

Fundamentalism

Prophecy and Protest in an Age of Globalization

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Introduction

“How did it feel to be named a cause of the invasion of Iraq?” I ask. The overweight mullah on the sofa looks at me. Then he breaks into laughter. His wife appears in the doorway with some tea and biscuits. She is just back from work. It is 2004, and this is my second interview with mullah Krekar. It takes place in the living room of his small apartment in Oslo, Norway. On the wall above the sofa is a picture of the Kaba in Mecca. On another wall is a bookshelf with books in Arabic. In the corner is a desk with a computer and a phone.

On February 5, 2003, U.S. secretary of state General Colin Powell presented the United Nations with data that would be the basis for the American justification of the war against Iraq. He said: “But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder.” Powell described a situation where Ansar al-Islam, headed by mullah Krekar, was harboring al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan and at the same time collaborating with Saddam Hussein. According to Powell, mullah Krekar’s group was *the sinister nexus*, the link between Saddam Hussein and international terrorism, which

was a central argument for invading Iraq and making sure its potential weapons of mass destruction did not find their way to al Qaeda groups operating in Iraqi Kurdistan or other regions.¹

It is hard to know exactly what was correct and what was not in Secretary Powell's assessment of the situation, and that is not really important here. It seems very likely that Mullah Krekar had links to al Qaeda, but he insists he did not have any contact with Saddam Hussein's regime.² After all, the Iraqi leader had used massive violence to crush Kurdish calls for autonomy. Being a Kurd, the mullah strongly disliked Hussein's policies. Mullah Krekar was the leader of the militant fundamentalist organization Ansar al-Islam, and in this capacity he was engaged in a civil war against secular Kurdish organizations competing for political control in Iraqi Kurdistan. He was a military leader fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state in the region. In the mind of a fundamentalist like mullah Krekar, however, the establishment of one small Islamic political entity must be seen as a step on the way to a larger goal: the (re)establishment of the Islamic caliphate.

Mullah Krekar is an example of how some fundamentalists use violent means to achieve their religious and political goals. In a later chapter of this book, I will return to this issue. I will look more closely at Muslim fundamentalist ideas about the caliphate, and I will discuss how fundamentalists in other world religions want to establish states, or change existing ones, to make politics conform closely to their conceptions of a religious ordering of society. Some Christian fundamentalists feel that the state should base its politics on biblical norms. Quite a few Buddhist and Hindu fundamentalists want a *Dharmarajya* (politics in accordance with religion), and some Sikhs want a Sikh state or *Khalistan*. Some Jews have religious visions of the state of Israel or reject the state as such on religious grounds.

¹ The case is treated in detail in Torkel Brekke, "Sinister Nexus: USA, Norge og Krekar-saken," *Internasjonal Politikk* 63, no. 2 (2005): 279–96.

² Brynjar Lia, *Irak og terrortrusslen: Eit oversyn over terrorgrupper med tilknytning til det irakiske regimet*. FFI/Rapport/2003/00940 (Kjeller: Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, 2003).

In the worldviews of fundamentalists within these traditions, politics is a sphere of human activity and ideology that was originally tied to religion in an organic way. In their eyes, the separation of politics and religion is a tragedy. Many of them would add that the separation of religion from other spheres, such as law, science, or education, is a negative effect of the same process of modernization and secularization. However, before we look in detail at how fundamentalists in the world religions believe that each of these societal spheres should be reconquered by religion, which is the subject of [Chapters 5 to 9](#), we need to establish a framework for our discussion. We can start by taking a brief look at the word “fundamentalism” and the debates that have taken place concerning its meaning, application, and relevance.

SHOULD WE USE THE WORD “FUNDAMENTALISM”?

The word “fundamentalism” is used to describe many different things in everyday speech. After the financial crisis of 2009, several economists criticized what they saw as *market fundamentalism*; that is, the conviction that markets correct themselves and that governments should stay out of the economy. In other words, the language of religion was brought into a different sphere to denote views and attitudes that were perceived as rigid and irrational. This use of the term “fundamentalism” probably tells us more about the views of the person using the term than about the nature of the thing that receives the negative label. In public debates and everyday conversation, the term “fundamentalism” is used widely simply to name persons or attitudes that we do not like.

