

PLATO AND THE
DIVIDED SELF

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From the *Phaedo* to the *Republic*

Plato's tripartite soul and the possibility of non-philosophical virtue

IAKOVOS VASILIOU

Both the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* emphasize a great difference between philosophers and non-philosophers in terms of their respective abilities, aims, and ultimate post-mortem fates. Each dialogue also appears to refer to three hierarchically ordered kinds of virtue: (1) slavish virtue (*Phaedo* 68d–69c; *Republic* 430b)¹; (2) political or civic, habituated virtue (*Phaedo* 82a–b; *Republic* 429c–430c, 522a, 619c); and (3) genuine or philosophical virtue (*passim*). Crudely, the first type of person (or even animal) avoids or pursues an action out of fear of pain or desire for pleasure. The second acts from some sort of habituated state “without knowledge.” The third agent acts in a way possible only for those who are truly wise and have knowledge, namely, philosophers. Perhaps the most notorious difference between the *Phaedo* and *Republic* is the detailed presentation of the tripartite soul in the latter in contrast with the one-part psychology of the former. In this chapter, I shall examine what difference this makes for our understanding of the three “types” of virtue.² I argue that the positing of a tripartite soul creates the possibility for a much more extensive education and development than the one-part psychology of the *Phaedo*, which results in a more plausible and optimistic picture of a

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- 1 All references to the *Republic* are to Slings (2003); the line numbers accordingly vary slightly from Burnet's Oxford edition (1900–07).
- 2 The idea that there are different grades of virtue connected to different cognitive and desiderative states in Plato has clear descendants in the Platonist tradition; see e.g., Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2, Porphyry, *Sententia* 32, and the ancient commentaries on the *Phaedo*. I cannot pursue these connections here, but see e.g., Brittain (2002).

non-philosopher's potential for a type of virtue. At the same time, there are clues in the *Phaedo* that point to the more complex picture presented in the *Republic*.³

In examining these questions scholars have paid insufficient attention to who does and who does not count as a philosopher in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. This has led to an unwarranted collapse in the possible types of virtue, into either slavish virtue or genuine, full virtue. In the *Phaedo*'s conception of a philosopher, I shall argue that Plato opens up conceptual space for a type of virtue that falls short of genuine, complete virtue, but is nevertheless not slavish. In the *Republic*, the role for such virtue – habituated, political virtue – will be greatly enhanced by the more complex tripartite psychology, which in turn expands the possibilities for the role of education.

I Two conceptions of philosophers

In both the *Phaedo* and *Republic* what most significantly distinguishes philosophers from non-philosophers is their recognition of and concern with Forms. But while the *Phaedo* refers to philosophers in the real world, the philosophers in the *Republic* are “offstage” as it were and will emerge together with the Kallipolis in the role of rulers.⁴

The philosopher in the *Phaedo* (a “Phd-philosopher”) is described as someone who loves and seeks wisdom more than anything else, but for whom possession of wisdom awaits death. To be a Phd-philosopher includes having lived one's life trying as far as possible to “separate” the body from the soul by avoiding (or at least being indifferent towards)⁵ the body and its needs, including food, drink, clothing, money, and sex (cf. 64c–65a). Philosophy is part of a purification process that rids a person of the ill-effects of his body and, if conducted correctly, releases

3 My thesis fits neatly with the traditional consensus among scholars that the *Phaedo* precedes the *Republic*; it does not, however, require that this be the case.

4 In *Republic* VI, Socrates does discuss what happens to people with the best (i.e., philosophical) natures in the real world, as well as the reputation of people typically referred to as “philosophers.” In addition at 496a–e Socrates mentions himself, Theages, and a few others who, in the actual world, “consort worthily with philosophy” (*kat axian homilountôn philosophia(i)*, 496b1). It is striking, however, that in this passage no one (not even Socrates) is ever referred to as a “philosopher”; contrast the description of philosopher-kings, who are referred to as “those who are in truth philosophers” (*hoi hōs alēthōs philosophoi*, at e.g., 540d3–4). The *Phaedo* repeatedly refers to those who philosophize “genuinely” or “correctly” or “truly”; see e.g., 66b2, 67b4, d8, e4, 68a7, 80e6, 82c3.

5 See Woolf (2004).

his unitary, immortal soul from the cycle of reincarnation. In addition the Phd-philosopher, while alive, strives to attain wisdom and realizes that wisdom does not lie in the sensible world and the faculties that reveal it to us (namely, the senses), but in the mind (soul), which uses reason alone to contemplate entities that are timeless and unchanging, namely, the Forms (65a–66a).

Attainment of wisdom, however, eludes the philosopher while still alive:

Well now, it really has been shown us that if we're ever going to know anything purely (*katharôs*) we must be rid of it [the body] and must view the objects themselves [i.e., the Forms] with the soul by itself; it's then, apparently, that the thing we desire and whose lovers we claim to be, wisdom, will be ours – when we have died, as the argument indicates, though not while we live. Because, if we can know nothing purely in the body's company, then one of two things must be true: either knowledge is nowhere to be gained, or else it is for the dead; since then, but no sooner, will the soul be alone by itself apart from the body. And therefore while we live, it would seem that we shall be closest to knowledge in this way . . . [by separating soul from body as far as possible while alive].

(66d7–67a2, Gallop (1975) translation, slightly modified)⁶

This and similar passages claim that a Phd-philosopher will achieve wisdom only after he has died.

The *Republic* has a more optimistic view in one respect: in the Kallipolis the philosopher-rulers actually *attain* knowledge while embodied in the world. They know the Forms, including the Form of the Good and, once their education is complete (at the age of fifty), they spend most of their lives contemplating them except for the periods when they are required to run the Kallipolis (540a–b). They also educate a new generation of capable people to become philosophers and, when they die, they go to live on the Isles of the Blessed.⁷ While they may continue to contemplate the Forms there, unlike in the *Phaedo*, they do not have to wait for the afterlife to attain the wisdom they seek in the first place. Indeed, it is their attainment of wisdom while alive that uniquely qualifies them to rule.

At the same time the *Republic* is more demanding than the *Phaedo* insofar as the former insists that it is not sufficient to be a philosopher merely to love or to seek wisdom in the right way, i.e., by acknowledging that one must know Forms via reason alone; one must actually attain

6 See too 68b3–4: “since this will be his [the philosopher’s] firm belief, that nowhere else but there [in the afterlife] will he attain wisdom purely.” Cf. 65c9, 65e2, 66b.

7 Plato’s preferred resting place for philosophers; cf. *Gorgias* 526c.

it. Thus Socrates is *not* a philosopher in the *Republic's* sense, given his explicit disavowal of knowledge of the Form of the Good (505a), still less are any of his fellow interlocutors in the *Phaedo* or *Republic*. In the *Phaedo*, by contrast, Socrates, at least, manifestly *is* supposed to be an example of a philosopher and thus to be appropriately confident about his post-mortem fate.

