

Evaluating Emotions

Eva-Maria Düringer

University of Tübingen, Germany

palgrave
macmillan

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Introduction

Emotions are messy. Sometimes we have them when we do not want them, sometimes we do not have them when we want them; they can be reasonable and unreasonable; short-term and long-term; mixed up with one another or straightforward. Some people say we can identify a set of basic emotions, others say we should not attempt a theory of the emotions at all. Some say they are what makes life worth living; others say we would be better off without them altogether. Some say they are essentially bodily; others say they are essentially mental. And many say something in between.

Values, perhaps, are even messier. For whilst emotions are complex, at least it seems that we all know what we are talking about – we all know an emotion when we have one. This allows for various forms of empirical and philosophical research: we can measure physical reactions and activity in the brain during, and describe the phenomenology and attempt to formulate appropriateness conditions of emotional episodes without too much of a problem – the problems arise when trying to put the pieces of the puzzle together. In contrast to this, it is not even clear what the pieces of the puzzle are when it comes to values, leave alone how to put them together. Some say they are dispositions to elicit certain responses under certain conditions, others say they supervene on natural properties that provide practical reasons, still others say they are simply *sui generis*.

It is not my priority to clean up this mess. That is to say, I do not first and foremost seek to make a contribution to the vast literature on the nature of emotions and the nature of values – taken separately. Instead, my priority is to try and understand the relation

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between emotions and values. Of course, in order to do this I will need working concepts of both emotions and values. But my focus will be on the relation, rather than the relata. Not only do I think that it is possible to discuss the relation without having a clear-cut conception of the relata; I also hope that a good understanding of the relation will actually help us define them.

The hypothesis I will be working with is that emotions have something to do with values. I will thus not be talking about views that proclaim that they are utterly independent, as perhaps mere feeling theories of emotions would, or a Kantian position of the kind that says that values are, both epistemologically and metaphysically, a matter of practical reasoning, and emotions are, if anything, a disturbing factor when it comes to knowing about and acting in accordance with them. Why is there good reason to think that emotions have something to do with values? If we look at ordinary emotions such as anger and fear, we see that we are usually angry about slights, offenses and injustices, and afraid of dangerous situations. Being a slight, offensive and unjust, as well as being dangerous, are evaluative properties. The propositions 'about' and 'of', as in 'about slights' and 'of dangerous situations', suggest that anger and fear are intentional mental states. Somehow my anger is directed at the slight, and somehow my fear is directed at danger. *That* there is this direction of emotions at values I take for granted. The question I wish to pursue is *how* it is they are thus directed.

There are various ways in which to account for this directedness of emotions at values. One attempt has been the judgement theory of emotions, which says that emotions are evaluative judgements. Robert Solomon (1976) and Martha Nussbaum (1990) are generally credited with this view. Even though the thought that my anger consists in the judgement that someone has just offended me accounts easily for the directedness of emotions at values by putting values into the propositional content of the judgements that emotions, on this theory, are, it faces severe difficulties. One difficulty is that it seems to be unable to do justice to the felt character of emotions. When I am angry I am mad, enraged, and in any state but that of a cool and calm judgement. Perhaps judgements could be supplemented by particular feelings, so that we end up defining emotions as particular value judgements plus particular feelings. But, as Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni (2012, chapter 5) point out, such supplements

often become so sophisticated that the initial judgement, which was meant to be the main constituent of the emotion, seems superfluous. Another and perhaps more serious difficulty is that we can be in situations which we judge to be perfectly safe, but we are still afraid. For example, I may judge a balcony to be perfectly soundly built and its banisters to be unyielding, and yet fear that I might fall. If my fear consisted in the evaluative judgement 'standing on the balcony is dangerous', then this judgement would stand in contradiction to my other judgement, 'being on this balcony is perfectly safe'. I could not consistently make both judgements. However, there is nothing inconsistent in judging myself to be safe and being afraid at the same time. So it does not seem to be the case that emotions are judgements (see also Döring 2009, Deonna and Teroni 2012, chapter 5).