There is also the opposite trend: the word “fundamentalism” is sometimes used in a very narrow sense. Some academics are of the opinion that fundamentalism is really an exclusively Christian phenomenon, and they believe that the term should not be used to describe people, organizations, and communities outside the

Christian world. They claim that it is meaningless to speak of fundamentalism in Islam or Buddhism, for instance. In a relatively recent work on the creation of an Islamic state in Iran, one author writes that she rejects the term “fundamentalism” in the case of Iran “as it reflects a different, Christian religio-political environment, and finds no corresponding term in Islamist vocabulary.”³ This way of discarding the term “fundamentalism” altogether simply by pointing out that it originated in a Christian context has become common among academics. One expert on Buddhism has argued that “fundamentalism” is a term that is not suited to describing Sinhalese Buddhists, even militants among them, because they do not want to return to the fundamental textual sources of their tradition and they are not concerned with the literal truth of those texts, unlike Christian fundamentalists.⁴

It is true that the word “fundamentalism” comes from a Christian context. It was first used in the early twentieth century by American Protestants who saw themselves as defenders of the fundamentals of the Christian religion against the onslaught of modern, liberal theology and critical textual scholarship that seemed to undermine the special status of the Bible. Fundamentalist is a good description of these Christians: they even used the word themselves. They saw their own activities as fundamentalist and were proud of that. To borrow a useful concept from the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, “fundamentalism” was an experience-near word to them.

In Geertz’s thinking, experience-near words are the words we use in our daily life to describe our own activities and the world we see around us. Experience-distant words are words

³ Vanessa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. xxi.

⁴ Richard Gombrich, “Is the Sri Lanka War a Buddhist Fundamentalism?” in *Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka*, ed. Mahinda Deegalle (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 22–37.

that are applied as analytical categories from outside.⁵ Scholars who insist on saving the term “fundamentalism” exclusively for groups in the Christian tradition because it is a Christian word assume that we must describe social phenomena, such as religion, in experience-near terms. But this is an assumption that, if taken to its logical conclusion, makes all academic study of other cultures impossible. We can illustrate this by looking at the word “religion.”

The word “religion” comes from a Christian context. It is a word in the Latin language. Cicero, one of the greatest writers to use the Latin language in the ancient Roman world, wrote extensively on the nature and origins of different conceptions of gods, and he used the word “religion” at least partly in the same sense as people use it today.⁶ Modern European languages – such as English – have all inherited this word from the ancient Romans. No other culture or society used the word “religion” for the simple reason that their languages were not derived from Latin. Moreover, it is in Europe that people started seeing religion as a special sphere of social life that could be analyzed apart from other spheres, such as politics, science, or law.

In Arabic, one has the word “*din*,” and this word refers to some, but not all, of the same things in the Arab world as the word “religion” in the Christian world. Likewise, in Indian languages, such as Hindi, we find the word “dharma,” and there is some degree of overlap between dharma and religion. However, it is certainly not the case that the words “religion,” “*din*,” and “dharma” refer to exactly the same things. In fact, it is often impossible to find a word in a different language that means

⁵ Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 57.

⁶ Of special interest is Cicero’s attempt to define religion by offering an etymology of the word. In fact, he gave two different etymologies. See Cicero, *De natura deorum. Academica*, with an English translation by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 192–93.

exactly the same as the words we use in English. This is one of the good things about studying a different language: one discovers that the world can be categorized in radically different ways from what one is used to.

If the word “fundamentalism” cannot be used to describe social phenomena in Islam or Hinduism merely because it is taken out of its Christian context, we can make the same argument for the word “religion.” However, if we want to study and describe other societies and cultures, we cannot accept the claim that we must only use experience-near terms. If we insist on using only words derived from a culture and its language when describing social life in that culture, we effectively give up research altogether.