While the *Phaedo* spends a considerable amount of time discussing the nature, activities, and outlook of the philosopher in contrast to the non-philosopher, there is little discussion about *why* or *how* one comes to adopt the attitude and outlook of a Phd-philosopher. Immediately after the Forms are introduced and the claim is made that they are accessible through thought alone and not through the senses (65c–66a), Socrates makes a speech *in oratio obliqua* (part of which was quoted above) that is presented as “what those genuinely practicing philosophy should say to one another” (66b2–3, cf. 67b3–4). This explains what a Phd-philosopher ought to believe and how he ought to act. It is clear that whether or not one is a Phd-philosopher depends on the recognition that wisdom lies in reason’s grasp of the Forms and also on the practice of avoiding the bodily passions as much as possible (cf. 82c). It is clear too that the sort of “practice (*meletê*)” he or she engages in while alive (81c4–6, 80e5–81a2) both constitutes the sort of life one leads, philosophical or the opposite, and determines a person’s corresponding post-mortem fate.

II Habituated, political virtue in the *Phaedo*

It becomes clear from the *Phaedo*, then, that one’s education, the way one is taught to live, and the activities and practices one is brought up to engage in are what make a person a Phd-philosopher or not. Although the *Phaedo*, unlike the *Republic*, does not develop this idea, the account it presents of how a person becomes a philosopher stresses the importance of education, habituation, and upbringing. During the discussion of reincarnated lives in the Affinity Argument, mention is made for the first (and only) time of “popular and political virtue.” Socrates asks of those who will be reincarnated, i.e., everyone except genuine philosophers:

aren’t the happiest even of these, who are going to the best place, the ones who have practiced popular and political virtue (*tên dêmotikên kai politikên aretên*), that which they call both temperance and justice, developed from habit and practice, without philosophy or understanding?

(82a10–b3)

Terence Irwin rightly comments that it is unclear to what extent this passage marks the distinction between political and slavish virtue that is made in the *Republic*.⁸ Christopher Bobonich argues that this “popular and political virtue” ought to be understood as a type of slavish virtue.⁹ As scholars emphasize, this “virtue” is “without philosophy or understanding (*nous*).” But, in theory at least (and, I argue, in practice in the *Republic*),¹⁰ practicing and possessing virtue “without philosophy or understanding” may have substantial ethical value. While the person with popular and political virtue may lack philosophy and understanding of what he does, he is, nevertheless, aiming at virtue. He intends to do the virtuous thing and conceives of his actions as virtuous. As we shall see below, this is in marked contrast with a person of mere “slavish virtue” and is similar to the person of full, genuine virtue (i.e., with philosophy and understanding).

What’s more, the person with popular, habituated virtue may be in two quite different situations. In one case, she may become habituated to act in certain ways called “virtuous” simply as determined by the beliefs or traditions in which she happens to be brought up, which may or may not be correct (i.e., in accord with what is truly virtuous). But another person of political virtue, while also lacking philosophy and understanding himself, may be habituated and brought up to act in ways that are *truly* virtuous because his education and habituation has been orchestrated by some person or people who are truly wise. The second scenario, which I believe is presented in the *Republic*, would make this habituated, political virtue an even more valuable state.

As a working hypothesis, then, the person of habituated virtue aims at doing the virtuous action and conceives of himself as doing what is virtuous because it is virtuous. Since he lacks philosophy and understanding, however, he is not in a position to know whether he is actually doing the virtuous action or not, since the content of his conception of virtue is based simply on the upbringing he has received and not on his own understanding. From what we might call a more “external” perspective, however, it may be the habituated person’s good fortune to have grown up

8 See Irwin (1995) 384 n. 16. Irwin believes that in the *Republic* a person can be non-slavish without knowledge, but not virtuous without knowledge. See Kamtekar (1998).

9 Bobonich (2002) 485 n. 16, takes the “popular and political virtue” of 82a11–b3 “to be a type of the slavish virtue (which is merely a façade of virtue) attributed to non-philosophers at 69b7–8.” Cf. Archer-Hind (1894) 149–55.

10 See below and Vasiliou (2008) chs 7–8.

in a Kallipolis, ruled by truly wise philosophers, so that what the person has been habituated to consider virtuous is in fact virtuous.

I shall return to the question of this “habituated virtue” again below, but we should note here that although this is the only place in the *Phaedo* where political or habituated virtue is explicitly referred to, after Socrates’ final argument for the immortality of the soul, he talks again about the importance of proper care of the soul (107c–d). Since the soul is immortal, one cannot be rid of a wicked soul by dying; the only way to escape wickedness is by making the soul “as good and wise as possible,” for the soul goes to the underworld with nothing “but its education and upbringing” (*plên tês paideias te kai trophês*, 107d3–4).¹¹ In the *Phaedo*, then, there is mention of the significance of education, habituation, and upbringing. Although the *Phaedo* discusses the types of practices philosophers and non-philosophers engage in, and the corresponding types of lives they lead, it does not, as the *Republic* does, focus on what sort of education makes a soul better or on how to realize such an educational program.

The *Phaedo* leaves open, however, the possibility that anyone could be a Phd-philosopher (though only a few people actually are) and so the possibility that anyone could possess wisdom post-mortem. The doctrine of *anamnêsis*, which is generally thought to be absent from the *Republic*, encourages such an idea. There is something quite optimistic about the doctrine of recollection as it is presented in the *Phaedo* and *Meno*. As part of the solution to “Meno’s Paradox,” it implies that it makes sense for anyone and everyone to inquire into what they do not know, for they have the knowledge inside them and have only to be reminded of it:

Inasmuch as the soul is immortal, has been born many times, and has seen all things both here and in the underworld, there is nothing that it has not learned, so that it is not amazing that it can be reminded of the things it previously knew, both about virtue and about other things. For inasmuch as the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, nothing hinders a person, having been reminded of one thing only – what people call learning – from discovering all other things himself, if he is brave and does not cease searching.

(*Meno* 81c5–d4)

11 Cf. *Gorgias* 524d4–7, where the soul stripped of the body after death carries the “marks” of the way of life it has led. A similar argument occurs at the end of the *Republic* 608d ff., where Socrates offers an argument to Glaucon for the soul’s immortality. A key idea in that argument is that even though, for most things, what is a proper and natural evil to it, destroys it (as, e.g., rust destroys iron), the soul is different, because what is bad for it, vice, doesn’t destroy the soul or make it any less a soul. So again a vicious soul cannot be destroyed or escaped except by becoming good.