A perhaps more popular attempt to account for the directedness of emotions at values has been the perceptual model of emotions (e.g. Deonna 2006; Döring 2003, 2007, 2009; Johnston 2001; Prinz 2004; see also Deonna and Teroni 2012, chapter 6). This model sees emotions as similar to, if not a kind of, sensory perception. Emotions are ways of seeing the evaluative properties of objects, just as visual perceptions are ways of seeing the colour properties of objects. The perceptual model of emotion can proclaim only this epistemological relation between emotions and values, that is, that emotions are ways of perceiving values. But many, if not most, perceptual theorists seem to want to go one step further and say that emotional dispositions also partly constitute values: just as the property of being red is constituted by looking red under certain conditions, the property of being dangerous is constituted by being feared under certain conditions. The advantages of a perceptual account of emotions are great: we would understand the way in which emotions are about values; we would understand the conditions under which emotions are appropriate; we would understand how emotions can justify beliefs; and we might even, if we take emotions to be the faculty that helps us gain moral knowledge, understand how moral knowledge can be motivating.

My goal with this book is twofold. First, I want to identify various arguments that are meant to make us favour a perceptual theory of emotions and show that they either suffer from intrinsic weaknesses or lead to conclusions that we should not easily accept. Second, I want to develop a new theory of emotions, which I will call the care-based theory of emotions. This new theory, I think, explains the relation between emotions and values with ontological modesty,

phenomenological accuracy and an ability to do justice to the various properties of emotions, such as being capable of being appropriate and inappropriate, motivating in some cases and non-motivating in others, and being about value-laden situations. Morality, in my view, is not something about which we should consult our emotions.

The first four chapters of this book will discuss various arguments for a perceptual theory of emotion. The positions examined in the first two chapters, however, do not argue for a perceptual theory directly, but they nevertheless lend themselves to arguments for a perceptual theory. The first chapter is the only one that does not discuss a contemporary position, but ventures into the history of philosophy. Franz Brentano held the position that we know what is valuable by having particular emotional experiences – a higher love that is experienced as correct. Such a love is comparable to a judgement experienced as evident. And just as we know, according to Brentano, that an evident affirmative judgement is true, so we know that the object of an affirmative correct emotion is good. Thus, Brentano seems to be working with a theory of emotions that is fairly close to today's perceptual theories: positive emotions are directed at goodness, they form our epistemic access to goodness, and this epistemic access need be no more mysterious than the epistemic access to the real world that judgements afford. I want to argue in Chapter 1 that Brentano makes a mistake when he works out his analogy and that, if understood properly, his analogy yields a more mysterious, even though perhaps not less interesting, result: goodness should be understood as on a par with existence, and not with truth. How we understand existence, however, is a deeply puzzling matter, perhaps even more so than how to understand truth. The question then is, if Brentano's analogy is successful, have we gained anything in our understanding of what emotions are and how they work? I do not want to answer this question definitely, but will be satisfied with having pointed out the difficulties that the analogy gets us into.

Chapter 2 marks the transition to contemporary philosophy and deals with an indirect argument for the perceptual model of emotions. The analogy between secondary qualities and values is developed by John McDowell not in order to show that emotions are perceptual, but that values are not ontologically queer in the sense that J. L. Mackie argued that they were. But if McDowell's analogy is successful in this respect, his analogy can easily be utilised by someone who wants

to argue that just as visual perceptions perceive colour properties, emotions perceive value properties. Hence, I will take a close look at McDowell's analogy and discuss two problems that it faces: whereas it is comparatively straightforward to list the conditions under which colour perceptions are accurate, it turns out to be very difficult to list the conditions under which emotions are accurate. Recourses to means like rigidification and introducing the concept of merit are both, I will argue, problematic. Given that it thus remains doubtful whether or not the analogy can make the ontological point it was meant to make, I take it that it should be doubtful whether or not it can make the epistemological point that proponents of a perceptual theory of emotions might want it to make.