So, on the one hand, we should avoid using the word “fundamentalism” about all those views that we happen to find zealous or narrow-minded. On the other hand, we cannot restrict the word to developments in the Christian world. In my view, fundamentalism is a special kind of reaction to certain developments in the modern world that have taken place in many, perhaps in most, religious traditions. We find fundamentalism a notable religious response to global developments reaching different societies and cultures at different times between 1800, at the earliest, and today. In other words, fundamentalism is a reaction to processes that take place at a particular stage in world history.

THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT

Since the 1990s, there has been a growing awareness about the renewed importance of religion in public and private life in many parts of the world. Most sociologists of the 1960s and 1970s insisted that modernity produced secularization more or less by necessity. Secularization means that religion is losing status and significance in society, and we will return to this idea shortly. However, since the late 1970s, things have happened in

the world that made it clear that religion was not about to disappear in spite of the predictions of the social sciences. One clear indication of the importance of religion in American culture was the reemergence of fundamentalism in the shape of a movement called the Moral Majority in the late 1970s. On the global scene, the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 was a clear indication that religion could still play a significant political role. During the same period, labor migration to Europe from countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Morocco resulted in the creation of new religious communities of Muslims in many European countries and, at least since the 1980s, this has led to a new awareness of the religious identity of both immigrants and host populations.

It would be misplaced to offer reviews of a number of books about fundamentalism here, but there is one work that must be mentioned because it has set a standard for later studies of fundamentalism. This is the Fundamentalism Project commissioned by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Between 1988 and 1995, the Fundamentalism Project produced five volumes that approached fundamentalism from different angles. The Fundamentalism Project brought a lot of new data and new theoretical insights, but it has also received criticism from those who disagree with the basic premise of the project, that there exist religious movements across the globe that share enough traits to lump them together under one heading.

In order to study fundamentalism across cultures, the editors of the Fundamentalism Project had to take what we might call an *ideal type* as their point of departure, and the construction of this ideal type was a main goal in the first of the five volumes. Some scholars would reject such a research strategy and insist that we restrict the use of the term “fundamentalism” to its original context, Christian movements that are self-consciously fundamentalist, but this is a misconceived criticism, as I just explained.

The Fundamentalism Project is one important point of departure for this book, and to disregard its many important contributions would be ridiculous. However, the volumes were published

in the early 1990s, and much has happened in the world since then. There are now enough books treating Muslim fundamentalism exclusively to fill a small library. There are several reasons why Muslim fundamentalism has received more attention than other forms of fundamentalism. With the revolution in Iran, it became clear that Islam had potential for motivating and justifying strong social and political movements, although, as I will explain later, the Islamic revolution in Iran might not be a very good example of fundamentalism. As the modern jihadist network created in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Soviet invasion started looking at the West as its enemy in the early 1990s, radical Islamic movements came to be perceived as a formidable security threat. Then came 9/11 and several other terrorist attacks, and interest in al Qaeda and related networks exploded.

There are now many books treating fundamentalism with different perspectives, but most of them have little to say about fundamentalism outside the Abrahamic traditions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This is partly because fundamentalism is most obviously present in the Abrahamic traditions, but it is also because people who are interested in fundamentalism often have their primary training in these traditions, whereas people who specialize in other religions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, or Sikhism, have been reluctant to enter into a comparative debate to see whether “their” traditions fit the theories and concepts used to study fundamentalism in the Abrahamic religions. One aim of this book is to find a way to bring other religions into the debate about the nature and causes of fundamentalism. This is of particular interest to me because much of my background as a scholar is in the study of the religious traditions in South Asia.

FUNDAMENTALISM: WHERE AND WHEN?

Let me say a few words about the choices I am going to make in this book. I am going to look at a number of organizations,

movements, and individuals belonging to what we have come to know as “world religions.” In the discipline called history of religions, or religious studies, it has for some time been fashionable to discuss how our idea of world religions arose and developed, but I will not go into this debate here. A basic assumption I am making is that there are movements, people, ideas, and practices in the world religions that are so similar that we can use the same word to refer to them. This is necessarily an assumption shared by any book dealing with fundamentalism as a cross-cultural phenomenon.

