

Narcissism and the Self

**Dynamics of Self-Preservation in Social
Interaction, Personality Structure, Subjective
Experience, and Psychopathology**

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1

Introduction

FREUD (1914) understood that the aim of narcissistic object choice is to *be* loved; the aim is to raise one's self-regard. Narcissistic object relations serve to maintain self-regard or self-esteem. Self-esteem can be defined simply as "confident conviction of being lovable" (STORR, 1968, p. 77). Narcissism, in turn, can be defined as a need – indeed an *automatic tendency* that is expressed in behaviour and cognition – to maintain self-esteem, that is, to be loved and to be *lovable*, to be approved and to be *approvable*, and to be generally accepted by and thus to feel connected to one's social surround. It is interesting to realize how much of human personality, social behaviour, social structure, and psychopathology are centred on this need to maintain self-esteem, even though the central importance of narcissism is often not immediately apparent. Narcissism, as a fundamental behavioural tendency, is often expressed in highly abstract forms; and much of the social complexity around us becomes translucent when considered in this way, as this book aims to show. 'Narcissistic' behaviour strategies unfolding in a particular social and cultural context not only aim to optimize the level of positive attention we can gather from fellow humans but also, more generally, to control *self-referential* patterns reflective of our acceptance by and safety within our social surround; and they do so on different levels of abstraction.

Healthy narcissism, that is, the set of adaptive behaviours and personality structures concerned with enhancing our acceptability and approvability in the eyes of others, is at work when we shape and define our self (and when we 'defend' our ego by repressing *unacceptable* instinctual wishes or expressing them egosyntonicly), when we defend the social position and the system of rules and norms that define our self and identity (or even the beliefs and allegiances through which we define ourselves), and when we offensively aggress those who challenge our self or the means by which we define our self. Pathological narcissism refers to an excessive reliance on external (and concrete) 'narcissistic supplies' (displays of others' love, approval, respect, recognition, or admiration directed towards ourselves), supplies that are solicited by way of inappropriate, maladaptive, and

hence ultimately self-defeating behaviours in an attempt to maintain a precarious self-esteem. Pathological narcissism covers over and defends against a 'basic anxiety' (HORNEY) or 'disintegration anxiety' (a sense of self-fragmentation) (KOHUT) and thereby steers the individual away from the abyss of 'annihilation' (FENICHEL). Pathological narcissism is a special case that illustrates the broader principle of self-preservation (need for safety), which is deeply embedded in a whole spectrum of social and psychopathological phenomena.

The self is an aggregate of self-representations, which are the various ideas a person has about himself (SCHAFER, 1967). The self is inseparable from the social environment, inseparable from others, inseparable also from one's representations of others (KERNBERG, 1982a). More particularly, the self is dependent on others' attitudes towards oneself; and it is dynamically constituted by way of influencing these attitudes, whether in an external social situation or in internal imagery (conscious fantasy). Others' attitudes that constitute the self, that provide the self with cohesion (KOHUT), are approving, respecting, accepting attitudes towards oneself; hence, the self can be said to be narcissistically cathected (HARTMANN, 1964; JACOBSON, 1964).¹ The self is not an agent but the core of a social monitoring mechanism (DANZIGER, 1997). Feedback control of social behaviour involves the perception of approving or acknowledging self-referential patterns in the social environment, patterns that are abstracted and integrated in form of a self-image or the sense of self or identity. Behaviour that regulates the sense of self with the aim of enhancing self-esteem (maintaining the narcissistic balance) is conveniently termed narcissistic. Narcissism automatically (and unconsciously) constitutes the self and thereby moves the individual from anxiety and insecurity to a feeling state of 'safety' (SANDLER), a feeling of self-worth or pride. In the absence of external approvals, the self disintegrates, especially when internal self-esteem regulating mechanisms are insufficiently developed (KOHUT). Self-experience and its regulation are explored in Chapter 6.

The need to maintain coherence of the self as a proxy for the individual's approval, recognition, or acceptance by the social surround – by way of behaviours and psychological mechanisms that can be subsumed under the

¹ In keeping with FEDERN and with FREUD's earlier work, the terms 'ego' and 'self' are treated synonymously in this book. 'Ego' should be read in most contexts as 'self', unless the term 'ego' is used specifically to denote part of the 'mental apparatus'. HARTMANN, JACOBSON, and KOHUT distinguished between the ego as a structure (part of the mental apparatus) or set of functions, on the one hand, and the self as an experiential (experience-near) entity, on the other. The self is one's image or concept of one's person. Self-representations are mental contents, contents of the ego. Self or self-representations, defined as mental contents, are narcissistically-libidinally cathected (HARTMANN, 1964; JACOBSON, 1964).

term 'narcissism' – has a precise evolutionary significance, as is argued in the book. The importance of intraspecific aggression in structuring interpersonal relations has been highlighted by ethologists (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, HASS, LORENZ, MOYNIHAN). Narcissism, it is proposed, is phylogenetically based on mutual appeasement of intraspecific aggression in group-living primates. Individuals acquire, in the course of their development, behaviours that ensure that they are accepted or recognized by others, which are behaviours that fundamentally have an appeasing function on others' aggressive potential. These culturally evolved behaviour patterns are superimposed on phylogenetically evolved appeasement gestures (Chapter 2). By behaving in accordance with cultural norms (internalized in form of the 'ego ideal') and by thus presenting the self as compliant and approvable, the individual counters the risk, deeply embedded in primate evolution, of becoming the target of the group's joint aggression (HASS) and of thus being *annihilated*. It is this risk that is signalled by social or paranoid anxiety (or 'basic anxiety' [HORNEY]); and it is to the extent that this risk has to be minimized (and related anxiety has to be reduced or prevented) that the 'ego' (in the sense of a structure) employs its defensive operations ('mechanisms of defence').

The context in which the infant is protected not only against interspecific (predatory) but also intraspecific aggression is the presence and devoted care of the mother. The mother's love and caring attention also signals that the infant is protected against the mother's own aggression. The self first emerges in the matrix of the mother's appreciating and loving relation to the infant, which is why the self-representation is bound to a representation of the good (caring) mother. Unconsciously, the self remains bound to the internalized omnipotent object or superego, which is a derivative of the primary maternal object. The superego as the counterpart of the self (and of the ego in its ideal form) is discussed in Chapter 5. As the self develops, it remains dependent on external appreciation and approval, although internalized self-esteem regulating structures (KOHUT), the superego in particular, play an increasing role in the maintenance of narcissistic balance or safety feeling (SANDLER).

Culturally, self-definition and self-actualization have become prevalent concerns (and the self has become a matter for theorizing), inasmuch as social structure has become less stable and cohesive (Chapter 9). The self acts as a defensive structure whenever the individual is exposed to an uncertain social situation or included in a fluid social structure; and, to ensure the individual's safety under these circumstances, the self has to be defined and actualized; the self has to be concerned with its own esteem or value. The self, as is argued in Chapter 9, contains (holds) the individual's culturally imposed separateness and vulnerability, in the same way that the cohesive group contains its members. In primitive groups or groups that have a high degree of cohesiveness, the safety-procuring infant-mother duality is replaced with the relationship between the group member and the group

as a whole or its leader (so that the group, too, can be regarded as a developmental derivative of the primary maternal object [SCHEIDLINGER]). The self can then be said to merge with the group or with the collective consciousness (DURKHEIM), much as the ego can fuse with the superego in states of mania or love (FREUD) (whereby in each case the state of primary narcissism would be approximated).

FREUD (1914) was aware of a fundamental connection of narcissism with self-preservation, that is, with the organism's need to avoid danger and steer away from annihilation. Narcissistic mechanisms, while maintaining or restoring self-regard or self-esteem (a developmental derivative of the blissful state of primary narcissism, the state of union with the mother [FREUD, 1914]), ensure the organism's safety. Character, according to WILHELM REICH (1928, 1929), is a 'narcissistic protection mechanism', a mechanism that protects against dangers emanating from an inherently dangerous outer world. Manoeuvres coordinated by one's character (personality) take place along one axis: they overcome or decrease anxiety or psychic pain² and restore, more or less successfully, the narcissistic equilibrium, that is, the feeling of safety (Chapter 7). Defence mechanisms, *in preserving the self* ('ego defences'), serve the same purpose, although movements from dangerousness to safety can be maladaptive and self-defeating, leading to conflicts and necessitating secondary defences. The 'principle of self-preservation', posited by self psychology as a fundamental principle of social behaviour (BRANDCHAFT, 1985), is likely to be an expression of a more fundamental tendency underpinning animal behaviour: the tendency to move from situations of danger to situations of safety. The organism's behaviour is so organized that it tends to decrease dangerousness and increase safety; and it is shaped (in the process of learning) according to whether or not it has this effect. Crucially, in humans, safety is signalled by the receipt (or *confident expectation*) of accepting, acknowledging, approving, affirming, or praising signals from others. Safety is experienced by the individual in terms of these reflections of himself in others' responses and attitudes, reflections that constitute or sustain the sense of self.

Object-relations theorists (KLEIN, BALINT, WINNICOTT, BION, FAIRBAIRN, KERNBERG) emphasized the importance of our dependence on objects, of our need for them. Object-relations theory does not explicitly address the question wherein this dependence on objects consists. Self psychology elucidates the nature of our dependence on objects and thereby brings into sharper relief many of the insights that have germinated on the fertile grounds of object-relations theory (BRANDCHAFT, 1986). Objects have different functions; they serve as targets for libidinal and aggressive impulses ('drives') and as sources of narcissistic supplies (GOODMAN, 2002). It is their role in maintaining the narcissistic balance (self-esteem), their

² Imminent danger is signalled by pain, and dangerousness is signalled by anxiety.

'selfobject' function (KOHUT), that is of greatest relevance to gaining a better understanding of personality development, psychopathology, and social processes, as this book aims to demonstrate (Chapters 4 to 9). Object-relations theorists speak of 'depressive anxiety', which relates to the infant's insight into his dependence on the maternal object (and, correspondingly, the adult's dependence on a derivative of the primary object, including the superego or omnipotent object internally). Failure to work through (resolve) the 'depressive position' in infancy – that is, an inability to save and repair internal loved objects (who, in their external incarnation, are the targets of the infant's hostility in the 'paranoid-schizoid position') – renders the individual vulnerable to psychological suffering later in life (KLEIN, 1940, 1946). Failure to securely establish good inner objects leaves the developing child with an inner insecurity that is coupled with heightened narcissistic needs vis-à-vis external objects. The critical insight is that the lack of secure internal objects, as conceptualized in object-relations theory, is equivalent to an insecure self (internal objects and self being inseparable [KERNBERG, 1982a; CASHDAN, 1988]). Individuals who lack secure internal objects and who hence have an insecure self are engaged in life-long attempts to overcome anxieties resulting from the loss of the primary object ('depressive anxieties').³

Lack of close and happy relationships confirms (perpetuates) 'fears of annihilation' from inside and fears of persecution from outside (whereby fears of persecution manifest a regression to the paranoid-schizoid position) (KLEIN, 1940). External reality under these circumstances cannot provide proof for the groundlessness of the individual's insecurities and of his worries about his 'internal world'. As KLEIN (1940) argued, insecurity constantly incites a need to observe the world of external objects. There is a deep evolutionary meaning to KLEIN's paranoid-schizoid position. The danger to which primitive humans were exposed early on in their phylogenesis was that of persecution and *annihilation* by the primal group. The need therefore arose to be constantly watchful of others' intentions and to guard against the possibility of persecution and annihilation by the group, and this had to be done by way of soliciting others' good will (especially that of the leader), that is, by drawing on their selfobject function.⁴ It is for reasons of security and self-preservation that we depend on others' approval and recognition. This dependence is particularly obvious in those with a 'neurotic personality' (HORNEY) or a 'disorder of the self' (KOHUT, WOLF), whose self-esteem is fragile (and who lack secure internal objects). Fragility of self-esteem is the

³ Defensive means of reducing the suffering of the depressive position include an excessive turning to *external* 'good objects' (those that meet narcissistic needs), which can manifest as neurosis (KLEIN, 1940).