In the following two chapters I will look at two more direct arguments for the perceptual theory. Chapter 3 deals with two arguments from best explanation. Both arguments centre on so-called expressive actions, that is actions that express an emotion and that are done for no purpose. Mark Johnston claims that the difference between the first-personal intelligibility of actions expressing emotions and actions expressing urges is only explainable if we assume that emotions reveal evaluative properties to us, whereas urges don't do this. I will argue not only that Johnston's refutation of a rival projectivist explanation is not convincing, but that this rival explanation is indeed the better one. Sabine Döring claims that, in order to explain how it can be that actions expressing emotions are intentional, even though they do not pursue a goal, we need to depart from standard belief–desire explanations of actions and introduce emotions as affective perceptions. I will try to show that affective perceptions themselves lack explanatory power when it comes to expressive actions, which is why as yet no pressing argument for why we should think that emotions are best understood as (similar to) perceptions has been found.

Chapter 4 looks at a different direct argument for a perceptual theory of emotions, which I call the argument from function. It is developed by Jesse Prinz and must be understood against the background of teleosemantic theories of mental representation, where the general thought is that the content of a mental representation is determined by its function. Prinz argues that what happens in an emotional episode is that we register patterns of bodily changes whose function it is to make us aware of particular value-laden situations or,

as he calls it, core relational themes. An emotion is then the mental representation of a situation as possessing a particular value, and we come to have this representation by registering a particular pattern of bodily changes. If Prinz's theory was convincing, it would have a big advantage over other perceptual theories of emotions. It would nicely explain how two central components of emotions, that is the felt and the representational component, come together: we come to have the latter in virtue of the former. I will argue, however, that Prinz's theory is not convincing because it rests on the premise that the patterns of bodily changes we undergo in an emotion have the function to inform us of a certain value-laden state of affairs. I think that by the time we undergo the patterns of bodily changes characteristic of emotions, we already have been informed of a certain value-laden state of affairs, and that it is the function of these bodily changes to either prepare us for taking the action appropriate to the situation, or that they simply constitute the delight we take in things having gone well.

The final two chapters are devoted to developing a new, non-perceptual theory of emotions. Ultimately I will argue that negative emotions are a particular class of felt desires or felt desire satisfactions. Desires come in two kinds, either as positive desires, whose content I want to bring about and anticipate as good in some way, or negative desires, or aversions, whose content I want to prevent from coming about and anticipate as bad in some way. Negative emotions are a particular class of felt negative desires, whereas positive emotions are a particular class of felt satisfactions of positive desires. I will arrive at this picture by having analysed the concept of care in Chapter 5. I believe that caring or being concerned about something, or something's being of import, plays an important role in most perceptual theories of emotions, too. Unlike proponents of perceptual theories, I will not add this phenomenon once my theory is already established in order to explain something hitherto unexplained, but rather, I want to make it the starting point of my theory. After all, it seems that caring about something is the only necessary condition that all emotions have in common: if I didn't care about *x*, I would not fear for *x*'s safety, I would not mind if *x* was offended, I would not be happy if *x* did well. By drawing on and critically discussing Harry Frankfurt's theory of what it means to care about something, I will arrive at the definition of caring as a volitional

or desiderative necessity concerning something that is important to us. This means, ultimately, that I care about an object either if I have long-standing desires regarding its welfare and perhaps presence, cannot but want my behaviour to be guided by these desires, and would suffer from the non-fulfilment of these desires, or if I have long-standing desires regarding its welfare and perhaps presence, cannot but have these desires, and would suffer from the non-fulfilment of these desires. On the back of this understanding of care I will attempt to give an account of values as the objects of care, but take it that, even if one remains unconvinced by this attempt, my following theory of emotions still works.

I think that once we have this understanding of what it means to care about something, a theory of what emotions are, what role they play and why they feel the way they do, falls into place fairly nicely, and it is my aim in Chapter 6 to spell this out. The driving engine behind all emotions is our caring about things. When the objects we care about don't do well, we have negative desires and try to either prevent bad situations from occurring, or try to reverse them once they are occurring. When the objects we care about do well, we enjoy this. Unfortunately things are seldom as simple as they might appear at first, and I will try to do my best to address and smooth the difficulties my account faces: do not emotions on my theory have the wrong direction of fit? Does it amount to a component theory that we should try to avoid? In what way does it still make sense to say that emotions are about values, and how can we still say that emotions are subject to appropriateness conditions?

