from Turkey the same night. Other members of the dynasty were given a little longer time to leave the country. When the dynasty was exiled, the next group to pose danger to the authority of Ankara became the supporters of the monarchy who were hostile toward the nationalists. The research for this book excludes the abolition of the caliphate but focuses on several other significant events.

GENERAL ARGUMENTS OF THE CHAPTERS

The present research is organized around three specific events between 1923 and 1926, after which Mustafa Kemal emerged as the sole leader whose authority was not challenged. Each chapter examines in detail the political and judicial maneuverings of Mustafa Kemal and his close associates to eliminate the opposition. As already suggested, the silencing of the opposition was not a painstakingly planned and executed political action. In fact, as mentioned before, the Kemalist governments in Ankara were improvising their action in response to the emerging political conditions. This pragmatic approach can be seen as the most valuable asset of the Kemalist regime in the early years of the republic.

Although there were many events to demonstrate the power struggle and the Kemalist success in silencing the opposition, I picked three to represent the others. I can categorize these events as (1) opposition to Ankara, (2) opposition in Ankara, and (3) opposition at large.

The first event that constitutes Chapter 2 deals with opposition to Ankara and focuses on the elimination of the political challenge to

the authority of the Ankara government. This chapter examines the exile of the 150 so-called opponents of the Ankara Circle. This event, known as the “the Incident of 150ers” (*Yüzellilikler Olayı*), in Turkish Republican history represents the process in which the Ankara government established its legitimacy by exiling 150 members, many (not all) of whom were loyal to the old regime. This event can be seen as one of the earliest attempts of the Ankara government to insert its authority over the İstanbul Circle. More specifically, Chapter 2 sheds lights on three main questions: who were the 150ers, what did they do, and how were they silenced? This chapter demonstrates that the 150ers were indeed an eclectic group and included members of the monarchists, ulama, military, former high-ranking Ottoman statesmen, journalists, and anti-Ankara rebels. The Ankara Assembly selected them by employing very loose and incoherent standards to deter opposition to the legitimacy of Ankara. Chapter 2 also contains prosopographical information for the 150 people since in the current scholarship not much is recorded about their backgrounds. Therefore, this chapter is greatest in length. The first section of the chapter introduces and analyzes the issue, and the second section provides biographical information for the individuals who were selected on the list. Unfortunately, available information about them is uneven. The reader will find that we have significant biographical information on some. However, there is almost no information available for some other members on the list.

Chapter 3 continues to examine the process of silencing the opposition by analyzing some aspects of the Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925, a Kurdish/Islamist revolt, and the government’s response to it. This rebellion became the main justification for the Kemalist government to silence the religious and other oppositional (such as the leftists) establishments in Turkey and hence paved the way for the secularization reforms to come. Equally significant was that this rebellion provided the pretext for the suppression of the opposition in Ankara. To understand the significance of the event, one needs to fully appreciate the political conditions of the period.

Let us first look at the political environment prior to the Sheikh Said Revolt. The regime in Ankara spent most of 1924 in restructuring the new state. After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, which formally recognized the Ankara government and the borders of the new Turkey, the Turkish government was still not content with the little authority afforded to the caliph and the suspicions of the legitimacy that the Ottoman dynasty still possessed. As

discussed above, on March 3, 1924, the caliphate was abolished—a source of discontent for some in Ankara and for many outside Ankara. Kemalists were bracing themselves for the rise of reactionary rebellions by Islamic-minded groups among which the Naqshbandi Kurdish *tariqas* (mystical orders) were visible in the eastern territories of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal and his associates in Ankara were already extremely sensitive toward any sign of opposition and discontent in and out of Ankara. They were fully justified in their sensitivity since their unprecedented move of abolishing the caliphate could have made them the target of many in the Islamic world.

When the Sheikh Said Revolt commenced on February 13, 1925, the political party in power was the Republican People's Party (RPP). This party, which originally included almost all of those who formed the Ankara Circle, split in November 1924. Some of Mustafa Kemal's former close associates (such as Rauf Bey, Kazım Karabekir, Refet, and Ali Fuat Pasha) accused several RPP members of radicalizing the party and Mustafa Kemal of having autocratic tendencies. Suggesting that a fully functional democracy needed a political opposition, these former leaders of the RPP, whose charisma were second only to that of Mustafa Kemal, established the first opposition party in the Turkish republic and called it the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası [PRP]). One must take note that this party was established only three months before the Sheikh Said Rebellion. Therefore, the timing of this rebellion has lent itself to many speculations about the cause and the nature of as well as the instigations for the rebellion. As discussed in Chapter 3, entry of the PRP into the Turkish political arena made Mustafa Kemal and some members of his party (such as Recep Bey and İsmet Pasha) very agitated. They might have seriously concerned that this political movement would be the commencement of a counterrevolution in which their lives were on the line. Therefore, the RPP's reaction to the Sheikh Said Revolt was understandably but disproportionately harsh.