⁴ Again, the fear of annihilation (equivalent to 'disintegration anxiety' or 'paranoid anxiety') is the opposite of the feeling of safety (SANDLER), of a secure sense of self.

origin of “the compulsive drive for worldly glory through success, power, and triumph” (HORNEY, 1950, p. 368). Compensating for ‘inferiority’ (inner insecurity, corresponding to weak self-esteem), the neurotic person strives for power and ‘superiority’ (ADLER, 1965). Even those who have securely established good internal objects and who benefit from internal self-esteem-regulating structures pursue power, prestige, and possessions for the same reason, namely narcissistic gratification (Chapter 7), although they do so less compulsively.

In self psychology, we have a convergence of object-relational theories and theories that emphasize the central role of self-esteem (or safety) and of its regulation in social behaviour, personality, and psychopathology (ADLER, HORNEY, SANDLER). Both of these branches of psychoanalytic thinking – the one that is primarily concerned with object relations and the one that places self-esteem at the heart of its theoretical investigations – have sprung from ‘classical’ psychoanalysis (which, in itself, underwent further theoretical development in the form of ego psychology [HARTMANN]) (Figure 1.1). KOHUT (1977) suggested that self psychology and traditional psychoanalysis constitute alternative theoretical frameworks that should coexist. In fact, most of the statements of classical psychoanalysis can be translated into the language of self psychology. For instance, conflict between drives, as it is understood classically, is associated with *intolerable* feelings, which refer to the social *unacceptability* of certain impulses. Impulses are intolerable or unacceptable, and hence need to be repressed or otherwise defended against, if they risk eliciting *disapproval* from others and hence causing disruption of the subject’s narcissistic balance (which is maintained by others’ approval or the confident expectation thereof). Impulses or thoughts are *egodystonic* insofar as they are subjectively intolerable *and socially unacceptable*, insofar as they are, or tend to be, disapproved by others, and insofar as they would therefore threaten the subject’s narcissistic balance. Thoughts are




Figure 1.1 Relationship between the main branches of psychoanalytic theory. SANDLER’S work, unlike that of ADLER and HORNEY, is firmly rooted in traditional psychoanalysis and unifies traditional psychoanalysis and self psychology in many ways

experienced as visible to internal objects, on whose approval the internal image of the self depends (Chapter 5), much as impulses that translate into actions or attitudes are evident to external objects. The internal image of the self, created in states of introspection and fantasy, and the world of internal objects to which it relates are two sides of the same coin, much as the 'ego' (insofar as it denotes the self) and the subject's selfobject surround are two sides of the same coin.

Rather than arranging psychoanalytic insights related to questions of narcissism, self, and the regulation of self-esteem according to theoretical schools (classical Freudian, ego psychology, self psychology, object-relations theory, etc.), the book takes a somewhat integrative approach, exploring how insights, formulated in whichever psychoanalytic framework, help us to understand the role of narcissism and self-esteem regulation in personality development, character structure, superego, self-experience, psychopathology,⁵ and sociology (Chapters 4 to 9). Much can be gained by blurring theoretical boundaries and considering within the same context the works of FREUD, FEDERN, RADO, FENICHEL, BERGLER, HARTMANN, SANDLER, KLEIN, KERNBERG, KOHUT, and many others, a lot more perhaps than by focusing on and amplifying differences. ADLER'S, HORNEY'S, SULLIVAN'S, and LACAN'S contributions to understanding character structure, superego, self, and psychopathology are discussed alongside those of classical analysts, ego psychologists, object-relations theorists, and self psychologists. All of these theoreticians were concerned with the same product of primate and cultural evolution; they all tried to disentangle innate human potentialities and their complex manifestations in culture. Despite differences in emphasis and terminology and despite the pursuit of some blind alleys (e.g., the death instinct), they all contributed to a body of knowledge within which we can discern the principles that govern the individual's development, social behaviour, and seemingly private thought. By taking an integrative approach, it will be appreciated how different schools approach and approximate the same fundamental process from different angles. What transpires through layers

⁵ The book is primarily about healthy narcissism, defined as adaptive behaviours and personality structures that serve to maintain one's connectedness to the selfobject milieu, that is, one's recognition and acceptance by the social surround (thereby maintaining one's self-esteem or narcissistic balance). It is not in the first place concerned with pathological narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder; pathological narcissism and other disorders of the self are discussed insofar as they demonstrate the malfunctioning of mechanisms evolved for maintaining one's connectedness to the group and acceptance by others. Other mental disorders are discussed insofar as concerns with the self and one's reflection in the social environment are central to their dynamics. The book does not discuss treatments and other clinical aspects (except where these matters provide an opportunity for illuminating theoretical points).

of different theories superimposed upon each other is a core dynamic model of human social behaviour and personality.⁶

The purpose of the book is to show that different psychoanalytic theories or paradigms complement each other and jointly give shape to and provide support for an evolutionarily sensible model of social behaviour and personality. The book is decidedly not an effort to critically appraise past psychoanalytic writers or contrast their theories with each other, but attempts to offer a synthesis of psychoanalytic thought that will impress the sympathetic reader as compelling once he or she adopts the position that self-esteem regulation (maintenance of the narcissistic balance) – being a proxy for regulation of interpersonal safety (self-preservation) – is of central importance for intrapsychic and behavioural phenomena in both mental health and illness. Differences between schools of thought, as stark and divisive as they can be made to appear,⁷ should not distract us from their common insight, expressed more or less explicitly and shared to a greater or lesser degree, that as humans we need to establish and maintain safety – to protect ourselves from latent but pervasive intraspecific aggression (LORENZ) – by appeasing others and making others acknowledge, approve of, or respect *ourselves* (and thus making others constitute our self). If, having read Chapters 2 and 3, dealing with affective expressions and affective states, the reader bears in mind that social behaviour and personality structure are predominantly organized according to the principle of ‘movement’ (ADLER) from insecurity or ‘basic anxiety’ (HORNEY) to safety (SANDLER), that is, from separateness (ROTHSTEIN, 1979) to self-cohesion (KOHUT) and to a sense of social inclusion and identity (ERIKSON), that is, in a neurotic context, from inferiority (associated with vulnerability and insecurity) to

⁶ The book does not offer a critical review of psychoanalytic theory and does not discuss aspects of the evolution of psychoanalytic thought, its historical context and significance, or the differences between schools of thought. Much has been written about these differences. Less perhaps has been said about the convergence of theoretical schools; yet it is likely to be at points of convergence where these schools approximate more closely the essence of what is their joint concern: the motivational structure and dynamics of social behaviour and subjective experience, in both mental health and illness. Psychoanalytic schools are not challenged in the book; they have their different areas of clinical application and different strengths with regard to interpretation of clinical material and guidance for psychotherapeutic endeavours. All the book tries to do is to show that, when looked at from a certain angle, the various theoretical schools substantially overlap and merge into a common shape. One can revert the perspective, without loss, to one that suits a particular clinical problem and treatment paradigm.

⁷ FREUD refused to pay serious attention to ADLER's work; and ego psychology and object-relations theory ignored HORNEY and SULLIVAN as well as each other. HORNEY's theories are perhaps the most underrated in the history of psychoanalysis, which has been a history to some extent of fractionism and ignorance, if not hostility, towards rival schools, the same hostility that is at work when we defend our narcissistically invested belief systems in professional, political, or other arenas.

superiority (ADLER), status, power, and possessions (HORNEY) (and the sense of security that they afford), then discussions (from different psychoanalytic or depth-psychological perspectives) of intrapsychic, interpersonal, social, and psychopathological phenomena and dynamics in subsequent chapters will hang together seamlessly.⁸

KOHUT himself felt that the task of showing how his insights can be related to the works of psychoanalytic theoreticians before him still had to be tackled. The book uncovers the extent to which KOHUT's ideas were anticipated in the works of ADLER, HORNEY, FEDERN, and of course FREUD, and also the extent to which they resonate with SANDLER's work. Looking back over the history of psychoanalytic theory from the platform erected by KOHUT, one could argue that ADLER's and HORNEY's oeuvres were closer to grasping the main unconscious current in human social behaviour and personality – and understanding it in a way that makes evolutionary sense – than was FREUD's work with his overemphasis of libido and belated recognition of aggression, although his work 'On Narcissism' (1914) remains a towering landmark in the field. By showing how themes of self-esteem and self-preservation more or less explicitly pervaded other psychoanalytic schools and were addressed in a wide range of theoretical writings, powerful support is provided for central notions of self psychology. Manifold evidence, harnessed from a wide range of theoretical approaches and paradigms, is marshalled for a model of the mind that makes evolutionary sense, that recognizes the central importance, in the phylogenesis of social behaviour and in cultural evolution, of latent fears of intraspecific aggression from the group (paranoid fears) and the overriding need for soliciting and receiving appeasing signals (expressed in culturally and phylogenetically ritualized forms) from the social surround. The need to feel safe by virtue of being recognized, accepted, approved by others is the central theme underpinning man's social behaviour, as recognized explicitly by SANDLER and KOHUT and implicitly by many others. The self, as an intrapsychic measure for safety, is the product of others' approval and recognition, whether real or fantasized; and it is constituted

⁸ In the book, psychoanalytic authorities are invoked rather than critically engaged. Their insights and formulations, when left to speak for themselves, have the power to substantiate a model of social behaviour that affords central importance to narcissistic sustenance and to mechanisms concerned with its attainment; by bringing into focus often forgotten insights and formulations, we can appreciate how the concept of narcissism illuminates a wide range of normal psychological and psychopathological phenomena. The most relevant theoretical insights are selected and placed side by side, regardless of their origin in one or another theoretical school. The selected material is arranged in a way that shows how authorities, of whatever allegiance, intuitively and often implicitly grasped the central point of crystallization in psychological, psychopathological, and social processes. Theoretical insights are not generally rephrased or knitted together; it is often the context of their placement and the sequence of their arrangement that will support arguments that are woven through the chapters.

increasingly, in normal development, by the confident expectation of approval and recognition within the specific cultural context to which the individual becomes adapted. This is a simple notion but its implications are vast and its potential for appreciating, bringing to life, and integrating a now often neglected body of psychoanalytic theories is impressive.

Can a reduction and synthesis of psychoanalytic theory advance our understanding of how human social behaviour has evolved and how it came to provide the substrate for cultural evolution? In order to understand how the balance between intraspecific aggression and phylogenetically and culturally evolved appeasement gestures, when played out among humans, can give rise to complex social and cultural as well as psychopathological phenomena, we need psychoanalysis or, more precisely, a form of psychoanalysis that places narcissism at its conceptual centre. The book aims to show how the concept of narcissism helps us to relate a range of phenomena that we consider to be specifically human to principles of sociality that were elicited by ethologists (LORENZ, HASS, EIBL-EIBESFELDT, MOYNIHAN). If we were able to deduce from the basic premise – that humans, when finding themselves in a social context, solicit and actively maintain the good will or respect of others and thereby inhibit others' intraspecific aggression – an internally consistent framework within which we can parsimoniously understand much of individual social behaviour and experience, personality structure and its development, and social processes on different levels of organization, then we could place social psychology and sociology on deterministic grounds in continuity with the natural sciences. If we were to accept that the equations that map the complexities of human social behaviour and experience on to phylogenetically more primitive group processes can only be provided by, or have to be derived from, psychoanalytic theory, then the book should be of interest to philosophers and sociologists who wish to understand human social behaviour and wider social processes deterministically as natural phenomena. In addition, psychoanalytic theory, when distilled into a philosophy of the self, can address and help to answer some of the fundamental questions debated in the behavioural and social sciences, that is, questions about the nature of selfhood, about the motivational processes at work in individual social behaviour and in collective and cultural processes, about the factors that govern our experience of the social world, and about the undercurrents that are responsible for the formation and stabilization of various psychopathological constellations and clinical syndromes.⁹

⁹ The dynamics of depression, for instance, can be shown to centre on the disruption and compensation of the narcissistic equilibrium, that is, around frustrations and circuitous attempts at satisfaction of the need for approval, recognition, and hence safety. Such formulations in the field of psychopathology will eventually allow us to make sense of the neurobiology of mental illness, to understand how the neural system that has evolved for the purpose of regulating social relatedness and individual safety can fail.