1

The Analogy between Emotions and Judgements

How are emotions related to values? In this first chapter I want to tackle this question from Franz Brentano's point of view. Like many proponents of the perceptual theory of emotions today, Brentano claims that we gain evaluative knowledge by having correct emotions. Unlike today's proponents of the perceptual theory of emotions, he accounts for this by an analogy between emotions and judgements. Perhaps, one might think, he should in this case be classed rather with those philosophers who take emotions to be value judgements, but this conclusion would be hasty, for Brentano does not think that emotions are judgments – they are *like* judgements in important respects. I think it is, however, correct to say that Brentano does not develop a perceptual theory of emotions, either. Rather, he takes both judgements and emotions to be affirming or rejecting reactions to objects that are presented to us perceptually. Furthermore, he takes it that just as correct judgements reveal what is true, correct emotions reveal what is good. Given that the latter claim is very close to central tenets of today's proponents of the perceptual theory of emotions, and given that Brentano's account of it does not seem to have received very much attention in the contemporary debate, I think it is a good starting point to our enquiry into the nature of the relation between emotions and values. The outcome of my analysis is perhaps not very satisfactory: I want to claim that Brentano's analogy should be drawn along lines that are slightly different from the lines along which he draws it. Once we draw

it properly, the result is surprising: goodness is not analogous to truth, on Brentano's picture, but to existence. I will try to give some background to how Brentano generally understands existence, but end up claiming that, rather than being elucidating, the analogy between judgements and emotions ends up being rather dark. This, however, need not speak against it. Perhaps there is something to be said for an understanding of goodness as analogous to existence, but if there is, I dare not say it.

1.1 The analogy as it appears

In his lectures *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* Brentano develops an analogy between emotions¹ and judgements. His aim in these lectures is to show that we have moral knowledge. This knowledge, Brentano argues, is conveyed to us via our emotions. The emotion that conveys knowledge of goodness, for example, is 'a higher love that is experienced as being correct' (Brentano 1969, p. 22). According to Brentano this means that emotions work in a very similar way to judgements. For judgements are correct, that is amount to knowledge, when we experience them as evident. With both emotions and judgements we can be sure that knowledge has been conveyed when we have experienced them in a certain way. And because experiencing a judgement as evident is not a problem when accounting for the correctness conditions of judgements, an experience of a higher love should not be a problem when accounting for the correctness conditions of emotions either. In the following I will outline Brentano's analogy in more detail. My focus will not be on the claim that we have moral knowledge, but rather on the more general claim that emotions can be compared to judgements. I will identify two central theses that Brentano draws from his analogy, the epistemological thesis and the ontological thesis, and try to show that the analogy does not in fact support them.

Brentano's analogy should be understood against the background of his theory of mental states (cf. Brentano 1969, p. 15 f.). Mental states, for Brentano, are by definition intentional. Mental states have contents; they are about objects. There are three classes of mental states: presentations, judgements, and emotions. Presentations are the simplest form of mental states. They are about objects, but they only present them. That is to say, they do not present them in any special

way – as existing, non-existing, good, or bad. That is the job of judgements and emotions. Judgements either affirm presented objects as existing or deny presented objects as non-existing. Emotions also affirm or deny presented objects, not as existing or non-existing, but as good or bad. As Brentano puts it, judgements and emotions both ‘involve an opposition of intentional relation’ (Brentano 1969, p. 17), by which he means the spectrum ranging from fully affirming to fully denying in both cases. Furthermore, judgements and emotions are similar in that they can be correct or incorrect. A judgement is true if a presented object is evidently affirmed or denied, and an emotion is correct if a presented object is affirmed or denied with ‘higher’ love or hatred.