This appears to be – and the argument needs it to be – a perfectly general claim about the capacities of all human beings. With some (unspecified) amount of determination, anyone is *capable* of acquiring knowledge of virtue. Although the *Meno* does not explicitly say so, the *Phaedo* makes it clear that the knowledge that resides in each person about virtue, equality, and so forth, is knowledge of Forms. In the *Phaedo* (73a–77b) recollection is used as part of an argument to show that everyone’s soul must pre-exist its bodily incarnation and that, in its prior non-bodily state, the soul has been in cognitive contact with the Forms.¹²

While the absence of recollection in the *Republic* may not necessarily signal a view that is inconsistent with the *Phaedo*, it does, I think, reflect a more pessimistic attitude about the ability of non-philosophers. In the *Republic*, it is not that only a few people *happen* to become philosophers and thus know the Forms, but that only a select few have the *natural ability* to do so. So even if, in a unitarian spirit, we believe that Plato holds the recollection theory in the *Republic*, the mere fact that all human beings have knowledge, in one sense, of the Forms inside them is not sufficient to prevent them from being hopelessly cut off from becoming knowers of the Forms by their natural abilities.¹³

I maintain, however, that the *Republic* is also more optimistic in that the citizens of the lower two classes in the Kallipolis will be more similar

12 *Phaedrus* 249b also appears to claim that anyone who is now human must have a soul that has seen the Forms. On the usual understanding of *anamnēsis*, it is involved in ordinary concept acquisition. As a person “learns” the ordinary concept, for example, of mathematical equality, so that she understands what it is for two objects to be the same length or the same weight, she is actually involved (whether she realizes it or not) in recollecting her forgotten knowledge of the Form of Equal, which is inside her soul and acquired from the time before her soul was incarnated. Scott (1995), however, argues that the act of *anamnēsis* is *not* in fact involved in ordinary concept acquisition and that *anamnēsis* is not intended to address the question of how human beings acquire concepts. Thus, unlike concept acquisition, *anamnēsis* is not an activity that most human beings ever engage in. Rather, it is restricted to those who are engaged in serious study of some philosophical, mathematical, or scientific issue. On this view, to recollect a Form involves a sort of study and investigation that goes considerably beyond the mere acquisition of concepts. But even if Scott is correct about how prevalent actual recollection is among human beings, the position is nevertheless still quite optimistic. As far as the “theory” of recollection goes, it is *still* true that all human beings *have* knowledge of the Forms inside them and could, in theory, engage in recollection, even if Scott is correct that few of them ever actually do.

13 If the *Republic* countenances recollection and *if* recollection is involved in concept acquisition, then ordinary people will partially recollect Forms. But the *Republic* will still be more pessimistic than the *Phaedo* in that ordinary people are unable to recollect Forms in a way that will count as *knowing* them; for the latter requires advanced mathematics, dialectic, and so on, which ordinary people will be incapable of doing.

to Phd-philosophers and will possess a habituated, political virtue, and will be less like ordinary people conceived of as possessing, at best, mere slavish virtue.¹⁴ I shall argue that what generates this more optimistic outlook is in part the *Republic's* account of the soul as tripartite. It will be important in the argument that follows to keep in mind the distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers who are in the Kallipolis as described in the *Republic*, on the one hand, and philosophers and non-philosophers in the ordinary world, as described in the *Phaedo*.

III Philosophical and slavish virtue in the *Phaedo*

That the *Phaedo* draws a contrast between genuine, philosophical virtue and a “slavish virtue” that is a mere illusory appearance of virtue is obvious, even if the precise description of each type is contested (68c–69d). The more controversial question is whether the “popular and political virtue” (cf. 82a11–b1) referred to above constitutes a third, distinct category or whether it is simply another way of referring to slavish virtue. This issue is significant because, as we shall see, Plato criticizes slavish virtue in harsh terms, calling it a mere “shadow-painting” of virtue.

Near the end of Socrates' defense of the claim that a person who is a philosopher should face death boldly and without fear, since philosophy is in fact a practice for dying and death (64a), he discusses the relationship between virtue and wisdom. The philosopher of the *Phaedo* looks forward to death, conceived of as the separation of the body and the soul (64c), because it is then (and only then) that he can attain the object of his desire: wisdom. Since this is the case, philosophers fear death “least of all men” (67e5–6). This conclusion is arrived at via a philosophical argument about the irrationality (*alogia*) of trying to effect a separation of soul and body as far as possible during life and then being resentful when that separation is about to come most definitively – at death. Thus anyone who is in reality a philosopher ought to welcome death (67e4–68a3). Socrates supplements this argument with a psychological one. Lovers of people are willing to die in the hope of seeing and being with the people they love. Analogously, genuine lovers of wisdom would be willing to die to attain the object of *their* desire (68a3–b6). Thus anyone who resents death must not be a true lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body (and

14 As I shall make clear below, the lower classes in the Kallipolis will not be similar to Phd-philosophers insofar as they are not striving for wisdom nor, therefore, are they striving to separate their souls from their bodies “as far as possible.”

so a lover of wealth, which enables one to provide things for the body), a lover of honor, or both.

Philosophers' lack of fear of death and indifference to (or disdain of) the pleasures and pains of the body thus make Phd-philosophers fit very well the ordinary descriptions of courageous and temperate characters (68c–d). Phd-philosophers do not know the Form of Courage, for they are mere lovers of wisdom, not possessors of it. Socrates is careful to say that Phd-philosophers most of all display “*what is called courage*” (68c5) and “*what the many name as temperance*” (68c9–10, my emphasis).¹⁵ They display these most of all because they are not aiming at avoiding death or minimizing pain, but at achieving wisdom; they are not in the business of exchanging pleasures, pains, and fears, but are, as it were, trafficking in other matters. But Socrates doesn't go so far as to say that they *are* in fact virtuous, since in the *Phaedo*, as we shall see, virtue is ultimately the purification that results from the *possession* of wisdom (which is what does the purifying). One must have wisdom to identify correctly the actions that are indeed virtuous. Otherwise, one might land in the contradiction of being, for example, temperate, but engaging in intemperate actions.