2

Affective Expressions

Instincts (innate actions), according to LORENZ (1935, 1952), are rigid and stereotypical, genetically determined and species-specific behaviour patterns. A releasing stimulus or stimulus configuration ('releasing stimulus situation') is required to elicit an innate behaviour sequence. If the naturally occurring releasing stimulus configuration remains absent, the threshold at which the releasing stimulus elicits the instinctive pattern is progressively lowered until the animal produces the innate behaviour spontaneously. The stimulus configuration that selectively activates an innate behaviour, or the 'device' that emits this stimulus configuration, is called 'releaser'. The 'releaser' evokes an instinctive behaviour sequence via activation of an 'innate releasing mechanism', that is, the perceptual correlate of the releaser. Each releaser activates a specific 'innate releasing mechanism' in the recipient and, thereby, sets off the innate behaviour sequence (LORENZ, 1935, 1952).

Fellow members of the species are the target (object) of various instinctive actions performed by the individual in social situations. Fellow members are also the *releasers* of (emit stimulation for) instinctive actions that the individual is programmed to perform in social situations. 'Social releasers' include conspicuous morphologic features and conspicuous (ritualized) behaviour patterns of fellow members of the species. Social releasers, their perceptual correlates (innate releasing mechanisms), and the responses elicited by them "constitute a sort of 'understanding' within a species" (LORENZ, 1937, p. 148). Once a social releaser, such as an individual's ritualized performance, has activated an innate releasing mechanism and evoked an innate behaviour pattern in another individual, that individual comes to act as a social releaser in its own right and elicits a matching social response in the former individual (feedback). LORENZ (1935) envisaged that, in social species, "the interlocking performances of individuals, the releaser in one animal and the released reaction in the other, make up the complex function of society" (p. 125).

The entire sociology of many animals, and particularly of birds, is based on complex systems of releasers and innate mechanisms, which guarantee consistent and biologically adequate handling of the sex partner, the young, in brief, of all the fellow members of the species.

(LORENZ, 1937, p. 141)

The entire sociology of higher animals is built up on social releasers and corresponding innate mechanisms. They should be the main building stones of all sociological research, because the thin coating of acquired behavior amounts to very little in proportion.

(LORENZ, 1939, p. 257)

'Drive', "which is a psychological concept with clinical referents such as impulses toward goal-directed behavior, persistence and plasticity", is distinguished from 'instincts', "referring to inherited, unchangeable patterns of behavior" (CURTIS, 1986, p. 50). Drive ('instinctive drive'), as an organizing principle of appetitive (goal-directed) behaviour, is correlated with experiences of wanting and striving. What the organism wants, or strives for, is what acts as a reward under certain physiological (motivational) conditions. What is the relationship between drive and instinct?¹

Drive is a property of appetitive (learned) behaviour, which moves the organism from one location to another on a multidimensional map representing contingencies of the external world, usually away from locations in which punishments are likely to be encountered to locations in which rewards of one kind or another are likely to be found. Drive is associated with emotional feeling, which represents the organism's specific autonomic preparedness and its readiness to express one or another instinctive motor pattern (hence drive can be called 'instinctive'). Emotional feeling may be regarded as an aspect of the releasing stimulus constellation for a particular instinctive motor pattern. In the context of a drive and hence of a feeling state, an external stimulus constellation ('releasing stimulus situation') triggers a suitable instinctive motor display, which, in turn, effects a change in the external world that translates into the satisfaction of a physiological

¹ WAELDER (1960) reminded his readers that FREUD'S notion 'Trieb' is often confused (due to inaccurate translation) with the concept of 'instinct'. FREUD was not concerned with 'instincts' (in the sense of inherited dispositions to unlearned behaviour patterns that are useful for the survival of the species) but with 'Triebe', that is, 'instinctual drives' (or simply 'drives'). FREUD regarded drive (or what is often wrongly translated as 'instinct') as an endogenous source of continually flowing stimulation that compels the mind to do some adaptive work (i.e., to engage in learned, goal-directed behaviour). Instinctual drive (or 'instinct' in the psychoanalytic sense) and instinct (in the ethological sense) may be linked nonetheless. WAELDER (1960) speculated that instinctual drives (as well as intelligence) "may be the *differentiation products of animal instincts*" (p. 102).




Figure 2.1 Appetitive behaviour navigates a landscape representing external contingencies with regard to the availability of rewards, while instinctive behaviour may be more directly involved in attaining a reward and thus resolving the drive state

need (reward) and hence the resolution of the drive state (Figure 2.1). Reward consumption is generally an instinctive behaviour, according to LORENZ. The likelihood of exposure to a motivationally relevant releasing stimulus constellation (i.e., the likelihood of consuming a reward and satisfying a need) is correlated with the attractiveness of the animal's location in the external landscape across which it manoeuvres by way of appetitive behaviour.

How does this model relate to narcissism? The receipt from others of signals of reassurance, acceptance, acknowledgement, approval, or tenderness acts as social reward (narcissistic nourishment). Appetitive behaviour manoeuvres the organism across a landscape consisting of social situations (abstract locations), each of which is characterized by a certain availability of or accessibility to social reward and a certain risk of exposure to social punishment (disapproval, rejection, hostility). Time and again, the organism is driven away from an anxiogenic situation (characterized by an increased risk of punishment) and towards a situation associated with an increased probability of receiving social reward. Exposure to social reward renders the present situation safe, concludes the train of appetitive behaviour that has moved the organism to that situation, and acts as reinforcement for this train of behaviour. Furthermore, in the context of any particular social situation, others act as releasers for our own instinctively submissive gestures, care-seeking expressions (derivatives of separation cries), assertive and exhibitionistic displays, or caring gestures. Our own feeling state codetermines the readiness with which we engage in these innate patterns of behaviour vis-à-vis others.

In safe situations, as judged by contextual cues and reflected in our feeling state, social releasers induce within us affectionate and playful expressions. If these are consistently not reciprocated by others, the attractiveness of the type of social situation in which affective exchange takes place is weakened.

Social punishment (rejection, disapproval, or disrespect) renders a situation aversive and may switch us into an affective (drive) state that entails an unpleasurable emotional tone (anxiety, pain, or anger), heightened defensive preparedness, and a disposition to display care-seeking, submissive, or offensively aggressive motor patterns vis-à-vis further social stimuli. Aversiveness needs to be overcome by appetitive retreat to safety. Appetitive aspects of submissive (compliant) and care-seeking (attention-seeking) behaviours are implemented, so as to move the individual to a safe situation. Thus, social behaviour is organized on two levels: it is appetitive behaviour, driven from anxiety to safety, that sets the framework within which affective exchange takes place; and it is affective exchange that, acting as reward or punishment, reshapes the navigable social landscape.

For Kohut there is clearly an innate, drive-like, peremptory, requirement for experiences with objects, more specifically selfobjects, for responses from human caretakers who guide psychological development; and it is the adequacy or inadequacy of these self-selfobject experiences that crucially organize and shape the infant, the child, and the adult in health and disease.

(P. TOLPIN, 1986, p. 102)

2.1 Aggression

The 'instinct of combat', as described by McDougall (1924), is "evoked by the behavior of any other creature that tends to thwart or obstruct him in the pursuit of any natural goal, that is, in the working out of any instinctive train of behavior" (p. 140) (i.e., appetitive pursuit of a goal). Combative behaviour (expression of the 'instinct of combat') is accompanied by an emotional excitement of anger, rage, or fury (representing degrees of intensity of this emotion). The instinct of combat operates in two successive phases: the phase of threatening and the phase of attack. The most widely used behavioural expressions of the threatening phase are "sounds produced by the voice or other means" (McDougall, 1924, p. 141). Strictly speaking, aggression has a drive component in the form of anger; and it is within this drive state that instinctive motor patterns associated with aggression readily find their expression. McDougall (1924) also discerned 'instincts' of self-assertion and submission, which he thought are crucial for the maintenance of social order, arguing that combat, fear, and punishment alone would be "wasteful of energy" and "little conducive to harmonious social existence" (p. 158).

Freud (1930) gave credit to the "fundamental hostility of human beings to one another" (p. 49); he appreciated that "the tendency to aggression is an original, autonomous disposition in man" (p. 58) and acknowledged that he could "no longer understand how we could have ignored the ubiquity

of non-erotic aggression and destruction and failed to accord it its due place in the interpretation of life" (pp. 56–7). Human beings are endowed with instinctive aggression,² which, like any other instinctive mechanism, "waits for some provocation"; or it "manifests itself spontaneously", if, under favourable circumstances, "the psychical counter-forces that would otherwise inhibit it have ceased to operate" (FREUD, 1930, p. 48). Then, "cruel aggression" can reveal "man as a savage beast that has no thought of sparing its own kind" (p. 48). When aggression is restricted by external circumstances and controlled by "psychical counter-forces", it "puts itself at the service of a different aim, which could be attained by milder means" (p. 48). If man's aggression finds no acceptable external aim, and if it is prevented by circumstances from expressing itself spontaneously, then "this outward-directed aggression would be bound to increase the degree of self-destruction" (FREUD, 1930, p. 56).

2.1.1 Phylogenetic ritualization

Interspecific (predatory and defensive) aggression (behaviour aimed at killing prey or protecting against predation) is the evolutionary precursor of *intraspecific* aggression (offensive aggression or hostility), which serves to control competition between conspecifics for resources. Interspecific aggression is dangerous, whereas intraspecific aggression, given its role in controlling competition, has to be safe; it has to be controlled in its turn (LORENZ, 1963; MOYNIHAN, 1998). Under selection pressures that favoured "the development of precautionary measures" (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 96), "the weapons and behaviour patterns for killing a prey or for defence against predators" were curtailed in their effectiveness, for they "are far too powerful, cruel and effective for rival fighting" (LORENZ, 1973, p. 211). This curtailment is attributed to phylogenetic ritualization. Hostile (offensive) performances are aggressive behaviour patterns that have become 'ritualized' in the course of evolution (LORENZ, 1963; MOYNIHAN, 1998).

'Unritualized' behaviour refers to sequences of postures and movements that are employed in the course of purposeful activities, such as feeding or hunting (interspecific aggression). 'Ritualized' performances ('displays') are behaviour patterns that are derived from unritualized forms of behaviour and that are specialized to convey information (serving the purpose of intraspecific communication) (MOYNIHAN, 1998). Ritualized displays of antagonistic behaviour "evolved from intention movements and ambivalent behaviour patterns derived from instinctive conflicts" (LORENZ, 1973, pp. 211–12). Unritualized patterns of advance or retreat performed in hostile contexts became, in the course of evolution, ritualized *movements of intent* (displays), the performance of which came to serve only the purpose of communication. In mammals, hostile performances are traceable to intention

² Here the term 'instinctive' refers to affective displays in LORENZ'S sense.

movements of attack, defence, and withdrawal (and much less to ‘displacement patterns’, as is the case in birds) (MOYNIHAN, 1998).