Now, an emotion might be correct if the object of the emotion is affirmed or denied with ‘higher’ love or hatred, but how can we be really sure that this is the case? Brentano answers this question by once more pointing to the analogy (Brentano 1969, p. 19). How do we know when a judgement is true? Take the judgement that it is impossible that p and $\sim p$. We know that this judgement is true, because we experience it as evident. Other examples of judgements experienced as evident include introspections (like ‘I am having a sensation of the colour red right now’) and apodictic judgements (like ‘ $2 + 2 = 4$ ’). What these evident judgements have in common is not the fact that we are highly convinced of their truth. Degrees of conviction have nothing to do with whether or not we really know something. Instead, what they have in common is that they are judged with a clarity that does not allow for doubt – they are evident. A judgement that comes with this kind of clarity is true. Analogously, an emotion that is experienced in a ‘higher’ form will be correct. Brentano gives the example of our love of knowledge, which is ‘a pleasure in its highest form’ (Brentano 1969, p. 22). If we imagine, as Brentano invites us to, a species of people who hate knowledge and love falsities, we would clearly find this ‘perverse’ (ibid.). Hence, ‘higher’ emotions seem to be those that do not tolerate any opposition – just as evident judgements do not tolerate any contradiction. And just as we take evident judgements to be true, we take ‘higher’ emotions to be correct.

Still, the mere experience of clarity, or ‘higher’ love and hate, might strike one as not quite enough to establish the truth of a judgement, or the correctness of love. After all, once we have experienced a

judgement as evident, might we not still ask: but is it really true? What makes it true? But Brentano believes that these further questions are not only unanswerable, but also that it is pointless to ask them:

Now if one were to raise the...question ['Why do you really believe that?'] in connection with a judgement that is immediately evident...it would be impossible to refer to any grounds. But in this case the clarity of the judgement is such as to enable us to see that the question has no point; indeed, the question would be completely ridiculous. Everyone experiences the difference between the two classes of judgement. As in the case of every other concept, the ultimate explication consists only in a reference to this experience. (Brentano 1969, p. 20)

It is 'ridiculous' to keep asking for further proof for a judgement once we have experienced it as evident. If we experience a judgement as evident, then it is true, full stop. Similarly, if we experience an emotion in a 'higher' form, then its object is good, full stop.

I hope this short exposition of Brentano's analogy suffices to give a picture of Brentano's general idea. For what is to come, I believe it is helpful to distinguish between two theses that are at stake in Brentano's analogy: the epistemological thesis (ET), and the ontological thesis (OT):

(ET): We know that a judgement is true when we experience it as evident – similarly, we know that an object is good when we experience the emotion that affirms it in a 'higher' form

(OT): The truth of a judgement consists in the experience of the judgement as evident – similarly, the goodness of an object consists in the experience of the affirming emotion in a 'higher' form

That Brentano holds ET follows partly from the previous quotation. Brentano claims that we know that we have judged correctly when we experience the judgement as evident – every further question into whether we really know is ridiculous. Similarly, in the case of emotions we know that something is good when we experience our love of it as a 'higher' love, or our pleasure in it as 'higher' pleasure – every further question into whether we really know is equally ridiculous. Furthermore, I believe that Brentano thinks that OT holds,

because he compares goodness with truth (Brentano 1969, p. 18). And just as truth is in a way constituted by experiences of evident judgements, goodness may be claimed to be in some way constituted by experiences of ‘higher’ emotions. I will argue that neither ET nor OT is defensible because Brentano’s analogy is muddled: Brentano believes truth and goodness to be analogous while in fact they are not. In the following I will outline this muddle, try to set it right, and explain why a clear picture of the analogy supports neither ET nor OT.

1.2 The analogy as it should be

The muddle arises because Brentano often writes in a way that suggests that the analogous counterpart to ‘good’ is ‘true’. This, however, is not the case. The correct analogous counterpart to ‘good’ is ‘exists’, or ‘existing’. We know that something is good when it is affirmed by a correct emotion, and we know that something exists when it is affirmed by a correct judgement.

To see this, it might be helpful to go back to Brentano’s classification of mental states, which I briefly outlined earlier. Presentations are the simplest form of mental states: a presentation is the mere thought, or idea, of an object. Judgements are the next class: they affirm or reject presentations. That is to say, judgements affirm or reject the existence of the object presented. Brentano himself says as much:

Someone who contemplates the concept of the red or the round does not thereby form a judgement. But a judgement is formed by the person who combines them by pronouncing that *there is something round which is red*. (Brentano 1973a, p. 125, italics mine)

Merely contemplating concepts is just a form of entertaining presentations. We can entertain presentations by themselves or combine them in any possible way. But by merely combining the presentation ‘red’ with the presentation ‘round’ we have not yet made a judgement, Brentano says. We have made a judgement only when we pronounce the *existence* of something red that is also round.