However, I work with an additional and stronger assumption that is not shared by many other books on the subject. I believe that the right way to study fundamentalism in the world religions is to look at movements within different traditions as sharing basic historical origins. The Fundamentalism Project and several other studies say that we can compare movements in different religions and put the label “fundamentalism” on them because they are similar. They share some characteristics. There is a family resemblance. I claim that there are movements in the world religions that we can call by a common name not only because there is a family resemblance but because they are in fact results of the same global historical processes. They have the same form *and* the same origins. It is the aim of the early chapters of this book to explain these common origins.

To do this, I will look at fundamentalism in Protestant Christianity in the United States; this is, after all, the “original case” of fundamentalism. I will also look at Muslim fundamentalists in the Middle East and South Asia. One important focus will be on Maulana Maududi and the fundamentalist party he established, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which has branches in several South Asian countries.⁷ Maududi was the person who more than anybody formulated a modern Muslim fundamentalist ideology,

⁷ It is not unusual to confuse South Asia with Southeast Asia. Whenever I use the term “South Asia,” I refer to the region comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan.

and he had a great impact in many Muslim societies. I will also look at relevant movements in other parts of the Muslim world, such as Egypt, and the Muslim Brotherhood will be an important example of Muslim fundamentalism in the Middle East.

Hindu fundamentalism is less well known than Christian or Muslim fundamentalism, but it could be argued that Hindu fundamentalists have had more political success than most others because they were able to put their leaders into government in the period 1999 to 2004. My focus will be on certain organizations, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), and certain key individuals, especially ideologues like M. S. Golwalkar (1906–1973) and Deendayal Upadhyay (1916–1968).

Buddhist fundamentalism will be discussed, too, and here I intend to focus on two societies in particular: Sri Lanka and Thailand. They both have majority populations belonging to the branch of Buddhism we call Theravada, and they have both experienced very dramatic changes in their meeting with the modern West since the nineteenth century, although the political contexts were very different. In the Buddhist case, I intend to focus on key leaders, religious and political, who have defined new religious roles since the late nineteenth century, such as the Sri Lankan activist Anagarika Dharmapala. I will also look at more recent movements, such as the Thai Buddhist movement called Santi Asoka, but for reasons of space I must skip the many interesting modern Buddhist movements of Japan, such as the Soka Gakkai, that have been favorite subjects for many sociologists of religion.

There are several important religious traditions that will not be dealt with in any detail. I will not look at Jewish fundamentalism partly because this is a tradition I know much less about than the ones mentioned so far and partly because it has been well documented and explained by others. Within Catholicism, the groups that are often called fundamentalists are the ones that rejected the changes in the Mass and other reforms after the Second Vatican Council, which opened in 1962 under

Pope John XXIII. Some Catholic protest groups repudiate the authority of the church and call for a return to the true rituals. However, I will not bring Catholicism into my discussion of fundamentalism.

When I started writing this book, I intended to include fundamentalism in Sikhism because I have over the past few years done interviews with fundamentalist Sikh leaders in India and studies of Sikh fundamentalist literature. Sikhism is an interesting and underexplored tradition. Sikhs themselves have a word – *mulvad* – connoting a polity and society organized according to scriptural religious authority, and in their approach to the holy text, the Guru Granth Sahib, conservative Sikhs share the same abhorrence of modern textual interpretation and exegesis as Protestant Christian fundamentalists.⁸ Unfortunately, space did not allow the inclusion of Sikhism here.

Let me say a few words about the historical limitations, too. I see fundamentalism as religious reactions against great changes happening in the modern world, and I believe we should restrict the use of the term to movements that arose well after 1800, or probably even later, say 1850. I disagree with the view that fundamentalism has existed for centuries in some world religions, such as Christianity or Islam. It is not difficult to understand what somebody means when they say that certain premodern currents in Islam were instances of fundamentalism because these movements strongly defended the position that the Qur'an is the eternal, uncreated word of God and should be accepted unconditionally. For instance, Hanbalism, one of the four schools of law in Sunni Islam, arose in strong opposition against rationalism and against heterodox currents in ninth-century Baghdad that seemed to relativize the status of scripture and tradition.⁹

⁸ Harjot Oberoi, "Sikh Fundamentalism: Translating History into Theory," in *Fundamentalisms and the State*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 256ff.