Communication is based on innate ‘expressive movements’ (phylogenetically ritualized patterns) as well as coevolved innate recognition mechanisms (HASS, 1968). Humans have an innate capacity to recognize “the most fundamental and important facial movements” (p. 119). The raising or lowering of the corners of the mouth, for instance, is an innate movement that acts “as an indication of mood” (p. 117), an indication that, owing to innate perceptual schemas, is understood by conspecifics. HASS (1968), too, recognized that many ritualized behaviour patterns with a communicative function are based on ‘movements of intent’ (“which convey an appetency toward specific modes of behavior” [p. 112]). Our ancestors defended themselves by biting. Teeth grinding is a “movement of intent which conveys a readiness to bite”; it is a phylogenetically ritualized “forewarning of the intention to bite” (p. 112). Acting as a signal, teeth grinding “may alone be sufficient to intimidate an opponent and provoke a withdrawal” (p. 112). For the communicative effect to occur, a ‘receptive mechanism’ (innate recognition mechanism) had to have evolved, which, at the sight of teeth grinding, prompts the appropriate behavioural response in the opponent. Our ancestors also possessed well-developed canines, and, in humans, the lowering of the corners of the mouth, originally to reveal these canines, is still part of the expressive movement of anger evolved from teeth grinding (HASS, 1968).

Baboons, which are equipped with particularly long upper canines, pull their lower lips down at the far corners when threatening, so that the canines are exposed to their full extent. We do just the same, although we do not possess long upper canines. Thus the motor pattern has outlived the reduction in size of the organ that was originally displayed.

(EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 19)

2.1.2 Disdain and disgust

Distrust, “as we call interest which is overlaid with fear”, is communicated by subtle ritualized movements of head, body, and eyes that have evolved from “movements of intent denoting a readiness to turn away and flee” and a concurrent narrowing of the eyes (in order to protect the eyes) (HASS, 1968, p. 113). HASS (1968) established, in correspondence with DARWIN’S views, that “a raising and half-turning of the head, a narrowing of the eyes, and a simultaneous expulsion of air through the nose” – reflecting a combination of “turning away from someone”, rejecting his smell, and “the wish to impress”, or assume a dominant position towards, him – became ritualized into a special signal conveying disdain (HASS, 1968, p. 114). Contempt, in MCDUGALL’S system, is a compound conative attitude, representing a fusion of conative attitudes of self-assertion (positive self-feeling)

and disgust. Disgust is a feeling of aversion; it is related to nausea (ADLER, 1927, p. 217). Disgust – “an archaic physiological defense syndrome which is automatically produced as soon as something repulsive reaches the digestive tract” – has evolved into “an expression of negation in general” (and “a defence against certain sexual, especially oral and anal, drives”) (FENICHEL, 1946, p. 139). Disgust contains an impulse of rejection. Grimaces that accompany disgust “signify contempt for everything and everyone, and an attempt to solve a problem by gesture of rejection” (ADLER, 1927, p. 217). Others’ expressions of contempt or disgust towards ourselves are powerful aversive stimuli that reveal our deepest anxiety, that related to the threat of annihilation.

2.1.3 Control of resources

Offensive (intraspecific) aggression serves the purpose of establishing a ranking position or defining a territory. Territorial aggression spaces out members of a species in order to optimize the utilization of resources (LORENZ, 1963). Situations that elicit offensive aggression in rats and other animals typically involve *dominance claims* or *resource disputes* (BLANCHARD & BLANCHARD, 1989). These situational elicitors are linked, in that dominance status influences access to resources. In these situations, “a challenge from a conspecific” serves “as an immediate elicitor of offence ... regardless of the resource/dominance focus of any actual dispute” (p. 102).³ Resource disputes (including disputes over property) and disputes over ‘rights’ are sources of offensive (angry) aggression in humans. Violations by others of “one’s own personal views of ‘how things should be’” are another, and possibly related, source of anger and angry (intraspecific) aggression in humans (BLANCHARD & BLANCHARD, 1989).

Implicit challenges (to one’s status, rights, or access to resources) may be reciprocated by explicit challenges and insults, which, in themselves, elicit angry (offensive) aggression. Explicit challenges and insults, expressed verbally and through gesture, prompt opponents to display their agonistic capabilities.⁴ Disputes are usually limited to the exchange of verbal threats and the display of fighting abilities, given that actual attack behaviour tends to be “inhibited by fear of the physical or social consequences of the attack” (p. 113). Fear predicated on an assessment of the opponent’s fighting ability restrains offensive aggression, much as anticipation of social punishment inhibits aggression. Through offensive aggression, one aims “to gain access

³ Even in the absence of resource/dominance disputes, “some highly aggressive animals seek out opponents to attack” (BLANCHARD & BLANCHARD, 1989, p. 103), consistent with the instinctive nature of offensive aggression (in LORENZ’s sense).

⁴ Unlike other states of emotional arousal, anger is usually accompanied by vocalizations (BLANCHARD & BLANCHARD, 1989). In other words, the drive-related, affective state of anger predisposes to the release of innate (instinctive) vocal patterns (displays).

to, control of, or possession of, the disputed property” or “to assert one’s right vis-à-vis the other” (p. 111). If the aim is achieved, offensive aggression is reinforced and becomes a more likely response to similar situations (BLANCHARD & BLANCHARD, 1989).⁵

STORR (1968) had “no doubt that man, too, is a territorial animal” (p. 33). Hence, man “possesses a great deal of innate hostility towards his neighbour” (p. 36), be it in the form of a neighbouring tribe or clan or another nation. Both territoriality and ranking order define our identity (and ultimately self-esteem). STORR (1968) thought that “there exists within us an aggressive component which serves to define the territorial boundaries of each individual personality” (p. 77), that is, the boundaries of our identity and self. Insofar as self-esteem, the sense of being accepted by or acceptable to others, is evolutionarily related to holding an eminent or stable position in the group’s ranking system, an injury to self-esteem will evoke within us a reaction of offensive or ‘territorial’ aggression, much as infringements upon our territory or rights (which define an abstract territory we occupy in society) can have this effect. Mental pain, having been inflicted by another’s disrespectful or subordinating action, activates offensive aggression, which evolutionarily has the objective of inducing submission in whoever poses the challenge. Successful induction of submission in the challenger not only reaffirms our social position (and makes further challenges unlikely) but also allows us to receive *appeasing signals* from the challenger, signals that are evolutionarily related to approving and praising signals, the very signals that we are likely to receive when we occupy a state of ‘safety’ (SANDLER), as opposed to anxiety.

2.1.4 Enforcement of compliance and normality

Offensive (intraspecific) aggression is inhibited in most situations. The expression of animosity is inhibited by “consideration of the circumstances as they are in a given situation” (HORNEY, 1937, p. 67). Circumstances show the individual “what he can and what he cannot do toward an enemy or alleged enemy” (p. 67). Behavioural inhibition is linked to anxiety, which in itself roots in an assessment of the situation. Anxiety is “the promoting factor behind inhibitions” (HORNEY, 1937, p. 59). Our compliance, motivated in part by anxiety, is a powerful inhibitor of intraspecific aggression in fellow humans. Our compliance helps to create the situational context within which others’ aggression is inhibited. We can become quite readily the target of others’ expressions of distrust and contempt, unless we inhibit these reactions through our compliance and normality (LAING, 1960).

With respect to ‘normality’, people may feel “some distaste or even hostility” for individuals who are handicapped or unattractive (BERKOWITZ,

⁵ This refers to the appetitive dimension of offensive aggression, the one that involves angry feeling and drive.

1989, p. 51). These “unfortunate individuals are basically aversive stimuli for others” (p. 51). There is evidence to suggest that an unattractive or handicapped individual is more likely “to draw aggressive reactions from those who are disposed to be aggressive for some reason and do not restrain themselves” (BERKOWITZ, 1989, pp. 52–3). Laughter is evolutionarily a form of joint aggression (HASS, 1968; EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Some children grow up in constant fear of appearing ridiculous and “being laughed at” (ADLER, 1927, p. 68). Ridicule “leaves a permanent mark on the psyche of children which resurfaces in the habits and actions of their adult lives” (ADLER, 1927, p. 68).

Many, perhaps most, disorders of social conduct, whether this conduct be innate or the product of cultural norms, induce in normal men strong feelings of aversion and rejection.

(LORENZ, 1973, pp. 243–4)

What we are afraid of is becoming the target of the group’s joint aggression, as it unconsciously carries with it the threat of our annihilation or elimination (‘expulsion reaction’ [HASS]). Instinctive aggression discharged jointly against outsiders and those who are unable to conform would have served an adaptive purpose in the evolution of primates as well as in early cultural evolution. Nonconformity was selected against, as was the inability to inhibit anger and aggression in accordance with social restraints and standards that pertain to a particular situation. MONEY-KYRLE (1961) spoke of “the elimination since the dawn of civilisation of those whose undisciplined aggression rendered them least adapted to it”, which “may have reinstated innate inhibitions, or developed in us an innate disposition to acquire them” (p. 41).

‘Knowing’ when to inhibit aggression against others and how to avoid becoming a target for others’ aggression is essential to the maintenance of social complexity; and it draws particularly heavily on higher cognitive functions. Complex assessments have to be made automatically, as illustrated by macaques. Macaque infants – when maternal protection disappears between the sixth and seventh month of their life – come to be punished more severely by others (reviewed in MACHADO & BACHEVALIER, 2003). Infants learn to judge aggressive signals from others. Around the same time, infants themselves start to show more aggression to control the behaviour of others. Between the sixth and eighth months, infants also start to initiate more grooming with others, especially with peers. In the first year of life, interactions with other individuals thus become increasingly more complex, and macaque infants have to learn that each individual has a “unique set of intentions determined by the combination of kinship, dominance, gender, environmental conditions and the current social context”. As MACHADO and BACHEVALIER (2003) pointed out, “macaques must learn to accurately assess

the emotional state and intentions of others and choose the most appropriate behavioural reactions for that situation”.

During the second year of their lives, macaques acquire their dominance rank in the troop (reviewed in MACHADO & BACHEVALIER, 2003). Punishment, or ‘retaliatory aggression’, is used to *discipline* offspring and maintain dominance relationships (MOYNIHAN, 1998). While an individual’s offensive aggression (in the form of punishment or retaliatory aggression) induces conformity in others, others’ nonconformity releases the individual’s aggressive potential. Punishment provides “a convenient outlet ... for the residual aggressive tendencies that may be supposed to lurk underneath the placid surfaces of even the most friendly associations” (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 54).

The shrine of normality at which all of us devoutly worship must on no account be examined into. ... The least infringement upon it calls forth a reflex defence-reaction in individual and community.

(BURROW, 1949, p. 50)

We help to enforce social and cultural norms by displaying anger (offensive aggression) and ‘punishing’ those who deviate from these norms. Normality, as recognized by BURROW (1949), “is the measure by which we judge all behaviour and indict as subversive or pathological whatever behaviour deviates from this popularly cherished ‘norm’” (p. 50). Others’ socially deviant behaviour automatically induces anger within ourselves and disposes us to display offensively aggressive signals towards them. We show “automatic defence-reactions in support of the accustomed habits and mores characteristic of the normal level of adaptation” (BURROW, 1949, p. 51).

To reemphasize, offensive aggression evolutionarily has the objective of inducing submission in an opponent (unless aggression turns into hatred and vindictiveness, as can be seen in neurosis [HORNEY]). In animals, offensive aggression stabilizes dominance hierarchies (much as its forerunner, territorial aggression, stabilizes the distribution of the species across its habitat). In humans, others’ submission is signalled by their reaffirmation of shared social norms, which entails an affirmation of our own position in society (and hence affirmation of our identity and restoration of our self-esteem). Others’ expressions of ‘respect’ or conformity have an appeasing function, in that they remove the trigger for our anger and aggression (Figure 2.2).

2.1.5 Neutralization

When maintaining and defending one’s ‘self’ (an abstract territory demarcating one’s access to narcissistic resources), one can aggressively restore others’ respect for oneself or work to obtain it by seemingly nonaggressive means. ‘Neutralization’ (sublimation) refers to “a change in the mode of energy,




Figure 2.2 Appetitive behaviour, which is accompanied by emotional feelings, may be a derivative of the arousal component of instinctive reactions. Social circumstances may effect a delay in the enactment of instinctive displays, allowing for the recruitment of appetitive (goal-directed) behaviour. Recruitment of an emotional appetitive behaviour mode may also be due to a persistence of provoking circumstances

away from instinctual and toward a noninstinctual mode” (HARTMANN, 1964, p. 223); neutralization concerns the “deinstinctualization of both aggression and libido” (p. 227). Instinctual drives are deflected “from instinctual aims to aims which are socially or culturally more acceptable or valued” (HARTMANN, 1964, p. 217). Indeed, activities fed by neutralized instinctual energy often aim to elicit *acceptance* and valuation of the self by the social surround. Social acceptance and approval is what the self or ego is concerned with.