In *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* Brentano then says that just as judgements affirm and reject, emotions also affirm and reject. As we have just seen in the case of judgements, affirming and rejecting has to do with the existence and non-existence of an

object, and in the case of emotions, affirming and rejecting (loving and hating) has to do with the goodness and badness of an object. When I affirm something in a judging manner, I affirm it as existing, and when I affirm something in an emotional manner, I affirm it as good. Hence, existence and goodness are analogous. Furthermore, correctness in the sphere of judgement comes with an experience of the judgement as evident. Correctness in the sphere of emotions comes with an experience of the emotion in a ‘higher’ form. Hence, the experience of a judgement as evident and the experience of an emotion in a ‘higher’ form should be analogous. Finally, if a judgement is experienced as evident, we say it is true. If an emotion is experienced in a ‘higher’ form, we say the emotion is correct. Hence, truth and correctness should be analogous. The following table shows the analogous pairs:

Table 1.1 Analogous pairs between judgements and emotions

Judgements	Emotions
True	Correct
Evident	‘Higher’
Existence	Goodness

If this interpretation is correct, then the following statements must be incorrect. In his interpretation of Brentano, Roderick Chisholm says, ‘Goodness and badness...are analogous to truth and falsity’ (Chisholm 1982, p. 73). If my interpretation of the analogy is correct, then goodness is not analogous to truth, but to existence. Truth is analogous to emotional correctness. Yet more recent interpreters of Brentano, Wilhelm Baumgartner and Lynn Pasquerella, seem to have made the same mistake as Chisholm:

Brentano was convinced that *just as* the concept of truth can be derived from evident judgements which are experienced as correct, the concepts of the good and the beautiful can be derived from emotions which are experienced as correct. (Baumgartner and Pasquerella 2004, p. 227, my italics)

Again, if I am correct, then Baumgartner and Pasquerella’s use of the expression ‘just as’ must be mistaken. The concept of truth is derived in a manner that is different to the manner in which the concept of

goodness is derived – what is similar to the way in which the concept of truth is derived is the way in which the concept of correctness is derived.

But why would Chisholm as well as Baumgartner and Pasquerella make such a mistake? The reason is, I believe, that Brentano himself often expresses himself in a misleading manner. In *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* Brentano declares: ‘We call a thing true when the affirmation relating to it is correct. We call a thing good when the love relating to it is correct’ (Brentano 1969, p. 18). Here Brentano himself compares ‘true’ with ‘good’ – but he also talks of ‘a thing’. But then he tells us in the clarifying notes that this is a rather imprecise manner of speaking:

We use the expressions ‘true’ and ‘false’ in a number of quite different ways. Taking them in their strict and proper sense, we speak of true and false *judgements*; then (modifying the meaning somewhat) we also speak of true and false *things*, as when we speak of ‘a true friend’ or ‘false gold’. It is hardly necessary to observe that when I spoke in the lecture of *things* being true or false, I was using the terms in their derivative sense and not in their strict and proper sense. In this derivative use, we may say that the true is that which is, and the false that which is not. (Brentano 1969, p. 73)

I do not think that it is a very wise idea, especially when setting up an analogy to shed light on something, to start ‘modifying the meaning’ of one of the central terms ‘somewhat’ as well as using it in its ‘strict and proper sense’. It leads to confusion and, as I will explain in the following paragraphs, a rather significant confusion in this case – the entanglement of which has important consequences for Brentano’s overall account of emotions and values.