In addition Socrates claims that everyone else besides philosophers behaves irrationally because they are courageous through cowardice and temperate through intemperance (68d2–69a4). Most people act bravely because they are afraid of dying; so in order to avoid what they fear even more, they endure a lesser fear, such as fighting in battle; similarly, in order to avoid a greater pain, such as a hangover, they forego what they perceive as a smaller pleasure, such as having another drink. So ordinary people act “temperately” because, irrationally, they are ruled by pleasure (and fear of pain) and act “bravely” because they are ruled by fear, e.g., of death (68d2–69a4). In the difficult passage that follows, the way people end up exchanging pleasures for pleasures and fears for fears without wisdom turns out to be only a “shadow-painting” (*skiagraphia*) of virtue that is “fit for slaves” and “has nothing true in it” (69b6–8). The understanding of part of this account is relatively uncontroversial. People will engage in actions that are, in one sense, the same as the actions that a truly virtuous person would engage in. For example, in some situations both the ordinary person and the truly virtuous person might stand firm in battle. The reason why the ordinary person stands firm, however, is because he fears death or the pain of disgrace more than

15 Cf. *Republic* 429c–430c where slavish and habituated “political” courage are distinguished.

he fears standing firm. This is “slavish” virtue and has “nothing true in it,” however, for a very specific reason. The slavish person’s ends are avoiding pain and gaining pleasure; he is not concerned about the truth about what the virtuous action is.¹⁶ The only faculty that could know what the *truly* virtuous action is is reason. While the body (or, in the *Republic*, the appetitive part of the soul) might tell a person what she fears or desires, only the mind (soul) (or, in the *Republic*, the rational part of the soul) can say what is true about virtue, once it is assumed (as Socrates does assume, cf. 65d) that the Just itself, the Good itself, and so on, are objects of knowledge whose existence and nature are independent of our attitudes towards them.¹⁷ Ordinary people’s virtue, then, is “slavish” because they are ruled not by virtue (and wisdom’s knowledge of it) but by pleasure, pain, and fear; it has “nothing true in it” because it has to do with people’s attitudes and feelings towards pleasure and pain and not with objective truth about the nature of virtue (contained, ultimately, in the Forms); and, finally, it is a “shadow-painting” because it only accidentally resembles a truly virtuous action.

This last criticism is important. If one acts ruled by fear of death, then, if one does what is in fact the brave action, it is only an *accident* that one has done it. Since one’s ultimate aim is to avoid death (and not to do the virtuous action) it is a mere coincidence that in such and such circumstances the action that avoids death happens to be the action that is brave; *mutatis mutandis* for “temperate” actions. This criticism that their “virtue” is a mere “shadow-painting” is not, as it were, about purity of motive for its own sake, but about how one correctly identifies what the virtuous action is. Only if one aims to do the virtuous thing above all does one non-accidentally do the virtuous action; if one is aiming at something else above virtue, such as staying alive, it will be a mere

16 This is a common argument in Plato’s dialogues. If avoiding pain or gaining pleasure is the highest aim one ought to have, then it is relatively simple to determine which actions afford pleasure and avoid pain. But if the highest aim one ought to have is to do the virtuous action (or not to do the action that is contrary to virtue) and one believes that whether or not an action is virtuous is *not* simply determined by the pleasure or pain it yields, then one needs knowledge of what the nature of virtue is in order to determine which actions are the virtuous ones; knowing which action avoids pain or gains pleasure will be of no help. See Vasiliou (2008), especially chs 3, 4, and 5, for more details.

17 Of course if hedonism were true, as the final argument in the *Protagoras* (351b3–360e5) supposes, then the virtuous action would be the action that maximizes pleasure and the only question left would be how to determine *which* token action in fact does that – thus, “the art of measurement of pleasures and pains” would be the “salvation of our lives” (357a6–7).

accident if a person does what is right. Of course, in addition, one must have knowledge of what the objectively virtuous action is. We saw this issue arise above in the context of understanding habituated or political virtue. The person with habituated virtue aims at doing the right thing and conceives of what she does as virtuous, but she lacks the knowledge and understanding that would ensure that what she actually does *is* the virtuous action. Ordinary people with slavish virtue exchange pleasures and pains *without* wisdom, but in addition they are aiming at avoiding the most pain, not at identifying the independent, objectively right or virtuous action. In the *Phaedo* (and the *Republic*) the necessary wisdom consists in knowledge of the Forms. Knowing the Form of Courage, one will be able to correctly identify which token actions in fact participate in Courage and which do not. Phd-philosophers, in contrast to ordinary people, are at least striving to attain the knowledge that would enable them to know what virtue is, even if they have not yet attained it.

We should note too that this argument about the nature of “slavish virtue” ought to be something that people who conceive of virtue in the ordinary sense can understand. Anyone can see that there is something amiss in the idea that temperate behavior, conceived of as behavior that rules over pleasure and pain, is engaged in for the sake of gaining pleasure or avoiding pain. When Phd-philosophers conform to virtue as ordinarily conceived, the point is that – however far they may be from genuine virtue, which requires possession of wisdom (see below) – they are at least engaging in actions in the right way, namely by trying to figure out (by trying to acquire wisdom) what the truly temperate and brave actions are.

If the argument so far is correct it makes sense of what Socrates says true virtue is in the “right-exchange” passage:

My dear Simmias, for this may not be the correct exchange with a view to virtue, the exchanging of pleasures for pleasures and pains for pains and fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser, like coins, but rather that alone may be the correct coin – wisdom – for which one must exchange all these things; and buying and selling everything for this, or rather in the company of this¹⁸ may in reality be courage and temperance and justice and, in sum, true virtue, in the company of wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and all other such things are added or subtracted; but when everything is separated from wisdom and being changed for one

18 Gosling and Taylor (1982) 92–93, argue persuasively that “with this” (*meta toutou*) does not mean using wisdom as a means, but to conduct the exchange *wisely*. See too Rowe (1993) 149–50.

another – such virtue may be a kind of shadow-painting and in reality fit for a slave, and neither is it anything healthy nor does it contain truth, but the truth may really be that temperance and justice and courage are a kind of purification of all such things and wisdom itself may be a kind of purifying rite.

(69a6–c3)

The person with slavish virtue is aiming at pleasure or at avoiding pain or fear and not at what true virtue requires, which, furthermore, can only be known if one has wisdom.

Christopher Bobonich comments on this passage as follows:

True virtue requires that

- (i) a person aim at wisdom for its own sake, and
- (ii) wisdom govern all the person's exchanges involving other things, that is, that the person choose and act on the basis of wisdom.

All non-philosophers lack genuine virtue because they fail both conditions. They do not aim at wisdom for its own sake, and their choices are not governed by wisdom . . . *Phaedo* 69a–c shows that Plato's requirements are stronger: genuine virtue requires both being guided by wisdom and taking wisdom as an ultimate end. The pursuit and possession of wisdom is not a higher good that may or may not be possessed by virtuous people, rather it is essential to being a genuinely virtuous person.