⁹ See a useful discussion of this problem in Said Amir Arjomand, "Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism," in *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 179–98.

However, I believe that the changes that have taken place in the world since the nineteenth century are so different from previous periods, and I think the threat that modern fundamentalists are reacting against is so special, that we need a name for modern movements that clearly distinguishes them from the conservative and puritan movements of the past. The scripturalism and conservatism of the fourteenth-century Muslim theologian Ibn Taymiyya, or of the original Wahhabi movement of the eighteenth century, arose from internal processes in the Muslim world and not as the result of the enormous changes brought about by Western political and cultural dominance, modernization, and globalization, which really started making an impact only in the nineteenth century. So, although Ibn Taymiyya or the Wahhabis were sources of inspiration for fundamentalists in the twentieth century, they were not fundamentalists themselves.

RADICAL CONSERVATIVES

But is it not the case that all fundamentalists are conservative? Isn't fundamentalism just another name for conservative religion? And if that is the case, why do we need the label "fundamentalism"? These questions about the relationship between fundamentalism and conservative religion are common, and their answer may serve as a first step toward a sound concept of fundamentalism.

Political philosophers would tell us that conservatism is not an ideology but rather a general approach to political and social life. Libertarianism and socialism are real ideologies with certain doctrines and views, whereas conservatism is rather an approach to politics that emphasizes slow change rather than revolution, and praises the values and wisdom of tradition regardless of the content of that tradition. Thus, conservative religion would refer to organizations or communities that cherish and hold onto established truths and traditions. Conservative religion would

resist change on many levels: in doctrine, in ritual, and in religious values and norms guiding social life.

Many fundamentalists are conservative in their theological outlook. As we will see, American Protestant fundamentalism started as a reaction against new ways of reading the Bible and new ways of interpreting the contents of scripture. The groups that we describe as fundamentalist in Judaism are mostly conservative in their interpretation of Jewish tradition, although theology has a very different position in Judaism than in Christianity. Fundamentalists in the Sunni Muslim world are also less concerned with theology than most Christian fundamentalists. In the Sikh religion, it seems reasonable to say that fundamentalists are conservative in their interpretation of both scripture and ritual, whereas in both Hinduism and in many parts of the Buddhist world it would seem that theology is not really that relevant to the debate or the struggle between fundamentalists and others. So if we ask whether fundamentalists are theologically conservative, the answer is certainly yes for Protestant Christian fundamentalists, but the question may be less relevant for fundamentalists in many other religious traditions.

On the other hand, if we look at views about social philosophy, most fundamentalist groups seem to be decidedly conservative. Conservatives are often critical of the developments in family patterns and sexual norms that they believe characterize the modern, secularized world. They would hold that it is a religious duty to build a family and have children (unless you devote your life to religious studies inside monastic walls). They would reject homosexual partnerships as immoral, and they would see extra- or premarital sex as sinful. Similar conservative attitudes on matters of social life, family life, and sexuality would be found among all fundamentalists in all the major religions that we will look at in this book.

However, in matters of religious authority, fundamentalists are *not* conservative. On the contrary, one of the key characteristics

of fundamentalism in most religious traditions is its rejection of the religious authority associated with traditional religious hierarchies and organizations. Fundamentalists reject the priestly authority that is backed up by hierarchy and traditional education. Instead, they espouse prophetic authority earned by charisma and gifts in preaching. Although it may seem like a contradiction in terms, fundamentalists are radical and conservative. They are *radical* because they reject traditional authority, and they are *conservative* in the sense that they often want to retain traditional understanding of doctrine and rituals and in the sense that they want traditional religious values to guide social life.

I would like to stress this point already in the introduction because we will return to it several times throughout this book and it is important that the reader understand why religious authority is such a crucial issue if we want to understand fundamentalists. On this subject, much of what I have to say is inspired by the work of the great German economist and sociologist Max Weber.