In the following I will show where exactly Brentano’s analogy gets muddled based on his double usage of the term ‘true’. For this purpose, I will first distinguish between the two meanings of ‘true’ on the basis of the previous quotation: there is the improper use of true – that is, true as it is applied to objects, and actually means ‘exists’: ‘the true is that which is’. Then there is the proper use of true – that is, true as it applies to judgements, and means ‘correct’: ‘we speak of true and false judgements’. I will call the former (‘true’ = ‘exists’) true₁, and the latter (‘true’ = ‘correct’) true₂. What happens in *The Origin* is that Brentano switches from using true₁ to true₂

without acknowledging, and probably without realising, this switch. Let us look at the following three claims, all of which are made in *The Origin*:

- (1) 'We call a thing *true* when the affirmation relating to it is correct. We call a thing *good* when the love relating to it is correct' (Brentano 1969, p. 18)
- (2) We know that a judgement is *true* when we experience it as evident – similarly, we know that an object is *good* when we experience the emotion that affirms it in a 'higher' form (ET)
- (3) The *truth* of a judgement consists in the experience of the judgement as evident – similarly, the *goodness* of an object consists in the experience of the affirming emotion in a 'higher' form (OT)

The switch from using true_1 to using true_2 occurs between claims (1) and (2). In (1) Brentano uses 'true' in the sense of true_1 : when he talks about calling a *thing* true, he is talking about judging that an object exists. Then in (2) and (3), he claims we know that *judgements* are true when certain conditions hold, and that truth consists in experiences of *judgements* as evident. Here he uses 'true' in the sense of true_2 : it is judgements that we know to be true and certain experiences of judgements that constitute their truth. (2) and (3) thus are not supported by the disentangled version of Brentano's analogy.

What the disentangled version of Brentano's analogy would support are claims based on a consistent usage of true_1 , with the added improvement of not talking about judgements as true, but objects – that is, claims about the analogy of existing objects with good objects:

- (2)* We know that an object *exists* (true_1) when we experience the judgement that affirms it as evident – similarly, we know that an object is *good* when we experience the emotion that affirms it in a 'higher' form
- (3)* *Existence* (truth_1) is making an evident affirmative judgement – similarly, *goodness* is affirming something with 'higher' love

I think there are two ways the discussion could go from here. We could see how attractive (2)* and (3)* are – perhaps they can be cashed out in such a way as to give a helpful account of the relation between

emotions and values after all. Or we could try to defend (2) and (3), that is, the original ET and OT, in a different way – a way that is not based on the disentangled version of Brentano's analogy. I will not try the latter. Whilst I find it fairly intuitive that judging might be similar to having an emotion, and that the truth of a judgement might be similar to the correctness of an emotion, I find it far less intuitive that the truth of a judgement might be similar to the goodness of an object. It might not be a hopeless endeavour, but I do not want to start on it. What I do think might be interesting, however, is to see where Brentano's actual analogy – now that we have cleaned it up – would take us, that is, to see whether (2)* and (3)* are defensible. Even though I do not want to pursue this at length, I want to have a brief look at the outlines of such a defence. In any case, one thing must be concluded at this point, namely that the disentangled analogy between emotions and judgement does not support either ET or OT.

In order to see whether existence and goodness can be fruitfully compared, I will provide a brief sketch of Brentano's understanding of existence. Brentano believes that existence is not a predicate: 'When we say, "A exists," this sentence is not, as many people have believed and still do, a predication in which existence as predicate is combined with "A" as subject. The object affirmed is not the combination of an attribute "existence" with "A" but "A" itself' (Brentano 1973b, p. 208). In an affirmative judgement, then, we do not affirm that an object exists, but the object itself. Existence is not a predicate we attribute to the object, but it is a quality of the judgement: an affirmative judgement says of its object that it exists; a rejecting judgement says of its object that it does not exist. But what does it mean to say existence is a quality of judgement? The following quotation will help to understand what Brentano has in mind:

Brentano relies on the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions, i.e., between terms that purport to denote entities, and expressions like 'is', 'and', 'or', etc. that do not. The former specify the content of a judgement, whereas the latter are used for specifying its quality. This distinction also applies to sentences of the form 'A exists'. Here the 'exists' does not purport to denote anything – the property of existence – rather it indicates which judgement is made: A positive judgement in present tense in the case of 'A exists (now)', a negative judgement in the present tense

in the case of 'A does not exist now', a positive judgement in the past tense in the case of 'A existed', a negative apodictic judgement in the case of 'A does necessarily not exist', etc. (Brandl 2010)