(Bobonich (2002) 16, 18)¹⁹

For both textual and philosophical reasons I agree with Bobonich that in the *Phaedo* (and specifically here at 69a–c) genuine, full virtue requires possession of wisdom.²⁰ But I think that there is trouble for his understanding of the contrast between the “slavish virtue” of the

19 Cf. also Bobonich (2002) 20: “Genuine virtue, as we have seen, requires both aiming at and possessing wisdom.”

20 It is less clear, though I won't press the point, that 69a–c *by itself* requires that a person pursue wisdom for its own sake. I suspect that this idea comes more from Bobonich's understanding of what it is to be a Phd-philosopher. A Phd-philosopher does, in fact, devote his life to seeking wisdom as far as he is able and also recognizes that wisdom consists in knowledge of intelligible objects, the Forms, which are knowable only by the mind alone. To this end, as we have seen, he seeks to purify himself by separating the soul from the body by ignoring or counting as worthless bodily desires as far as possible while alive. And, to be fair to Bobonich, on the account in the *Phaedo* a person will *only* have the chance of attaining wisdom after death if he has *pursued* it in the right way while alive (thereby purifying his soul so that it may go dwell with the gods and, in contemplating the Forms, attain the object of its desire: wisdom).

non-philosopher and the genuine virtue of the philosopher.²¹ As I discussed above, Phd-philosophers do not *possess* wisdom, and so, if virtue requires the possession of wisdom (as Bobonich repeatedly insists), Phd-philosophers must not possess genuine virtue. Roslyn Weiss appreciates that a Phd-philosopher is one who *pursues* but does not *possess* wisdom.²² But she then concludes, incorrectly in my view, that Plato's position must be that philosophers can be virtuous even though they do not possess wisdom; all that virtue requires is *aiming* at wisdom. She points out that the philosopher is described as temperate and courageous "*in life*" (her emphasis), citing 68c–d; thus she argues that since the philosopher of the *Phaedo* is virtuous while alive, yet does not possess wisdom while alive, possession of wisdom must not be necessary for virtue.²³ But we have seen that all 68c–d says is that a Phd-philosopher will act more than anyone else in the ways *most people call* temperate and courageous; we have seen too why this would be so and that it is not the same as saying that the Phd-philosopher is fully virtuous. Weiss' position contrasts nicely with Bobonich's. He holds (as I do) that full virtue requires wisdom, but then, as we shall see, waters down the criteria for possession of wisdom so that Phd-philosophers will count as wise. The reading I defend takes the two (apparently) offending pieces of evidence in stride and accepts the conclusion that follows: (1) genuine virtue *does* require possession of wisdom; (2) Phd-philosophers do *not* possess wisdom; therefore (3) Phd-philosophers must not be genuinely or fully virtuous.

Another, to my mind unpalatable, consequence of *both* Weiss' and Bobonich's positions is that since Socrates fulfills the criteria for being a Phd-philosopher, he turns out to be fully virtuous. This strikes me as a characterization of Socrates that runs counter to all of the dialogues.²⁴ The *Phaedo* ends by saying that Socrates is the most virtuous, wisest, and most just "of those whom we then (*tote*) had had experience" (118a16),

21 This is a particularly important issue for Bobonich since he insists that in the *Phaedo* Plato denies not only that non-philosophers can be happy but also "that even the best of non-philosophers can have lives that are worth living" (2002, 22).

22 Weiss (1987) esp. 62 n. 34 and n. 39. 23 Weiss (1987) n. 39.

24 Bobonich (2002) does not discuss this implication of his position. Weiss (1987, 57 and n. 1) thinks that Socrates claims he himself is virtuous in the *Apology* because he claims to be the greatest good for Athens and is a "champion" of justice and virtue. In my view he is the greatest good for Athens because he *champions* virtue above all, but this is compatible with his not possessing virtue himself. For the importance of this distinction, see Vasiliou (2008) chs 1–2.

which nicely leaves open how far short that might be from the virtue, wisdom, and justice Socrates will possess post-mortem when he knows the Forms.

Bobonich avoids the conclusion that Phd-philosophers fall short of genuine virtue only by manipulating the criteria for possession of wisdom. He makes it clear that wisdom involves knowledge of the Forms (2002, 34 and n. 38). He maintains that:

A person who knows the Form of F:

- (A) recognizes that the Form of F is not identical with sensible things or properties,
- (B) is able to give an account of the Form of F, and
- (C) recognizes that all sensible Fs are F in virtue of participating in the Form of F.

Certainly Bobonich is right that a person who knows the Form of F meets these three criteria.²⁵ But is each of them of equal significance? (A) and (C) are things that anyone who has read certain dialogues, such as the *Phaedo*, can do.²⁶ They are also something that Phd-philosophers can do.²⁷ Criterion (B), however, seems to me quite different: (B) is *the* criterion for knowing the Form of F, as Socrates himself says at 76b5–7: “Would a man who knows be able to give an account of the things he knows or not?” ‘He must certainly (*pollê anankê*) [be able to],’ he [Simmias] said.” If one is able to give an account of the Form of F, then, given what Forms are, one will have already met (A) and (C). But no reader of the dialogues – not the most distinguished scholar on Plato – meets (B). The most we can say is that scholars have some views about *what it would be* to give an account of the Form of F. But this is quite different from *having* the account of the Form of F and it is this that is necessary for possessing knowledge of the Forms.

25 As will be clear below, Bobonich calls all three “criteria,” although they are not strictly written so as to function as such.

26 I am assuming, of course, that the “theory” of Forms is true and that the dialogues give readers good reason to accept it.

27 (A) and (C) are not sufficient for being a Phd-philosopher. In particular one must also lead a certain sort of life of “purification” and strive to achieve knowledge by devaluing or dismissing the testimony of the senses and the pleasures of the body. In a way that is important for the *Republic*, it is also significant that one can fulfill (A) and (C) *without* striving one’s utmost to achieve that wisdom (e.g., if it has been determined that you are naturally incapable of achieving it) and without adopting an indifferent or ascetic attitude towards the body and its needs.

Bobonich continues:

Since non-philosophers do not recognize Forms in addition to sensible things and properties, they fail all three criteria . . . Plato can, on the other hand, allow that philosophers, even while embodied, satisfy enough of these criteria or come close enough to satisfying them to have a genuine sort of wisdom, although this wisdom is not fully adequate or pure. They will have recognized the non-identity of Forms with sensibles, accepted the priority of non-sensible Forms with regard to understanding and explanation, and will have made some progress toward grasping an account of what they are.²⁸

Bobonich takes this amount of progress towards wisdom as “close enough” for having a “genuine sort of wisdom.” Clearly it does amount to more than an inchoate desire for wisdom, but it also amounts to much less than what is required of philosophers in the *Republic*, who completely meet all three criteria, most critically (B), in the case of the Form of the Good as well as the rest of the Forms. (A) and (C) by themselves are insufficient to count as having knowledge of the Form of F; (B) is a necessary criterion. Without needing to meet (B), any reader of the dialogues might meet (A) and (C).