Attraction of narcissistic supplies (and regulation of narcissistic homeostasis on more abstract levels) would count among what HARTMANN called ‘ego aims’ (ego functions). Energies that “the ego uses for its specific functions are as a rule not instinctual”, they are ‘desexualized’ and ‘deaggressivized’ (p. 226). Ego aims are usually “fed by neutralized energy”, although they “may, under certain conditions, also be cathected with instinctual energy”, especially when “ego aims lie in the direction of id tendencies” (p. 230). By way of neutralization, “the ego allows a certain amount of discharge of the original tendencies, provided that their mode (and, often, their aims) have been modified” (HARTMANN, 1964, p. 231). For example, aggression can be woven into healthy assertiveness that is used to control selfobjects, that is applied, in other words, to an ego aim and used for the benefit of the ego (*self-assertion*). Thus, “the ego accepts some instinctual tendencies and helps them toward gratification”, while, at the same time, substituting “ego aims for the aims of the id” (HARTMANN, 1964, pp. 229–30).

Ego functions (corresponding to psychic structures) provide aggressive and other instincts (instinctual *drives*, to be precise) with “specific modes of expression” (HARTMANN, 1964, p. 87). Defence mechanisms (‘ego defences’), for example, are ego functions that have at their disposal “a neutralized form of aggressive energy” (p. 87). Some defence mechanisms retain “an element (fight) that allows of their description as being mostly fed by one mode

of aggressive energy” (p. 232). Furthermore, the establishment and maintenance of object relationships presupposes some degree of neutralization of instinctive drives, including aggression. Adaptation to reality generally presupposes neutralization of aggressive energy; however, reality situations “appeal sometimes to the unmitigated expression of aggression” (HARTMANN, 1964, p. 87). Aggression can be expressed in unmodified form under ‘favourable’ circumstances, such as when “psychical counter-forces” (FREUD, 1930) are suspended by a sense of injustice or righteousness.

2.1.6 Coercion and hatred

Normal, primary, nondestructive aggression, in its primitive as well as in its developed form, subsides as soon as the goals that had been striven for are reached (whether these goals are related in the main to objects that are experienced as separate from the self – as independent centres of initiative – or to the self and to self-objects). If, however, the phase-appropriate need for omnipotent control over the self-object had been chronically and traumatically frustrated in childhood, then chronic narcissistic rage, with all its deleterious consequences, will be established. (KOHUT, 1977, p. 121)

Aggression, according to KOHUT (1977), “is, from the beginning, a constituent of the child’s assertiveness, and under normal circumstances it remains alloyed to the assertiveness of the adult’s mature self” (p. 116). Destructiveness, being a nonadaptive manifestation of aggression, emerges as a ‘disintegration product’ when the ‘psychological configuration’ of assertiveness breaks down vis-à-vis ‘empathy failures’ of selfobjects (pp. 114–15). Destructiveness is “the result of the failure of the self-object environment to meet the child’s need for optimal ... empathic responses” (p. 116). Empathy failures result in an injury to the self (narcissistic injury). Destructive, narcissistic rage “is always motivated by an injury to the self” (KOHUT, 1977, p. 116). An individual’s disposition to react with narcissistic rage is predicated on a ‘vulnerable self-structure’. Destructive rage is viewed by self psychology “as a secondary reaction to the traumatic empathy failures of caregivers that have menaced the cohesion of a vulnerable self-structure” (STOLOROW, 1983, p. 288).

KERNBERG (1992) regarded hatred as an affective response to danger felt to be emanating from an object. The aim of hatred is to destroy or devalue (dehumanize) the “object, a specific object of unconscious fantasy, and this object’s conscious derivatives” (p. 23). In milder forms of hatred, the person desires to dominate the object and exert power over it, so that “attacks on the object tend to be self-limited by the object’s submission” (KERNBERG, 1992, p. 24). The aim of offensive aggression is to induce submission in a challenger; the other’s submission, in turn, allows for the receipt from the other of appeasing signals, which are evolutionarily related to affectionate




Figure 2.3 Signals of approval (and affirmation) are evolutionarily related to signals of appeasement (and submission). Assertiveness can turn into coercion and hatred, all of which are related to offensive aggression and efforts to control resources (in territorial or status disputes with conspecifics)

signals (providing narcissistic sustenance). Aggressively inducing submission is therefore related to coercion of the love object (Figure 2.3). BOWLBY (1973) recognized that angry behaviour “has coercion as its function” (p. 248). Angry coercive behaviour expressed towards a parent or partner “acts to promote, not to disrupt, the bond” (p. 248). Anger is dysfunctional “whenever a person, child or adult, becomes so intensely and/or persistently angry with his partner that the bond between them is weakened, instead of strengthened” (pp. 248–9). Anger becomes hatred “whenever aggressive thoughts or acts cross the narrow boundary between being deterrent and being revengeful” (BOWLBY, 1973, p. 249).⁶

2.2 Appeasement and submission

The majority of fights between members of a species for territory or ranking position are ritualized tests of strength; they rarely have a lethal outcome (LORENZ, 1963). The victor in an agonistic confrontation is usually satisfied with the defeated animal’s retreat (from the disputed territory or contested status). The defeated animal displays appeasement (submissive) gestures to *signal* that it concedes victory to its opponent. Gestures of submission displayed in the course of an agonistic confrontation are innately ‘understood’ by the opponent. Signalling admission of defeat, they inhibit any further attack from the opponent (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Appeasement gestures are ritualized escape behaviours; their purpose is to attain safety. Submission to authority, visually communicated by submissive gestures, can be regarded

⁶ In BALINT’S view, hate and aggression are remnants of archaic object love; they are derivatives of *frustrated* archaic object love. BALINT stated that behind the rage of a narcissistically injured patient lies his love (reviewed in BRANDCHAFT, 1986).

as a derivative of escape behaviour, too (RADO, 1956). Submission is a ritualized escape behaviour that is employed in “social dependency relationships” (pp. 219, 245). Submission to authority would have the same motivational origin as the infant’s cry for help, namely fear prompting escape to safety (RADO, 1956). It is this safety – attained by displaying submissive gestures and witnessing the opponent’s or authority’s pacification (appeasement) – that constitutes the essence of the narcissistic equilibrium we try to maintain by more complex social behaviours or intrapsychic manoeuvres.

Appeasement behaviour, according to MOYNIHAN (1998), refers to “any behavior pattern that reduces an opponent’s tendency to attack” (p. 51). Appeasement gestures often involve the turning away from the victor of the animal’s natural weapon or the presentation to the victor of the animal’s vulnerable part (STORR, 1968). Looking away is an effective signal of submission. Removing the face, eyes, and beak from the view of the opponent may terminate a hostile encounter between birds “by virtually hiding the releasing stimuli” (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 44). Presenting to an opponent a vulnerable part of the body, and thereby exposing it to possible attack, also inhibits the opponent’s aggression. ‘Advertisement of vulnerability’ is a common method (message) used to control conspecific aggression (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 44). Vulnerability is also expressed by making oneself appear small. Lying flat on the belly in front of the victor, as can be seen in marine iguanas, is designed to make the losing animal appear smaller, which, according to EIBL-EIBESFELDT (1970), actively inhibits the opponent’s aggression or removes the releasing stimulus for the opponent’s aggression. By contrast, gestures that enlarge the animal’s physical stature are ritualized displays of aggressive intent that serve to challenge or threaten a conspecific. The submissive gesture of making oneself appear small is “the precise opposite of threatening behaviour” (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 172).

2.2.1 Bonding and familiarity

Appeasement gestures contribute to bond formation by inhibiting intraspecific aggression and the potential thereof. What is more, personal bonds (partner bonds) are in their nature “aggression-inhibiting, appeasing behaviour mechanisms” (p. 133); they evolved on the basis of appeasement gestures (LORENZ, 1963). As stated by STORR (1968), “aggression was antecedent to brotherly love” (p. 35). Bonding behaviour was shown by LORENZ (1963) to be more pronounced in species with notable intraspecific aggression (even when aggressiveness is heightened only under certain conditions or at certain times, such as during breeding seasons). STORR (1968) agreed that “it is only when intense aggressiveness exists between two individuals that love can arise” (p. 36). Bonding takes place between sexual or breeding partners and between parents and offspring. Care-seeking and care-giving gestures inherently inhibit aggression between mother

and offspring, similarly to appeasement gestures exchanged in resource disputes. Familiarity further inhibits aggression between mother and offspring. Nevertheless, "aggression between mother and child is inevitable" (STORR, 1968, p. 41).

In most mammals and birds, the mother's bond with her young is individualized. Mothers recognize their own offspring and "often drive strange youngsters away fiercely" (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 121). Acquaintanceship inhibits the mother's aggression towards her own offspring. The bond between partners in parental care, too, is based on acquaintanceship. In birds, at the beginning of bond formation, courtship ceremonies serve to inhibit aggression. Once the bond has been formed, and partners recognize each other, acquaintanceship takes over the function of inhibiting aggression between partners, so that appeasing behaviours are no longer necessary (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Familiarity also reduces the aversiveness of relatives, peers, and others. We are, as a rule, friendly towards those who are familiar to us. Others' familiarity (a complex contextual stimulus) has the same effect as their appeasement gestures on our innate aggressiveness. The exchange of appeasement gestures is the only way of inhibiting aggression between *unfamiliar* individuals (strangers), but, through the exchange of appeasement gestures, individuals become familiar with each other. Appeasement gestures have the "side effect ... that different individuals become accustomed to one another" (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 47).

Familiarity reduces hostility between territorial rivals; territorial rivals that have become familiar with one another fight less frequently and less vigorously (MOYNIHAN, 1998). Familiarity also reinforces the cohesion in family units, herds, flocks, groups, and dominance hierarchies (p. 14). Familiarity between individuals (based upon individual recognition) is a mechanism that establishes "relatively peaceful social bonds" among members of a group (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 85). The need to be *recognized* (as familiar) and *accepted* (into a bond) may have arisen in evolution insofar as the state of not being recognized or accepted in the company of conspecifics became aversive (and dangerous), while the state of loneliness (of not being in the company of conspecifics) remained aversive, too (and dangerous for other reasons). *Being recognized or accepted instils feelings of safety precisely because it signifies that others' aggressiveness is inhibited.* Trust in another person is a conviction in the absence of the other person's aggressive inclinations towards oneself. Trust, too, instils safety. Sudden loss of trust in a person upon whom one relies generates 'basic insecurity' (STORR, 1968, p. 40).

The perception of cues related to others' aggressive potential or their aggressive readiness is associated with anxiety. Instinctively, the individual overcomes anxiety and attains safety by displaying appeasement gestures and thus inhibiting others' aggressive potential. Others' aggressive potential can be inhibited also contextually, that is, by a complex context that is established and recreated by way of appetitive behaviour. The bond can

be regarded as a context of safety. Attainment of safety is reinforcing, and appetitive behaviour becomes so organized that it repeatedly moves the individual away from an anxiogenic and towards a safe situation, and thereby renews the bond. We form bonds or friendships partly *in order to feel safe* (and partly to satisfy our libidinal needs).

2.2.2 Infantilisms and alloparental behaviour

Appeasement (pacification) of an opponent in a potentially hostile situation can be achieved by displaying gregarious patterns of behaviour (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 100). Appeasement behaviours are often derivatives of infantile behaviours (although infantile behaviours may have originally evolved from more primitive submissive gestures). The mother reacts to signals emitted by her infant (signals advertising the infant's vulnerability) by looking after it. Parental care behaviour is associated with inhibition of aggression. Appeasement rituals capitalize on this mechanism (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Alloinfantile behaviour, which is "reminiscent of the behavior of young animals seeking comfort or protection from a parent", reduces the probability of fighting between bonding partners (and may, at the same time, help soliciting in sexual encounters) (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 48).