Existence is a syncategorematic expression. It possesses no meaning of its own, and makes sense only in combination with other expressions that are categorematic, that is, are meaningful by themselves. Existence is in this way on a par with terms like 'and', 'or', etc. So while it does not add anything to the content of a judgement, because it has no meaning of its own, existence does indicate the quality of a judgement: it indicates whether a judgement is an affirmation or a rejection of an object. So existence has to do with whether a judge affirms or denies an object. As William Vallicella puts it, Brentano 'is denying that there is the existence of *a*, and replacing the existence of *a* with a judge's acceptance of *a*' (Vallicella 2001, p. 315). This means we cannot think of 'the existence of *A*' in a meaningful way. For 'existence' adds nothing to the meaning of '*A*'. What we can think, however, is that a judge affirms an object or denies an object. Thus, it is in these terms that we should think about existence.

I do not want to discuss Brentano's view on existence here, but see whether we can take the above picture of 'existence' and find any parallels between it and the concept of goodness. If we have to think of existence in terms of a quality of judgements, and existence and goodness are analogous, then it seems to me that we have to think of goodness in terms of a quality of emotions. For emotions are analogous to judgements, and if existence is best thought of in terms of a quality of the latter, and goodness and existence are analogous, then goodness has to be best thought of in terms of a quality of the former. But what does it mean to say that goodness is thought of as a quality of emotions? Perhaps we could understand it this way: an emotion is affirmative (love) if it evaluates its object as good; an emotion is rejecting (hate) if it evaluates its object as bad. Goodness, just as existence, is not a predicate of objects. It merely indicates whether an emotion is affirmative or rejecting.²

One thing that seems wrong here is that goodness simply does seem to be more than a quality of emotions that does not possess meaning in and of itself. The Frege–Geach objection to expressivism illustrates this nicely: when we utter the sentence 'helping other people is good', for example, then the meaning of this sentence is

not exhausted in 'helping other people'. In other words, 'is good' does seem to add to the meaning of the sentence – the term 'good' seems to be meaningful and does not need to be used in conjunction with other terms in order to make sense. This is shown by the fact that the following argument seems perfectly valid:

- (1) Helping others is good
- (2) If helping others is good, then it is good to get my little brother to help others
- (3) Hence, it is good to get my little brother to help others

But for this to be a valid argument, the premises must have truth-values. The premises can only have truth-values if we grant the term 'good' to be meaningful. This means, however, that goodness is not syncategorematic after all.

Now, the Frege–Geach objection need not mean that goodness and existence are not analogous. For, in fact, the Frege–Geach objection seems to apply to existence as well. Imagine the above arguments with statements like 'this ball exists', 'if this ball exists, then I can kick it', 'hence, I can kick this ball'. Again, this seems like a perfectly valid argument. If it is, it seems that existence must have meaning and cannot be syncategorematic. One could, then, give up the idea that either existence or goodness are syncategorematic and see if they are analogous in a different way.

I do not want to go into these options any further, however, but conclude that there may be a fruitful account of goodness to be had from an analogy to existence, but it is not clear to me how to draw it. In any case, it seems to me that Brentano, on the back of his own theory of mental states and how they work, cannot claim that goodness is analogous to truth, and that just as there is no mystery about evident judgements amounting to knowing what is true, there should be no mystery about emotions of a higher form amounting to knowing what is good. Rather, evident judgements amount to true judgements, and they in turn amount to knowing what is, and higher emotions amount to correct emotions, and they in turn amount to knowing what is good.

What Brentano's analogy makes clear, however, is the difficulty of how to determine the correctness conditions of emotions. Perhaps we could agree with Brentano that there are certain evident judgements,

that is, judgements that make every further question into their appropriateness look weird. But are there emotions that work similarly? Are there forms of love that are so clear, so 'high', whatever that means exactly, that they make every further question into their appropriateness look weird? It seems doubtful. Even Brentano's own example, that of our love of knowledge, does not straightforwardly show that the so loved object is good. Knowledge, after all, can be bad. I might be much better off not knowing that I am suffering from a severe illness, or that someone lied to me. At least, in these cases it is not clear that love is the appropriate attitude towards knowledge. The question about the appropriateness, or correctness conditions, of emotions will be with us all the way through the book. Whether or not there is such a thing as correct loving, and whether it constitutes value, is a question I hope to have answered by the last chapter.