The rebellion, which contained in itself Kurdish nationalist tendencies but was overtly Islamist in nature, was suppressed in a relatively short period of time by the Turkish army. Sheikh Said and 47 of his associates were executed on June 29, 1925. Although the rebellion had ended, a political witch-hunt had just begun. This chapter examines specifically this process of silencing the political and intellectual opposition in Turkey. It seeks answers to the following questions: What political and judicial maneuverings were employed to eliminate the opposition in the Turkish Grand National Assembly? How were

the critics of the Ankara regime, such as the journalists, silenced? What is the likelihood that the Sheikh Said Revolt was fomented by the RPP government to eliminate the opposition? And how was this rebellion manipulated and exaggerated to discredit the opposition and accomplish the radical Kemalist reforms within such a short time as three years?

Chapter 4 is the continuation of the previous chapter in that it examines the completion of the process of silencing the political opposition and the political consequences of an assassination plot against Mustafa Kemal in 1926. This event, known as "the İzmir Conspiracy," resulted in the removal of all members of the PRP from parliament. Furthermore, it went far beyond expectations and purged the potential opposition at large, which was embodied in the remnant of the CUP. There should be little doubt that higher-ranking officers of the former CUP could have challenged the RPP in the upcoming general elections in 1927. As foreign observers in Turkey reported, there was a good chance that a new party, manned by the former CUP leaders, would even attract a large group of former lower-ranking CUP members who were in the RPP. If such unification was realized, this would constitute a counterrevolution that Mustafa Kemal and his inner circle were afraid of. A document, dated October 15, 1923, and penned by Maynard B. Barnes, the American consul and the delegate of the U.S. high commissioner for Turkey, concluded that the RPP is a purely fictitious organization whose popularity depends heavily on that of Mustafa Kemal. "The rank and file of the [RPP] are still Unionists who will revert to their original party as the popularity of Kemal wanes and when strong Unionist leaders openly enter the political arena."¹⁶

Against this background, the trials for the İzmir Conspiracy in 1926 become more revealing to demonstrate how this threat was dealt with. After the İzmir Conspiracy trials first in İzmir and then in Ankara, there was no visible dissent left in and outside the TGNA. Laws passed with little or no discussion in parliament. Until the next election in 1927, no opposing vote was cast. Deputies showed their discomfort to a particular bill by not showing up for the voting. Newspapers refrained from making any comments that could be interpreted as critical to the government. Even after the 1927 general elections, the lack of a healthy opposition was so visible that even Mustafa Kemal recognized the harm it might have caused to the republican regime. Against this background, the reader can better understand Mustafa Kemal's desire for a tamed political opposition and hence the formation of the Free Party (Serbest Fırka) by the directives of Mustafa Kemal himself.¹⁷ The

current study does not interest itself with this political experience in 1930, which lasted only three months. However, this experience illustrates that the formation of an oppositional party stirred so much emotion among a considerable group of people (especially in İzmir and the Aegean region in general) that Mustafa Kemal asked the leader of the Free Party, Fethi Bey, his close associate in the RPP, to shut the party down.¹⁸ The opposition remained mute until after the death of Mustafa Kemal. It was the post-World War II necessities that forced İsmet İnönü, the new president of the country after Mustafa Kemal's death, to allow the formation of new political parties in 1945. Therefore, understanding the political history of modern Turkey requires diligent scholarly examination of the period that has long been considered "sacred" and hence affected the unbiased scholarly production. Although politicians continue to make a growing number of references to the period under examination here, their references lack authority because of the limited number of objective studies available to them. The same problem also exists for the new generation of scholars, especially outside Turkey. The highly politically charged nature of the period caused many students to shy away from this extremely significant subject for Turkish and Middle Eastern studies.

STATE OF THE FIELD AND ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Compared to other subfields in Turkish studies, history of the early republican Turkey can readily be considered in the stage of infancy, particularly in the scholarship outside Turkey. When considering the current state of the field in the early Turkish republic, we need to separate the scholarship into two categories: the scholarship that has been produced inside and outside Turkey. The first category understandably is much greater in volume compared to the second. However, it is dominated by nonprofessional historians whose analysis of issues lacks academic discipline and thoroughness. These books, however, are great sources for academics, for they contain significant leads to recently available primary sources. For the "Incident of 150ers," for example, we have, among others, Kamil Erdeha, *Yüzellilikler Yahut Milli Mücadelenin Muhasebesi*; İlhami Soysal, *150'liler*; and Cemal Kutay, *150'lilikler Faciası*. These books are useful but lack scholarly rigor. In academia, there are a small number of master's theses: Şerife Özkan, "Yüzellilikler and Süleyman Şefik Kemali: A Legitimacy and Security Issue"; Şaduman Halıcı, "Yüzellilikler"; and Sedat Bingöl,