Infantile behaviours inhibiting an opponent's aggression include lying on the back.⁷ Begging and mutual feeding are common behaviours among social canines. Dogs and wolves feed other animals in the pack with the prey they catch. Begging behaviour induces this feeding response in a conspecific (or, insofar as domestic dogs are concerned, in a human) (LORENZ, 1973). In wolves and dogs, ritualized behaviour patterns that derived from the young animal's begging for food have an appeasing function. The ritualistic display of begging to be fed arouses a friendly mood in an opponent (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Similarly, a dog can use puppyish behaviour to induce a friendly mood in the opponent. Humans, too, display helplessness, weakness, and infantile behaviours in order to arouse pity in an opponent and thereby curtail or prevent the opponent's aggression (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970).

Alloparental behaviour in gregarious mammals and birds (in which one individual reacts to another, potentially aggressive individual as if it was its own infant) similarly inhibits intraspecific aggression. Allopreening and allogrooming (preening or grooming *another instead of oneself*) in birds and mammals, respectively, are ritualized behaviour patterns that are related to alloparental behaviour. Allopreening and allogrooming, which involve tactile contact, seem to prevent hostile encounters, but cannot be used to curtail an opponent's aggression. Tactile signals "are both particularly risky and perhaps unusually effective in reducing social tensions" (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 98).

⁷ A dog or wolf can break off a fight by rolling on to his back and urinating a little. This ritual replicates the behaviour of "a cub offering itself to its mother to be cleaned" (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 65).

In species with parental care, birds and mammals, all or most of the numerous friendly and gregarious patterns, so often used to control or canalize aggression, seem to be derived from familial reactions. They include joining, following, and helping, at the nest and elsewhere. These patterns can be shown, by extension, to all sorts of potential cooperators, competitors, rivals, opponents. The results include the formation of groups of different sizes ... of different levels of structural complexity ... (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 100)

2.2.3 Smile

The suspicious or surly face is an unmistakable warning which arouses uneasiness in the person approaching – not only because of past experience but because of an innate recognitive reaction situated far deeper within us.

(HASS, 1968, p. 123)

Humans are innately aggressive and possibly aggressive by default, so that being among them is innately aversive and dangerous, as illustrated by developmentally normal stranger anxiety as well as perhaps by paranoia. Normally, this is not apparent to us because of a multitude of appeasement behaviours that are subliminally exchanged in social contexts. Familiarity and appeasement gestures counteract the aversiveness of conspecifics and inhibit their inherent aggressiveness. The smile is an effective appeasement gesture. Smiling powerfully inhibits others' aggressive potential or dissolves their anger ('smile disarms') (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). We depend for our safety on others' friendly expressions (which we induce by our own friendly expressions) as well as on their adherence to common norms (which we foster by our own compliance). It is because of our thorough dependence on others' friendliness that narcissism (the attitudes and behaviours that regulate others' friendliness towards us) plays such a central role in social behaviour and psychopathology.

In our primitive forebears' communities it must have been extremely important to a child to know when it was permissible or inadvisable to approach an adult. The same applied equally to adults encountering strangers. The angry, ill-tempered, sick individual could be dangerous if approached too closely by those who encroached on his private territory. In this context, it was extremely important for man to develop an innate recognition mechanism which would give him suitable warning on sighting such a face. It was just as important for man to develop an appropriate signal for the contrary mood – a sign of approachability. And this ... became further strengthened into a means of inhibiting aggression and actively enlisting fellow feeling.

(HASS, 1968, pp. 130-1)

HASS (1968) spoke of an “instinctive tendency to remain aloof from members of the same species”, a tendency that “constitutes a disruptive factor” in processes of mating and bond formation (p. 121). Human smile, expressing a friendly and accommodating attitude, became “an arrow which pierced these invisible barriers”, fulfilling “the important function of bringing us aggressive creatures closer together” (p. 131). Smiling became “a means of eliciting contact readiness in others and of conveying our own accessibility to contact” (p. 123). By smiling, “we ingratiate ourselves with other people and bind them to us” (p. 131). Civilization “can be said to owe its cohesion to a myriad-and-one such smiles” (HASS, 1968, p. 131).

Smile probably evolved as the ‘antithesis’ (DARWIN), that is, the direct opposite, of threatening expressive movements. This is to say that the facial expression communicating “friendliness and accessibility to contact” evolved to be as dissimilar as possible from the expressive movement signalling an aggressive stance (HASS, 1968, p. 130). Smile, thus, is the opposite of “the human facial expression which conveys ill humour”, the latter being characterized by “a mouth drawn downward at the corners, vertical furrows in the forehead, and a slight jutting of the lips” (p. 130).⁸ Smiling is fundamentally different from laughter, “both in significance and origin” (p. 126). Unlike laughter, smiling does not involve the opening of the mouth or emission of sounds. Both signals, however, possess “a strongly infectious quality” (HASS, 1968, p. 127).

If we encounter a stranger and laugh at him on sight, he will probably interpret it as a sign of derision and disparagement rather than as a greeting. If we smile at him, all misunderstanding is precluded.

(HASS, 1968, p. 127)

2.2.4 Bowing and nodding

Phylogenetic ritualization can be distinguished from ontogenetic and traditional (cultural) ritualization (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Traditional (cultural) ritualization is transmitted in the course of cultural evolution from one generation to the next, impacting on the ontogenesis of behaviour in each generation. Ontogenetic and traditional ritualization plays a particular role in humans. Unlike phylogenetic rituals, ontogenetic and traditional rituals are acquired through learning; however, similarly to phylogenetic ritualization, behaviour patterns that become ritualized in ontogenesis or cultural evolution “are exaggerated in pantomime and accentuated through additional equipment” but also simplified and rhythmically repeated (p. 50). Modifications that original behaviour patterns undergo in the process of

⁸ Smile can be “embarrassed, shamefaced, or nervous”, in which case “the friendship signal is superimposed upon the expression of fear or shame appropriate to the circumstances” (HASS, 1968, p. 128).

ritualization are “designed to make the signal striking and unmistakable” (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 54).

Cultural, ontogenetic, and phylogenetic forms of ritualization are interwoven in the evolution of human appeasement gestures. Appeasement and submissive gestures that are culturally developed often have an innate (phylogenetically evolved) element (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). In humans, bowing is an appeasement gesture; it inhibits another person’s potential aggression (STORR, 1968). It is related to the defeated animal’s diminutive behaviour and its aversion, from the victor, of its offensive weapons. One submits to another person by making oneself appear smaller, which culturally developed not only into bowing but also kneeling or lying flat in front of the ruler (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Bowing, being a gesture of submission, is used in greetings. Greeting behaviours, observed in humans and other species, “are ritualized forms of submission that confirm asymmetries of status between the participants or partners” (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 50). Greetings are usually initiated by subordinate individuals. Formal expressions of status “often obviate the need for actual attacks or fighting” as a means of organizing dominance hierarchies (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 97).

Nodding is a ritualized bowing gesture and signals submission. Nodding is used as a gesture of affirmation and as a greeting gesture. Nodding is more ritualized than bowing or falling to one’s knees (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). The nod is “a curtailed inclination of the head – that is to say, a ritualized appeasement gesture”, whereby ritualization involved not only curtailment but also acceleration and reiteration (HASS, 1968, p. 147).⁹ Nodding means that “one accepts the views, suggestions, or commands of another” (HASS, 1968, p. 147). When nodding towards a speaker, “we are submitting, as listeners, to the ideas of the speaker” (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 169). If the speaker feels unsure of himself, he “will look enquiringly at his friends and wait for a sign of encouragement: a nod or a wink will suffice” (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 177). The speaker feels less anxious because nodding in the audience signals to him that their aggressiveness is inhibited.

We are dependent to an enormous degree upon others for the minute nods of agreement and approval, for signs that friendliness rather than hostility is present, for safety signs.

(SANDLER, 1989a, p. 81)

2.2.5 Greeting

In the “most differing peoples in the world”, greeting takes the form of “a rapid raising and lowering of the eyebrows, accompanied by a smile and

⁹ Correspondingly, our expression for ‘no’ is a “curtailed, accelerated, and reiterated” (i.e., ritualized) movement of aversion (HASS, 1968, p. 147).

often also a nod" (EBIL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 16). Greeting with the eyes is a phylogenetically ritualized expression of pleasant surprise. Phylogenetic ritualization "is often accompanied by the development of special physical structures" (p. 54), of which the eyebrows are an example. EBIL-EIBESFELDT thought that, in our phylogenesis, eyebrows have survived the otherwise widespread loss of facial hair because they evolved into "a means of emphasizing the optical greeting" (HASS, 1968, p. 116). It is not a coincidence that "girls spend so much time on their eyebrows", "painting them and tracing their outlines" (HASS, 1968, p. 116). Although many greetings have an innate basis, greetings are often culturally emphasized in humans (EBIL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Culturally developed greeting rites include the raising of a hand, the touch to the side of one's head, or the shaking of hands. The raising of the open hand in greeting demonstrates peaceful intent and "that one is not holding a weapon in the right hand" (p. 181). Leave taking in humans is also a form of greeting behaviour. When a person walks away from another, he enters a *dangerous situation* (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). The person – when leaving the aggression-inhibiting context of the interaction and turning his back to the other – has to assure himself of the other's peaceful intentions.

In birds, the passing over of nesting material is a common greeting gesture with a clear appeasing function (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). In some species of birds, the sight of a conspecific "releases strong aggressive feelings which can only be appeased by the offer of nesting material" (p. 105). Gifts have a similar function in humans. Gifts and food are offered in greeting to guests in various peoples and cultures (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). While familiarity powerfully inhibits intraspecific aggression, aggression is less inhibited when meeting strangers. The aggression-inhibiting effect of greeting gestures has to be relied on when meeting strangers or people with whom one is less familiar. Humans greet each other after a period of separation, often repeatedly during the day and after only short separations. We feel an urge to greet as soon as "we step out of the anonymous crowd" (p. 167). We greet a stranger "when we enter a shop or a strange house" or "if we meet him alone somewhere out in the open" (p. 167). If we fail to offer greetings in these situations, "we experience an unpleasant feeling of tension" (p. 167). Omission of a greeting releases others' aggression and undermines our safety. Conversely, a greeting "can relax the tension in a situation" (p. 166). The return of a greeting "is generally a guarantee of security" (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 166).

2.2.6 The imaginary plane

Being familiar with the work of LORENZ and TINBERGEN, LACAN (1966) understood that instinctive behaviour patterns are released in response to particular visual images (imagos). Recognition (unconscious, in accordance with a 'mental schema') of a visual image ('imago' or perceptual gestalt) of another member of the species mobilizes a primitive impulse towards that member

of the species (whereby the impulse may be related to attack, territoriality, courtship, or mating). LACAN (1966) assigned the visual image ('*imago*') and the reflexive response to it to a fundamental plane or dimension of behaviour, which he called 'the imaginary' ('the register of the imaginary'). On the imaginary plane, the gestalt provides the stimulus for behaviour. The 'logic' of the imaginary plane is one of acting and being acted upon (LACAN, 1966). The individual is manipulated, in a sense, by an other; and it is through these manipulations that the infant's first attitudes take shape. The power of looking at others or being looked at by others can be ascribed to the power of 'the imaginary'. The imaginary is the seat of primitive 'drives' (or instincts, strictly speaking), such as the libidinal 'drive'. Attunements or communications unfolding on 'the imaginary' plane can be libidinal (referring to the induction, giving, and receipt of care or love) or aggressive-submissive in nature. The cycle of sexual behaviour, too, is centred on the imaginary. By fixing libidinal and other 'drives' (instincts) to visual images (perceptual registrations), the imaginary establishes the initial conditions under which objects in the world can be predictably experienced. Our relation to 'the other' (another individual) is ultimately rooted in 'the imaginary' plane (LACAN, 1966).