In an attempt to argue that Socrates meets (B) at least to some degree, Bobonich appeals to 74b where Socrates and Simmias say that they know what the Equal itself is, and to 76b10–12 where Simmias says that after Socrates dies, he fears that no one will be able to give a “worthwhile” (*axiôs*) account of the Forms “they have been discussing.” Bobonich then says: “This does not entail that no one but Socrates (i) can give such an account of some of these Forms, or (ii) can give some sort of account of all of these Forms” (2002, 488 n. 40).²⁹ Socrates himself, however, never endorses Simmias’ flattering idea that he can give an adequate account of *any* of the Forms. It is true that Socrates and his fellows acknowledge *that*

28 Bobonich (2002) 34–35.

29 I also think that this conclusion strains the text, for the following reason. At 76b8–9 Socrates asks whether Simmias thinks that everyone can give an account “about these things which we were now discussing.” Bobonich’s reading attempts to restrict the scope of Simmias’ reply so that it does not entail that no one but Socrates can give a “worthwhile” account of “some of these Forms.” But it is clear from 75c10–d5 that “these things which we were now discussing” refers to *all* of the Forms, not just the Form of Equal: “for our argument is no more about the Equal than about the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the Just, the Pious, and, as I say, about all those things which we mark with the seal of ‘what it is’ . . . so we must have acquired knowledge of them all before we were born.” So, Simmias’ remark must mean that *no one*, once Socrates has died, will be able to give a worthy account of *any* of these.

there are Forms, grasped only by the intellect, but the crucial further claim that anyone has an adequate account of any of them is absent; it is certainly never suggested or endorsed by Socrates.³⁰ Even if one thinks that Socrates is presented as having knowledge of the Form of Equality, there is no hint that he knows the Forms of Beauty, Justice, or any other ethical property. And it is knowledge of *these* that is important for assessing a person's virtue. If mere acknowledgment of the existence of the Forms as entities that are distinct from sensibles is sufficient to count as "a genuine form of wisdom" and so to make people "close enough" to count as philosophers, it seems odd that Bobonich's account is so stark and either/or when it comes to attribution of kinds of virtue. Why is there not an enormous difference between the belief *that* there are Forms, distinct from sensibles, and so on, and the knowledge that consists of *giving an account* of those Forms? We can call the first "a sort of" genuine wisdom if we wish, but then there ought to be two different kinds of virtue to go along with these two different types of wisdom.

My hypothesis, then, is that with his conception of a Phd-philosopher as fulfilling (A) and (C), but not (B), Plato has made room for a third category of virtue between slavish and genuine, full virtue. In addition to the slavish virtue of people who fail to meet all three of Bobonich's criteria, there is the so-far unnamed virtue of Phd-philosophers who, in my view, meet (A) and (C) (as well as leading a certain kind of life) but fail to fulfill (B). (B) is fulfilled by Phd-philosophers post-mortem but by Rep-philosophers while still alive. The Phd-philosopher's virtue is not slavish because he is striving to become wise (including becoming wise about virtue) and lives a life in accordance with that (involving, among other things, welcoming death). But the Phd-philosopher's virtue also falls short of genuine virtue, since the Phd-philosopher lacks wisdom; once the Phd-Philosopher dies he will obtain the wisdom, and so obtain the virtue, that he lacked while alive.

Let's consider one final aspect of the passage from 69a6–c3. The passage makes the odd claim that wisdom is the cause of the purification, the result of which is the purified state, i.e., virtue. Christopher Rowe comments on 69c1 as follows:

30 Indeed, despite the evidence provided by the Recollection Argument, Socrates continues throughout the dialogue to regard even the *existence* of the Forms as a working hypothesis – a hypothesis that he believes, to be sure, but never one that he claims to know or to have established in a way that necessarily ought to convince someone who was skeptical about their existence. See e.g., 76e, 100b, 107b.

Previously it was said that our purification from ordinary desires and fears was a condition of our acquisition of wisdom (see especially 66c–67b); now the claim seems to be that such purification is conditional on wisdom. “Wisdom” here, however, is not the complete understanding of things which was talked about earlier (since that was said to be inaccessible to the philosopher while still alive), but simply a clear-minded appreciation of what is truly valuable (which is what will be available to the philosopher, and to him alone).³¹

Rowe raises an important puzzle here. How can wisdom be the *katharmos* (what effects the *katharsis*) in 69b8–c3, and the resulting states of virtue be the *katharsis*, since the whole idea up until then is that by purifying oneself, i.e., by separating the body and soul as far as possible in life, one might then be able to achieve wisdom in the afterlife? It seems an unsatisfactory resolution of this, however, to think that, in this pivotal passage which is concerned to distinguish true from illusory virtue, “wisdom” would suddenly no longer refer to the object of the philosopher’s desire, but only to some appreciation he has about what is valuable. Rather, we should recall that it is clear that purification is something that comes in degrees. Phd-philosophers’ actions are dictated by their aiming at wisdom and so their aiming at the truth about what ought to be done and not by calculations about bodily pleasures or pains. This is why their actions are so different from those of ordinary people and are not slavish. But what would accomplish the final “purification” of them is the possession of, not the mere seeking after, wisdom. Insofar as this only happens after death in the *Phaedo*, to that extent only after death could a person be completely virtuous.

And indeed there is something problematic and unsatisfying about this, for anyone who is a Phd-philosopher will, upon death, be completely separated from his body, which, as I shall discuss below, is the seat of all desires and fears (66c). For the disembodied mind of the post-mortem Phd-philosopher, possessed of wisdom and dwelling with the gods in eternal contemplation of the Forms, virtues like courage or temperance would presumably have no application. Certainly the post-mortem attainment of true knowledge of, for example, the Form of Temperance will have no practical effect in the sensible world or in the Isles of the Blessed. Matters are quite different, however, in the *Republic*. Rep-philosophers have knowledge of the Forms *while embodied* and thus can and will, in the Kallipolis, manifest as far as possible that knowledge in the sensible world

31 Rowe (1993) 151.

by dictating which actions and practices are in fact temperate, courageous, and so on (cf. 484c6–d3, 500d4–8, 501b1–7, 540a8–b1).

IV Training desire in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*: what a difference a tripartite soul makes

In the *Phaedo* the body is the subject of desires.³² One place this emerges clearly is during Socrates' three arguments against Simmias' suggestion that the soul may simply be an "attunement" (*harmonia*) of the body and not a distinct substance. The first of these (92e3–93a10, 94b4–95a3) sheds some light on the possibilities that the psychology of the *Phaedo* allows for a person's education.³³ In the argument Socrates appeals to the fact that the soul of a person (especially a wise soul) frequently opposes the affections of the body, "dragging it the opposite way" when the body is thirsty or hungry (94b9). The soul rules over the body, opposing it practically always, and is master in "all kinds of ways" (94c9–d2). These include punishing (*kolazousa*) it by inflicting pain, e.g., by physical training (*gumnastikê*) or medicine (*iatrikê*). In addition there are "more gentle" methods: "in some cases threatening, and in other cases admonishing, by conversing with our desires, passions, and fears as one being to some other thing" (*hôs allê ousa allô(i) pragmati*, 94d2–d6).