“Yüzellilikler Meselesi.”¹⁹ The last two are especially significant, for the authors utilize a number of primary sources that even today are not fully available to researchers. These works are limited in the sense that they report only the activities of the 150ers in exile and do not provide us with much biographical information. In addition, both are master’s-level works that require academic maturity and benefit from a degree of objectivity. Although my conclusions differ from these sources, I have made use of them in reference to some archival sources that I did not have access to. There is no published academic work that exists on the subject of the 150ers in English or, to my knowledge, in any other language. For that reason, the current study fills a significant gap for those who cannot use Turkish as their research language or simply cannot access these secondary sources.

There is a considerably large body of scholarship that exists on the subject of Chapter 3 since this is one of the most controversial subjects in Turkish republican history. Therefore, the researcher must be cautious in examining them, expecting that their professional judgments would be colored by their political positions. On the subject of the Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925, there are a number of books in Turkish, including Metin Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı*; Uğur Mumcu, *Kürt İslam Ayaklanması 1919–1925*; Behçet Cemal, *Şeyh Sait İsyanı*; and Nurer Uğurlu, *Kürtler ve Şeyh Sait İsyanı*. The available books in Turkish are mainly descriptive in and do make references to the period after Takrir-i Sükun. In English, Robert Olson’s *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism: 1880–1925* and Martin van Bruinessen’s *Agha Shaikh and State* provide useful information on the Sheikh Said Revolt. All secondary sources uniformly conclude—although differing in intensity—that the Sheikh Said Revolt initiated a period of political silence in Turkey. However, all of them neglect to demonstrate and document how exactly this was accomplished. Chapter 4 is unique in that it documents and examines the process of political intimidation.

I must recognize that there are a growing number of able Turkish scholars dealing with certain aspects of the process described above. For example, Ahmet Yeşil’s *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde İlk Teşkilatlı Muhalefet Hareketi: Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* is a great contribution to the field and updates Erik Jan Zürcher’s *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party 1925–1925*, a classic on the first opposition party and its fate. I have greatly benefited from these sources when I examined the dissolution of the first organized political opposition in Turkey, the PRP. Although all of us may share similar conclusions, the present study brings in many other primary sources to

make stronger arguments. Furthermore, this chapter examines the demise of the oppositional press and intellectuals. Although a growing number of memoirs have become available in recent years, no scholarly work has been done on the effect of the *Takrir-i Sükun* on the oppositional press and how they were muzzled.

Chapter 4 deals with a significant issue of purging the former CUP members. Erik Jan Zürcher has ably examined this subject in his *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926*. However, since its publication in 1984, many other primary sources have become available. This chapter aims at updating Erik Jan Zürcher's work with available primary sources. Accordingly, our conclusions are similar with the exception that I emphasize the pragmatic nature of purging the opposition more than Zürcher does.

Throughout the book, in addition to Turkish and British archival sources, I make heavy use of U.S. consular reports. The main reason for this is to introduce these sources, which have not been fully examined by students of Turkish republican history. Lest I be accused of relying heavily on these sources in my conclusions, I must state that my conclusions are based on more than one collection of primary sources. The U.S. sources are displayed prominently in the text with my hope to demonstrate that these sources are in fact rich and detailed and can shed some light on early Turkish republican history. They provide us with some information that cannot be found in Turkish archives, the reliability of which, like any other sources, cannot always be vouched for.

Finally, let me make several comments on the accessibility of Turkish archives, which is still limited. For this study, I have consulted the Prime Minister's Republican Archives and the Institute of Turkish Republican History archives in Ankara. The Directorate of General Security Archives (DGSA) on the 150ers was transferred to the Prime Minister's Republican Archives. I was informed by the DGSA that this collection was in transit. However, the Republican Archives informed me that the collection was not cataloged and hence not open for researchers as of 2010. I had photocopies of several DGSA documents on this subject, and for the remainder, I relied on the previously mentioned works. The researcher must be warned that these documents, once recataloged at the Prime Minister's Republican Archives, might very likely have different reference numbers. Parliamentary minutes are in print and available to researchers in the TGNA library and other venues. I did not attempt to work on the ATASE archives of the

General Staff for the expected problems in accessing information and possibly very little return. I utilized published material from the Presidential Archives (Çankaya Arşivi) and the TGNA archives; on occasion, I collected information from secondary sources that included copies and reprints of some significant documents regarding the PRP.

After the implementation of a better cataloging system and easier access to some of these archives, future researchers may stretch our understanding of the period greatly. Other consulted primary sources are listed accordingly in the bibliography.