2.2.7 Interaction with context and emotion

In higher social animals, including humans, "the great majority of expressive actions and gestures reflect an urge to threaten or appease" (LORENZ, 1973, p. 213). An individual's aggressive display in the *context* of evidence for his aggressive potential (related to dominance status) automatically induces a disposition towards submissive displays (an urge to appease) in the opponent; and displays of submission, in turn, tend to inhibit aggressive displays in those who are the recipient of submissive signals. Expressive actions and gestures not only reflect one's own mood but also tend to induce an emotional state in the other, which, in turn, controls the likelihood of the other's expressive actions and gestures. Contextual factors, too, control emotional responses and hence the disposition to emit certain gestures. In conversations, we automatically assume postures of submission when talking to somebody in authority, while our conversation partner unknowingly emits signals of dominance (reviewed in FERGUSON & BARGH, 2004).

Many social behaviours in humans are automatically triggered by the perception of others' actions (FERGUSON & BARGH, 2004). Insofar as others' actions have an innate component, the triggering involves activation of an innate releasing mechanism (LORENZ). In a conversation, verbal and gestural expressions are elicited *more or less* automatically by perception of the other's linguistic and affective motor patterns. Perception of the other's affective or linguistic expressions may elicit one's affective or linguistic expressions *less* automatically if they trigger instead an emotional response (an evolutionary derivative perhaps of the instinctual response), which, in




Figure 2.4 Affective interaction with mutual induction of expressions and emotions

turn, controls acquired (and cortically represented) components of one's affective or linguistic expressions. Individuals involved in a conversation 'prime' each others' linguistic representations, bringing them close to the threshold at which they produce the encoded motor pattern, thus making it *likely* that "each partner generates his utterances on the basis of what he has just heard from the other" (GARROD & PICKERING, 2004, p. 9). The priming effect – the increase in probability of the release of culturally and ontogenetically ritualized linguistic and affective motor patterns (the disposition towards the display of these patterns) – is a function of the emotional state within which the conversation takes place (Figure 2.4).

Although drives, in the sense of affective states, need to be distinguished from instincts, in the sense of innate motor patterns (LORENZ), affects and instincts are nevertheless likely to be related (and hence it is not insensible to speak of 'instinctual drives'). Affects, as understood by KERNBERG (1996), "always include a cognitive component, a subjective experience of a highly pleasurable or unpleasurable nature, neurovegetative discharge phenomena, psychomotor activation, and, very crucially, a distinctive pattern of facial expression" (p. 127). Patterns of facial expression associated with affects originally served "a communicative function directed to the caregiver" (KERNBERG, 1996, p. 127). Affective states (drives) and affective expressions (ritualized instinctive displays) may well have coevolved from unritualized instinctive motor patterns. Unritualized instincts may have become ritualized displays (with a communicative function) once they could be partially inhibited (by a contradictory instinct or action tendency). Partial inhibition (implicit in so-called intention movements) helped to make the expression of instinctive patterns conditional on the context (a prerequisite for their effective communicative function), while the state of tension concomitant to partial neurovegetative and psychomotor activation (the partial activation of neurovegetative and general psychomotor components of instincts) evolved into affective or drive states. With further evolution, the conditionality of instinct inhibition upon context (sensitivity to context) could have combined with neurovegetative discharge phenomena to

give rise to emotional feelings (subjective experience of a pleasurable or unpleasurable nature).

2.3 Care seeking and giving

'Instinctual responses', according to BOWLBY (1958), denote observable patterns of behaviour, patterns that often have the function of safeguarding the individual or mediating reproduction. These instinctual responses are often directed towards one particular individual ('monotropy'). Mating responses, for instance, tend to be directed towards a particular member of the opposite sex. The mother figure plays an integrative function for the child's instinctual responses. The repertoire of 'positively directed mother-oriented instinctual responses' (sucking, clinging, following, crying, smiling) ensures that the infant evokes maternal care and remains in close proximity to the mother (BOWLBY, 1958). BOWLBY (1958) proposed that each of the child's mother-oriented instinctual responses (sucking, clinging, following, crying, smiling) makes a distinct contribution to the formation of the child's tie to his mother. Component instinctual responses become integrated into 'attachment behaviour' in the course of the first year of life. For an emotional attachment to form, the mother has to permit the child to display clinging and following behaviours towards her. Rejection of clinging and following causes emotional and psychological disturbances (BOWLBY, 1958).

Libido (love) is, as FAIRBAIRN (1952) emphasized, object-seeking rather than pleasure-seeking. The real libidinal aim is not pleasure, as FREUD had proposed, but to establish satisfactory relationships with objects. Libidinal tendencies urge the individual to *make emotional contact* with others (FAIRBAIRN, 1952). Expressions of libido can be considered as caring or care-giving behaviours, but they also provide narcissistic nourishment, whereas care-seeking behaviours express narcissistic needs. Care-seeking and care-giving displays coevolved (BOWLBY, 1977). They act as releasing stimuli for each other and are linked in processes of 'affective attunement' (FELDMAN et al., 1999) or 'mutual cueing' (MAHLER, 1967, 1968).

Care-seeking and care-giving interactions (affectionate interactions) are both soothing and rewarding (pleasurable); they assuage anxiety and gratify narcissistic needs. Narcissistic supplies in the form of others' caring and affectionate signals are needed in order to maintain self-esteem (FENICHEL, 1946). Failure to elicit care-giving responses from an other is injurious to self-esteem. If care-seeking behaviour fails, that is, if the care-seeker fails to induce care-giving or affectionate behaviour in the partner, then pain or anxiety arises, which, in turn, may lead to a switch to anxious care-seeking behaviour ('attention-seeking behaviour') (MCCLUSKEY, 2002). The pain or distress experienced when care-seeking behaviour fails (narcissistic pain) is likely related to infantile separation distress. Failure to effectively solicit care or 'attention' promotes 'self-defensive' behaviours and interactions (MCCLUSKEY, 2002).

If the careseeker fails to have his or her careseeking needs met, the behavioral patterns that accompany careseeking cannot shut down and the system for careseeking is infiltrated by the activation of the personal defense system. In this way careseeking is then expressed by whatever behaviors have been found to evoke in the caregiver responses that assuage the pain of not reaching careseeking goals.

(McCLUSKEY, 2002, p. 133)

Narcissistic needs “compel the child to ask for affection” (FENICHEL, 1946, p. 41). The child may solicit and procure essential narcissistic supplies, that is, supplies of affection and approval, by way of exhibitionistic behaviours or “by force”; or he may seek to attain them “by submissiveness and demonstration of suffering”¹⁰ (FENICHEL, 1946, p. 41). The feeling state of wellbeing or ‘safety’ is a state of narcissistic balance, which the individual strives to attain in compliance with external standards, often through situationally *appropriate* forms of attention-seeking or exhibitionistic behaviour. The state of well-being or safety is “the polar opposite of feelings of pain, anxiety, or discomfort” (JOFFE & SANDLER, 1965, p. 157), that is, the opposite of feelings that may arise in consequence of failed care-seeking behaviour, failures that are often predicated on parental or wider social attitudes towards *inappropriate* ‘drive’ satisfaction, including inappropriate exhibitionistic displays and inappropriate attention-seeking behaviours. It is the maintenance of this feeling state of wellbeing or safety with which the ego is ultimately concerned and for which it enlists the help of the superego (JOFFE & SANDLER, 1965).

2.3.1 Face-to-face interactions

Newborns are predisposed to express certain emotional states (affects) by facial expressions, vocalizations, and gestures (IZARD, 1994). These expressions evoke complimentary affective responses from the mother. Short face-to-face interactions between mother and infant emerge when the infant is approximately two months of age. During face-to-face interactions, infant and mother attune to each other’s affective expressions, that is, they synchronize their affective behaviour (FELDMAN et al., 1999). Mutually attuned, synchronized face-to-face interactions have a soothing effect. Asynchrony in reciprocal facial communication causes the infant to experience distress. Synchrony will be disrupted at times, and the infant will be in distress; however, the mother usually reattunes her affective expressions to allow the infant to recover from distress (FELDMAN et al., 1999). Face-to-face interactions have a soothing effect, perhaps insofar as they reaffirm contact and

¹⁰ This is also the mechanism of masochism.

safety. The infant synchronizes his affective expressions with his mother's "in order for him to feel secure" (SANDLER, 1989a, p. 81).

Similarly, macaque infants remain in close physical contact and establish frequent face-to-face interactions (mostly lip-smacking) with their mothers in the first few postnatal weeks (reviewed in MACHADO & BACHEVALIER, 2003). In humans, smiling plays a particular role in face-to-face interactions between mother and infant. It is clear that "the infant is equipped innately with the capacity for a smiling response, a capacity that is evoked by a set of key releaser stimulus configurations, such as the human face gestalt, which become effective at certain phases of development" (SCHECTER, 1973, p. 22). For the mother, eye-to-eye contact with her infant and perception of his smile are innately rewarding (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970).

KOHUT recognized the exhibitionistic (*attention-seeking*) nature of the child's expressions towards his mother. The child's exhibitionism, much as the adult's ambitiousness, expresses the need to be seen, to be acknowledged and accepted, and thus to feel safe (and, from evolutionary point of view, to be safe). Care-seeking displays (related to separation cries), aiming to attract the mother's *attention*, find expression in the context of anxiety (the polar opposite of safety). On the other hand, affective exchange, especially *affectionate* interaction, often develops spontaneously on the background of safety; safety may even be a precondition for affectionate interaction. Thus, the child's or adult's narcissistic needs (expressed by way of attention-seeking and exhibitionistic behaviours) may have to be satisfied – and safety may have to be attained – before his libidinal needs can be expressed (by way of affectionate or care-giving behaviours, which would then induce reciprocal affectionate and care-giving responses from the other).

2.3.2 Infantile cries

As already pointed out, parental (care-giving) behaviour has evolved to be complementary to the child's care-seeking behaviour (BOWLBY, 1977). The 'parental instinct', according to MCDUGALL (1924), is evoked by distress cries of the young; but it can also be evoked by the sight of any young and helpless creature. Emission by the infant of the cry of distress is an expression of what MCDUGALL (1924) called the 'instinct of appeal'. Many young mammals or birds emit cries when they have lost contact with their mother or fallen out of their nest. A newborn child frequently cries and only "calms down when it is caressed, picked up or spoken to" (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 206). Infants tend to cry when they are put down, not when they are carried.

This is a natural and probably innate reaction which has its roots in our remote past. If the child of primitive man lost contact with its mother, it was exposed to attack by predators. Cries, which functioned as a request to the mother to reestablish contact, were thus of species-preserving importance.

(HASS, 1968, p. 164)

Crying behaviour serves the function of bringing the mother to the infant's side. Presence of the mother provides the 'terminating stimulus' for the infant's crying (BOWLBY, 1958).¹¹ In primate infants, being prevented from clinging to the mother provokes the crying response. In humans, crying behaviour, but not clinging or following, is effective at birth, consistent with the greater extent to which human infants are dependent on the exertions of their mother (BOWLBY, 1958). Smiling is present in human infants when they are six weeks old. The instinctual smiling response, which is elicited by perception of a face gestalt, acts as another powerful releaser for maternal behaviour, especially for maternal affection (love). Thus, infantile crying and smiling influence maternal behaviour; they act as social releasers for instinctual responses in the mother (BOWLBY, 1958).