What follows is a quote from the *Odyssey*, notoriously repeated in Book IV of the *Republic* (441b), where Odysseus' reason rebukes his spirited desire to take immediate revenge. In the *Republic*, this anecdote is taken as evidence for positing a spirited part of the soul that is distinct from the rational part. Here in the *Phaedo* it is supposed to be an example of the soul admonishing a desire of the body. Either way, however, the passage describes conflict: Odysseus' spirited desire, whether the subject of it is a distinct part of his soul or his body, is proposing to do something wrong and so gets rebuked by either the rational part of the soul or the soul *simpliciter*. What is important for present purposes is that in the passage from the *Phaedo* the methods for handling the desires of the body involve, in the first instance, a non-discursive and painful physical training and painful medical treatment in order to get the body to conform with the

32 Some have tried to deny this, e.g., Bostock (1986) 26–27, or diminish its force, e.g., Rowe (1993) 142. But see Bobonich (2002) 28 and 486 n. 26, for an effective response.

33 Socrates provides the premises of the argument in the first passage, moves on to a distinct argument from 93a11–94b3, and then returns to conclude the argument from 94b4–95a3. For some ideas about why Plato presents the arguments in this complex structure, see Gallop (1975) 157–58, and Rowe (1993) 220.

dictates of reason (the soul). And even the “more gentle” methods, which include a conversation (*dialegomenê*) between soul and body, involve either threats (presumably threats of pain or at least the denial of pleasure) or admonishments (*nouthetousa*).³⁴ Entirely absent from this section of the text is the idea of any education or habituation of the body; instead it is physical force or the threat thereof “by one being on another thing” that makes the body conform. The body is viewed as a recalcitrant “other thing” that can only be avoided, shunned, or else admonished, mastered, and punished.

The account of education in Books II and III of the *Republic* provides an illuminating contrast. At the beginning of the account of education Socrates declares that “a person who intends to be a fine and good (*kalos kagathos*) guard of the city” must be a lover of wisdom, spirited, and quick and strong (376c4–5). A proper education and upbringing is supposed to transform someone with the proper nature into such a “fine and good” guard. It is clear that proper education is the result of proper training, which consists in engaging in the proper activities and practices (*epitêdeumata*). By practicing different sorts of activities people become whatever they are, whether cobbler, farmer, soldier, artist, or athlete (374b ff.). Having the right education consists (at this point in the *Republic* anyway³⁵) in engaging in the right activities, which is particularly important for the young insofar as they are easily impressionable and take on whatever stamp (*tupos*) is impressed upon them (377a11–b2). Activities affect both one’s body and one’s soul, and engaging in activities of a certain sort generates a person of a corresponding sort (377c1–6). What makes the activities one engages in so significant is that such conduct “settles into both habits and nature in body, speech, and thought” (395d2).³⁶

In discussing what sort of education would make the guards as excellent as possible, Socrates and Glaucon must rely on some idea of how virtue arises in individuals. In general terms the answer is by engaging in

34 Cf. *Gorgias* 478e2–4, where Socrates describes a man who gets rid of his vice (*kakia*) by “being admonished and whipped and paying the penalty” (*ho nouthetoumenos te kai epiplêttomenos kai dikên didous*). “Being admonished” is here grouped together with corporal punishment without comment.

35 The education described here will later be downgraded as bringing about merely “political” (cf. 430a–c) or “habitual” virtue (cf. 522a), and not the genuine virtue that will be the possession of philosophers alone. I shall nevertheless continue to describe this early education as inculcating virtue, since that is how Socrates himself speaks about it (e.g., 378e1–3, 386a6).

36 There is a similar story for the activities one “imitates,” though I will not discuss that here.

the right (virtuous) activities, listening to and imitating the right stories, and so forth. Over the course of Books II and III, the proper content of stories, their proper style, appropriate rhythms, and proper types of painting, weaving, and architecture are all discussed. Exposure to and engagement with excellent examples of such stories and artworks yield excellent, graceful, and well-ordered souls. Thus a version of what we might call “the habituation principle,” the idea that one becomes, for example, just (or unjust) by doing just (or unjust) actions, is an explicit part of the argument here in the *Republic*.³⁷ As Socrates emphasizes in the *Gorgias* (cf. 464a, 524d ff.), acting virtuously is so important because how we act leads either to the health or illness of one’s soul, to its excellent condition or its corruption, and the condition of one’s soul is of paramount importance.

An important contrast with the *Phaedo* becomes evident. The *Republic* is deeply concerned with how people become the sorts of people they are and plausibly explains this as resulting from a combination of nature and education. These two ideas are succinctly expressed by Socrates very early in the *Republic*, where he secures Adeimantus’ assent to the ideas that people “differ in nature” and so are naturally suited to different tasks, and that people get better at what they practice (370a6–b7). We saw that the *Phaedo* marks philosophers as those who live a certain kind of life, that is, engage in certain practices while holding certain attitudes. Absent from the *Phaedo* is any idea that people have different natures. It would seem to be up to any ordinary person to adopt the attitude of a Phd-philosopher, but, as we have seen, a Phd-philosopher does not attain wisdom. To become a Rep-philosopher, by contrast, it is not enough for a person to adopt the proper attitude or engage in the proper type of practice: One must have a certain natural ability to complete the complex educational program, which results in the attainment of wisdom. According to the *Republic*, very few people have the capacity to do this.

It is instructive to look more closely, if briefly, at what the *Republic* says about the educative effects of “musical education” (*mousikê*) and physical training (*gumnastikê*).³⁸ We saw above that in the *Phaedo* the soul masters

37 The *locus classicus* for this idea is, of course, Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1.

38 “Musical education” translates *mousikê*, which is a considerably broader idea than our “music.” It consists not only in playing music and singing but in the study of poetry, and even acting out parts in skits. To be *mousikos* is to be cultured, well-read, and refined, not to be a musician in the contemporary sense (cf. 398e1). It is one of the three traditional parts of an Athenian education, along with “physical training” (*gumnastikê*) and “letters” (*grammatikê*).

the body through physical training and medicine, along with threats and admonishments. Those educated in the Kallipolis, however, will become temperate as a result of the proper training they receive in “music” and because of this they will pursue physical training in the same way and so have no need of medicine, except when absolutely necessary (410b1–3).³⁹ Socrates then goes on to say that in fact people who establish education properly realize that *both* musical education *and* physical training are in reality “for the sake of the soul” (410c5–6). He goes on to say that physical training toughens the spirited aspect (*to thumoeides*) of the soul while musical education softens it; the proper amount of each yields courage, while too much of one or the other yields excess or defect. When properly harmonized, the soul becomes both temperate and courageous (410c8–411a1). Socrates here is already talking about parts⁴⁰ of the soul, prior to the famous division in Book IV, and about how they are molded and transformed by the education they receive. This is no longer the account of the *Phaedo*, where “one being is talking to some other thing” that has to be forcibly combated or avoided or punished. Violence and force are for recalcitrant people; those who have an “incurably bad-natured soul” are put to death in the Kallipolis (410a3–4). The more elaborate psychology expands the educative possibilities. A habituated virtue, which does not depend on a purely rational soul, is now possible.