2.3.3 Distance-decreasing and contacting behaviours

Mammals are "equipped with appetitive behaviour for restoring contact – to begin with by crying out and later through active seeking" (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 205). The mother is the 'goal-in-flight' for the infant (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). The appetitive urge to establish contact with conspecifics persists into adulthood in many species. In many species of mammals and birds, animals readily approach, join, and follow their conspecifics (MOYNIHAN, 1998). These movements are called friendly, gregarious, affiliative, or 'distance-decreasing'. Joining and following patterns in gregarious mammals and birds are evolutionary extensions of familial reactions between parents and offspring. Friendly or gregarious patterns of behaviour are derived from patterns preexisting within the behavioural repertoire of the species, "patterns that were originally evolved to regulate and encourage family (possibly including sexual) relations" (MOYNIHAN, 1998, p. 89).

Following behaviour that is focused on a parent has the function of keeping the infant in close proximity to the parent. The same can be said about clinging behaviour. While infants can be observed to follow their mother in a great variety of species of mammals and birds, clinging behaviour is virtually confined to primates (BOWLBY, 1958). Primate infants cling with hands and feet to their mother's belly or back. Infants often cling to their mother both day and night during the early weeks of their life. Although the clinging response is predominantly directed towards the mother, it can be directed, according to BOWLBY (1958), towards 'transitional objects' (WINNICOTT, 1953). BOWLBY (1958) cited evidence suggesting that even chimpanzee infants cling to transitional objects, objects that are plainly identified with an absent parent. In humans, the clinging response appears to

¹¹ Infants readily cry when they experience cold, hunger, fear, or loneliness. The infant's crying not only brings about maternal presence but also elicits maternal aid; and if the infant's hunger has brought forth his crying, then the maternal feeding response may act as the 'terminating stimulus' for the crying (BOWLBY, 1958).

have become ritualized into an intention movement that signals the intention to cling to the parent (arm extensions towards the parent) and that (acting as a social releaser) has the effect of activating the parental response of picking up the infant (BOWLBY, 1958).

Many innately friendly social interactions between humans are derived from the seeking and granting of contact in interactions between mother and infant. Extending the hand or placing it on another person's outstretched hand are gestures of seeking and granting contact, respectively, gestures that are derived from parent–infant interactions (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Importantly, seeking and granting contact have the function of seeking and granting reassurance, respectively. Other gestures of granting contact are patting and embracing. The embrace, originally a protective action on part of the mother towards her infant, has been ritualized into a social gesture of *comforting* and greeting (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970).

Nonhuman primates have a fully developed clinging response at birth and develop a following response later (BOWLBY, 1958). In humans, neither the clinging response nor the following response are effective at birth. The clinging response is present in rudimentary form from the earliest days and remains ineffective in the early months of life. Once the clinging response has become effective, infants cling to their mother with great tenacity at times of anxiety or after a separation experience. The clinging response is at its peak in the second year of life. Human infants follow their mother as soon as they have become mobile.¹² The zenith, with regard to the intensity of the following response, is reached in the period of 18 to 30 months of age (BOWLBY, 1958).

2.3.4 Infantile appeals to care

The infant's cries attract the mother, but may not always in themselves release the mother's cherishing behaviour. There are behaviours displayed by the young animal that are designed to elicit the mother's caring behaviour. In mammals and birds, "the young of the species transmit signals which release cherishing behaviour" in their parents, whereby the parents' response to their infant is "motivated by the parental care drive" (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 120). The infant's display of helplessness is one of the factors that evokes the 'parental instinct' in the mother (MCDUGALL, 1924).

The cherishing behaviour patterns of parental care have their natural counterpart in the signals which release them, which have been taken over into the repertoire of contact-making and aggression-inhibiting behaviour patterns as 'infantile appeals'.

(EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 148)

¹² Infants are more likely to remain within their mothers' sight or earshot when they are tired, hungry, in pain, or anxious (BOWLBY, 1958).

Adult animals display infantile behaviour patterns whenever the aim is appeasement or to release cherishing behaviour in a conspecific (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, p. 113). Humans who seek to elicit affectionate behaviour “relapse quite involuntarily into the role of a small child” (p. 148). Culturally or phylogenetically ritualized displays of helplessness release in others the impulse to cherish the person displaying these patterns, much as an infant’s display of helplessness releases the mother’s care-giving behaviour. Care-seeking signals (infantilisms) and care-giving (cherishing) behaviours not only unite parents with their offspring but are also “excellently suited to reinforcing the bond between adults” (p. 124). Owing to their aggression-inhibiting effects, care-seeking and care-giving behaviours are innately understood as friendly (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970).

2.3.5 Bonding and courtship

Distance-decreasing and contact-seeking behaviours need to be somewhat distinguished from attachment behaviour. Attachment is defined ethologically as a set of behaviours that help to maintain contact with a *specific* individual (BOWLBY, 1973; SCHECTER, 1978). Parent and infant are equipped with behavioural modes that enable the formation of a bond; contact seeking is one of them. According to EIBL-EIBESFELDT (1970), appetitive behaviour for contact “is the true root of the bond between mother and child” (p. 205). Contact-seeking behaviour is an attachment behaviour when it is directed at the attachment object. Attachment behaviours also include affectionate displays towards the attachment object. Affectionate interactions are rewarding (pleasurable) and may thus serve to reinforce appetitive mechanisms involved in bond formation. The bond between parent and infant is formed and strengthened in processes of mutual smiling and playful interaction. These early reciprocal interactions are important precursors of all human communication (SCHECTER, 1978).

Most bond-establishing rites are derived from the field of parental care. In courtship, animals display phylogenetically ritualized behaviour patterns that are modified infantilisms or actions derived from parental behaviour, especially parental cherishing behaviour (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Parental behaviour includes protective actions towards the infant, such as fetching back the infant if it goes too far away during its explorative forays. Coy behaviour is ritualized flight behaviour signalling an invitation to pursuit in mating foreplay (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Young animals use contact calls to call their mothers; and adults in some species emit the contact call of the young when pursuing a prospective partner. Begging behaviour of the young animal elicits a feeding response from its parents. Begging behaviours of young animals have, in many species of birds, evolved into ritualized appeasement gestures and expressions of affection. Many courtship behaviours in birds are derived from the begging of the young animal (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970).

Ritualized feeding behaviour, too, has an appeasing and bond-strengthening effect. Kissing is a ritualized feeding gesture¹³ that is used by humans and chimpanzees during courtship or when greeting each other (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970). Offerings of food or drink are also ritualized feeding behaviours. Sharing food and eating together form part of many bond-forming cultural rituals. Social grooming is another affiliative behaviour derived from parental care. Caressing is a ritualized derivative of the mother's grooming of her infant. Like ritualized feeding behaviour, social grooming has an appeasing and bond-strengthening effect (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970).

Even the individualized relationship – love – evolved primarily from the parental care relationship. ... The roots of love are not in sexuality, although love makes use of it for the secondary strengthening of the bond.
(EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970, pp. 124–5)

2.3.6 Exhibitionism

Exhibitionistic behaviour seeks to gratify narcissistic needs, given that exhibitionism is “always connected with an increase in self-esteem, anticipated or actually gained through the fact that others look at the subject” (FENICHEL, 1946, p. 72). Infantile exhibitionism and its developmental derivatives play an important role in the maintenance of narcissistic homeostasis (as reflected in self-esteem and feelings of ‘safety’ [SANDLER, 1960a]). Exhibitionistic means of attracting others’ positive attention (and, thereby, of regulating the narcissistic homeostasis) have to be reality-syntonic (and hence egosyntonic). This is to say that exhibitionistic impulses (seeking to gratify narcissistic needs, i.e., needs for safety) have to be sublimated. Actors, for instance, are “attempting to sublimate their exhibitionistic impulses in their work” (JOFFE & SANDLER, 1967, p. 181), whereby sublimation, an adaptive ego activity (HARTMANN), ensures that the safety-enhancing effect of being in the focus of others’ attention is not offset by greater vulnerability of becoming the target of others’ aggression (and ridicule), a vulnerability that is signalled to the ego (self) by feelings of anxiety (and shame). Schizoid individuals engage in artistic activities as a way of expressing their exhibitionism without exposing themselves directly to potentially dangerous social contact (FAIRBAIRN, 1952).

Exhibitionism is allied with vanity (ADLER, 1927). Vanity can be seen “in those people who dress conspicuously, or with self-importance, who deck themselves out for a brave show, in the same way that primitive peoples made an exhibition of themselves by wearing an especially long feather in their hair when they have reached a certain degree of pride and honour” (p. 172). Body ornaments and tattoos are exhibitionistic expressions of

¹³ In anthropoid apes (gorilla, chimpanzee, orang-utan) and some human cultures, mothers feed their children with premasticated food (EIBL-EIBESFELDT, 1970).

vanity. People's striving to make an impression can be shameless, as ADLER (1927) pointed out (p. 172), and, indeed, shame is the counterpart and inhibitor of exhibitionism.

Exhibitionistic impulses, with which humans are endowed, can be discharged spontaneously or are used in the service of defence ("the question of defensive exhibitionism versus instinctual exhibitionism" [SANDLER, 1985, p. 348]). Children age-appropriately perform actions of 'showing off' or clowning in order to attract attention (REDDY, 2003). Positive attention (communicating interest or praise), if it can be attracted, is innately rewarding (SCHECTER, 1973). Inappropriate exhibitionism, borne out of a heightened need for attention and reassurance, often has the opposite effect, attracting negative attention and further increasing anxiety. SANDLER (1985) pointed out that "children become exhibitionistic when they lose the parent's attention (when a sibling arrives, for example)" (p. 348). Clowning or joking then constitute defensive manoeuvres "directed toward restoring self-esteem" (p. 105). In adults, defensive exhibitionism is linked to disturbances of narcissism (SANDLER, 1985, p. 105). Exhibitionism, when used defensively, is "a technique for gaining admiration and praise in order to do away with underlying feelings of unworthiness, inadequacy, or guilt" (JOFFE & SANDLER, 1967, p. 181).

Exhibitionism is often not evident as such; in sublimated forms, it underpins a great deal of adaptive social behaviour, as already pointed out. Moreover, in the normal personality, exhibitionistic means for regulating safety are in a balance with object love. Libidinal investment in objects (establishment of love relationships) provides an alternative way of securing narcissistic supplies, one that lowers the individual's reliance on exhibitionistic techniques. FENICHEL (1946) pointed out that the capacity for object love makes available a "higher, postnarcissistic type of self-respect" (p. 85).

2.3.7 Social feeling

ADLER (1927) proposed that 'social feeling', that is, the ability to feel affectionate towards another human being, is inborn and developmentally "unfolds in an early search for affection" (p. 46). 'Social feeling' changes and broadens in development, "until it touches not only on the members of the immediate family, but also the extended family, the nation and finally, the whole of humanity" (p. 46). Social feeling is what "binds humanity together" (p. 156).¹⁴ ADLER (1927) thought that "cheerful temperament, when not taken to extremes, is an indicator of a highly developed social feeling" (p. 203). Laughter is associated with cheerful temperament and strengthens "the natural bond that links all human beings", although the "laughter of those who find humour in other people's misfortune" is an

¹⁴ ADLER's concept of 'social feeling' or 'social interest' is thus closely related to FREUD'S concept of libido.

aggressive one (p. 203). Social feeling underlies our tendency to take interest in others, to be caring towards them. Our willingness to respond to others' care-seeking behaviour (and our capacity to be influenced to this effect) can be regarded as evidence for "natural social feeling" (p. 61). Caring gestures towards others and attendance to their wellbeing are evoked by signs of their helplessness or sickness; "sickness of fellow human beings calls on the social feeling of every normal person" (p. 165); "sickness is a danger sign that says, "Take care!" (p. 166). Our "willingness to give, serve, or help, brings with it a certain compensation and psychological harmony" (ADLER, 1927, p. 172).¹⁵

¹⁵ It is likely that commitment to and genuine interest in fellow human beings fosters the sense of connectedness with the social surround (and thus increases inner harmony and the sense of safety). Others' gratitude has an additional self-esteem-enhancing effect, much as libidinal (as opposed to narcissistic) investment in objects provides a 'postnarcissistic' source of self-esteem (FENICHEL).