I do not have the space to explain in detail how such a reading plays out over the rest of the *Republic*.⁴¹ In brief, just as the condition of Phd-philosophers is a matter of practice and attitude (and not natural ability), so the non-philosophers of the Kallipolis will have undergone a habituation of sorts simply by growing up in the restricted environment of the Kallipolis (and, for the guards, at least, by going through the educational program of Books II and III).⁴² In addition, all of the citizens must be persuaded that philosophers ought to rule, since the Kallipolis possesses moderation, which consists in a common belief between ruler and ruled about who should rule and be ruled (431d9–e2). Thus, parallel to the Noble Lie discussed at the end of Book III, which is told to all

39 Necessary medical treatment would be for wounds or “seasonal illnesses”; see 405c7–d1.

40 Most scholars speak of “parts” of the soul, although the word “part” (*meros*) is most often absent, the Greek saying simply “the spirited [thing].” See Jennifer Whiting, Chapter 8, for the potential significance of this.

41 For a detailed argument for the reading of the *Republic* outlined in this paragraph, see Vasiliou (2008) chs 7–8.

42 See Burnyeat (1999) and Kamtekar (2004) for some ways that musical education and growing up in the Kallipolis affect its inhabitants.

of the citizens, there must also be an argument similar to the one given to “lovers of sights and sounds” at the end of Book V, which aims to explain to all of the citizens why philosophers ought in fact to be the rulers. This argument establishes that there are Forms, distinct from sensibles, and that knowledge is not possible without knowledge of them. The philosophers’ knowledge of Forms is what qualifies them to rule and justifies their ruling. So, the ordinary citizen of the Kallipolis, like the Phd-philosopher, will understand *that* there are Forms but will also recognize that he or she does not have knowledge of the Forms, inasmuch as he or she does not possess an account of the Forms (see criterion [B] above). It is true, however, that the non-philosopher of the Kallipolis will not spend his or her life striving to attain wisdom, like the Phd-philosopher, but this is at least in part because they will have understood that they are not naturally capable of attaining it.

I have argued that the *Phaedo* provides conceptual space for a type of virtue between full, philosophical virtue and slavish virtue, despite there being little explicit discussion of a habituated, political virtue in the dialogue.⁴³ The Phd-philosopher lives a certain life and engages in certain activities with the aim of putting himself in the position to achieve wisdom finally at death. Those who participate in habituated, political virtue in the *Republic* are similar to Phd-philosophers insofar as they possess neither slavish virtue nor genuine, full virtue, and so fall in between. They are also similar in that each group, Phd-philosophers on the one hand, and possessors of political, habituated virtue on the other, has become the way it is by a certain sort of practice at engaging in particular activities. They are nevertheless importantly dissimilar insofar as the lower classes in the *Republic* are not aiming at becoming wise. In the *Republic*, there is an expansion of the idea of habituation and engagement in particular activities that yield not wisdom, but a type of virtue, viz., habituated, political virtue. The model of musical education is able to work on the lower parts of the soul and to guide their development. Assuming that the person guiding the structure and content of that education is doing it with wisdom (i.e., as a Rep-philosopher would do it), it should yield people who have been habituated in what is in fact the best way. So the model of engaging in a certain way of life from the example of the Phd-philosopher is now generalized to the populace of the Kallipolis. Since the populace relies on the knowledge of the philosopher-kings to establish their educational regimen, they are habituated into ways of acting

43 As I said above, the brief mention of it at 82a–b is not conclusive by itself.

that are genuinely virtuous. While they will not be aiming at wisdom, as Phd-philosophers were, they will be getting their malleable souls molded in accordance with virtue, as determined by their truly wise philosopher-kings.

It seems apposite to note in conclusion that there is a brief appearance in the *Phaedo* (60d8–61c1) of *mousikê*, which looms so large in the *Republic* as an educational program for effecting habituated, political virtue in the Kallipolis and, in part for this very reason, as a cultural product that must be regulated by wise rulers.⁴⁴ Very early in the dialogue, Cebes asks Socrates, on behalf of the absent Evenus, why he has begun to write poetry by converting Aesop's fables into verse. Socrates replies that he did this in an attempt to make sense of frequent dreams that he has had ordering him to make "*mousikê*" (60e3). Again and again, Socrates says, his dreams told him "to do and practice *mousikê*" and until then he had always interpreted them as encouraging him to practice philosophy, which, he says, he took to be the "greatest *mousikê*." But now in prison, in case the dreams were ordering him to practice "popular music" (*dêmôdê mousikê*), he thought he would try his hand at verse.

It is striking that Plato depicts Socrates, at the very end of his life, as wondering whether there may be some value to practicing a *mousikê* that is not philosophy. There is no question, of course, that Plato concurs that philosophy, after all, is the greatest *mousikê*. But the *Republic* claims there is important value as well in a *mousikê* that is not identical to philosophy but that would be, in the final analysis, guided by the knowledge that philosopher-rulers possess. *Mousikê* reaches down and affects the character of one's soul (now conceived of as tripartite), constituting habituated, political virtue and laying the groundwork, for those with the requisite natural ability, for the attainment of wisdom and complete virtue. Moreover, an ideal state should carefully monitor what is available for cultural consumption because of the role that culture plays in affecting the souls of its citizens. Once the soul is more than just the rational mind it may be shaped and influenced by more forces, and even by physical training. The highest aim for the rational part of the soul is still, as in the *Phaedo*, wisdom. While only the most elite will *possess* wisdom, the rest, in a way partly similar to Phd-philosophers, will recognize their own ignorance

44 And also in Aristotle, cf. *Politics* 8.5, esp. 1340a14–1340b19. Protagoras, in his "Great Speech" in the eponymous dialogue (320a8–328c2), also outlines more briefly an educational program for instilling "political virtue" that has striking similarities with the account in *Republic* II and III; but Protagoras does not use the term *mousikê*.

and thus be content to have philosophers rule. The brief reference to Socrates' search, in the eleventh hour, for the possibility of a new role for a different sort of "musical education" sounds a call answered in the *Republic* for a more thorough account of culture and education and the nature of the soul affected by them.